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3 Abstract 
This  thesis  seeks  to  examine  the  deregulation  of  airline  employment  within  Europe, 
by  relating  that  change  to  the  US  experience.  A  historical/political  economy  approach 
is  adopted  which  locates  the  process  of  deregulation  within  a  context  of  changing 
product  market  conditions,  bargaining  power  and  regulatory  influence.  The  regulated 
regime  where  labour  conditions  were  protected  is  contrasted  with  one  in  which  labour 
has  come  under  pressure  to  concede  premium  terms  and  conditions.  Analysis  of 
labour  costs  and  productivity  assume  that  these  terms  and  conditions  will  simply 
evaporate  under  the  pressure  of  competition  and  privatisation.  The  thesis  provides 
evidence  that  this  may  not  be  the  case.  It  is  argued  that  failure  to  examine  employee 
concerns  and  perceptions  underestimates  employee  responses,  and  overestimates  the 
power  of  airline  management,  given  the  considerable  bargaining  power  of  key  labour 
groups.  Airline  workers,  especially  those  in  large  and  successful,  formerly  state 
owned  carriers,  have  expectations  of  wages  and  conditions  based  upon  the  regulated 
era.  This  regulatory  overhang  is  examined  in  a  detailed  questionnaire  of  British 
Airways  as  a  major  European  carrier,  previously  state  owned,  but  now  privatised.  A 
number  of  models  of  labour  market  deregulation  and  case  studies  are  introduced  to 
analyse  the  nature  and  extent  of  these  deep  seated  changes  and  their  implications  for 
labour,  management  and  the  state. 
4 Introduction 
US  and  European  Airline  Deregulation  and  Employment:  An  Emerging 
Comparison 
In  the  summer  of  1997,  British  Airways'  (BA)  cabin  crew  engaged  in  a  short  bitter 
strike against  restructuring  proposals  (Blyton  et  al  1998).  In  the  spring  of  that  year, 
the  airline  recruited  a  temporary  workforce  and  trained  them  in  ground  handling 
techniques  at  an  air  force  base  in  Oxfordshire.  (Ibid.  )  This  was  part  of  a  contingency 
plan  to  defeat  similar  strike  action  then  being  contemplated  by  ground  staff.  In  July  of 
the  previous  year,  pilots  at  British  Airways  had  forced  management  to  back  down  on 
restructuring  proposals  with  the  threat  of  strike  action.  (Financial  Times  3.7.1998).  In 
September  1998  pilots  at  the  US  carrier  Northwest  struck  and  were  locked  out  over  a 
new  pay  contract.  (Financial  Times  7.9.1998).  In  Europe,  Air  France  employees,  who 
in  the  autumn  of  1994  had  blocked  the  runways  of  Orly  airport  in  protest  at  job  and 
wage  cuts,  continued  to  take  industrial  action.  With  the  1998  soccer  World  Cup  about 
to  take  place  in  France,  pilots  at  the  state  airline  took  industrial  action  against 
restructuring  proposals.  This  was  despite  the  presence  of  a  new  management  regime 
and  an  acceptance  of  core  restructuring  proposals.  (Gill  1998:  11.  )  In  the  summer  of 
1999  pilots  at  the  low  cost  carrier  Virgin  Express  launched  strike  action  against 
attempts  to  relocate  them  from  Belgium  to  Ireland.  (Jones  1999:  8.  )  In  many  other 
airlines,  conflict  and  strife  have  been  endemic. 
It  would  be  easy  to  see  these  strikes  and  disputes  as  the  growing  pains  of 
restructuring,  and  as  a  short-lived  response  to  the  deregulation  of  the  airline  industry. 
However  the  range  of  countries  involved,  and  the  fact  that  they  are  all  at  different 
stages  of  the  deregulation  process  with  differing  product  and  labour  market 
environments,  suggests  something  deeper  than  knee-jerk  union  responses. 
This  thesis  analyses  the  process  of  restructuring  which  took  place  in  the  wake  of 
deregulation.  In  doing  so  it  looks  beyond  the  fixation  with  costs  and  productivity, 
which  has  preoccupied  the  research  effort  in  airline  employment.  This  approach  aims 
5 to  explain  the  nature  of  regulatory  change,  management  strategy  and  labour  response 
to  airline  restructuring.  The  thesis  will  locate  these  changes  within  a  broader  product, 
labour  and  regulatory  environment,  allowing  us  to  understand  why  the  pace  and 
tempo  of  change  varied  within  different  airlines  and  in  different  national  contexts. 
It  is  the  central  contention  of  this  thesis  that  deregulation  has  fundamentally  altered 
the  product  market,  with  competition,  market  entry  and  some  renegotiation  of  the 
regulatory  environment.  Nevertheless,  deregulation  has  taken  much  longer  to  alter  the 
labour  market.  Traditionally  airline  jobs  have  been  associated  with  higher  pay  and 
conditions  than  the  rest  of  the  economy,  fostering  a  determination  amongst  airline 
workers  to  retain  these  premia  even  in  a  deregulated  environment.  This  "regulatory 
overhang"  which  pertains  across  the  industry,  as  this  thesis  will  demonstrate,  has 
proved  difficult  to  undermine.  This  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  workers  will  be  able  to 
resist  the  onslaught  on  wages  and  conditions  indefinitely,  but  rather  the  process  will 
take  time.  For  the  full  impact  of  deregulation  on  wages  and  employment  in  the  airline 
industry  to  occur  requires  a  fusion  of  regulatory  and  product  market  change;  a  process 
which,  though  already  emerging,  is  a  gradual  one  nonetheless.  Product  market  and 
regulatory  change  push  airlines  onto  a  path  of  restructuring,  giving  rise  to  an 
increasingly  competitive  industry.  The  need  to  service  different  markets  and  routes 
and  the  need  to  compete  in  a  wide  range  of  segmented  markets  is  promoting  a 
globalised  airline  labour  market.  This  globalised  airline  labour  market  though  still  in  a 
putative  stage,  has  led  to  a  downward  pressure  on  wages  and  conditions. 
The  episodes  of  restructuring  and  conflict  introduced  in  page  one  above  provide  a 
flavour  of  that  process  in  microcosm.  In  each  case  management  sought  to  introduce 
cost  reductions  in  anticipation  of  an  increasingly  threatening  competitive 
environment.  At  British  Airways,  for  example,  the  carrier  attempted  to  restructure  the 
pay  and  conditions  of  cabin  personnel.  They  tried  to  do  this  by  reforming  the  internal 
cabin  crew  labour  including  the  consolidation  of  overtime,  allowances,  a  merit  based 
promotion  system  and  lower  entry-level  wages.  '  But  cabin  crew  employees  resisted 
and  members  of  the  main  cabin  crew  union  either  took  strike  action  or,  fearing 
management  retaliation,  reported  sick.  In  the  case  of  ground  handling  workers, 
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6 management  wanted  a  dramatically  lower  cost  structure  for  the  Heathrow  operation, 
which  has  been  characterised  by  high  levels  of  overtime  and  low  productivity.  Again 
it  wanted  to  restructure  allowances  and  pay  and  introduce  two  tier  wage  rates.  This 
time  the  members  concerned  were  so  fearful  of  the  threat  of  outsourcing  they 
accepted  instead  a  long  term  pay  freeze.  Other  ground  handling  workers  accepted  the 
pay  restructuring  and  two  tier  wage  rates. 
In  the  US  case,  pilots  at  Northwest,  many  of  whom  have  conceded  wage  reductions  of 
up  to  30  per  cent  in  the  past  five  years,  sought  to  restore  their  position,  in  a  buoyant 
domestic  market,  whilst  attempting  to  close  the  gap  between  established  and  new 
entrant  workers.  2  (Northwest  Airlines  5.9.1998.  )  In  France,  pilots  were  trying  to 
restore  the  two  tier  pay  deals  and  wage  freezes  they  conceded  under  less  auspicious 
times,  and  using  the  massive  public  spectacle  of  the  1998  World  Cup  to  do  so. 
(Moxon  1998;  25.  )  In  the  UK,  nominally  less  regulated  UK  BA  pilots  have  been  able 
to  resist  restructuring  and  have  even  managed  to  recoup  ground  conceded  in  an  earlier 
round  of  restructuring.  In  the  case  of  Virgin  Express,  the  Belgian  pilots  objected  to  the 
decision  of  the  carrier  to  relocate  them  to  Dublin  in  order  to  escape  Belgium's  high 
non-wage  costs. 
The  cases  above  demonstrate  three  principal  issues  about  the  effects  of  deregulation 
on  employment.  Firstly,  the  differing  experience  of  pilots,  cabin  crew  and  ground 
workers  provide  evidence  on  the  varied  experience  of  different  occupational  groups 
during  restructuring.  Broadly,  general  workers  have  suffered  and  found  their  premium 
wages  and  conditions  most  under  threat,  whilst  strong  groups  such  as  pilots  have  been 
relatively  unscathed.  Secondly,  they  indicate  the  extent  to  which  restructuring  is 
contested  at  all  levels  of  the  industry  from  national  flag  carriers  to  smaller  low  cost 
operators.  However  these  superficial  similarities  mask clear  variations  in.  response 
according  to  the  country  and  labour  regulation  environment  concerned. 
This  is  clear  in  the  disputes  we  have  already  discussed.  In  all  of  these  cases,  workers 
were  opposing  in  whole,  or  in  part,  the  impact  of  deregulation  on  their  terms  and 
conditions.  Yet  all  are  are  experiencing  different  stages  of  the  process.  In  the  UK, 
2  Northwest  Airlines  Web  page  5.9.98 
7 British  Airways,  which  has  been  privatised  since  the  late  1980s,  is  responding  to  new 
regulatory  and  product  market  environment  of  the  1990s  to  guarantee  future  survival 
in  an  increasingly  competitive  airline  industry.  In  doing  so  it  faces  a  workforce  used 
to  a  particular  set  of  wage  and  employment  conditions,  defined  in  the  thesis  of 
regulatory  overhang.  There  is  a  similar  picture  in  France,  in  the  USA  and  in  Belgium. 
Airline  workers  are  facing  an  increasingly  merciless  drive  to  improve  cost 
competitiveness.  For  reasons  analysed  in  chapter  I  and  subsequently,  labour  costs 
within  the  industry  are  the  most  readily  variable  aspect  of  that  cost  base. 
In  order  to  understand  and  contextualise  these  issues,  and  to  make  sense  of  the 
emerging  regulatory  environment  and  labour's  response  to  it,  it  is  necessary  not  to 
analyse  regulation  and  deregulation  as  binary  opposites.  Rather,  it  is  necessary  to  see 
the  process  as  a  continuum,  which  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  its  effect  upon  the 
labour  market  and  the  bargaining  power  and  stance  of  labour  and  capital.  Despite 
deregulation,  workers,  especially  those  in  highly  skilled  industry  specific  categories 
such  as  pilots  and  mechanics,  have  maintained  their  bargaining  threat  given  the 
disruptive  capacity  which  they  possess.  Until  the  nature  of  the  regulatory  regime 
changes  to  such  an  extent  that  the  balance  of  power  is  dramatically  altered,  then 
labour  will  continue  to  be  effective  in  resisting  restructuring.  Nevertheless,  the 
process  by  which  this  takes  place  is  tortuous  and  complex.  It  is  argued  that  a  changing 
form  of  regulation  in  the  shape  of  globalisation,  in  the  form  of  major  alliances, 
provides  that  background.  Within  these  groupings,  and  with  the  aid  of  a  tolerant 
regulatory  structure  at  national,  regional  and  supranational  levels,  airlines  can,  and  do, 
develop  the  capacities  to  undermine  the  structure  of  labour  market  regulation  and 
bargaining  power  which  have  existed  since  regulation. 
Outline  of  the  Thesis  Chapters 
In  order  to  locate  the  approach  of  the  thesis  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  nature  of 
labour  market  regulation  and  the  effects  which  changing  regulatory  regimes  can  have 
on  labour.  The  first  chapter  looks  at  the  Political  Economy  of  Restructuring  in 
Regulated  and  Privatised  Industries  in  order  to  provide  the  backdrop  to  the  rest  of 
the  study.  The  chapter  also  looks  at  how  economic  criticisms  of  regulation  and  state 
ownership  (that  it  leads  to  rent  seeking  by  powerful  monopoly  unions)  have  driven  the 
8 debate  around  employment  restructuring.  Yet  there  has  been  little  attempt  to  move 
beyond  these  essentially  theoretical  analyses  of  the  regulated  labour  market.  This 
chapter  discusses  the  theoretical  approach  to  the  labour  market  aspects  of  regulation 
and  deregulation.  The  thesis  then  argues  that  in  many  cases  the  process  of 
deregulation  and  privatisation  becomes  a  process  of  labour  market  deregulation  and 
the  privatisation  and  commercialisation  of  employment  relationships.  Evidence  from  a 
number  of  industries  is  used  to  indicate  the  extent  of  this  and  its  often  negative  effect 
when  seen  as  the  sole  solution  to  the  problems  of  restructuring  industries.  The  thesis 
then  argues  that  neglect  of  the  industrial  relations/institutional  environment  has  meant 
studies  which  emphasise  short-term  wage  and  employment  considerations  have  been 
to  the  fore.  More  institutionally  grounded  approaches,  which  emphasise  the  industrial 
relations  aspects  of  deregulation  and  privatisation,  are  then  utilised.  It  is  proposed  that 
by  looking  at  the  interconnection  between  product  market,  labour  market  and 
regulatory  change,  and  considering  both  employer  and  labour  strategy  in  the  process 
we  can  come  to  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  process  of  deregulation/privatisation  and 
labour  market  change.  The  different  stages  of  labour  market  regulation  are  discussed 
by  reference  to  a  number  of  industries.  These  models  are  respectively:  the  regulated 
control  model,  the  competitive  disengagement  model,  the  labour  market  restructuring 
model  and  the  global  product  market  convergence  model.  Each  model  is  illustrated  by 
reference  to  a  particular  industry,  and  all  four  used  to  explain  the  process  of  regulation 
and  deregulation  within  the  airline  industry. 
Chapter  2  outlines  the  methodological  approach,  introducing  the  combined  political 
economy  approach  and  the  models  of  regulation  and  deregulation  discussed  above. 
The  concept  of  the  "regulatory  overhang"  is  examined  and  a  survey  of  BA  used  to 
explore  it.  The  study  also  uses  a  case  study  approach  and  utilises  industry  statistics.  In 
order  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  regulatory  process,  and  in  order  to  locate  the 
process  of  regulation  and  deregulation  in  a  historical  context,  the  third  chapter  looks 
at  these  issues. 
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without  reference  to  the  historical  antecedents  of  regulation.  Chapter  3  looks  at  this 
process  of  change  by  considering  Industrial  Relations  and  Collective  Bargaining  in 
the  US  and  UK  Airline  Industries:  The  Historical  and  Institutional  Context.  This 
strand  of  the  thesis  considers  the  evolution  of  product  market  and  labour  market 
regulation  within  both  the  US  and  UK.  The  US  developed  a  structure  of  agency 
regulation,  formalised  a  framework  of  labour  legislation,  and  craft  based  collective 
bargaining.  The  development  of  a  framework  of  industrial  relations  was  premised 
upon  the  state's  desire  for  stability  in  an  industry  that  had  been  characterised  by 
chronic  downward  directed  competition,  and  labour  unrest.  (Capelli  1987:  137.  )  The 
formation  of  the  pilots'  union,  ALPA,  represented  the  origin  of  major  trade  unionism 
within  the  industry.  The  state  assisted  labour  in  its  battle  to  gain  recognition,  and  then 
underpinned  labour's  bargaining  power  as  with  other  labour  groups  in  the  New  Deal 
legislation.  With  their  unique  bargaining  power  pilots  were  able  to  secure  their 
objectives  until  the  formation  of  an  employers'  pact  neutralised  their  power. 
The  UK  industry  was  state  owned  and  embodied  a  corporatist  form  of  industrial 
relations  often  used  to  represent  typical  developments  in  regulation  within  Europe. 
This  involves  the  nationalisation  of  the  industry,  and  the  development  of  corporatist 
forms  of  industrial  relations.  In  the  case  of  the  UK  industry,  the  protections  afforded 
to  labour  were  less  clear  cut,  and  pilots  were  offered  the  right  to  collective  bargaining 
under  legislation  dating  from  the  late  1930s.  Full  nationalisation  provided  a  more 
systematic  framework  of  industrial  relations  but  constrained  the  power  of  pilots  and 
other  skilled  groups,  allowing  the  nationalised  operators  BEA  and  BOAC  to  control 
costs.  The  development  of  industrial  relations  and  collective  bargaining  in  both 
countries  is  examined  using  the  regulated  control  model.  In  particular  the  US  is 
identified  as  exhibiting  characteristics  of  strong  regulated  control  for  reasons  already 
discussed.  The  UK,  on  the  other  hand,  with  its  weak  formal  levels  of  product  and 
labour  market  regulation  can  be  analysed  as  conforming  to  a  pattern  of  weak 
regulated  control.  Even  with  nationalisation  and  nominal  state  control  there  was  never 
a  significant  level  of  codified  regulatory  intervention  as  occurred  in  the  US  industry, 
and  the  implications  of  these  differences  are  examined. 
10 In  chapter  4  the  process  of  deregulation  is  examined  by  looking  at  pilots,  as  the 
occupational  group  who  have  benefited  most  from  regulation,  and  yet  retain  potent 
bargaining  power  through  their  skill  specificity  and  bargaining  muscle.  Such  workers 
benefited  from  regulation  as  the  regulated  environment  allowed  increases  in  pay  and 
conditions  to  be  funded  independent  of  the  financial  performance  of  the  airlines 
concerned.  (Capelli  1987:  139.  )  This  situation  altered  and  in  chapter  4  Pilots  and 
Management  Under  Deregulation:  The  USA  and  Europe,  we  look  at  the  effect  of 
deregulation  on  pilots.  For  the  USA  we  look  at  the  effect  on  wages  and  bargaining 
power,  including  the  nature  of  concession  bargaining,  and  on  the  influence  of  pilots  as 
a  labour  group  with  particular  power  and  influence  in  the  firm  and  the  regulatory 
arena.  For  Europe,  a  similar  analysis  is  undertaken  and  the  process  of  deregulation  is 
viewed  in  terms  of  its  effect  on  the  earnings,  bargaining  power  and  regulatory 
influence  of  pilots.  We  examine  this  period  in  terms  of  the  competitive  disengagement 
model  to  analyse  the  effect  of  restructuring  on  pilots  in  both  the  US  and  Europe.  The 
impact  of  strategies  such  as  regionalisation,  franchising  and  the  impact  of  low  cost 
carriers  are  used  to  look  at  the  European  industry,  and  to  introduce  these  issues  for 
later  chapters. 
Having  set  the  scene  by  discussing  the  nature  of  regulation  and  the  labour  market, 
introduced  the  historical  and  institutional  context  and  looked  at  the  detailed  fortunes 
of  pilots  as  a  barometer  of  the  long-run  effects  of  deregulation,  we  need  to  examine 
the  process  of  how  change  is implemented  and  more  importantly  perceived  by  airline 
workers.  One  of  the  worldwide  constants  of  airline  restructuring  is  that  airline 
workers  expect  superior  terms  and  conditions  as  a  result  of  working  in  the  airline 
industry,  and  regardless  of  their  skill  and  occupational  level.  Thus  chapter  5  and  6 
bring  the  discussion  into  the  deregulated  period  discussing  how  management  strategy 
has  changed  to  adapt  to  the  new  competitive  environment  of  market  entry,  fierce 
competition  from  restructuring  flag  carriers  and  a  general  concentration  on  labour 
costs. 
As  previous  chapters  argued,  the  importance  of  employee  attitudes  to  restructuring 
and  deregulation  is  crucial  in  terms  of  the  existence  of  a  'regulatory  overhang'  of 
expectations  of  employment,  wages  and  bargaining.  This  concept  should  be  seen  as 
II separate  and  distinct  from  the  airline  wage  premium,  which  has  been  well  noted 
particularly  in  the  US  industry  (see  Hendricks  et  al  1980). 
The  'regulatory  overhang'  describes  the  set  of  beliefs  and  expectations  which  airline 
workers  have  towards  change  in  the  deregulatory  period,  as  influenced  by  the  residual 
effect  of  the  regulated  era.  Thus,  whilst  pilots  might  realise,  and  even  accept,  that  the 
industry  environment  is  threatening  and  competitive,  they  will  seek  to  defend  flight 
duty  limitations  which  date  from  the  regulated  era,  as  these  are  seen  as  part  of  the 
'airline  package'.  and  the  benefits  of  working  in  a  large  scale  regulated  industry. 
Ground  handling  workers  will  resist  market  rates  for  their  occupation,  because  they 
view  themselves  as  airline  workers,  and  have  always  received  higher  rates  of  pay  than 
external  workers. 
Given  the  existence  of  this  set  of  beliefs,  little  work  has  been  conducted  on  employee 
attitudes  within  the  airline  industry  in  regard  to  the  deregulated  environment.  The 
overhang,  however,  changes  through  time  and  though  workers  initially  resist 
restructuring  on  the  basis  of  protecting  gains  obtained  from  regulation,  the  changing 
industry  environment  forces  a  re-evaluation.  In  a  US  study,  Wever  charted  employee 
attitudes  to  take-over  restructuring  on  the  basis  of  an  Employee  Share  Ownership 
Programme  (ESOP).  (1989:  163-185.  )  Studies  have  largely  concentrated  on 
management  strategy  or  the  effects  of  changing  regulation  and  product  markets 
without  addressing  employee  attitudes.  The  identification  of  a  'regulatory  overhang' 
in  the  expectations  of  airline  workers  meant  that  it  was  necessary  to  test  employee 
attitudes  towards  deregulatory  change.  This  is  especially  significant  against  a 
backdrop  of  employment  change  and  labour  market  deregulation  which  is  threatening 
the  premium  terms  and  conditions  enjoyed  by  airline  workers.  The  attitudes  and 
stance  of  both  management  and  airline  workers  is  crucial  in  making  sense  of  the  often 
complex  process  of  deregulation  and  restructuring. 
Chapter  5,  which  is  entitled  Corporate  Strategy  and  Employment  Change  in  the 
Global  Airline  Industry,  prepares  the  survey  by  discussing  the  nature  of 
management  strategy  in  an  emerging  global  airline  labour  market.  In  particular  the 
chapter  points  to  the  nature  of  BA's  strategy  since  privatisation  which  has  been 
identified  by  Blyton  and  Turnbull  (after  Storey)  as  one  of  'dualism'  (Blyton  and 
12 Tumbull  1998:  74)  and  where  attempts  to  rationalise  collective  bargaining  to  reflect 
perceived  business  needs.  The  impact  of  global  strategies,  such  as  the  formation  of 
alliances  and  code  sharing,  is  also  discussed  with  the  implications  for  BA  workers. 
Chapter  6  presents  the  results  of  the  survey  on  employee  attitudes.  The  survey 
considers  issues  such  as  regionalisation,  franchising,  the  impact  of  low  cost  carriers, 
the  creation  of  internal  low  cost  subsidiaries  and  the  extension  of  atypical  work. 
Further  questions  examine  employee  attitudes  towards  outsourcing  and  policies  of 
globalisation.  These  policies  are  addressed  from  the  point  of  view  of  both  the  product 
and  the  labour  market.  Thus,  attitudes  towards  issues  such  as  state  subsidy  and 
alliances  are  examined  in  terms  of  their  effect  on  BA,  as  is  the  perceived  effect  of 
these  policies  on  employment.  The  chapter  also  looks  at  employee  attitudes  on  the 
proposed  abolition  of  collective  bargaining,  which  is  crucial  given  the  obstacle  which 
unionisation  presents  to  management  strategy.  Undertaken  at  a  major  turning  point  in 
the  airline's  future,  before  both  the  major  efficiency  drive  of  the  Business  Efficiency 
Programme  (BEP)  and  after  the  threatened  pilots'  strike  of  July  1996,  the  survey 
provides  a  rich  and  varied  assessment  of  employee  attitudes  towards  the  deregulation 
of  employment.  The  survey  also  provides  an  indication  of  the  sort  of  employment  and 
wage  expectations  which  BA  workers  have.  The  survey  provides  a  detailed 
assessment  of  the  attitudes  and  perceptions  of  BA  workers  as  they  face  a  period  of 
major  change. 
Chapter  7  develops  the  issues  introduced  in  the  preceding  two  chapters  by  examining 
Labour  Market  Restructuring  in  the  European  Airline  Industry.  This  extends  and 
deepens  the  discussion  in  detail  of  the  process  of  post  deregulation  adjustment  within 
the  European  airline  industry.  The  chapter  utilises  the  labour  market  restructuring 
model  introduced  in  chapter  I  to  examine  the  perceived  high  cost/low  productivity 
perception  of  the  industry. 
Firstly  the  chapter  examines  the  nature  of  wages  and  earnings  within  the  European 
airline  industry  in  order  to  explore  the  extent  to  which  the  perception  of  high  costs  has 
motivated  both  management  and  government.  Secondly,  we  consider  the  comparative 
evidence  on  wages  and  productivity  between  the  US  and  Europe,  arguing  that,  though 
the  gap  has  been  closing,  pressure  for  labour  cost  has  not  abated.  Evidence  suggests 
13 that  premium  wages  are  still  fairly  high  in  the  European  airline  industry  and  that 
workers  enjoy  a  significant  premium on  workers  outside  the  industry.  This  can  be 
partly  attributed  to  the  highly  skilled  nature  of  many  jobs,  but  the  existence  of  this 
premium  has  led  management  to  target  the  wages  and  conditions  of  airline  workers. 
The  chapter  then  details  some  of  the  strategies  which  are  being  pursued  to  erode  those 
premium  wages  and  conditions,  building  on  earlier  chapters.  Such  policies  include  the 
use  of  internal  low  cost  carriers,  the  spread  of  outsourcing,  expansion  through 
franchising  and  regionalisation  and  increasing  use  of  tiered  pay  structures.  Given  the 
power  of  organised  labour  within  Europe,  however,  management  attempts  to 
restructure  the  wage/effort  bargain  within  the  industry  have  been  met  with  industrial 
unrest.  In  many  cases  management  strategy  has  been  altered  to  take  account  of  the 
continuing  institutional  power  that  labour  enjoys.  It  is  argued  that  although 
restructuring  has  taken  place,  labour  has  been  able  to  resist  in  many  cases,  although 
the  impact  of  industrial  relations  institutions  has  not  been  as  important  as  many 
analysts  imagined.  In  the  longer  term,  restructuring  can  only  be  achieved  when 
regulatory  change  allows  management  to  obtain  global  scope  and  thereby  to  reduce 
labour  costs. 
Whilst  chapter  7  indicated  the  extent  to  which  restructuring  has  been  taking  place,  it 
also  demonstrated  that  the  process  is  a  difficult  and  conflict  ridden  one.  In  chapter  8 
we  look  at  the  broad  sweep  of  change  from  Regulated  Control  Towards  Global 
Product  Market  Convergence.  Subtitled  The  Emerging  Regulatory  Framework 
and  the  Airline  Labour  Market,  the  chapter  focuses  on  how  change  in  the 
regulatory  environment  has  facilitated  labour  restructuring.  The  environment  has 
fundamentally  altered  from  systems,  which  had  the  effect  of  upholding  and  protecting 
the  interests  of  organised  labour,  to  one  which  vests  control  in  the  hands  of  major 
airline  alliances.  This  has  allowed  the  major  airlines  to  control  the  industry  and  to 
procure  reduced  costs,  whilst  avoiding  curbs  on  concentration  and  monopoly. 
Whilst  regulators  have  allowed  major  airlines  to  pursue  growth  through  consolidation 
and  'virtual  merger'  they  have  failed  to  protect  labour  conditions  in  the  US  and  are 
seeking  to  dismantle  them  within  Europe.  The  effect  of  the  emerging  regulatory 
framework  is  to  allow  operators  to  reap  economies  of  size  and  scope,  and  arguably 
scale,  whilst  failing  in  most  cases  to  guarantee  market  access,  for  example,  by  re- 
14 allocating  slots  in  mergers  and  alliances  to  a  sufficient  degree.  In  the  USA  this  is 
characterised  by  the  failure  of  government  to  address  the  effects  of  deregulation  on 
jobs  as  originally  provided  for  under  the  Airline  Deregulation  Act  of  1978.  In 
addition,  the  toleration  of  systemic  bankruptcy  within  the  industry  has  encouraged 
operators  to  drive  down  costs  in  the  face  of  the  pricing  strategies  of  bankrupt  carriers. 
This  phenomenon  has  also  initiated  a  wave  of  concession  bargaining  which,  though 
leading  to  large  scale  reduction  in  the  wages  of  pilots  and  others  over  the  short  terrn, 
has  produced  instability  as  workers  seek  to  claw-back  lost  ground.  At  the  same  time 
authorities  are  pursuing  at  national,  regional  and  supranational  levels,  an  agenda  of 
supply  side  labour  market  reforms,  which  favour  large  operators,  often  accepting  the 
harmonisation  arguments  of  operators. 
Thus  regulators  have  allowed  cross  border  crewing,  attempts  to  harmonise  the  hours 
of  flight  deck  staff  around  less  restrictive  criteria,  and  the  deregulation  of  local  ground 
handling  services,  all  benefiting  capital  within  the  industry.  Increasingly  these  trends 
are  connecting  at  a  global  level,  as  the  industry  restructures  along  the  lines  of  large- 
scale  regional  carriers  and  massive  global  alliances. 
The  thesis  then  seeks  to  indicate  the  likely  nature  of  employment  deregulation  within 
the  context  of  the  changing  global  framework  of  regulation.  A  reassessment  of  the 
product,  labour  and  regulatory  environment  is  undertaken  using  a  model  of  global 
product  market  convergence,  to  examine  how  common  global  product  market 
pressures  combine  to  alter  the  labour  market. 
Whilst  these  processes  are  taking  place  labour  has  not  remained  quiescent. 
Nevertheless  these  new  developments  present  considerable  challenges  to  organised 
labour  within  the  industry.  The  chapter  thus  utilises  a  major  survey  of  ITF  unions, 
involving  the  author,  to  examine  the  position  of  trade  unions  towards  globalisation 
and  labour  flexibility.  (Blyton  et  al  1998a.  )  Finally  the  emergence  of  new  forms  of 
trade  union  collaboration  and  co-operation  and  the  possibility  of  new  forms  of  cross- 
national  bargaining  are  detailed,  demonstrating  both  opportunities  and  threats  inherent 
within  the  emerging  regulatory  framework. 
15 Overall,  therefore,  the  thesis  seeks  to  provide  a  study  of  the  detailed  effects  of  labour 
market  change  within  the  regulated  and  deregulated  airline  industry,  with  a  special 
focus  on  the  comparative  aspects  of  that  process  and  on  the  emerging  pattern  of 
regulation  evident  within  the  deregulated  period.  This  will  contribute  to  our 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  employment  regulation  and  deregulation,  its  specific 
labour  market  impacts  and  the  response  of  both  management  and  labour. 
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The  Political  Economy  of  Labour  Restructuring 
and  Industrial  Relations  in  Regulated 
Industries, 
1.1  Deregulation  and  The  Labour  Market:  An  Introduction 
This  chapter  addresses  the  literature  on  the  labour  market  effects  of  deregulation 
focusing  not  just  on  wages  and  employment  but  on  wider  issues  of  market  structure, 
regulatory  regime  and  industrial  relations.  This  approach  will  provide  a  broader 
understanding  of  labour  market  deregulation  than  has  hitherto  been  available.  The 
treatment  provides  a  more  grounded  understanding  of  employment  trends  than  that 
provided  by  dominant  models  of  deregulation  and  employment.  The  purpose  of  the 
chapter  is  to  evaluate  and  examine  the  extent  of  labour  market  deregulation.  In  order 
to  do  so  we  need  to  firstly  'unpack'  some  of  the  broad  approaches  which  have  been 
deployed  to  date,  most  notably  the  union  monopoly/rent  sharing  view  and  its 
supporting  theories.  Secondly,  we  will  examine  some  of  the  empirical  and  theoretical 
evidence  on  the  employment  affects  of  deregulation.  Thirdly,  given  the  basis  within 
this  literature  towards  assessing  outcomes,  we  will  develop  a  series  of  models  of  the 
process  of  labour  market  deregulation.  Using  case  studies  these  models  will  allow  us 
to  view  the  interconnections  between  product  market,  regulatory  and  labour  market 
change,  attending  deregulation.  Having  introduced  these  models  we  will  then  examine 
the  industrial  relations  dimension  of  labour  market  deregulation.  Economists  have 
tended  to  problematise  labour  in  terms  of  its  productive  efficiency,  reasoning  that 
changing  the  regulatory  regime  and  removing  rigidities  will  automatically  lead  to 
greater  labour  efficiency  and  productivity.  Industrial  relations  scholars  have  studied 
the  institutional  interplay  between  capital  and  labour  in  privatised  and  regulated 
industries.  It  is  the  task  of  this  chapter  to  unite  these  two  perspectives  and  to  assess 
17 the  wide-ranging  effects  of  labour  market  deregulation.  The  first  task  is  to  map  the 
context  of  deregulation  and  the  dominant  models  and  approaches  used  to  examine  its 
labour  market  impacts. 
1.1.1  Context:  The  Push  Towards  Deregulation  and  Privatisation. 
The  transport  economist,  Kenneth  Button,  has  described  the  period  since  the  late 
1970s  as  the  "Age  of  Regulatory  Reform",  when  an  almost  total  belief  in  the  role  of 
the  state,  either  through  ownership  or  regulation,  was  replaced  by  a  corresponding 
faith  in  market  solutions.  This  was  particularly  so  within  the  transport  and  the  utilities 
sector.  (Button  1988:  13.  )  Growing  global  convergence  of  product  markets  and 
regulatory  policy,  mean  that  even  countries,  which  choose  not  to  deregulate,  face  a 
deregulated  external  environment.  These  product  market  and  regulatory  changes  feed 
through  into  the  labour  market.  Whilst  a  great  deal  of  research  and  policy  analysis  has 
been  undertaken  into  the  market  structure  and  consumer  choice  aspects  of 
deregulation,  less  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  labour  market  dimension.  Although 
there  is  a  great  deal  of  solid  research  on  labour  costs  and  productivity  within  the 
privatised  and  deregulated  industries  there  has  been  little  work  so  far  on  the 
interconnections  between  regulatory  change,  product  market  change  and  labour 
market  change.  3  In  addition  little  attention  is  paid  to  the  manner  in  which  regulatory 
non-intervention,  as  opposed  to  intervention,  has  come  to  define  the  current  era.  The 
post-deregulation  dynamics  have  meant  that  as  the  state  withdraws,  a  number  of 
labour  market  and  employment  effects  become  manifest.  In  this  chapter,  such 
processes  are  analysed  within  a  variety  of  industries  and  the  evidence  is  then  applied 
to  the  airline  industry.  The  first  task  is  to  review  some  key  theoretical  perspectives  on 
the  relationship  between  regulatory  and  labour  market  change. 
1.1.2.  Regulation  and  the  Labour  Market:  A  Theoretical  Overview 
Early  work  on  the  possible  employment  effects  of  privatisation  and  deregulation  was 
initiated  by  'new  right'  economists.  Their  critique  flowed  from  a  number  of  key 
observations  about  the  functioning  of  regulated  and  state  controlled  industries.  Under 
Belzer  (1993)  provides  an  example  of  such  an  approach  in  his  analysis  of  the  US  trucking  industry. 
18 regulation,  it  was  argued,  labour  protected  its  position  with  arcane  work  rules  and 
sought  inflationary  wage  increases  paid  for  in  higher  consumer  fares.  Managers  had 
little  or  no  incentive  to  alter  the  situation  as  all  operators  in  a  regulated  market  were 
protected  from  bankruptcy  and  either  isolated  from,  or  subject  to,  lax  shareholder 
pressure.  Privatisation  or,  in  the  case  of  the  USA,  deregulation,  would  break  this 
cycle  of  rent-seeking  and  featherbedding  and  force  managers  to  control  costs.  A 
tvirtuous  circle'  of  improved  cost  control,  better  labour  relations  and  enhanced  work 
rules  would  then  ensue,  resulting  in  lower  fares.  Looking  at  the  US  airline  industry 
and  having  discussed  the  ease  with  which  costs  could  be  passed-on  to  consumers 
Bailey  et  al  encapsulated  the  deregulationists'  main  concern  about  the  operation  of  the 
regulated  labour  market: 
'Workers'  negotiating  leverage  was  also  augmented  by  several  other 
characteristics  of  the  airline  industry.  First  airlines  as  a  service  industry  cannot 
store  output,  so  sales  lost  during  strikes  are  lost  forever.  Secondly  the 
prevalence  of  highly  skilled  workers  with  a  corresponding  problem  of 
substitutability  make  it  difficult  for  management  to  confront  powerful  organised 
labour.  In  addition  regulation  created  a  small  number  of  stable,  easily 
identifiable  carriers  for  unions  to  organise.  '  (Bailey  et  al:  1984:  97.  ) 
Bailey  et  al's  criticisms  of  labour  management  within  the  regulated  airline  industry 
can  be  applied  to  most  regulated  and  state  controlled  sectors,  consequently  they  and 
other  economists  viewed  labour  market  reform  as  a  crucial  gain  from  deregulation. 
According  to  these  writers  deregulation  produced  several  positive  outcomes  in  terms 
labour  market  efficiency.  First  came  productivity  improvements  in  labour  and 
delivery  systems,  second,  increased  innovation  in  price-service  options,  third,  the 
adjustment  of  prices  towards  incremental  costs  and  fourth  an  end  to  cross  subsidy. 
(1984:  54.  )  Just  how  privatisation  and  deregulation  affects  labour  is  best  demonstrated 
by  the  rent-sharing  approach,  which  identifies  labour's  ability  to  command  a  large 
share  of  regulated  revenues  through  unionisation  as  the  source  of  its  superior  terms 
and  conditions.  These  issues  are  explained  in  relation  to  a  number  of  seminal  studies, 
all  emanating  from  the  USA,  which  nevertheless  have  informed  policy  makers  in  the 
UK  and  now  Europe. 
The  dominant  neo  classical  tradition  of  economic  analysis  tends  to  see  regulation  as 
the  guarantor  of  union  monopoly  power.  For  writers  in  this  tradition  the  labour  market 
19 is  characterised  by  the  power  of  union  monopoly,  underpinned  by  the  strict  control  of 
market  entry  and  pricing.  (Booth  1994:  chapter  3.  )  Using  the  union  monopoly 
framework,  Posner  (1984:  990)  views  control  of  entry,  demarcation  and  the  use  of 
seniority  as  the  key  distortions  which  arise  from  union  control.  He  argues  that  the  US 
legal  framework  "is  best  understood  as  a  device  for  facilitating,  though  not  to  the 
maximum  possible  extent,  the  cartelization  of  the  labour  supply  by  unions.  "  (Ibid.  )  A 
further  dimension  of  the  union  monopoly  model  is  the  notion  of  union  members  as 
privileged  incumbents  of  jobs  within  regulated  sectors.  The  monopoly  union/rent 
sharing  theory  also  models  the  behaviour  of  managers.  Without  the  rigour  and 
discipline  of  competition,  managers  have  little  incentive  to  resist  union  demands  and 
are,  in  any  case,  hampered  by  union  control.  This  control  is  institutionalised  through 
systems  of  state  directed  industrial  relations  and  collective  bargaining.  These 
mechanisms  are  implied  to  set  the  limits  of  managerial  intervention.  (Ibid.  ) 
Exercised  by  the  prevalence  of  regulated  enterprise  throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s, 
American  scholars  have  developed  detailed  empirical  studies  of  the  effect  of 
regulation  and  later  deregulation.  The  dominant  paradigm  has  been  that  of  rent- 
sharing.  Unions,  it  is  argued,  are  able  to  capture  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  higher 
prices  consumers  pay  for  goods  produced  within  regulated  sectors.  4 
The  trucking  industry  was  the  focus  of  many  of  these  studies,  as  it  provided  a  simple 
test  of  a  strong  and  powerful  union,  the  Teamsters,  and  a  regulated  product  market 
through  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  (ICC).  Earlier,  Moore  (1978:  327-343) 
investigated  the  effects  of  trucking  regulation  on  the  various  parties  and  found 
evidence  of  significant  bargaining  power  for  the  International  Brotherhood  of 
Teamsters  (IBT),  the  drivers  union.  Hirsch  and  MacPherson  (1997)  viewed  the 
4  One  major  detailed  study  of  labour  earnings  under  regulation  found  little  evidence  of  a  systematic 
regulatory  effect  upon  earnings  (I  lendricks  1977)  Indeed  earlier  research  into  earninas  within  electrical  00 
utilities  had  shown  that  "wages  were  lower  than  in  unregulated  industries  with  the  same  market 
structure"  (ibid.  ).  Hendrick's  research  qualifies  any  regulated-industry-higher  earnings  hypotheses, 
0 
although  it  could  be  argued  that  rent  seeking  in  three  key  industries  is  evidence  that  the  phenomenon  0  C,  does  exist.  Hendricks  questioned  the  accepted  notion  that  regulated  industries  would  automatically 
push  wage  increases  onto  consumers.  His  research  found  support  for  the  idea  that  rent  sharing  of  the 
variety  described  might  be  offset  by  a  desire  of  union  members  for  employment  security  and  stability. 
In  other  words  unions  and  their  members  rrdght  not  act  to  secure  higher  wages  at  all  times  but 
sometimes  prioritised  job  security  prizing  the  greater  quality  of  regulated  jobs.  Regulated  firms  might 
also,  he  argued,  pay  premium  rates  to  obtain  better  quality  labour.  Above  all  Hendricks  emphasised  the 
importance  of  the  "type  of  regulation"  in  any  analysis  of  labour  market  effects.  (Hendricks  1977:  249)  C, 
20 truckers  union  as  the  major  beneficiary  of  regulation  in  terms  of  cosy  working 
agreements,  high  wages,  and  a  variety  of  other  benefits.  Rose's  empirical  analysis  of 
'rent-sharing'  in  the  US  trucking  industry  formed  a  seminal  critique  of  union 
behaviour  under  regulation.  Using  a  longitudinal  study  she  argued: 
'Understanding  rent  sharing  is  essential  to  analysing  government 
regulation.  Regulatory  protection  can  create  rents  over  which  workers 
and  firms  negotiate.  Regulatory  profit  constraints  may  distort  a  firm's 
labour  input  decision  or  alter  bargaining  power  vis  a  vis  unions: 
regulatory  barriers  to  entry  may  enhance  union  power  and  the  political 
nature  of  regulatory  agencies  can  expand  the  scope  of  potential  games 
between  firms  and  workers.  '  (Rose  1987:  1147.  ) 
Rose  analysed  union  contracts  in  both  the  regulated  and  deregulated  periods  to  test 
her  prediction  that  rents  would  fall  in  the  absence  of  regulation.  As  evidence  of  rents, 
she  measured  union  wage  premia  in  both  periods.  Her  data  identified  a  union 
premium  of  50  per  cent,  close  to  previous  estimates.  In  addition,  she  compared  the 
trucking  premium  with  that  for  other  groups  of  American  workers.  (Rose  1987  :  1165.  ) 
She  found  that  even  the  highest  premia  in  general  industry  were  exceeded  by  the 
trucking  premium  by  about  one  third.  (Ibid:  1165.  )  Rose  found  that  the  premium  fell 
considerably  after  the  introduction  of  the  Motor  Carrier  Act  of  1980  which 
'deregulated'  the  industry.  In  addition,  she  estimated  an  overall  figure  for  regulated 
rents  and  found  that  these  were  allocated  disproportionately  in  favour  of  labour.  (Rose 
1987:  1174.  )  In  her  calculations  the  IBT  captured  75  per  cent  of  regulatory  rents,  a 
sum  of  around  $1.2  billion.  (Rose  1987:  1175.  )  In  the  same  year,  Hirsch  looked  in 
detail  at  the  effect  of  deregulation  on  unionisation  and  earnings.  He  concluded  that 
deregulation  led  to  a  significant  decline  in  wages  for  unionised  employees.  (1987:  3  1.  ) 
The  rent  sharing  approach  therefore  identified  a  significant  'regulated  premium'  for 
unionised  workers  in  the  USA.  Has  this  experience  been  replicated  within  the  UK? 
1.1.3  Privatisation  and  Labour  Market  Restnicturing  in  the  UK 
The  US  findings  on  deregulation  and  earnings  were  confirmed  in  the  later  context  of 
UK  privatisation  and  deregulation.  Haskel  and  Sysmanski  (1993:  161)  looked  at  the 
fortunes  of  labour  in  the  UK's  deregulated  and  privatised  industries.  In  their  1993 
21 study,  which  spanned  16  years  of  state  control  and  privatisation,  these  writers 
identified  significant  labour  market  impacts.  The  change  to  more  commercial 
objectives  led  to  a  fall  in  employment.  However,  wages  tended  to  be  affected  only  if 
the  firm  lost  market  power.  Arguably,  these  studies  underestimated  the  effect  on 
employment  and  wages.  (Martin  and  Parker  1997:  85.  )  In  a  later  study  Martin  and 
Parker  (1997)  found  that  the  share  of  business  income  going  to  wages  fell 
considerably  in  most  UK  privatised  industries,  implying  the  pre-existence  of  rents. 
For  example,  whilst  the  proportion  of  income  allocated  to  wages  at  British  Gas  was 
20  per  cent  in  the  nationalisation  period  this  fell  to  18  per  cent  by  1996.  (Martin  and 
Parker  1997  Table  8.2.  )  At  British  Telecom,  the  figure  fell  from  44  %  in  1977  to 
fewer  than  30  per  cent  in  1995. 
In  a  recent  study  Haskel  and  Sanchis  identified  the  erratic  nature  of  earnings  within 
privatised  industries.  Wages,  they  found,  rose  or  fell  according  to  the  product  market 
position,  the  level  of  monopoly  power  and  the  influence  of  trade  unions.  (Haskel  and 
Sanchis  1995:  301.  )  The  authors'  explanation  of  rising  wages  is  based  on  a  simplified 
and  stylised  model  of  the  labour  market.  They  account  for  rising  wages  post 
privatisation  in  terms  of  increased  effort.  The  firm  is  assumed  to  pay  more  for  greater 
effort.  (Ibid:  302.  )  However,  privatisation  and  deregulation  may  have  a  considerably 
deeper  affect  on  organised  labour  than  is  suggested  in  this  type  of  literature. 
The  overall  employment  picture  is  also  important.  Whilst  Haskel  and  Sysmanski  and 
earlier  studies  identified  a  fall  in  employment  attending  UK  privatisation,  Martin  and 
Parker  present  an  updated  longer-term  picture,  where  the  trend  becomes  more 
discernible. 
22 There  are  clearly  dramatic  declines  in  employment  within  the  telecom,  gas  and  steel 
industries,  though  employment  is  stable  in  civil  aviation.  (See  figure  1.1 
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Nevertheless,  the  general  picture  is  one  of  employment  decline,  pointing  at  least  to 
huge  increases  in  efficiency  and  utilisation,  as  well  as  the  impact  of  new  technologies. 
Whilst  the  UK  literature  provides  rigorous  measures  of  wage  and  productivity  change, 
it  fails  to  capture  the  institutional  and  organisational  effects  of  such  changes. 
Arguably  these  are  the  most  important  considerations,  and  a  lack  of  focus  upon  these 
issues  can  lead  to  a  crude  form  of  analysis.  We  might  assume  that  wages  fall  for 
example,  because  of  a  restoration  of  management  power  and  the  dissolution  of  a 
union  monopoly,  when  in  fact  the  fall  may  be  a  tactical  adaptation  by  either  unions  or 
management  to  product  market  change.  In  addition,  whilst  we  have  a  great  deal  of  L- 
information  about  the  labour  market  outcomes  of  deregulation,  we  have  little 
systematic  understanding  of'  the  process.  Arguably,  these  issues  can  be  more  clearly 
understood  by  using  an  approach  which  recognises  the  interconnections  between 
product,  labour  market  and  regulatory  change.  This  aspect  is  addressed  in  the  next 
section. 
23 
Source:  Generated  frorn  Martin  and  Parker  Chapter  8 1.2  Regulatory  Change  and  Labour  Market  Effect:  A  Re-Assessment 
1.2.1  Re-conceptualising  Labour  Market  Deregulation 
Arguably  an  understanding  of  the  processes  and  dynamics  of  change  is  crucial  to  our 
understanding  of  how  deregulation  and  market  reform  affect  employment.  It  is 
important  to  look  at  the  nature  of  bargaining  and  the  interaction  between  the  labour, 
product  and  regulatory  environments.  A  change  in  the  emphasis  of  regulatory  policy 
can  have  a  profound  effect  upon  employment  within  a  given  industry.  MacDonald  and 
Cavaluzzo  for  example  (1996:  79)  identified  ma  or  impacts  upon  labour  within  the  US 
railroad  industry,  arising  from  pricing  adjustments  under  the  Staggers  Act  of  1980. 
Shippers  responded  to  the  price  reform  by  concentrating  production  within  certain 
terminals  and  certain  types  of  traffic,  all  reducing  labour  demand.  (MacDonald  and 
Cavaluzzo  1996:  80.  )  The  writers  believe  that  an  increase  in  profits  could  be  ascribed 
to  increasing  work  intensification.  Wages  did  not  fall,  they  concluded,  but 
productivity  rose  markedly.  (Ibid.  )  This  was  despite  the  existence  of  job  protection 
legislation  implicit  within  the  legislation.  Subtle  adjustments  in  pricing  and  changes  in 
the  regulatory  stance,  that  at  face  value  to  have  little  to  do  with  the  labour  market,  can 
have  wide  ranging  effects. 
In  order  to  understand  the  impact  of  deregulation  and  market  reform upon  the  labour 
market  it  is  necessary  to  conceptualise  precisely  how  varying  types  of  regulatory 
environment  act  to  alter  labour  market  dynamics.  In  order  to  build  that  understanding 
a  number  of  models  are  used  to  analyse  the  deregulation  of  the  labour  market.  These 
are  then  supported  by  a  case  study  of  that  type  of  labour  market  deregulation  to 
enhance  understanding.  Devised  in  the  course  of  the  study,  the  models  build  upon 
existing  research  on  the  employment  consequences  of  deregulation.  They  help  to 
categorise  the  interconnections  between  the  regulatory  product  and  labour  market 
environment,  within  privatised  and  deregulated  industries.  The  models  are  not 
intended  to  be  mutually  exclusive  and  there  are  elements  of  each  within  the  other,  but 
they  do  help  to  organise  our  thinking  in  this  complex  area.  Broadly  the  models  used 
are  the  competitive  disengagement  model,  the  regulated  control  model,  the  labour 
24 market  reform  model  and  the  product  market  convergence  model.  Whilst  there 
are  obvious  similarities  and  overlap  between  the  models  they  do  have  distinct 
characteristics  which  can  help  us  understand  the  process  of  labour  market 
deregulation.  The  first  model  to  be  discussed  is  the  competitive  disengagement  model. 
1.2.2.  The  Competitive  Disengagement  Model:  UK  Bits  Privatisation 
In  cases  of  competitive  disengagement  the  state  withdraws  in  order  to  promote  a 
competitive  environment  unburdening  itself  of  the  regulatory  oversight  and  financial 
support  it  has  previously  allowed.  This  effect  is  most  likely  in  industries  such  as  US 
trucking,  domestic  airlines,  inter  city  buses  and  UK  buses  and  ports.  Here  short  run 
competition  competes  away  the  excess  profits  of  the  regulated  era  and  immediately 
threatens  the  premium  wages  conditions  and  work  rules  of  labour.  In  the  competitive 
disengagement  model  labour  market  effects  become  immediate  as  the  product  market 
becomes  highly  contested.  In  some  cases  competitive  disengagement  is  undertaken 
with  the  precise  aim  of  labour  market  reform  in  mind. 
The  labour  market  is  affected  in  several  ways.  Firstly,  the  bargaining  power  of  labour 
is  reduced  by  competitive  entry  as  a  non-union  sector  challenges  the  unionised  labour 
market.  Secondly,  the  withdrawal  of  government  control  marginalises  collective 
bargaining  and  industrial  action.  Management  is  forced  to  confront  costs  and  more 
importantly  to  resist  labour  demands,  as  postulated  in  the  public  choice  and  X- 
inefficiency  arguments.  Thirdly,  after  the  initial  'competitive  frenzy'  and  with  the 
process  of  merger  and  concentration,  there  is  interaction  between  the  product  market 
and  the  labour  market  encouraging  innovation  within  labour  management  strategies. 
These  can  range  from  wage  restructuring  and  bargaining  reforrn  in  order  to  serve 
differentiated  markets,  to  the  outsourcing  of  key  areas  in  order  to  procure  lower  costs. 
Management  might  develop  strategies  based  on  differentiated  quality  production 
(DQP)  as  for  example  Federal  Express  in  the  US  trucking  industry  and  American  and 
Delta  within  the  airline  industry.  All  have  employed  high-wage/high-performance 
models  of  labour  management,  with  an  emphasis  on  organisational  culture  and 
Human  Resource  approaches  to  labour  management.  Alternatively  management  might 
seek  to  pursue  a  low  costflexible  production  (LFP)  strategy  where  cost  containment, 
especially  in  areas  of  low  margin  high  volume  business,  is  emphasised.  (See  chapters 
25 5  and  6.  )  The  strategies  can  of  course  be  differentiated  within  firms,  with  the 
employment  of  both  DQP  and  UP  strategies  according  to  the  product  market 
environment.  (See  Porter  1990.  )  The  deregulation  of  the  product  market  therefore 
drives  the  deregulation  of  the  labour  market,  whether  towards  cost  cutting  and  cost 
containment,  or  towards  service  improvement  and  the  development  of  quality  based 
policies.  Each  approach  has  specific  effects  on  the  wages  and  conditions  of  labour 
within  the  industry. 
The  deregulation  of  the  bus  and  coach  industry  in  Britain  from  1980  provides  a  clear 
example  of  the  competitive  disengagement  model  of  labour  market  deregulation. 
Deregulation  was  advanced  as  offering  greater  price  and  route  competition  in  an 
industry  beset  by  managed  decline.  Government  advanced  the  idea  that  deregulation 
should  help  halt  the  long-term  structural  decline  of  the  bus  industry: 
New  measures  are  urgently  needed  to  break  out  of  the  cycle  of  rising  costs, 
rising  fares,  reducing  services  so  that  public  transport  can  win  a  bigger  share  of 
the  expanding  market.  Competition  provides  the  opportunity  for  lower  fares, 
new  services,  and  more  passengers.  '  (Dept  of  Transport  Buses  White  Paper 
1985  quoted  in  Bannister  1997:  Ibid.  ) 
Barriers  to  entry  were  relaxed,  the  role  of  the  traffic  commissioner  in  overseeing  the 
fare  and  route  structure  was  bypassed,  and  as  predicted  fierce  competition  ensued. 
New  entrants  flooded  in  and  incumbents  sought  to  protect  and  enhance  their  position. 
Savage  (1985:  58)  described  in  an  earlier  study  of  the  deregulation  of  long-distance 
coach  services  the  effect  of  that  initial  phase  of  competition  upon  labour.  Using 
Liebenstein's  X-ineffliciency  framework,  he  describes  how  competitive  pressure 
provided  incentives  to  reduce  costs.  Managers  tighten  up  on  scheduling,  reduce  slack 
time,  and  lengthen  the  productive  hours  of  work.  Alternatively,  the  benefits  of 
increased  competition  were  obtained  through  the  replacement  of  a  high  cost  operator 
by  a  lower  cost  operation.  (Savage  1985:  59.  )  In  this  way,  the  cost  nature  of  the  pre- 
deregulation  operation  and  its  attendant  institutions  is  exposed. 
The  cumulative  effect  on  the  workforce  arising  from  bus  deregulation  has  been 
profound.  Wages  were  reduced,  hours  lengthened  and  discretionary  wage  elements 
26 such  as  overtime  and  shift  bonus  consolidated  into  basic  rates.  In  addition  there  has 
been  widespread  pay  restructuring.  Firms  created  lower  wage  rates  for  new  entrants, 
often  using  enhanced  redundancy  payments  to  buy  out  the  higher  rate  'insiders.  In 
addition,  wage  settlements  have  often  involved  lump  sum  payments  rather  than 
percentage  rate  increases,  eroding  the  real  value  of  earnings  and  further  reducing 
costs.  Forrester  (1993)  indicates  the  nature  of  such  policies  at  East  Midland  Motor 
Services  where: 
The  wage  structure  prior  to  1987  was  detailed  in  the  national 
agreements  covering  many  other  ex  NBC  (National  Bus  Company) 
subsidiaries.  Later  in  the  year  hourly  rates  of  pay  were  consolidated 
into  a  single  rate,  and  in  1989  a  separate  lower  rate  of  pay  was 
introduced  for  recently  recruited  minibus  employees.  All  subsequent 
new  recruits  were  to  start  as  minibus  drivers.  '  (Forrester  1993:  225.  ) 
Most  operators  chose  to  increase  utilisation  rather  than  to  reduce  wages.  Considering 
the  evidence  for  productivity  improvements  in  the  post-deregulation  coach  industry, 
Forrester  (1993:  226)  identified  an  increase  in  the  proportion  of  driving  time  to  total 
hours  of  some  9  per  cent,  a  considerable  increase  which  involved  the  introduction  of 
unpaid  meal  breaks  and  the  introduction  of  split  shifts.  The  Transport  and  General 
Workers  Union  (TGWU),  the  main  bus  workers'  union,  anticipated  the  sacrifice  in 
basic  terms  and  conditions  which  would  arise  from  deregulation.  Glaister's  findings 
on  the  cost  difference  between  a  regulated  and  deregulated  industry  identified  a 
differential  of  one  third  between  the  labour  costs  of  a  large  double  deck  bus  under  the 
regulated  and  deregulated  system.  (1986:  243  table  15.  )  Deregulation  brought  a 
significant  reduction  in  labour  costs.  Costs  were  mainly  productivity  improvements 
(the  elimination  of  X-inefficiency)  and  then,  as  the  industry  grew  more  'competitive' 
and  wage  costs  became  more  salient,  through  reductions  in  wages  and  conditions. 
In  some  ways  the  post  deregulation  dynamics  of  competition  have  benefited  labour. 
Concentration  for  example  around  four  major  operators  has  led  to  a  stabilisation  in 
wages  and  conditions.  There  has  been  a  proliferation  in  employee  shareholding  within 
privatised  operators,  although  often  these  in  return  for  concessions.  (See  chapter  4  for 
airline  industry  examples.  )  Bus  workers  have  obtained  significant  capital  gains  from 
these  developments.  (Bannister  1997:  43.  )  The  bus  industry  case  indicates  that  after 
27 an  initial  bout  of  competition,  which  promoted  a  concentration  on  labour  costs,  the 
industry  has  settled  into  a  pattern  of  zonal  oligopoly  with  operators  such  as 
Stagecoach,  Firstbus  and  Arriva  promoting  investment  and  some  forms  of 
organisational  innovation.  Nevertheless  labour  costs  remain  crucial  in  the  competitive 
strategies  of  bus  operators.  Whilst  competitive  disengagement  in  the  bus  industry 
forced  operators  to  compete  on  efficiency  and  labour  costs  in  response  to 
'spontaneous'  competitive  pressures,  in  the  UK  utilities  government  engineered  a 
model  of  regulation,  which  had  similar  effects.  For  similar  reasons  labour  costs  also 
become  paramount  within  the  UK  utilities  where  labour  market  effects  can  be 
assessed  through  the  regulated  control  model  discussed  below. 
1.2.3  The  Regulated  Control  Model:  The  UK  Utilities. 
The  regulated  control  tnodel  applies  to  industries  or  sectors  which  are  nominally 
deregulated  but  where  potential  market  power  and  monopoly  force  government  to 
regulate  and  control  the  industry.  The  regulated  control  model  often  occurs  where 
there  is  no  real  prospect  of  competition  in  the  short  run  and  where  any  future 
competition  has  to  be  based  upon  strict  regulation.  The  regulated  control  model  is 
most  evident  within  the  US  railroad  and  energy  sector,  UK  utilities  and  UK  railways. 
By  varying  means,  from  limiting  rates  of  return,  capping  profits,  holding  down  prices 
and  using  tenders  and  auctions,  government  asserts  control  over  the  industry.  The 
regulated  control  model  allows  the  undertaking  to  receive  private  investment  and  to 
trade  its  shares.  Managerial  control  is  enhanced  and  executive  rewards  linked  via 
share  options  and  performance  bonuses.  Though  government  manages  the 
environment  and  full  commercial  freedom  is  curtailed,  the  incentive  to  organisational 
change  and  reform  is  restored.  The  best  examples  of  these  types  of  labour  market 
regulation  use  the  price-capping  method  whereby  consumer  prices  are  held  down  by 
regulatory  intervention,  promoting  a  concentration  on  input  costs.  (Jackson  and  Price 
1994:  14.  )  Predictably,  since  labour  costs  are  among  the  most  variable  of  input  costs, 
this  promotes  a  clear  incentive  towards  labour  cost  savings. 
The  importance  of  the  regulated  control  model  to  the  labour  market  is  clear  from  the 
privatisation  and  subsequent  regulation  of  the  UK  utilities.  (Yarrow  1994:  71.  ) 
Consumer  prices  are  held  at  a  level  below  the  retail  price  level  prescribed  by  the 
28 regulator.  The  method,  known  generally  as  RPI-X,  tightly  controls  the  prices  which 
can  be  set  by  these  private  monopolies.  Constrained  in  the  price  setting,  the  utilities 
can  only  profit  by  increasing  internal  efficiency.  The  focus  of  efficiency  measures 
tends  to  be  labour  costs  as  these  are  usually  the  most  malleable  of  costs.  In  most 
utility  privatisations,  there  have  been  both  massive  job  losses  and  increased  work 
intensification  for  those  remaining.  O'Connell  Davidson's  analysis  of  the  privatised 
UK  water  industry  reasons: 
'Water  companies  now  have  a  strong  incentive  to  cut  costs  and  improve 
labour  productivity,  in  order  to  avoid  being  penalised  when  the  "K" 
setting  is  viewed.  This  pressure  was  one  of  the  factors  that  spurred 
management  to  make  the  changes  to  employment  relations  and  work 
organisation.  '(O'Connell-Davidson  1994:  40.  ) 
In  another  study  Ogden  identified  the  effect  of  privatisation  on  bargaining,  confirming 
to  an  extent  the  public  choice  view  of  managerial  behaviour 
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(Ogden  1993:  44-58.  ) 
As  a  consequence  of  privatisation  the  industry  was  segmented  into  a  patchwork  of 
local  water  and  sewerage  monopolies.  Predictably  national  level  bargaining 
disappeared  and  managerial  prerogative  was  unleashed.  A  flavour  of  management's 
restored  vigour  is  given  in  the  following  comment  from  a  senior  manager  at  Thames 
Water  on  the  implications  of  the  collapse  of  national  bargaining. 
"Managers  are  given  greater  control  over  their  own  affairs  and  their 
responsibility  for  people  is  more  clearly  established.  If  you  believe  that 
management  is  essentially  about  the  motivation  and  organisation  of  people.  In 
those  circumstances  it  is  difficult  to  justify  the  delegation  of  pay  and 
employment  conditions  to  an  outside  body.  "  (Ibid.  ) 
The  effects  of  price  cap  regulation  are  perhaps  most  apparent  in  the 
telecommunications  industry.  Denied  the  path  of  price  increases,  British  Telecom  has 
focused  on  a  strategy  of  sustained  cost  reduction.  A  huge  technological  shift  in  the 
industry  as  it  converts  from  analogue  to  digital  technology,  and  diversifies  into  areas 
such  as  mobile  telecommunications,  direct  business  to  business  communications,  and 
computer  networks,  has  allowed  the  company  to  off  load  workers  whilst  increasing 
productivity.  (Bolton  1994:  1.  )  Some  40-50,000  jobs  have  been  shed  in  the  UK  since 
5  Public  Choice  views  of  management  slack  and  bureaucratic  satisficing  are  often  an  adjunct  of  the 
monopoly/rent  sharing  view  of  unions. 
29 privatisation,  for  example,  at  a  time  when  the  volume  of  business  has  increased. 
Whilst  within  the  competitive  disengagement  model  and  the  regulated  control  model 
the  labour  market  effect  of  deregulation  is  implicit,  that  is,  the  pressures  of  product 
market  and  regulatory  change  lead  to  an  effect  on  the  labour  market.  In  other 
circumstances  the  labour  market  becomes  the  prime  target  of  deregulation.  Often  a 
perceived  unholy  trinity  of  managerial  slack,  inefficiency  and  union  monopoly  mean 
that  labour  market  deregulation  is  identified  as  the  only  solution  to  industry  problems. 
Thus  a  labour  market  restnicturing  approach  is  adopted  which  prioritises  labour 
market  reform.  This  aspect  of  labour  market  deregulation  is  discussed  below. 
1.2.4.  The  Labour  Market  Restnicturing  Model:  UK  Port  Transport 
The  labour  market  restnicturing  model  of  deregulation  is  explicitly  concerned  with 
the  deregulation  of  a  regulated  labour  market,  rather  than  with  any  wider  objective  of 
'allocative'  efficiency.  6  Normally  analysis  of  the  labour  market  within  a  particular 
industry  indicates  a  strong  union  monopoly,  high  levels  of  rent  sharing  and  X- 
inefficiency.  The  deregulation  of  this  labour  market  is  thus  expected  to  deliver  the 
principal  benefits'.  In  other  words  the  'technical  efficiency'  motive  is  explicit  over  the 
'allocative'  benefits.  Examples  include  the  deregulation  of  the  US  trucking  industry 
and  the  UK  port  transport  sector.  In  both  industries  the  union  monopoly,  underpinned 
by  respectively  product  market  and  explicit  labour  market  regulation,  boosted  the 
power  of  the  main  unions.  The  UK  ports  industry  is  a  prime  example  of  explicit 
labour  market  deregulation,  however,  the  tendency  of  policy  makers  to  view  the 
labour  market  as  the  central  problem  can  have  adverse  consequences  as  the  case 
below  indicates. 
Privatisation  and  deregulation  can  often  be  seen  as  a  way  of  restructuring  labour 
markets  viewed  as  'inefficient'  and  'corrupt.  This  point  is  addressed  by  Turnbull  in 
60  We  make  the  distinction  here  between  allocative  efficiency  (AE)  (greater  competition  and  pricing 
options,  lower  prices,  better  services  etc.  and  technical  efficiency,  (TE)  greater  efficiency  from  factor 
inputs  within  the  firm/  industry/sector.  The  two  can  be  self-reinforcing  with  greater  TE  allowing 
greater  competition  and  lower  prices,  as  in  US  trucking.  In  some  cases  however  there  is  reduced 
allocative  efficiency  as  in  the  case  of  the  UK  bus  industry,  and  the  docks  industry,  while  TE  is 
improved.  In  effect  it  could  be  argued  that  this  simply  means  rents  are  taken  from  labour  and  given  to 
the  firm,  without  any  redistribution  to  consumers  in  the  form  of  lower  fares,  greater  competition  or 
better  services.  (in  the  case  of  buses),  or  to  the  overall  performance  (In  the  case  of  UK  ports.  ) 
30 his  study  of  the  economic  impact  of  ports  restructuring  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
abolition  of  the  United  Kingdom  Dock  Labour  Scheme  (NDLS)  in  1989.  Turnbull 
(1991:  17-35.  )  The  'scheme'.  as  the  NDLS  became  known,  reformed  the  casualised 
basis  of  port  work  by  offering  registered  dockers  a  monopoly  over  wharfside  work. 
(Ibid.  )  The  NDLS  operated  as  a  union  monopoly  situation,  though  there  was  a 
'competing'  labour  force  in  the  'non  scheme'ports.  However,  as  Turnbull  argues,  the 
abolition  of  the  scheme  was  based  on  an  unrealistic  and  almost  theoretical  view  that 
7  non-scheme  ports  operated  as  non-union  environments.  Deregulationist  views  of  the 
labour  market  based  on  neo  classical  assumptions  of  monopoly  union  behaviour 
drove  the  policy  of  both  government  and  employers.  (Turnbull  et  al  1992:  3.  )  Labour 
was  characterised  as  the  source  of  inefficiency  with  little  reference  made  to  issues 
such  as  under-investment  and  fragmentation  in  the  UK  industry.  Structural  factors, 
such  as  the  impact  of  changing  trade  patterns  on  port  networks,  were  neglected  or 
ignored. 
As  Turnbull  (1991:  25)  argues  the  neo  classical  view  of  the  labour  market  encourages 
the  belief  that  industrial  relations  can  only  be  reformed  by  climactic  change.  The 
labour  market  is  viewed  as  the  sole  problem  and  deregulation  in  creating  incentives 
and  discipline  for  both  management  and  workers  is  seen  as  essential  to  that  process. 
The  activities  of  trade  unions  and  of  workers  and  collective  action  is  often  viewed  as 
malevolent  with  labour  groups  often  characterised  as  being  pathologically  committed 
to  maintaining  demarcations  and  restrictive  practices.  One  of  the  problems,  Turnbull 
argues,  is  the  simplified  use  of  labour  market  models.  Used  with  care  and 
qualification  these  can  elucidate  complex  employment  relationships  both  theoretically 
and  empirically,  but  in  the  hands  of  some  policy  makers  and  academics  these  models 
can  become  purely  ideological. 
According  to  Turnbull  the  simplicity  of  assumptions  involved  in  labour  market  policy 
debates  can  often  lead  to  perverse  outcomes.  The  UK  now  has  a  relatively  inefficient 
port  transport  sector  and  because  of  the  limited  scale  of  port  capacity  is  unable  to 
7  This  assumption  was  based  on  the  Monopoly  Union  wage  Model  of  employment.  However  the  actual 
power  of  Dockers  related  not  to  their  institutional  position  within  the  labour  market  but  to  the  nature  of 
the  labour  process  and  work  organisation.  As  Turnbull  explains  non-scheme  ports  where  characterised 
by  the  same  working  methods,  restrictive  practices  and  personnel  problems  as  Scheme  ports.  (Turnbull 
1991:  22) 
31 attract  the  deep  sea  traffic  which  has  been  largely  captured  by  the  rival  Hanseatic 
ports  of  Rotterdam,  Hamburg,  Antwerp  and  Bremen.  (Ibid:  27.  )  Continued  labour 
unrest  as  witnessed  in  the  recent  Liverpool  dock  strike  (Saundry  and  Turnbull  1997: 
275-289)  has  been  a  feature  of  this  casualised  labour  market  environment. 
Casualisation  and  the  destruction  of  premium  terms  and  conditions  is  of  course  a 
feature  of  other  industries,  it  fits  exactly  with  the  creation  of  a  non  union  sector  to 
challenge  perceived  union  monopoly  situations,  and  with  the  incentive  on 
management  to  reduce  costs.  In  the  case  of  the  ports  industry,  reform  has  taken  place 
sporadically  across  various  countries  often  under  the  pressures  for  structural 
adjustment,  (see  Turnbull  and  Wass  1996).  In  the  UK,  USA  and  Australia  port  labour 
has  been  comprehensively  deregulated  and  its  fortunes  can  be  contrasted  with  other 
nations  where  reform  took  place  within  a  bigh  road'  strategy  of  increased  training, 
flexibility  and  productivity.  Thus  there  has  been  a  clear  divergence  in  the  port 
transport  sector  usually  reflecting  national  industrial  relations  systems  and  constraints. 
For  example  in  a  comparative  study  of  the  UK  and  Spain,  Saundry  and  Turnbull 
(1999:  271-294)  point  out  that  in  Spain  the  tendency  towards  casualisation  has  been 
mitigated  by  comprehensive  training  and  job  protection.  They  argue  that: 
Through  a  contextualized  comparison  of  labour  regulation  in  both  countries,  it 
is  possible  to  demonstrate  that  an  institutionally  saturated  and  politically 
bargained  system  of  production  and  employment  is  compatible  with,  if  not  a 
necessary  condition  for,  competitive  performance  in  the  international  port 
transport  industry.  '  (Saundry  and  Turnbull  1999:  271-294.  ) 
Similar  developments  are  seen  in  the  Netherlands  and  Japan.  In  other  industries  the 
pressures  for  convergence  are  activated  by  a  deep-seated  reform  of  the  regulatory  and 
product  market  environment.  These  operate  in  tandem  with  common  international 
cost  structures,  common  technology,  a  similar  customer  base  and  infrastructure  to 
promote  a  global  convergence  on  re-regulation.  Within  such  an  environment  labour 
costs  become  paramount  and  though  changes  are  refracted  through  the  lens  of  national 
industrial  relations  systems,  there  is  a  pressure  for  global  convergence  on  the  labour 
market.  This  final  example  can  be  defined  as  the  global  product  tnarket  convergence 
model  and  is  discussed  below. 
32 1.2.5  The  Global  Convergence  Model:  The  Airline  Industry 
Within  certain  industries  deregulation  of  the  product  market  acts  because  of  the 
globally  integrated  nature  of  the  industry  to  promote  global  deregulation  within  the 
labour  market.  Key  examples  are  the  global  shipping  industry  where  the  deregulation 
of  crewing  has  led  to  a  convergence  on  low  cost  'flag  of  convenience'  crewing  (see 
Lane  1997),  and  the  global  airline  industry  where  deregulation,  privatisation  and 
liberalisation  have  rendered  labour  the  most  malleable  and  alterable  component  in  the 
cost  structure.  Thus  global  pressures  towards  convergence  affect  the  labour  market. 
The  developing  global  airline  industry  offers  an  example  of  this  global  product 
market  convergence  model  of  labour  market  deregulation.  The  airline  industry  has 
been  characterised  to  a  large  extent  by  growth,  with  expansion  well  above  that  of  the 
growth  in  GDP.  The  story  for  much  of  the  industry's  existence  has  been  of  vigorous 
growth  and  expansion.  As  Hanlon  argues  disregarding  the  exaggerated  impact  of  the 
low  growth  base  of  World  War  Two  passenger  air  transport  has  grown  by  an 
annualised  average  of  9  per  cent  since  1960.  The  total  output  of  the  industry  measured 
in  average  tonne  kilometres  grew  by  a  factor  of  around  20  between  1960  and  1993  the 
corresponding  GDP  rate  was  only  3.2.8  As  global  prosperity  has  grown  so  to  has  air 
travel  though  growth  has  been  more  fitful  recently  with  an  annual  rate  of  5.4  per  cent 
in  the  ten  years  between  1982  and  1992.  Most  future  predictions  of  growth  are  that  it 
will  settle  at  between  5  and  7  per  cent  over  the  decade  from  the  millennium  (Hanlon 
1996:  11,  International  Air  Transport  Association  IATA  1998.  )  Growth  rates  tend  to 
vary  by  region  with  maturity  (or  rather  stability)  being  reached  in  Europe  and  North 
America,  and  growth  potential  evident  in  the  Latin  American  and  Asia  Pacific 
regions.  This  growth  however,  is  accompanied  by  a  fall  in  yield  (the  average  profit 
per  passenger),  meaning  that  despite  huge  volumes  the  industry  earns  low  margins. 
Yield  has  fallen  precipitately.  This  is  partly  because  of  the  growth  of  leisure  travel 
which  is  price  elastic  compared  to  the  more  lucrative  business  travel  market  which  is 
(relatively)  inelastic.  In  general,  business  travellers  who  account  for  only  a  fifth  to  a 
33 third  of  passengers  can  yield  between  two  thirds  to  three  quarters  of  revenues.  British 
Airways,  for  example,  earned  70  percent  of  revenue  from  30  per  cent  of  passengers. 
Yields  have  been  falling  precipitately  thereby  affecting  profitability.  In  constant  1985 
values  yield  has  fallen  from  about  190  cents  per  passenger  in  1960  to  around  65  cents 
per  passenger  in  1995.  (Doganis  1993:  11.  )  (Ourn  and  Yu  1998:  229-237.  )  In  a  ten- 
year  analysis  of  productivity  and  profitability  Ourn  and  Yu  found  that  increased 
efficiency  was  the  most  likely  explanatory  factor  in  higher  profitability.  In  addition, 
for  much  of  its  existence  the  airline  industry  has  operated  within  a  cartelised 
environment.  States  developed  their  airline  industries  as  national  assets  given  the 
enormous  costs  of  establishing  airlines,  their  strategic  importance,  and  their  early  role 
as  a  military  reserve.  Consequently  airlines  tended  to  be  under  either  public 
ownership  as  in  the  majority  of  states,  or  operated  under  tight  regulation  as  in  the 
USA.  (See  chapter  2.  )  States  have  prioritised  the  growth  of  their  airlines,  and  in  the 
USA  the  state  through  regulation  has  also  fostered  that  growth.  In  parallel  with  state 
ownership,  given  both  the  early  problem  of  viability,  the  need  for  stability  and 
national  security,  state  ownership  and  regulation  exists  beneath  an  internationally 
regulated  system  of  bilateral  competition.  In  effect,  nations  have  agreed  to  the 
exchange  of  air  services  between  two  'city  pair'routes  often  agreeing  to  pool  revenues 
and,  in  order  to  ensure  viability,  have  restricted  the  number  of  operators  on  those 
routes.  These  'air  services  agreements'  (ASAs)  have  continued  in  existence.  A  prime 
example  is  the  Bermuda  II  agreement  between  the  UK  and  the  USA  which  in  effect 
protects  British  Airway's  access  to  the  American  market  whilst  restricting  the  rights 
of  US  operators  into  the  UK.  (Button  et  al  1998:  17.  )  In  many  ways  the  environment 
of  air  transport  regulation  has  changed  dramatically  commencing  with  the 
deregulation  of  the  US  industry  in  1978  and  the  spread  of  bilateral  liberalisation 
agreements  between  countries  such  as  the  UK  and  Ireland  (see  Barrett  1997  67-75) 
and  the  UK  and  the  Netherlands  (see  Uiittenboggart  1997:  31-38),  and  European 
deregulation.  (Hanlon  1996:  chapter  3.  )  Major  change  has  taken  place  within  the 
industry,  even  then  however,  the  structures  of  regulation  have  remained.  Writing  in 
1993  Doganis  described  a  situation,  which  largely  pertains  today: 
8  Average  Tonne  Kilometres  (ATK)  is  the  standard  crude  output  measure  and  simply  means  the  C, 
Average  number  of  Tonnes  (Passenger  and  freight)  flown  per  kilometre.  0  C,  C, 
34 Today  a  complex  web  of  bilateral  air  services  signed  by  its  home  state  faces 
each  international  airline.  Such  agreements  will  specify  which  points  can  be 
served  and  what  traffic  rights  have  been  granted.  Some  may  impose  capacity 
controls  others  may  not.  Some  may  even  insist  that  air  services  be  operated  in 
4pool'.  It  is  the  bilateral  which  tells  the  airline  when  and  where  it  can  and  cannot 
fly  and  how.  '(Doganis  1993:  30.  ) 
Air  transport  regulation  is  evolving  especially  as  air  transport  services  come  under  the 
general  framework  of  competition  policy  common  in  other  traded  services.  9  The 
cumulative  effect  of  national  and  supranational  deregulation  has  been  profound.  In 
response  to  these  pressures  countries  such  as  the  UK  and  the  Netherlands  have 
pursued  the  path  of  privatisation  and  partial  privatisation  in  order  to  adapt  their 
national  flag  carriers  to  the  competitive  environment.  The  privatisation  of  British 
Airways  in  1987  was  preceded  by  about  10  years  of  comprehensive  restructuring,  a 
similar  situation  occurred  within  the  Dutch  carrier  KLM.  These  'early  adapting' 
countries  (Encoua  1991)  as  cited  in  Marin  (1991)  have  developed  'open  skies' 
bilateral  agreements  between  them  which  have  expanded.  They  have  since  been 
joined  by  countries  like  Germany,  France,  Spain  and  Italy  who  have  undertaken 
massive  restructuring  in  order  to  meet  the  challenges  of  the  deregulated  environment. 
As  carriers  adjust  to  this  position  of  low  yields,  intensified  competition,  and  the 
escalating  price  of  equipment  and  infrastructure,  they  seek  to  control  costs.  Since  the 
cost  of  aircraft,  equipment,  reservations  systems  and  other  aspects  are  relatively 
stable,  the  area  in  which  management  has  increasingly  sought  cost  reduction  is  in 
labour  costs.  As  chapter  6  indicates,  attempts  to  reduce  labour  costs  are  based  on  the 
fact  that  air  transport  workers  have  enjoyed  premium  wages  and  conditions  which 
outstrip  those  of  external  comparators.  However,  as  in  other  industries,  management 
have  sought  to  roll  back  these  regulated  terms  and  conditions  often  in  the  teeth  of 
concerted  labour  opposition.  (Blyton  et  al  1998a.  )  Yet,  as  this  thesis  will  demonstrate, 
even  within  those  carriers  which  have  been  privatised  or  liberalised  at  an  early  stage, 
the  premium  wages  and  conditions  for  airline  workers  remain  high.  (McGurk  1997.  ) 
In  essence  these  terms  and  conditions,  as  well  as  the  industrial  relations  structures  of 
the  industry,  are  bound  up  with  the  state  owned,  subsidised  legacy  of  the  industry. 
9  There  is  a  clear  intention  under  the  General  Agreement  on 
Trade  in  Services  (GATS)  to  break  the  bilateral  system.  However  this  is  being  resisted  as  nations 
continue  to  make  air  transport  a  special  case. 
35 The  main  consequence  has  been  a  restructuring  of  national  airlines  to  improve  the 
cost  base  and  prepare  carriers  for  competition.  The  foremost  policy  has  been  that  of 
segmentation,  where  airlines  have  created  separate  operational  units  based  on  costs 
and  yield.  This  practice  originated  in  the  US  with  the  'vertical  integration'  of 
commuter  operators,  but  in  Europe  however,  the  process  has  been  one  of  franchising 
and  regionalisation.  Franchising  has  allowed  large  operators  such  as  British  Airways 
and  Lufthansa  to  feed  commuter  and  regional  traffic  into  their  route  networks  whilst 
escaping  the  costs  and  risks  of  servicing  essentially  low  yield  routes.  Lower  terms  and 
conditions  reflect  the  marginal  nature  of  these  services  thereby  allowing  the  airline 
concerned  to  reap  lower  costs.  Management  polices  in  this  regard  are  typified  by  the 
position  of  British  Airways.  (See  Colling  1995:  18-33.  ) 
These  developments  have  had  obvious  consequences  for  airline  labour  especially 
within  the  national  flag  carriers  where  regulated  wages  and  conditions  are  threatened. 
As  this  thesis  argues,  the  deregulation  of  the  airline  industry  within  both  the  USA  and 
Europe  has  been  at  least  partly  rationalised  on  the  basis  of  lower  labour  costs. 
Although  earlier  advocates  emphasised  competition  and  consumer  benefits  (Caves 
1962:  109),  later  advocates  concentrated  on  the  effect  of  regulation  in  promoting  rent 
sharing  between  labour  and  capital.  Bailey  et  al's  (1986)  demonstration  of  the  wage 
comparison  between  union  and  non-union  carriers  and  Capelli's  detailed  argument 
(1987:  44)  that  regulation  allows  increased  wages  to  be  passed  on  in  higher  consumer 
fares,  have  in  many  ways  driven  the  debate.  More  general  critiques  of  the  regulated 
sector  such  as  Kahn's  argument  about  the  inherent  productive  inefficiency  of 
regulated  enterprise  were  also  seminal,  and  had  major  labour  market  implications. 
(Kahn  1970.  )  These  contributions  have  all  reflected  an  aspect  of  the  wider  debate 
about  regulation/deregulation  and  the  labour  market  originating  in  the  USA.  Both 
Caves  and  Bailey  et  al  utilised  a  simple  union  monopoly  framework  to  analyse  how 
labour  obtains  and  protects  superior  wage  levels.  Kahn's  approach  utilised  a  mixture 
of  public  choice  theory  and  X-efficiency,  to  indicate  how  managers  and  bureaucrats 
had  little  incentive  to  serve  the  public  interest  causing  them  to  collude  in  rent  sharing 
pacts  with  airline  labour.  Capelli  demonstrated  how  collective  bargaining  dominated 
by  strong  labour  groups  such  as  pilots  and  maintenance  staff,  allowed  labour  to  share 
in  the  rents  of  the  industry  and  for  a  disproportionate  share  of  those  rents  to  accrue  to 
36 the  most  powerful  groups.  Thus  analyses  of  the  regulated  airline  industry  carried  an 
implicit  analysis  of  how  labour  benefited  from  regulation. 
As  later  chapters  will  demonstrate,  US  airline  labour  has  suffered  setbacks  and  has 
conceded  some  ground,  yet  the  resilience  of  labour  terms  and  conditions  is  the  more 
dominant  picture.  Disregarding  some  seemingly  spectacular  falls  in  average  earnings 
(see  chapter  4)  which  appear  no  worse  than  general  falls  in  the  economy,  deregulation 
has  affected  labour  ifi  more  subtle  ways.  10  Arguably,  although  there  has  been  some  re- 
alignment  and  retrenchment  over  the  long  run,  deregulation  has  had  no  great  impact 
on  the  potential  power  of  organised  labour.  That  is  not  to  disregard  the  effect  of 
painful  restructuring  and  bankruptcy  episodes  and  the  many  bitter  disputes  which 
have  arisen,  but  to  put  these  in  a  longer  term  context. 
Has  a  similar  picture  emerged  within  Europe?  Clearly  the  process  of  liberalisation  and 
deregulation  within  Europe  has  affected  airline  labour  within  Europe,  most  often 
through  the  privatisation  of  state  carriers  and  the  withdrawal  of  continuous  state 
subsidy.  At  the  same  time  the  emerging  structure  of  competition  has  had  pronounced, 
if  as  yet  unmeasured,  effects.  The  pressure  towards  concentration  and  merger,  and  the 
growth  of  alliances  and  marketing  pacts,  are  promoting  a  major  re-alignment  of  costs 
within  both  large  and  small  airlines.  Constraints  of  infrastructure  and  the  continued 
dominance  of  large  carriers  through  their  proprietary  alliances  mean  that  competition 
has  taken  place  at  the  margins,  but  arguably  this  low  cost  competition  has  had  major 
labour  market  effects.  Carriers  such  as  Ryanair,  EasyJet,  and  Air  One  have  exposed 
the  cost  bases  of  the  major  carriers  in  low  yield  routes,  and  threaten  profitability  on 
key  business  routes  through  the  problem  of  overcapacity.  The  major  carriers  use  cost 
comparisons  with  these  carriers  in  order  to  encourage  cost  reductions  within  their  own 
operations.  (See  chapter  7.  )  The  low  cost  carriers  however,  target  a  different  market 
than  the  flag  carriers  who  still  derive  enormous  benefits  from  their  domination  of  the 
major  international  hubs,  which  tend  to  be  used  by  business  travellers.  The  low  cost 
operators  tend  to  use  secondary  airports  and  target  the  'point  to  point'budget  leisure 
market.  (See  chapter  7  for  discussion  of  their  cost  structures.  )  Often  the  major 
carriers  initiate  their  own  low  cost  operations  as  BA  has  done  with  the  creation  of 
37 both  EuroGatwick  and  GO,  and  Alitalia  with  it's  TEAM  subsidiary,  often 
supplementing  these  with  regional  operations  carrying  lower  wage  rates  and  inferior 
conditions  to  'core'  (i.  e.  higher  yield)  services.  These  trends  towards  labour  market 
segmentation  have  affectedwages  and  conditions  within  the  main  flag  carriers  and 
illustrate  the  kind  of  restructuring  which  is  going  on  within  them. 
Thus  it  is  essential  that  we  understand  the  interactions  and  dynamics  taking  place 
within  the  system  of  regulation,  the  product  market  and  the  labour  market.  However 
one  final  piece  of  the  jigsaw  has  to  be  completed  in  order  for  us  to  reach  a  full 
understanding  of  the  process  of  deregulation.  So  far  we  have  concentrated  on  the 
labour  market  and  employment  change,  rather  than  on  the  industrial  relations  aspects 
of  the  issue.  Yet  these  are  crucial.  It  is  the  prevalence  and  power  of  organised  labour, 
the  relationship  between  labour  and  the  state,  and  the  power  resources  of  both  labour 
and  capital  which  together  with  the  system  of  regulation,  the  product  market  and 
labour  market  environment,  determine  the  course  of  events.  The  industrial  relations 
context  is  discussed  below. 
1.3  Privatisation,  Deregulation  and  Labour  Market  Reform:  The 
Industrial  Relations  Dimension 
1.3.1  Privatisation,  Deregulation  and  The  Institutions  of  Industrial  Relations 
'The  labour  market  never  was  and  never  will  be  a  bourse  and  other  intellectual 
tools  are  required  to  explain  persistent  wage  and  benefit  differences  in  labour 
markets.  Product  market  forces  and  internal  labour  markets  play  a  significant 
role  in  such  persistent  differentials  beyond  any  supply  side  differences.  ' 
(Dunlop  1993:  7.  ) 
Dunlop's  advice  to  look  beyond  the  pre-occupation  with  wages  and  labour  costs  has 
only  recently  been  heeded.  Employment  change  within  privatised  and  deregulated 
industries  have  been  well  documented  by  writers  such  as,  Ferner  and  Colling  (1991 
and  1995),  Veljanovski  (1987),  and  O'Connel-Davidson  (1994).  Looking  at  the 
experience  of  privatisation  in  the  UK  erner  and  Colling  associate  privatisation  with 
the  removal  of  the  "social  and  political  obligations  and  constraints  that  hamper 
10  Chapter  4  will  demonstrate  that  moving  beyond  earnings  gives  a  more  complete  picture  of  how  key 
labour  groups  have  been  affected  by  deregulation. 
38 management  action.  "  (Ferner  and  Colling  1995.  )  This  brings  a  reassertion  of 
managerial  prerogative  as  the  public  choice  and  agency  theory  literature  would 
suggest.  (Ibid.  )  Privatisation  implies  the  transfer  of  property  rights  from  the  public 
domain  to  the  private,  and  encourages  management  to  re-assert  its  power  and  control. 
As  privatisation  takes  place  and  labour  markets  are  deregulated,  there  is  a  clash 
between  the  industrial  relations  structures  of  nationalisation  and  the  desire  of 
management  to  utilise  labour  resources  more  'efficiently'.  Implicit  within  this  view  is 
an  assumption  that  where  labour  markets  are  subjected  to  privatisation  or 
deregulation,  they  automatically  become  more  'efficient'. 
Typical  of  these  approaches  was  a  study  of  the  industrial  relations  of  privatisation  and 
marketisation  within  UK  public  enterprises.  (Pendleton  and  Winterton  1993:  55, 
Ferner  and  Colling  1995:  391-409.  )  The  study  examined  the  impact  of  privatisation 
and  deregulation  upon  the  workforce,  trade  unions,  bargaining,  and  managerial 
prerogative.  In  analysing  these  industries  in  both  contemporary  and  historical  context, 
these  writers  were  able  to  uncover  many  interesting  facets  of  the  deregulated 
employment  relationship.  One  such  finding,  and  a  finding  bome  out  by  this  thesis,  is 
that  there  is  a  tendency  to  look  at  privatisation  and  deregulation  as  a  discontinuity,  a 
break  with  some  perceived  former  system.  This  may  well  be  true  in  terins  of  the 
product  market  and  organisational  structures  but  is  only  partially  true  of  industrial 
relations.  The  studies  indicate  that  even  without  overt  commercial  pressure,  rapid 
change  was  introduced  into  such  industries  over  time.  Pendleton's  study  of  the 
railway  industry  is  instructive.  As  he  argues,  systematic  rationalisation  took  place 
throughout  the  nationalised  period:  the  route  network  was  reduced  by  44  per  cent 
from  1948  to  1979.  (Pendleton  1993:  45.  )  Major  job  loss  and  labour  market 
restructuring  attended  this.  Major  modernisation  initiatives  such  as  the  transition  from 
steam  to  diesel  and  then  electric  power  caused  considerable  job  loss  (Ibid.  46). 
1.3.2  Deregulation,  Decentralisation  and  Bargaining 
Perhaps  the  key  difference  between  a  regulated  and  a  privatised  environment  is  an 
overriding  emphasis  on  efficiency.  One  key  efficiency  target  is  the  rationalisation  and 
decentralisation  of  bargaining  structures  and  the  introduction  of  more  managerial 
forms  of  labour  control.  The  trend  towards  decentralisation  in  transport  and  utilities  as 
39 a  consequence  of  fragmentation  and  the  'strategic  choice'  by  management  in  British 
Airways  to  develop  an  HRM  culture  in  the  aftermath  of  privatisation  are  examples  of 
this.  However  as  the  British  Airway's  case  study  in  chapter  5  and  6  will  indicate,  the 
transfer  of  ownership  from  the  public  to  the  private  sphere  does  not  mean  that  the 
bargaining  power  of  labour  is  automatically  challenged.  This  very  much  depends  on 
the  context  of  regulation  and  industrial  relations  within  the  country  concerned  and 
industry  studied. 
Certainly,  labour  often  suffers  from  job  losses,  reduced  pay,  casualisation, 
outsourcing  and  other  negative  employment  aspects  associated  with  restructured 
labour  markets.  However,  these  changes  cannot  be  applied  uniformly  to  labour  in 
regulated  and  privatised  industries,  again  they  depend  on  the  context  of  the  regulatory 
system  and  the  product  market.  Another  essential  aspect  of  the  industrial  relations 
picture  is  the  role  of  expectations  in  worker  perception  of  the  employment  contract. 
Under  regulation  and/or  public  ownership  workers  become  used  to  a  level  of 
employment  regulation.  How  this  regulation  of  the  employment  relationship  arises  is 
the  topic  of  the  next  chapter.  What  is  important  at  this  stage  is  that  these  expectations 
can  only  be  altered  slowly  and  painfully.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  industries  such 
as  the  airline  industry  where  the  effects  of  strike action  on  individual  carriers  are  so 
severe  that  'climactic'  change  of  the  type  discussed  by  Turnbull  in  relation  to  the  UK 
ports  is  at  best  extremely  difficult  and  at  worst  impossible.  Management  to  some 
extent  relies  on  the  effects  of  regulatory  and  product  market  change  to  drive  forward 
restructuring. 
Regulatory  reform often  plays  a  central  role,  in  tandem  with  product  market  change, 
in  undermining  structures  of  labour  market  regulation  and  collective  bargaining. 
(Femer  and  Colling  1991:  391-409.  )  It  is  the  combined  pressure  of  regulatory, 
product  market  and  labour  market  change,  which  in  turn  influence  management 
strategy.  Deregulation  allows  product  rnark-et  change  to  become  more  of  a  driver  of 
labour  market  conditions  than  in  the  preceding  regulated  era.  Despite  the  obvious 
pressures  labour  does  not  willingly  submit  to  this  set  of  regulatory  and  product  market 
pressure.  Management  often  assumes  that  workers  will  submit  to  the  realities  of  the 
deregulated  environment  and  surrender  the  premium  terms  and  conditions 
40 accumulated  under  regulation.  Workers  however,  become  used  to  a  certain 
expectation  of  labour  market  regulation  such  as  a  full  time,  well  paid  job,  a  core 
employment  contract  underpinned  by  collective  bargaining,  which  they  become 
reluctant  to  surrender.  In  fact  given  the  alternative  of  'market  rates',  outsourcing,  the 
introduction  of  atypical  contracts  and  the  dissolution  of  national  wage  bargaining,  it  is 
rational  for  workers  to  protect  their  regulated  terms  and  conditions.  These 
expectations  which  can  be  termed  the  'regulatory  overhang'are  discussed  in  chapters 
3,4,5,6  and  7.  Nevertheless,  even  in  privatised  and  deregulated  environments  labour 
retains  strong  bargaining  power  and  is  able,  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  is  often 
acknowledged,  to  influence  that  change.  The  'regulatory  overhang'  can  only  be 
removed  by  guarantees  of  job  security  at  existing  rates  for  existing  staff,  and  the 
transfer  of  the  adjustment  burden  onto  new  staff.  The  use  of  pay  restructuring, 
particularly  the  use  of  tiered  wage  structures,  reflects  this  need  within  the  airline 
industry  to  protect  'insiders'at  the  expense  of  outsiders.  This  issue  and  others  will  be 
detailed  in  the  case  study  of  British  Airways. 
Undoubtedly  in  the  long  run,  labour  can  suffer  from  privatisation  and  deregulation, 
however,  to  re-iterate,  its  fortunes  are  affected  by  a  complex  interplay  of  business 
strategy,  product  market  change,  and  regulatory  response.  Aspects  such  as  inter-firm 
collaboration,  concentration,  and  globalisation  all  operate  to  shape  labour  market 
change.  In  response  to  these  labour  market  developments  a  variety  of  changes  in 
bargaining  and  in  management  and  trade  union  response  occur.  Both  management  and 
trade  union  response  are  crucial  in  our  discussion  of  the  airline  industry.  The  effect  of 
market  reform  despite  the  stylised  models  of  rent  sharing  and  public  choice  does  not 
automatically  strengthen  management.  The  process  can  be  much  more  complex. 
Fairbrother  (1994)  uses  the  example  of  restructuring  of  industrial  relations  in  the  UK 
Civil  Service,  pointing  to  the  absence  of  literature  on  the  labour  implications  of  these 
reforms: 
'...  it  remains  uncertain  just  how  managerial  structures  have  been  recast  and  the 
way  their  recasting  has  a  bearing  on  work  and  employment  relations.  ' 
(Fairbrother  1994:  13.  ) 
41 Fairbrother  believes  that  paradoxically  privatisation  and  market  restructuring  can 
impact  positively  on  trade  unionism,  by  opening  the  door  to  trade  union  renewal.  He 
points  to  the  ossified,  male  dominated  structures  of  UK  Civil  Service  unions  being 
galvanised  by  the  growing  concern  of  members  at  the  threat  to  jobs  and  conditions. 
(Ibid.  )  Moreover,  he  points  to  a  rise  of  managerialism  replacing  the  culture  of 
paternalism,  which  operates  in  tandem  with  the  old  union  structures.  These  forces,  he 
argues,  combined  to  alter  the  stance  of  both  trade  unions  and  management.  Further 
evidence  for  the  renewal  thesis  is  found  in  Lloyd's  study  of  the  effect  of 
decentralisation  on  bargaining  within  the  NHS.  (Lloyd  1997:  477-446.  )  Such 
arguments  certainly  call  into  question  the  assumptions  of  the  public  choice/principal 
agent  approach,  they  illustrate  the  richness  and  complexity  of  industrial  relations 
environments  which  are  not  automatically  eroded  by  restructuring.  What  is  clear  is 
that  changes  of  ownership  and  the  introduction  of  explicitly  commercial  objectives  do 
affect  industrial  relations  but  that  these  changes  interact  with,  and  are  tempered  by, 
the  power  and  capacity  of  management  and  labour. 
Conclusion 
We  have  examined  the  centrality  of  employment  change  within  the  context  of 
deregulation  and  privatisation  in  a  number  of  industries.  Major  theories  relating  to  the 
issue  of  both  regulation  and  the  labour  market  have  been  discussed,  focusing  on  the 
dominant  union  monopoly/rent-sharing  approach.  In  order  to  develop  our  analysis  of 
it  was  argued  that  economic  approach,  devoid  of  industrial  relations  institutions  and 
contexts,  was  inadequate.  Despite  the  methodological  rigour  of  many  such  studies, 
they  address  only  the  outcomes  of  labour  market  deregulation.  Rather,  an  appreciation 
of  the  interplay  between  regulatory  reform,  product  market  change  and  industrial 
relations  processes  provided  a  richer  and  more  fruitful  analysis.  Workers  become  used 
to  a  certain  expectation  of  employment  under  regulation,  which  is  not  readily  altered 
by  the  introduction  of  regulatory  reform  and  restructuring.  Such  change  can  even  have 
the  effect  of  re-galvanising  the  bargaining  environment  sometimes,  as  in  the  civil 
service;  dormant  institutions  of  industrial  relations  are  re-vitalised  by  change.  This 
suggests  a  further  complication  to  the  deregulation-employment  argument,  which  is 
42 examined  within  this  thesis.  In  order  to  build  upon  this  analysis  the  next  chapter 
begins  a  study  of  deregulation  and  labour  market  change  within  the  airline  industry. 
Given  the  case  study  and  theoretical  evidence  on  deregulation  and  employment,  the 
airline  industry  provides  an  excellent  opportunity  to  assess  the  nature  of  deregulation 
and  labour  market  change.  The  airline  industry  has  been  one  of  the  few  globally 
regulated  industries,  whose  deregulation  alters  labour  market  conditions  throughout 
the  world.  Regulatory  intervention  in  both  the  USA  and  Europe  made  labour 
conditions  and  industrial  relations  part  of  the  fabric  of  that  regulation.  Analysis  of  the 
comparative  industrial  relations  system  between  the  USA  and  UK  will  therefore,  be 
used  as  a  framework  to  examine  the  principal  types  of  product  and  labour  market 
regulation  and  their  specific  effects  on  employment.  The  following  chapter  therefore 
locates  that  Process  of  change  historically  by  examining  the  nature  of  product  market 
and  labour  market  regulation  within  the  airline  industry. 
43 2 
Methodology 
2.1.1  The  Broad  Theoretical  Approach:  A  Political  Economy  of  Airline  Deregulation 
and  Employment 
The  previous  chapter  explored  the  nature  of  labour  market  deregulation  in  regulated 
industries.  Building  on  the  models  of  deregulation  and  employment  introduced  in 
chapter  1,  the  thesis  develops  an  analysis  of  the  airline  industry,  as  a  sectoral.  case 
study  of  the  impact  of  employment  deregulation.  In  order  to  do  so  the  study  develops 
an  approach,  which  integrates  regulatory,  product  market  and  labour  market  aspects 
of  deregulation  and  employment.  In  doing  so  it  focuses  upon  the  airline  industry 
building  upon  previous  research  efforts.  There  is  a  huge  disparity  in  that  research 
effort  between  Europe  and  the  United  States  where  airline  industry  research  is  more 
prominent.  Thus  early  work  by  Kahn  (1950)  and  Baitsell  (1966)  looked  at  the 
bargaining  power  of  pilots  and  engineers  but  very  much  from  an  institutional  and 
empirical  viewpoint.  Krolick  developed  a  broader  approach  in  his  comparative  study 
of  the  occupational  differences  between  pilots  and  railroad  engineers,  yet  a 
comprehensive  analysis  was  missing.  (Krolick  1966.  )  In  Britain,  Blain's  (1971) 
application  of  Dunlopian  system  theory  to  the  development  of  the  pilots'  union, 
BALPA,  and  growth  of  industrial  relations  structures  provided  the  first  systematic 
analysis  of  the  airline  industry.  The  approach  of  these  researchers  was  necessarily 
confined  to  the  institutional  history  of  pilots  and  their  employers.  (Blain  1970.  )  Both 
provided  a  historical  analysis  of  pilots  in  the  UK  and  the  USA  respectively  but  only 
Blain  made  an  attempt  to  develop  theory  out  of  seemingly  disparate  episodes  of 
industrial  relations  behaviour.  The  author  felt  that  most  approaches  tended  to  divorce 
the  airline  industry  from  its  regulatory  structure  product  market,  and  often  from  its 
wider  labour  market.  The  issue  of  continuity  therefore  becomes  as  an  essential  aspect 
44 of  the  research  given  the  resilience  of  aspects  such  as  trade  union  power,  collective 
bargaining  and  labour  unrest  in  a  deregulated  and  privatised  environment.  These 
factors  contribute  to  the  persistence  of  worker  expectations  of  terms  and  conditions, 
defined  in  chapter  7  as  the  regulatory  overhang. 
In  investigating  the  emergence  of  deregulatory  change  within  the  USA  and  Europe, 
this  study  hopes  to  accomplish  several  aims.  Firstly,  to  synthesise  the  available 
literature  identifying  a  common  set  of  themes  and  issues.  Secondly,  to  develop  a 
theoretical  approach  to  the  study  of  labour  market  regulation/deregulation  within  the 
industry.  Thirdly,  to  provide  core  case  studies  of  the  effect  of  regulation/deregulation 
on  pilots  as  a  key  occupational  group.  Fourthly,  the  thesis  uses  a  case  study  and 
employee  survey  of  British  Airways  to  look  at  worker  attitudes  towards  deregulatory 
and  product  market  change,  within  a  critical  case  context.  The  survey  provides  the 
foundation  for  a  wider analysis  of  deregulation  within  Europe  and  the  effects  of  that 
process  on  trade  union  and  employer  strategies.  Finally,  the  consequences  of  the 
emerging  regulatory  and  product  market  environment  are  analysed  in  respect  of  their 
impact  for  the  future  labour  market  environment. 
Before  going  on  to  consider  the  research  questions  we  need  to  outline  the  basic 
theoretical  approach  of  the  thesis.  The  approach  involves  identifying  distinct 
categories  of  employment  effect  arising  from  the  process  of  regulation  and 
deregulation.  A  process  of  regulated  control  can  be  seen  to  have  pertained  between 
1935-1978.  Then  product  market  and  technical  regulation  delivered  a  heavily 
regulated  labour  market,  although  there  were  shifts  in  the  nature  and  extent  of 
regulation.  This  period  was  followed  by  a  process  of  competitive  disengagement, 
where  the  removal  of  regulatory  controls  on  the  product  market  encourage  rapid 
market  entry  and  exit,  as  in  the  USA  from  1978.  The  process  of  deregulation  was 
much  more  gradualist  within  Europe,  but  when  regulatory  and  product  market  took 
place,  industrial  relations  and  the  labour  market  were  identified  as  the  central  obstacle 
to  reform.  Thus  the  labour  market  restructuring  model  is  used  to  explain  this  period 
of  early  restructuring  within  Europe.  In  that  period  powerful  unions  and  collective 
bargaining  were  identified  as  upholding  excessive  wages,  poor  productivity,  and 
driving  political  pressure  for  subsidies  and  protection.  By  the  late  deregulation  period 
roughly  from  about  1995  onwards,  industry  consolidation,  interfirm  collaboration  and 
45 an  increasing  focus  on  costs  and  productivity  the  airline  industry  can  be  identified 
within  a  global  product  market  convergence  model. 
In  addition  to  these  broad  questions  a  number  of  specific  questions  are  addressed 
within  the  survey  relating  to  employee  perceptions  of  the  effect  of  deregulation, 
product  market  change  and  labour  market  change  upon  airline  employees  using  the 
case  study  of  British  Airways.  These  research  questions  within  the  British  Airways 
case  are  addressed  in  section  2.2.5. 
2.1.2  The  Political  EconomylDynamics  of  Industrial  Relations  Approach 
In  addressing  these  research  questions  the  thesis  was  informed  by  a  central  theoretical 
approach.  The  main  theoretical  stance  is  that  of  the  political  econoinyldynainics 
approach  based  on  realist/political  economy  approach.  Godard  (1994:  1-35.  )  Godard 
criticises  prevailing  approaches  to  the  study  of  industrial  relations  as  reliant  on  logical 
empiricist  and  behaviourist  epistemologies.  He  argues  for  a  more  grounded  analysis, 
providing  a  theoretical  foundation  for  the  field.  The  'political  economy'  approach, 
practised  by  writers  such  as  Hyman  (1989,1991),  Fox  (1974),  R.  Edwards  (1979), 
Gospel  and  Littler  (1983)  and  P.  K.  Edwards  (1986)  is,  he  believes,  more  useful.  These 
approaches  which  analyse  industrial  relations  their  social,  and  economic  context  allow 
seemingly  rapid  shifts  and  reversals  to  be  viewed  dynamically.  That  is  they  come  to 
be  seen  not  as  disparate  episodes  but  as  part  of  the  process  of  industrial  relations 
between  the  state  capital  and  labour.  This  approach  is  adopted  by  Turnbull  et  al 
(1992)  in  their  analysis  of  the  restructuring  of  the  dock  labour  scheme.  Understanding 
critical  episodes  of  conflict  and  change  and  analysing  these  within  their  industry, 
economic  and  political  context  is  therefore  crucial.  As  Blyton  and  Turnbull  argue: 
'Employee  relations  do  not  take  place  in  a  vacuum.  They  are  situated 
within,  influenced  by  and  in  turn  impact  upon  many  other  aspects  of 
the  work  organisation.  Variables  such  as  the  size  and  structure  of 
companies,  the  technologies  they  use,  their  patterns  of  ownership  and 
control,  and  the  character  of  their  product  markets  have  increasingly 
come  to  be  recognised  as  important  influences  on  the  processes  and 
outcomes  of  employee  relations.  '  (B  lyton  and  Turnbull  1998:  37.  ) 
46 Without  such  an  emphasis,  institutional  complexities  and  peculiarities  fixate  analysis. 
(Blyton  and  Turnbull  (1998.  )  Extending  this  approach  the  same  authors  have 
developed  an  approach,  which  views  industrial  relations  not  as  the  study  of 
institutions  and  their  peculiarities,  but  as  an  analysis  of  'changing  modes  of  labour 
regulation'.  (Blyton  and  Turnbull  1996:  7-20.  )  Modes  of  regulation'are  the  forms  of 
low  level  and  high  level  job  control,  which  govern  the  relationships  between  labour 
and  capital.  (Ibid.  )  In  this  way  we  can  assess  changes  in  employment  regulation  in  a 
comparative  sense  without  being  blinded  by  institutional  differences.  As  chapter  3 
will  indicate,  the  stability  which  characterised  the  airline  industry  before  the  1980s 
was  upset  by  the  changed  economics  of  the  industry,  forcing  management  to  institute 
a  new  mode  of  regulation  via  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact,  (MAP)  which  effectively  matched 
the  collective  bargaining  strength  of  pilots.  The  role  of  the  state  is  crucial,  given  its 
own  goals  in  promoting  a  strong  and  stable  airline  industry.  The  fact  that  it  reversed 
its  previous  decision  of  upholding  the  interests  of  labour  indicated  the  ways  in  which 
changes  in  the  form  of  product  market  regulation  could  impact  upon  labour. 
Previously  the  state  had  overseen  the  promotion  of  craft  based  collective  bargaining 
through  the  Railway  Labor  Act,  as  a  method  of  securing  safe,  stable  air  transport. 
These  shifts  can  be  understood  within  dynamics/political  economy  framework. 
Traditional  approaches  would  see  unions  neutralised,  and  management  in  the 
ascendancy,  because  of  the  nature  of  product  market  competition  and  management 
strategies.  Such  a  view  would  be  particularly  plausible  in  the  case  of  the  UK,  where 
labour  market  deregulation,  job  insecurity  and  high  unemployment  have  produced  a 
labour  market  setting  which  has  strengthened  management.  Yet  such  a  view  ignores 
the  institutional  and  product  market  context  of  the  airline  industry  which,  though 
privatised  was  still  subject  to  tight  regulation.  Thus  collective  bargaining  and  union 
influence  continued  to  apply  within  labour  management  relations  at  BA,  more  than  a 
decade  after  privatisation.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  reason  for  this  is  that  workers  have 
become  used  to  certain  broadly  defined  norms  of  employment  within  the  airline 
industry,  involving  a  unified  firm  focus,  high  wages,  generous  work  rules  and 
generous  fringe  benefits.  These  characteristics  are  all  part  of  an  airline  employment 
compact,  described  in  chapters  3  and  4.  The  study  of  BA  and  its  employment  relations 
forms  a  central  aspect  of  the  study. 
47 2.2.  The  Research  Questions 
In  looking  at  these  issues  several  key  questions  are  addressed.  The  broader  questions 
are  introduced  and  are  posed  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  regulated  and  deregulated 
period.  These  broad  questions  are  then  expanded  into  specific  research  questions  to  be 
dealt  with  in  each  chapter. 
2.2.1  The  Regulated  Environment 
A  number  of  broad  questions  address  the  nature  of  the  labour  market  under  regulation. 
This  allows  the  study  to  be  set  in  context  by  framing  the  issue  in  terms  of  the 
continuities  of  industrial  and  labour  relations.  This  provides  an  opportunity  to  locate 
the  issue  of  regulation/deregulation  within  the  context  of  earlier  employment  change. 
Why  did  labour  market  regulation  arise  in  the  airline  industry,  whatfonnIs  did  it 
take  and  what  were  the  broadprocesses  of  its  introduction? 
Which  groups  of  workers  benefitedfrom  collective  bargaining  and  why? 
"  How  did  airline  management  in  both  nations  regard  the  spread  of  collective 
bargaining? 
"  What  was  the  role  of  product  market  regulation  in  regard  to  controls  on  market 
entry,  fare  setting,  mergers,  concentration  and  other  industry  matters? 
2.2.2  The  Deregulated  Environment 
Deregulation  has  altered  the  airline  labour  market  considerably.  In  terms  of  the 
deregulated  environment  a  number  of  general  questions  are  addressed: 
What  were  the  effects  of  deregulation  on  the  product  market  and  labour  market? 
What  effect  did  deregulation  have  on  the  earnings  of  key  airline  labour  groups? 
Whatfeatures  of  the  institutional  and  labour  market  endured  between  the  USA  and 
Europe? 
What  was  the  role  of  the  state  in  promoting  a  particular  type  of  deregulation?  - 
What  sort  of  business  strategies  einergedfrom  deregulation  and  what  were  the 
limitations  of  these  strategies? 
9  What  has  been  labour's  response  in  the  USA  and  Europe? 
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questions.  These  are  detailed  by  order  of  the  chapter  in  which  they  are  dealt  with, 
although  issues  are  interlaced  throughout  the  thesis.  The  British  Airway's  case  study 
and  research  questions  are  dealt  with  in  a  later  section. 
The  Dynarnics  of  Product  and  Labour  Market  Regulation  In  The  US  and  Airline 
Industry. 
This  section  examines  the  detailed  impact  of  regulation  and  industrial  relations  within 
the  airline  industry.  It  identifies  the  product  and  labour  market  effects,  permitting 
shifts  and  developments  in  the  relative  position  of  labour  and  management  to  be 
analysed.  The  following  questions  are  addressed. 
*  How  did  regulation  of  the  product  market  affect  the  labour  market  and 
employment  relations  within  both  the  US  and  the  UK? 
*  How  did  an  institutional  framework  of  industrial  relations  arise  within  the  airline 
industry,  in  the  US,  UK  and  globally? 
*  What  were  the  effects  on  trade  unions  and  management? 
*  How  did  management  respond  to  the  bargaining  power  of  trade  unions  in  both 
countries? 
What  role  did  the  state  play  in  airline  industrial  relations? 
To  what  extent  does  the  Regulated  Control  nwdel  of  labour  market  deregulation 
explain  the  nature  ofproduallabour  market  regulation  in  this  period? 
Pilots  and  Management  Under  Deregulation:  The  USA  and  Europe  (Chapter  4). 
Building  on  earlier  analysis  of  the  regulated  and  deregulated  environment,  the 
discussion  details  the  impact  on  a  key  employee  group.  Concentrating  on  the 
experience  of  pilots  in  both  the  USA  and  the  UK  allows  for  a  number  of  key  questions 
to  be  addressed: 
*  What  has  been  the  effect  of  deregulation1product  market  change  on  pilots  as  a  key 
occupational  group  both  within  the  USA  and  Europe? 
49 "  To  what  extent  has  concession  bargaining  affected  pilots  within  the  US  and 
European  industry? 
"  To  what  extent  have  European  airline  management  been  able  to  make  inroads  into 
pilot  tenns  and  conditions? 
"  How  have  airline  premium  wages  been  main  tained/undermined  since 
deregulation? 
"  How  have  pilots  maintained  their  influence  through  regulatory  structures  and  new 
forins  offirin  governance? 
"  How  does  the  Competitive  Disengagement  model  of  labour  market  deregulation 
explain  this  period? 
Deregulation  and  Employment  in  the  European  Airline  Industry:  The  Emerging 
Trend  (Chapter  7). 
The  study  of  the  European  airline  industry  examined  in  this  chapter  offers  a 
comparative  analysis  between  the  US  and  Europe.  Extending  earlier  work  on  pilots 
and  the  case  study/survey  of  British  Airways  allows  for  issues  of  wages  and 
productivity,  management  strategy  and  trade  union  response  to  be  addressed. 
How  do  US  and  European  airlines  compare  in  terms  of  productivity  and 
efficiency? 
To  what  extent  is  state  ownership  afactor  in  this  relative  performance? 
Can  this  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  concept  of  rent  sharing  and  premium 
wages/regulatory  overhang? 
How  have  management  strategies  attempted  to  tackle  these  rigidities  in  response 
to  deregulation? 
What  has  been  the  extent  offranchising  and  low  cost  strategies  within  Europe? 
To  what  extent  has  there  been  industrial  actionlconflict  within  the  European 
airline  industry? 
How  has  industrial  action  affected  management  stance  in  the  restructuring 
process? 
How  does  the  Labour  Market  Restructuring  model  of  employment  deregulation 
help  us  to  understand  the  process  of  adjustment  in  the  European  airline  industry? 
From  Regulated  Control  to  Global  Product  Market  Convergence:  The  Emerging 
Regulatory  Framework  and  The  Airline  Labour  Market  (Chapter  8). 
Additional  questions  about  market  structure  and  competition  within  both  the  USA  and 
Europe  are  addressed  in  chapter  8.  This  chapter  investigates  the  dynamic  nature  of 
regulatory,  product  and  labour  market  change.  This  allows  a  comparison  between  the 
USA  and  Europe.  The  chapter  also  offers  an  analysis  of  the  global  consequences  for 
airline  employment  of  an  'emerging'regulatory  and  product  market  environment. 
50 To  what  extent  has  the  US  and  European  airline  industry  become  concentrated 
since  deregidation? 
What  has  happened  to  regulatory  and  competition  policy  since  deregulation? 
How  has  the  withdrawal  of  state  aid  affected  the  stnicture  of  the  industry  and 
impacted  upon  airline  labour? 
How  have  concentration  and  emerging  regulatory  structures  affected  labour 
conditions? 
What  is  the  likely  impact  of  alliances  and  code  sharing  on  employment? 
To  what  extent  have  regulatorylproduct  market  changes  shifted  the  burden  of 
deregulation  onto  labour? 
How  have  trade  unions  responded  towards  these  strategies? 
To  what  extent  does  Global  Product  Market  Convergence  explain  changes  in  the 
labour  market  and  industrial  relations? 
The  study  will  therefore  utilise  the  models  of  employment  regulation  introduced  in 
chapter  1,  detailing  how  the  interconnected  process  of  product,  labour  market  and 
regulatory  change  impact  upon  employment.  The  next  section  discusses  the  various 
sources  used  in  this  aspect  of  the  study. 
2.2.1  The  Secondary  Data 
In  order  to  analyse  these  questions  a  range  of  secondary  data  and  literature  is 
analysed.  These  combined  sources  are  used  to  address  both  broad  and  specific 
questions  on  the  employment  impact  of  deregulation.  The  benefits  and  shortcomings 
of  the  various  sources  are  discussed  below.  Questions  on  the  BA  case  study  are  given 
in  the  section  on  the  case  study  and  survey  (2.2.5). 
ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  Data  and  IATA  World  Air  Transport  Statistics 
In  addition  a  range  of  questions  relating  to  the  nature  of  wages,  employment  and 
bargaining  are  addressed  through  secondary  data.  This  involved  using  International 
Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO,  the  UN  directorate  for  civil  aviation)  and  the 
International  Air  Transport  Association  (IATA,  the  employers'  body)  as  key  sources 
of  data  on  wages  employment  and  productivity.  There  are  major  problems  with  these 
secondary  sources.  Firstly  the  problem  of  non-response  is  particularly  acute  in  regard 
to  the  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  data  where  many  large  airlines  fail  to  complete  the 
necessary  entries  and  the  researcher  has  to  extrapolate  from  earlier  data.  For  example 
51 in  order  to  obtain  comparison  data  for  earnings  between  European  carriers  the  mean 
of  the  highest  earnings  in  Europe  and  the  US  is  used  for  the  missing  observations. 
(See  chapter  7.  )  In  addition  the  data  is  often  out  of  date,  as  returns  are  made  just  in 
time  for  a  new  reporting  year.  There  are  often  bizarre  omissions.  For  example  in  the 
1997  series  Lufthansa  occupational  data  is  so  incomplete  as  to  be  unusable,  yet  there 
is  full  data  for  the  small  low  cost  carrier  German  Wings.  (See  chapter  7.  ) 
Nevertheless  ICAO  data  is  the  major  source  of  data  and  it  does  provide  a  good 
overview  of  the  principal  trends  in  wages,  employment  and  productivity,  and  is 
widely  used.  The  National  Institute  of  Economic  and  Social  Research  for  example, 
compiled  the  most  recent  comparison  of  productivity  using  ICAO  data.  (NIESR) 
(Vass  1997.  ) 
The  IATA  World  Air  Transport  Statistics  (WATS)  provide  trend  data  on  employment 
growth  across  occupational  categories  and  detailed  financial  information  on  carriers. 
IATA  data  tends  to  have  a  higher  response  rate  due  to  the  fact  that  is  an  employers 
body  (rather  than  a  regulatory  function  as  ICAO  is  often  viewed),  but  often  fails  to 
repeat  the  same  series  of  data  in  consecutive  years  making  comparisons  difficult.  In 
addition  IATA  data  tends  to  give  only  aggregated  trend  data  on  employment  change, 
rather  than  the  specific  occupational  data  given  by  ICAO.  Nevertheless  together  these 
are  the  only  consistent  sources  of  raw  data  on  labour  market  issues  within  the  airline 
industry. 
US  Labor  Department:  Monthly  Labor  Review 
The  US  Labor  department  Monthly  Labor  Review  (NILR)  data  provide  comprehensive 
and  complete  information  on  bargaining  arrangements  within  US  industry  and  provide 
other  information,  for  example,  on  aggregate  employment  trends.  The  MLR  also 
provides  detailed  information  on  concession  bargaining,  wage  agreements  and 
employee  shareholdings,  as  well  as  periodic  analyses  of  different  industries  and 
sectors.  Year  end  analysis  in  the  January  edition  of  each  MLR  provides  a 
comprehensive  overview  of  foregoing  trends  and  developments.  These  data  are  used 
extensively  in  chapters  3,4,7  and  8. 
New  Eamings  Survey  (NES) 
52 NES  is  published  by  the  UK  Office  of  National  Statistics  (ONS)  and  provides  a 
comprehensive  survey  of  pay  and  hours  data  by  industry  and  sector.  This  data  allows 
us  to  look  at  general  aggregate  data  on  earnings  in  UK  air  transport  in  order  to 
contextualise  the  discussion  on  British  Airways  in  chapters  5  and  6.  This  provides  the 
foundation  for  our  discussion  in  chapter  7  of  the  regulatory  overhang  and  the 
premium  wage.  The  difficulty  with  the  NES  data  is  that  for  air  transport  it  provides 
only  aggregate  data  increasing  the  distorting  effect  of  high  salaries.  However  it  does 
provide  data  on  male  manual  wages,  which  can  be  compared  through  other  data 
sources. 
Avniark  Data 
Avmark  is  a  major  aviation  research  organisation  and  consultancy  which  publishes  a 
bi-monthly  industry  journal,  the  Avinark  Aviation  Economist.  The  study  uses  a  report 
commissioned  by  the  European  Union  to  investigate  detailed  issues  of  labour  cost  and 
productivity.  The  Avmark  data  is  used  in  tandem  with  ICAO  and  IATA  surveys,  to 
supplement  the  analysis  in  chapters  4  and  7.  In  addition  the  survey  uses  occasional 
reports  and  papers,  compiled  by  a  variety  of  organisations.  In  order  to  provide  data  on 
bargaining,  wages  and  employment  within  a  more  detailed  national  context,  aggregate 
data  from  the  US  labour  Department,  UK  New  Earnings  Survey  and  other  statistics 
are  also  utilised. 
Airline  BusinesslAir  Transport  World 
These  monthly  industry  journals  are  used  extensively  throughout  the  thesis.  Both 
provide  extensive  coverage  of  the  industry,  and  regular  comments  and  editorials.  Both 
Journals  take  an  industry/management  viewpoint  but  are  analytical  in  their  approach. 
Major  industry  statistics  are  published  by  both  and  particular  use  is  made  of  the 
Airline  Business  Yearly  Airport  Data,  published  in  January  of  each  year,  which 
provides  the  raw  data  for  analyses  of  concentration  and  market  dominance  within  the 
industry.  Airline  Business  also  publishes  an  authoritative  survey  and  analysis  of  global 
alliances  in  June  of  each  year,  which  is  used  to  look  at  alliance  impacts  on  the 
workforce.  Air  Transport  World  publishes  a  regular  global  survey  of  world  airlines, 
53 and  detailed  industry  traffic  and  employment  data.  Both  publications  also  carry  a 
variety  of  named  articles,  which  are  alphabetically  listed  in  the  bibliography. 
2.3  The  British  Airways  Case  Study/Survey  and  Its  Context 
A  major  aspect  of  the  study  involved  a  detailed  case  study  of  British  Airways.  This 
carrier  was  used  as  a  typical  example  of  a  carrier  pursuing  the  new  business  strategies 
in  a  unionised  collectively  bargained  environment.  Single  case  study  approaches  are 
often  criticised  for  being  ungeneralisable,  therefore  before  elucidating  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  the  case  study  it  is  necessary  to  justify  the  single  case  study  approach  and 
the  trade  unions  based  nature  of  the  questionnaire  utilised. 
2.3.1  British  Airways:  A  Critical  Case  Study  of  Airline  Deregulation  and  Employment 
In  terms  of  revenue,  market  ranking  and  employment  for  instance,  British  Airways  is 
a  hugely  important  carrier  in  the  global  airline  industry.  Its  leadership  in  many 
business  strategies  and  early  prioritisation  of  cost  reduction  make  it  hugely  influential 
within  the  industry.  BA  is  a  'first  mover'  in  industrial  relations  change,  and  an 
aggressive  innovator  in  low  cost  business  strategies,  whose  policies  are  nonetheless 
tempered  and  controlled  by  the  historical  legacy  of  collective  bargaining,  and  of  the 
specific  episode  of  corporate  reconstruction  which  accompanied  its  privatisation.  Its 
industrial  relations  antecedents  can  be  traced  back  to  the  beginnings  of  UK  airline 
industrial  relations.  For  all  of  these  reasons  a  case  study  of  BA  represents  to  a  great 
extent,  the  past,  present  and  future  of  airline  industrial  relations. 
British  Airways  is  currently  adjusting  to  new  regulatory  and  market  environments 
ahead  of  other  European  carriers.  For  these  reasons  the  British  Airways'  case  study 
offers  a  'critical'  example  of  the  processes  and  issues  affecting  the  labour  market  and 
industrial  relations  after  deregulation.  The  case  also  serves  to  indicate  the  importance 
of  employee  attitudes  towards  deregulation  and  employment  change,  and  as  such, 
provides  an  insight  into  the  way  in  which  workers  cherish  premium  terms  and 
conditions,  even  within  carriers  which  operate  in  neo  liberal,  flexible  labour  market 
environments  such  as  Britain.  The  existence  of  the  'regulatory  overhang'  and  the 
strength  and  capability  of  organised  labour  means  that  workers  in  the  airline  industry 
54 generally  have  been  reluctant  to  give  concessions.  The  BA  case  illustrates  these  issues 
by  examining  both  management  strategies  and  employee  attitudes  during  a  period  of 
critical  change.  At  the  time  of  the  present  study  the  carrier  was  responding  to  the 
phased  deregulation  of  the  European  market  whilst  evaluating  the  prospects  for  an 
alliance  with  American  Airlines.  It  also  faced  the  challenge  of  low  cost  carriers  and 
the  general  problem  of  falling  yields.  The  presence  of  much  stronger  transatlantic 
competition  both  from  Virgin  Atlantic  and  the  stronger  US  carriers  also  threatened 
long  term  profitability.  These  pressures  led  to  a  major  series  of  employment 
initiatives,  which  sought  to  radically  restructure  costs  within  the  airline.  The  nature  of 
regulatory  and  product  market  structures  mean  that  carriers  will  tend  to  converge  in 
terms  of  their  responses  to  these  broad  environmental  pressures.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
the  detail  of  their  response  will  neglect  the  constraints  of  industrial  relations,  and 
labour  organisation  within  specific  countries,  there  will  be  wide  variation  in  response, 
but  to  say  they  are  driven  by  the  pressures  of  a  converging  global  regulatory  and 
product  market  structures.  (Chapter  8.  )  This  leaves  room  both  for  specific  institutional 
response  in  terms  of  the  broad  national  industrial  relations  framework  and  specific 
'strategic  choices'  from  management  towards  that  environment.  These  issues  are 
discussed  in  chapters  5  and  7.  However  all  of  these  choices  are  constrained  by  a  wider 
environmental  context.  Since  all  airlines  need  to  respond  towards  globalisation, 
alliances,  low  cost  competition  and  the  withdrawal  of  state  funding,  all  face  the  need 
to  restructure  operations  to  address  these  pressures. 
In  short  British  Airways  has  encountered  all  of  these  pressures,  and  as  a  privatised 
flag  carrier  has  had  to  confront  the  need  for  change  much  earlier  than  other  carriers. 
Consequently,  other  carriers  have  emulated  BA's  employment  policies.  Looking  in 
detail  at  these  issues  within  British  Airways  therefore  provides  a  'critical'  case  study 
on  how  individual  carriers  and  their  workforces  adapt  to  deregulation  and 
employment  change. 
This  then  raises  the  question  of  representativeness.  Is  BA  representative  of  the 
industry  as  a  whole?  To  a  large  extent,  and  owing  to  its  early  adapting  role  it  is 
representative,  but  we  need  to  be  aware  that  it  is  representative  only  of  the  regulatory 
and  product  market  pressures  which  drive  airline  management  in  the  current  era.  In 
that  sense  it  is  a  representative  case  and  its  experiences  are  applicable  to  other  carriers 
55 at  various  stages  of  the  restructuring  process.  BA's  early  experience  with  privatisation 
and  employment  change  with  the  withdrawal  of  state  aid  and  market  flotation  render 
it  useful  in  comparing  the  experience  of  other  European  carriers  undergoing 
privatisation  and  quasi-privatisation.  Its  post  privatisation  experience,  whereby 
management  pursued  massive  cultural  change  programmes  such  as  the  quality 
initiative  Putting  People  First,  are  being  emulated  in  one  way  or  another  by  other 
European  airlines.  Its  post  deregulation  experience  where  it  faced  the  need  to  confront 
the  problem  of  declining  yields  and  greater  competition,  has  been  the  experience  of 
other  European  carriers  such  as  Lufthansa  and  Air  France.  Though  all  are  pursuing 
different  policies  according  to  their  own  unique  national  labour  market  environment, 
the  regulatory  structures  and  product  market  pressures,  which  they  face,  are  largely 
similar.  This  issue  of  global  product  market  convergence  is  addressed  in  chapters  I 
and  8.  The  case  of  BA  illustrates  clearly  the  stages  of  adaptation  to  the  deregulated 
competitive  environment,  within  a  major  flag  carrier  airline.  The  detailed  rationale  for 
the  case  study  and  its  relevance  to  the  research  objectives  are  discussed  below. 
2.3.2.  Case  Studies  and  Relevance 
The  debate  between  the  case  study  method  and  other  methods  is  often  misconceived 
as  a  debate  between  qualitative  and  quantitative  approaches.  Often  such  debates 
become  not  discussions  about  the  appropriateness  of  methods  in  particular  settings, 
but  puerile  exchanges  about  the  efficacy  of  one  or  other  method,  adding  little  to  our 
understanding  of  methodology.  Case  studies  should  be  understood  and  used  as  a 
hybrid  technique  that  can  embody  the  best  of  both  quantitative  and  qualitative 
approaches.  Yin  argues  that  case  studies  are  often  confused  with  more  specialised 
qualitative  techniques,  such  as  ethnography  and  participant  observation.  (Yin  1994: 
11.  )  Yin  cites  Schramm's  viewpoint  that: 
'The  essence  of  a  case  study,  the  central  tendency  among  all  types  of 
case  study  is  that  it  tries  to  illuminate  a  decision  or  set  of  decisions, 
why  they  were  taken,  why  they  were  implemented  and  with  what 
result.  '  (Ibid.  ) 
Other  researchers  offer  the  case  study  as  a  particularly  valuable  tool  in  organisational 
research.  Bryman  argues,  for  example,  that  case  studies  in  facilitating  the  application 
i 
56 of  many  techniques  of  data  collection  and  analysis  allow  a  much  more  involved  and 
meaningful  interpretation  of  issues.  (Bryman  1989:  172.  )  On  the  problem  of 
generalisation  Bryman  argues  that  many  criticisms  of  the  inadequacy  of  case  studies 
in  this  respect  are  based  on  "erroneous  application  of  statistical  notions  which  treat 
the  case  study  as  a  sample  of  one.  "(Ibid.  )  Such  views  question  the  applicability  of  the 
case  study  on  the  basis  that  it  cannot  be  generalised  statistically.  However,  as  Yin 
argues,  case  studies  should  be  judged  on  the  basis  of  the  theoretical  inferences 
generated.  The  case  study,  he  argues,  provides  information  which  informs  theoretical 
reasoning.  In  any  case,  belief  in  the  cast  iron  dependability  of  statistical  methods  is 
itself  questionable  given  the  issues  raised  by  the  realist  school  in  social  science 
research.  (See  Sayer  1984:  190-199.  )  Again  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  section  to 
revisit  methodological  debates,  which  however  stimulating  can  become,  in  the  wrong 
context,  ultimately  diversionary.  Rather  the  aim  is  to  justify  the  relevance  of  utilising 
a  single  case  study  of  British  Airways  as  a  basis  from  which  to  generate  theory  on  the 
process  of  airline  industrial  relations  in  the  deregulated  and  oligopolistic  era  of  airline 
competition. 
2.3.3  The  British  Ainvays  Case  Study:  Relevance  to  the  Research  Objectives 
The  case  study  allows  us  to  look  at  the  depth,  richness  and  complexity  of  airline 
industrial  relations  within  a  carrier  whose  environment  and  market  position,  though 
unique,  are  not  peculiar.  The  evolving  structure  of  the  industry  (described  in  chapter 
8)  means  that  we  can  make  some  generalisations  about  airline  strategy  based  on  this 
case.  In  stating  this  preference  for  theoretical  generalisation  it  is  hoped  that  the  error 
of  practical  generalisation  is  not  committed.  This  can  be  seen  at  the  most  basic  level 
in  the  excellence  literature  of  Peters  and  Watennan  and  journalistic  analyses  of  airline 
strategy,  which  tend  to  utilise  the  case  as  a  confirmatory  and  even  celebratory  device. 
This  involves  identifying  several  qualities  and  attributes,  which  are  deemed 
"'desirable',  identifying  these  within  one  setting  and  prescribing  these  for  other 
settings.  This  characteristic  of  the  case  is  de-contextualised  from  other  factors, 
becoming  in  effect  an  'ideal  stereotype.  '  In  this  vein  writers  such  as  Corke  and 
Campbell-Smith,  (both  1986)  have  written  largely  celebratory  accounts  of  British 
Airways  transition  from  the  public  to  the  private  sector.  Given  the  paucity  of  literature 
on  UK  airline  industrial  relations,  these  approaches  have  become  unduly  influential. 
57 For  example,  the  radical  cost  surgery  of  1982,  where  unions  accepted  employment 
reductions,  wage  freezes  and  the  implementation  of  new  management  strategies,  is 
identified  as  the  manifestation  of  a  unique  British  Airways'  spirit  rather  than 
reflecting  the  specific  economic,  political  and  industrial  relations  environment  of  the 
UK.  Such  factors  were  equally  if  not  more  important  than  any  cultural  factors.  These 
views  betray  a  unitarist  pre-occupation,  to  be  expected  in  essentially  journalistic 
accounts  of  the  'phoenix  from  the  flames'  variety.  However,  even  within  established 
industrial  relations  research  there  is  a  tendency  towards  this  confirmatory  bias  in  the 
use  of  case  studies. 
For  example,  in  a  study  of  European  airline  industrial  relations  Warhurst  (1995:  259- 
74)  argues  that  most  European  airlines  would  'converge'  upon  the  sort  of  Human 
Resource  Management  (HRM)  model  utilised  by  BA.  (Warhust  1995:  259-74.  )  As 
Blyton  and  Tumbull  argue,  this  assumes  that  the  institutional  richness  and  complexity 
of  European  industrial  relations  is  susceptible  to  being  shoe-homed  into  a  particular 
management  paradigm,  or  that  organised  labour  has  no  agency  in  these  matters. 
(Blyton  and  Turnbull  1996:  7-20.  )  In  any  case,  British  Airways,  as  recent  events  have 
shown,  has  not  avoided  strikes  and  conflict  and  has  been  constrained  by  traditional 
institutions  of  collective  bargaining  and  unionised  labour.  Outside  core  managerial 
grades,  it  is  doubtful  whether  HRM  policies  are  greatly  used.  Nevertheless,  major 
preconceptions  exist  about  the  nature  of  BA's  business  and  industrial  relations 
strategies,  and  these  often  inform  analysis.  When  British  Airways  faces  a  strike  the 
reaction  of  uninformed  commentators  has  often  been  one  of  surprise  or  even 
incredulity.  "  The  detailed  critical  case  study  is  therefore  of  great  importance  in 
analysing  and  explaining  episodes  of  industrial  unrest  and  employee  dissatisfaction 
that  could  otherwise  be  viewed  as  pathological.  It  moves  beyond  the  merely 
confirmatory  and  celebratory  accounts  of  the  mainstream  and  journalistic  literature, 
and  provides  a  much  deeper  understanding  of  the  complexity  of  labour  management 
relations  then  can  be  obtained  from  descriptive  and  prescriptive  accounts  in  the 
academic  literature. 
11  This  surprise  is  likely  to  be  dampened  after  the  1997  cabin  crew  strikes  and  episodes  such  as  BEP, 
late  1990s  profits  slump.  These  events  have  exposed  organisational  problems  at  BA,  many  of  which  are 
deep-  rooted  industrial  relations  issues. 
58 The  approach  is  first  of  all  to  delineate  the  carrier's  detailed  strategies  within  the 
wider  context  of  global  competition  and  market  structure  analysed  in  chapters  6  and  7. 
Secondly,  to  consider  employee  responses  to  these  strategies.  The  first  section  looked 
in  detail  at  the  employment  initiatives  being  undertaken  by  British  Airways.  The  first 
aspect  of  the  process  involved  detailed  in  depth  interviews  with  key  actors  from  both 
management  and  trade  unions.  These  interviews  were  used  to  explore  and  refine  some 
of  the  key  research  hypotheses,  which  had  arisen  from  the  historical  work  and  the 
developments  in  the  USA.  The  interviews  also  helped  in  the  formulation  of  research 
questions  for  the  specific  European  context.  The  interviews  were  supplemented  with 
an  investigation  of  company  documents,  many  of  which  related  to  the  key  business 
strategies  then  being  advanced.  In  addition  trade  union  material  from  various  levels 
was  also  utilised;  constraints  and  practical  problems  including  management  re- 
organisation  were  reviewed. 
The  issues  uncovered  during  the  BA  case  study  led  the  author  to  believe  that  there 
was  a  substantial  gulf  between  the  carrier  and  its  trade  unions  in  terms  of  future 
direction.  This  raised  questions  of  the  extent  to  which  staff  views  were  being  taken 
into  account  by  management.  The  assumption  was  that  staff  were  more  or  less 
resigned  to  the  employment  implications  of  deregulation  and  there  would  be  little 
resistance.  Management  emphasised  the  need  to  adapt  to  the  global  marketplace,  and 
to  compete  in  an  increasingly  contested  environment.  There  was  little  evidence  on 
staff  attitudes  about  detailed  issues.  The  company  carried  out  periodic  surveys  but  the 
type  of  attitudinal  questions  did  not  look  at  sentiments  about  the  future  of  the  industry 
and  issues  of  restructuring  which  were  becoming  'live'  at  that  time. 
2.3.4.  The  Questionnaire:  Rationale  and  Research  Questions 
The  survey  instrument  was  designed  to  test  the  idea  that  staff  attitudes  were  being 
influenced  by  the  'regulatory  overhang'  argument  deployed  in  chapters  2  and  3.  In 
essence  employees  had  become  used  to  a  certain  type  of  labour  contract  which  had 
arisen  under  a  regulated  environment,  and  this  employee  belief  in  this  challenged 
short  term  and  even  long  term  cost-reduction  policies.  After  interviewing  both 
management  and  staff  it  became  clear  that  there  was  a  need  to  look  at  employee 
attitudes.  Too  often  staff  views  have  been  assumed,  particularly  in  the  rent 
59 sharing/union  monopoly  literature,  which  aggregate  the  views  of  entire  workforces 
under  a  set  of  theoretical  assumptions.  However  this  is  also  the  case  in  the  popular 
literature  and  the  HRM  based  literature  of  Kochan  et  al  and  Warhurst,  where 
management  policies  and  strategies  are  accepted  implicitly,  without  recourse  to 
employee  views.  Employee  views  however  are  of  utmost  importance  because  the 
perceptions  of  employees  upon  the  legitimacy  of  management  decisions  can  often 
have  huge  consequences  for  the  process  of  restructuring.  An  example  is  the  BA  cabin 
crew  strike  of  1997  where  management  assumed  that  cabin  crew  would  accept  the 
need  for  pay  restructuring  and  a  rationalisation  of  overtime  and  pay  increments. 
However  cabin  crew  were  attached  to  the  traditional  earnings  package  based  in  the 
regulated  era,  and  preserved  throughout  the  transition  period  of  King  and  Marshall. 
There  were  similar  issues  around  the  restructuring  of  ground  handling,  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  catering.  Thus  in  order  to  engage  the  interest  of  respondents,  and  to 
loperationalise'  a  number  of  the  key  research  hypotheses  the  questionnaire  was 
designed  to  reflect  a  number  of  debates  and  issues  which  were  affecting  both  the 
airline  and  the  industry  at  that  particular  point  in  time. 
The  attitudes  explored  related  to  the  following  broad  areas: 
Internal  outsourcing,  regionalisation  and  franchising 
Flexibility 
Management  strategy 
Globalisation. 
Outsourcing 
Future  of  collective  bargaining 
Detailed  questions  addressed  within  the  survey  related  to  the  nature  of  the 
employment  contract  within  the  large  international  carrier,  and  allowed  some 
assessment  to  be  made  of  the  concept  of  regulatory  overhang. 
How  will  workers  view  the  introduction  of  regional  terms  and  conditions  with 
lower  pay  rates?  Will  workers  accept  this  or  resist  it? 
How  will  workers  view  the  extension  of  franchising  and  low  cost  operations? 
Are  there  any  differences  in  perception  of  employment  effects  between  those  who 
were  recruited  pre-privatisation  (before  1987)  and  those  who  were  recruited 
before  post  privatisation  (after  1987)? 
What  will  be  the  attitude  of  workers  towards  the  extension  of  atypical  work?  Will 
there  be  any  differences  by  gender? 
60 "  How  do  workers  perceive  the  threat  of  outsourcing  to  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment? 
"  Given  the  trend  towards  outsourcing  which  aspects  of  working  for  BA  do  workers 
rank  highest? 
"  How  do  workers  view  the  loss  of  the  terms  and  conditions  when  considering  the 
possible  outsourcing  of  theirjob? 
Additional  questions  on  management  strategy  and  globalisation  sought  to  obtain  the 
view  of  workers  on  the  strategies  being  pursued  within  the  airline,  and  whether 
workers  supported  or  rejected  these  policies. 
"  How  do  workers  view  management  strategies  in  the  post  deregulation 
environment? 
"  How  do  workers  view  the  policy  that  cost  reduction  should  be  the  overriding 
priority? 
"  What  is  the  attitude  of  workers  towards  moving  some  functions  to  low  labour  cost 
countries? 
"  What  is  the  attitude  of  workers  towards  the  growth  of  global  alliances  and 
acquisitions? 
"  In  terms  of  global  alliances  how  do  workers  view  the  prospect  that  existing  flights 
could  be  operated  by  partner  airlines? 
How  will  workers  view  general  management  strategy  on  globalisation? 
How  will  workers  view  global  policies  when  posed  directly  in  terms  of 
employment? 
How  do  workers  view  these  policies  in  terms  of  their  effects  on  local  terms  and 
conditions? 
Other  questions  related  to  the  perceived  break  up  of  national  level  bargaining.  This  set 
of  questions  can  be  seen  as  addressing  an  aspect  of  the  regulatory  overhang  as 
national  collective  bargaining  underpins  the  regulated  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment,  its  abolition  would  be  perceived  as  in  other  industries,  as  the  precursor 
to  large  scale  reductions  in  terms  and  conditions. 
How  will  employees  view  the  break  up  of  national  bargaining? 
Will  workers  perceive  that  the  break-up  of  national  bargaining  will  lead  to  lower 
terms  and  conditions  and  to  threaten  stability  of  employment? 
How  do  employees  view  the  introduction  of  business  unit  bargaining? 
Will  employees  perceive  their  trade  unions  as  being  marginalised  by  such 
developments? 
2.3.5.  Early  Design  and  Modification 
61 After  extensive  reading  on  questionnaire  design  the  author  opted  for  a  'closed  set' 
attitude  questionnaire  based  on  the  Likert  scale.  The  format  was  to  design  blocks  of 
questions  in  specific  'modules'  which  could  be  used  to  measure  a  particular  set  of 
variables.  Questions  themselves  were  formulated  on  the  basis  of  industry  knowledge 
gathered  from  interviews,  documentation  and  other  accounts.  The  questions  attempt  to 
measure  staff  attitudes  towards  aspects  of  business  strategy,  which  had  direct  and 
indirect  effects  on  employment  and  industrial  relations.  In  order  to  capture  the  full 
range  of  attitudes  and  to  minimise  'formulation  bias'  in  the  questionnaire,  statements 
were  alternatively  loaded'  where  appropriate,  in  one  direction  or  another.  This 
technique  was  used  in  response  to  Oppenheim's  advice  about  loaded  questions  and 
their  role  in  the  production  of  bias.  (Oppenheim  1992:  137.  )  The  decision  was  taken 
to  make  the  loading  of  questions  explicit  and  to  alternate  the  loading  bias.  Thus  one 
question  would  embody  a  company  view  of  the  issue  alternated  with  a  trade  union 
view. 
62 So.  a  qLICStIOll  CICSIDICCI  to  111Cý1SUIv  employee  attitudes  towards  flexihility  might  havc 
the  l'ollowing  set  of'  responses  (see  I'l,  "Llre  2.1 
1  Z7 
Figure  2.1  The  Loading  Of  Questions  Within  the  Survey 
Strongl,  ý  Agree  Neither  Strongly  Disagree  No  Opinion 
Agree  agree  nor  Disagree 
disa  ree 
More  flexible  hour-, 
%sill  help  %%ith 
commitments  such 
as  familN. 
I  %till  get  lo%%er 
stages  due  to  the 
reduction  of  hours. 
I  is  ill  get  fe%ser 
benerits  than  full 
time  staff. 
Fie-tibilit  for  the 
compan)  ,  %ill  mean 
greater  job  sectjrit.  ý 
for  e%er.  %  one 
including  those  oil 
contracts. 
The  compan)  will 
use  neiwe  shifts  to 
cut  out  mertime 
%%hich  %till  reduce 
paN 
I  is  ill  accept  it 
because  the  airline 
business  needs 
people  to  be  nexible. 
It  can  be  seen  that  even  if  a  respondent  were  to  tick  the  boxes  at  random  s/he  would 
have  a  reasonably  equal  chance  of'  agreemo/disagreeing  with  a  management  loaded 
Z-  --  Z7  I- 
statement  as  a  trade  union  loaded  one.  This  is  appropriatc  in  a  nuillher  of  otile[* 
questions  and  appendix  2,  which  includes  a  full  reproduction  ofthe  questionnaire,  will 
indicate  this. 
2.3.6  Piloling  and  The  Negollalion  (ý/',,  Access 
Having  formulated  the  questions  and  generated  scveral  versions  of'  the  questionnaire.  Cý  I- 
pilot  testino  commenced  in  March/April  of  1996.  It  is  worth  commenting  oil  some  of 
the  existing  advice  on  piloting  that  rightly  advises  that  questionnaires  should  be  fully 
piloted  on  every  aspect.  Oppenhelm,  for  example,  adViSeS  LIS  (0  'test'  eVerVilling 
through  a  scrics  Of  Pilot  SLIIAVVS,  1),  tying  attention  to  cletalls  from  the  stanip/frank  issue 
down  to  the  quality  of  the  typeface.  (Oppenheim  1992:  Chapter  4.  )  He  a(kises  Lis  to 
63 conduct  a  number  of  pilot  surveys  until  we  perfect  the  questionnaire.  Unfortunately  in 
an  industrial  relations  context,  especially  at  a  time  of  critical  change  and  management 
re-organisation,  the  opportunity  for  pilot  work  is  limited.  However,  within  these 
constraints  appropriate  pilot  work  was  undertaken.  A  sample  of  80  questionnaires 
were  dispatched  in  March  1996  through  the  various  unions  and  the  management  with 
equal  numbers  sent  to  each  (20).  Returns  indicated  that  a  number  of  issues  had  to  be 
reworked  and  re-thought.  At  the  same  time  extensive  consultation  with  both 
management  and  trade  union  officials  indicated  the  need  for  some  immediate  changes. 
For  example  the  category  of  bargaining  unit  in  the  first  pilot  was  changed  to  that  of 
National  Sectional  Panel  (NSP)  in  the  next  revision  after  consultation  with  the 
TGWU,  as  discussions  with  a  TGWU  full  time  officer  suggested  members  related 
only  to  their  NSP  grouping.  In  addition  consultation  with  supervisors  and  a 
departmental  methodology  adviser  suggested  the  need  to  rework  scales,  and  include  a 
'neither  agree  nor  disagree'  category  in  addition  to  the  'no  opinion'  response.  Some 
additional  questions  were  formulated  and  revised  in  response  to  pilot  survey 
comments.  Returns  for  the  first  pilot  amounted  to  33  per  cent. 
British  Airways  had  initially  been  favourable  to  the  survey  but  after  detailed 
discussions  and  a  major  meeting  at  their  HQ,  decided  that  the  time  was  'not  right'to 
allow  a  questionnaire  to  be  distributed.  12  The  author  was  told  that  the  issue  could 
either  be  reconsidered  or  new  research  plans  discussed.  The  issue  of  focus  groups  in 
line  with  access  to  an  internal  company  questionnaire  was  discussed  but  the  author 
saw  severe  limitations  in  this  approach.  The  focus  groups,  though  chosen  solely  by 
management,  were  considered  as  an  appropriate  method  of  discussing  issues  with 
employees  and  monitoring  and  recording  their  views.  These  would  have  been  based  in 
Glasgow  and  London  but  problems  with  the  frequency  of  meetings  in  an  environment 
characterised  by  shiftwork  and  in  the  expense  of  servicing  meetings  in  London  and 
Glasgow,  led  to  the  decision  that  the  focus  group  approach  would  be  inappropriate. 
12  Management  at  BA  returned  incomplete  all  20  pilot  questionnaires  sent  to  them.  They  wished  to 
C, 
"discuss"  the  questionnaire  and  felt  that  it  was  "not  the  best  way  to  collect  information".  The  author 
tried  to  resolve  this  situation  by  setting  up  a  meeting  with  management,  which  resulted  in  a  major  re- 
appraisal  of  the  project.  A  further  modified  pilot  was  designed  and  presented  to  BA  management  in 
June  1996.  Management  initially  wanted  a  more  neutral  questionnaire  but  appeared  convinced  of  the 
benefits  of  a  'no  holds  barred'  attitudinal  questionnaire.  However  by  26  June  1996  when  the  author  met 
with  British  Airways  management  to  discuss  the  distribution  of  the  questionnaire,  the  airline  faced  a 
strike  ballot  by  pilots,  which  caused  them  to  withdraw  their  promised  participation  in  the  survey. 
64 The  use  of  the  BA  staff  questionnaire  was  more  problematic.  Though  easy  to  access  it 
addressed  none  of  the  research  questions  the  study  was  designed  to  address  and 
amounted  to  a  satisfaction  survey,  rather  than  attitudinal  questionnaire.  The  data  from 
this  staff  survey  were  available  only  in  aggregated  graphical  form,  which  made  it 
impossible  to  re-analyse  or  interpret  the  data.  This  alternative  methodology  was 
therefore  abandoned  and  instead  a  decision  made  to  distribute  the  survey  via  the  trade 
unions.  This  decision  had  a  number  of  implications  for  the  survey  as  discussed  below. 
2.3.7  The  Trade  Union  Based  Questionnaire:  Questions  and  Issues 
The  three  key  trade  unions  participating  in  the  research  were  approached  to  distribute 
the  questionnaires,  given  BA  management's  withdrawal  of  co-operation.  This 
approach  in  itself  presented  several  problems.  Firstly,  the  sample  would  be  confined 
to  trade  union  members  only.  Secondly,  the  method  of  distribution  was  problematic. 
The  method  envisaged  was  that  of  the  stratified  sample.  This  is  the  ideal  cost  efficient 
method  of  sampling  across  a  number  of  different  locations  and  occupational 
categories.  The  technique  involves  the  selection  on  the  basis  of  a  random  sample, 
which  should  represent  the  different  geographical  and  occupational  categories.  (De 
Vaus  1996:  65.  )  The  main  drawback  with  the  stratified  sampling  technique  is  that 
small  deviations  (oversampling,  undersampling  and  non-sampling)  can  produce  large 
distortions.  However,  as  De  Vaus  argues  this  may  not  matter  if  the  characteristic  on 
which  the  sample  is  unrepresentative  is  not  related  to  the  focus  of  the  study.  (Ibid.  )  In 
this  case  there  were  three  trade  unions  all  of  which  were  sampled  on  the  basis  of  their 
actual  membership  in  British  Airways. 
A  sample  of  the  unionised  workforces  of  the  TGWU,  BALPA  and  AEEU 
(respectively  40,000,10,000  and  8,000)  was  selected  with  an  average  1.7  per  cent 
sample.  Repeated  attempts  were  made  to  obtain  access  to  union  records  and 
membership  data,  in  order  to  construct  a  stratified  sample,  and  to  obtain  control  over 
return  and  follow  up.  In  pursuing  this  repeated  faxes  and  telephone  calls  were  made  to 
key  officials  reminding  them  of  the  need  for  a  random  sample  to  be  obtained  from  a 
list  of  members.  Despite  these  attempts  this  access  was  not  given  by  any  of  the  trade 
unions,  all  of  which  cited  confidentiality  and  union  rules  in  justification.  A 
compromise  solution  was  therefore  needed.  The  unions  did  agree  to  distribute  the 
65 questionnaires  via  key  officials  who  acted  as  'gatekeepers'to  the  occupational  groups 
concerned.  These  'gatekeepers'  would  then  distribute  the  questionnaires  according  to 
sampling  instructions  given  by  the  author.  Considering  the  dissagregated  nature  of 
this  data  and  the  impossibility  of  identifying  individuals  it  could  only  be  concluded 
that  the  request  was  perceived  as  an  intrusion  on  the  time  and  resources  of  the 
organisation  concerned.  I  offered  to  fund  the  costs  of  any  search  but  was  again 
refused  access  to  the  data.  Despite  my  best  attempts  at  re-assurance  and  promises  to 
sign  any  documentation  relating  to  anonymity  and  confidentiality,  the  records  were 
not  made  available.  This  then  presented  the  problem  of  trying  to  ensure  that  the 
distribution  of  the  questionnaire  was  as  random  as  possible,  with  neither  the  detailed 
records  with  which  to  select  a  random  sample,  nor  the  opportunity  to  ensure  a  proper 
representation  of  employees  by  region,  trade  union,  gender  and  other  relevant 
categories.  I  then  asked  the  organisations  concerned  to  distribute  the  sample  on  the 
basis  of  my  instructions  and  was  assured  that  this  was  done.  Returns  based  on  postal 
dates  indicated  no  significant  difference  between  late  response  and  non-response. 
(Wass  1994:  106.  )  The  co-operation  of  busy  union  officers  at  a  time  of  considerable 
industrial  unrest  and  organisational  upheaval  was  greatly  appreciated,  and  the  author 
could  not  reasonably  expect  these  officers  to  prioritise  an  issue  such  as  this.  There 
was,  however,  a  great  deal  of  support  from  the  unions  concerned  and  a  great  deal  of 
belief  in  the  importance  of  a  neutral  survey. 
2.3.8  Returns  and  Non  returns:  Sonw  Issues 
There  was  a  significant  disparity  in  return  rates  between  the  TGWU  and  other  unions, 
with  a  corresponding  over  representation  of  ground  handling  staff  within  the  TGWU 
sample.  There  were  no  returns  from  cabin  crew,  which  may  well  have  been 
institutional 
. 
13  The  bunching  of  a  large  cluster  of  returns  on  similar  dates  suggested 
there  might  well  have  been  a  non-random  distribution  on  a  'convenience  sample  basis' 
to  certain  groups  that  could  not  be  discounted.  It  can  be  contended  that  whilst  very 
13  Although  the  surveys  were  distributed  via  the  union's  national  Airline  Officer  George  Ryde,  who  is 
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also  the  major  official  dealing  with  cabin  crew,  it  was  assumed  that  the  surveys  would  be  distributed 
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amongst  cabin  crew  as  the  sampling  instructions  indicated.  The  returns  sug  est  that  there  was  no  00 
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systematic  distribution  to  cabin  crew,  suggesting  that  for  reasons  unknown  they  were  excluded  from 
distribution.  One  explanation  might  be  that  the  cabin  crew  section  of  the  TGWU  (BASSA)  has  a 
separate  group  of  officials  and  separate  union  offices.  This  may  have  rendered  the  inclusion  of  cabin 
crew  less  likely. 
66 step  was  taken  to  ensure  random  and  representative  distribution,  the  real  institutional 
constraints  of  the  industrial  relations  environment  made  this  extremely  difficult  and 
even  theoretically  impossible. 
The  belief  that  only  statistics  generated  from  a  random  sample  possess  validity  is 
widespread  within  the  industrial  relations/employment  research  literature.  Yet  the 
author  would  argue  that  even  if  it  had  been  possible  to  ensure  that  the  data  were 
perfectly  random,  the  skewed  nature  of  the  data  would  have  made  it  difficult  to 
conduct  meaningful  statistical  tests.  Should  the  data  then  be  discarded  as 
inappropriate?  There  are  reasons  for  arguing  this  should  not  be  the  case.  First  of  all 
the  replicability  of  sample  surveys  in  industrial  relations  is  under  severe  question  (see 
Hartley  and  Barling  1998).  Many  such  surveys  take  place  at  a  particular  time  and 
place  and  can  do  no  more  than  obtain  a  snapshot  of  the  views  and  attitudes  of  those 
whom  they  seek  to  measure.  In  another  sense  it  could  be  argued  that  a  survey  of  the 
attitudes  of  human  beings  cannot  be  expected  to  measure  attitudes  in  the  same  way  as 
an  experiment  within  the  natural  world.  Human  agents  on  both  sides  of  the  research 
experience,  both  'experimenter'  and  'subject'  are  informed  by  their  own  mores  and 
values,  n-dsgivings,  instincts,  intuitions  and  beliefs.  Given  the  highly  contested  nature 
of  industrial  relations  and  business  policy  at  British  Airways  and  at  many  other  firms 
undergoing  a  cathartic  process  of  restructuring,  we  could  not  expect  anything  else. 
Yet  many  social  scientists  expect  to  be  able  to  measure  attitudes  and  then  predict  the 
behaviour  of  others  from  that  set  of  initial  conditions.  (Godard  1994:  13.  )  The  survey 
was  designed  to  examine  several  key  hypotheses  about  the  processes  of  deregulation 
and  employment.  It  was  supplemented  by  a  number  of  other  methodological 
approaches  from  interviews  with  key  official  and  managers,  to  a  detailed  investigation 
of  secondary  data.  Validity  should  be  seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
methodological  stance  and  the  role  of  the  survey,  which  was  to  provide  some  test  of 
the  attitudes  of  workers. 
The  main  quantitative  data  aspect  of  the  study  is  an  illustrative  case  study  designed  to 
look  at  the  theoretical  issues  developed  throughout  the  thesis.  Whilst  it  is  intended  to 
provide  some  information  on  these  criteria  it  does  not  seek  to  exhaustively  or 
comprehensively  test  them.  Firstly  that  would  be  impossible  to  justify  given  the 
I 
67 nature  of  responses,  which  made  it  difficult  to  obtain  the  preconditions  for  even  the 
most  basic  inferential  tests  such  as  Chi  square.  Secondly,  it  would  be  unnecessarily 
reductionist  to  ascribe  the  aspects  of  one  case  study  to  the  entire  industry  on  the  basis 
of  one  set  of  employee  attitudes.  However  sound  the  statistical  basis  for  such  a 
generalisation  the  theoretical  basis  would  not  support  this.  The  airline  industry  exists 
in  a  multiplicity  of  political  and  economic  contexts  and  market  environments.  Each  of 
these  environments  is  governed  by  an  overarching  set  of  regulatory  and  market 
pressures  which  to  some  extent  encourage  airlines  to  adopt  common  policies.  These 
policies  such  as  outsourcing,  the  creation  of  internal  low  cost  strategies  and  the 
formation  of  alliances  are  all  common  trends  within  the  industry.  However  it  is 
necessary  to  temper  these  pressures  towards  a  form  of  common  strategy  with  the 
reality  of  the  industrial  relations  environment.  A  case  does  in  such  a  context  provide  a 
worthwhile  illustration  of  the  trends,  which  are  developing  within  other  airlines  and 
their  employees.  This  is  especially  so  if  it  is  designed  specifically  to  look  at  industrial 
relations  issues.  (Kitay  and  Callus  1998:  111.  ) 
In  a  sense  the  questionnaire  goes  beyond  the  usual  'snapshot'  example  whereby  a 
questionnaire  is  used  to  say  something  about  the  issue  at  a  specified  point  in  time  and 
place.  The  questionnaire  in  this  study  is  the  culmination  of  a  careful  and  thorough 
examination  of  the  development  of  employment  change  within  the  industry.  It  focuses 
on  British  Airways  as  a  carrier  poised  at  a  particular  point  in  the  evolution  of  the 
European  airline  industry.  In  any  case,  representativeness  in  attitudinal  surveys  is  not 
a  clear-cut  issue.  Whilst  a  traditional  positivist  research  methodology  would  question 
the  validity  of  a  questionnaire  which  could  not  infer  from  a  sample  population,  few 
such  treatments  deal  specifically  with  industrial  relations  issues.  When  they  do  deal 
with  such  issues,  many  approach  the  field  from  the  disciplines  of  psychology  and 
economics  where  predictive  validity  is  paramount. 
68 Hartley  and  Barling,  for  example,  articulate  fairly  well  the  preoccupation  of 
psychologists  with  what  they  themselves  term  "psychometric  issues.  " 
'It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  psychologists  are  overly  concerned  with 
psychometric  properties  of  their  research  instruments  (most  notably 
reliability  and  validity),  but  these  are  key  aspects  of  questionnaire 
design  and  hence  research  design.  In  addition  a  lack  of  reliability  and 
validity  may  well  affect  any  inferences  that  can  be  made.  If  a 
quantitative  measure  of  a  variable  has  poor  reliability  or  low  validity, 
then  the  researcher  is  not  in  a  position  to  make  confident 
interpretations  of  the  research  data,  because  variability  in  scores  may 
be  as  much  a  function  of  instrument  error  or  of  random  responding  as 
any  "true  variation"  within  the  sample.  '  (Hartley  and  Barling  1998 
:  167.  ) 
In  this  survey  predictive  validity  is  less  important  than  the  issue  of  construct  validity. 
Construct  validity  refers  to  the  ability  of  the  survey  to  carry  out  the  task  for  which  it 
was  designed.  It  can  be  argued  that  in  looking  at  specific  debates  and  issues  around 
the  issues  of  employment  change,  globalisation  and  deregulation  the  survey  fulfilled 
its  purpose.  It  measured  a  sub-sample  of  BA  employees  across  a  range  of  bargaining 
groups,  and  highlighted  a  particular  group  of  employees;  those  involved  in  ground 
handling  and  engineering  as  fairly  typical  of  the  general  workforce  within  the 
industry.  The  survey  was  also  divided  into  those  employed  within  the  engineering  and 
ground  handling  functions.  The  results  of  the  survey,  bearing  in  mind  its  deficiencies 
and  inadequacies,  provide  a  good  summing  up  of  the  survey  and  its  methodological 
framework. 
2.3.9  Questionnaire  Method  and  Industrial  Relations  Research:  Some  Observations 
Whilst  it  is  necessary  to  strive  for  random  distribution  the  realities  of  industrial 
relations  research  in  a  conflictual  environment  render  this  difficult.  In  times  of 
increasing  closure  and  secrecy  from  the  actors  themselves,  it  becomes  very  difficult  to 
pursue  any  type  of  organisationally  focused  enquiry.  The  possibility  of  obtaining  any 
information  is  increasingly  jeopardised.  The  possibilities  of  obtaining  access  on  terms 
which  allow  a  fully  validated  random  sample,  are  becoming  rare.  Often  this  level  of 
access  is  only  granted  in  cases  of  'partnership  research',  or  'action  research'  whereby 
69 academics  act  as  'change  consultants'to  a  particular  organisation.  In  both  companies 
and  trade  unions  obtaining  total  access  and  therefore  a  likely  high  response  rate  is 
often  only  possible  at  the  expense  of  objectivity.  Organisations  invite  this  kind  of 
research  only  on  the  basis  that  it  can  be  seen  to  affirm  organisational  goals. 
Management,  for  example,  would  not  allow  the  survey  to  take  place  at  a  time  of 
conflict.  Conversely  trade  unions  actually  wanted  the  survey  to  take  place  before 
issues  went  'off  the  boil'in  the  minds  of  their  memberships.  The  researcher  then  faces 
the  problem  of  reconciling  two  sides  of  a  contentious  debate.  Indeed  nowhere  is  the 
attitudinal.  fissure  between  employee  groups  and  management  better  exemplified  than 
in  the  brokering  of  a  questionnaire  into  a  fraught  industrial  relations  environment. 
Given  the  aims  of  the  research  and  the  need  to  address  issues  identified  through  the 
early  interview  work,  and  the  ever-encroaching  time  factor,  access  had  to  be  obtained 
on  some  basis.  The  need  for  data  was  unavoidable  and  yet  there  were  many  reasons 
for  waiting  until  a  more  favourable  'window'  arose.  This  was  attempted  waiting  for 
access  to  management  who  were  pre-occupied  with  the  announcement  of  the 
BA/American  alliance,  and  had  promised  co-operation(June  1996).  There  was  in 
addition  to  a  possible  strike  of  pilots  a  large  scale  management  re-organisation,  which 
led  to  the  redeployment  of  some  key  management  contacts.  14 
Conclusion 
The  methodological  approach  employed  in  this  thesis  seeks  to  provide  a  framework 
for  the  study  of  employment  regulation  and  deregulation  within  the  airline  industry. 
As  we  have  noted  the  political  economy  approach  is  used  to  develop  an  analysis  of 
change  and  continuity  within  the  sector,  by  relating  it  to  other  sectors  thus  developing 
a  series  of  questions  about  the  nature  of  labour  market  deregulation.  This  involves  the 
development  of  several  models  of  labour  market  deregulation,  which  are  used 
throughout  the  thesis  to  examine  the  airline  industry.  Next  the  thesis  looks  specifically 
at  the  regulated  period  of  the  industry  developing  several  key  propositions  on  the 
14  This  re-organisation  saw  the  HRM  director  moved  to  another  post  and  many  HRM  professionals 
moved  into  other  functions.  That  managgers  were  able  to  afford  any  time  to  the  project  was  remarkable 
70 effects  of  industry  regulation,  structure  and  product  market  upon  airline  employment. 
Using  this  broad  framework  the  thesis  then  examines  the  impact  of  deregulation  on 
pilots  as  a  key  occupational  group.  The  next  set  of  questions  addresses  the  effect  of 
deregulation  upon  a  particular  carrier  and  its  workforce  using  a  detailed  survey  and 
case  study  method.  British  Airways  provides  a  'critical  case'with  which  to  examine 
subsequent  developments  in  the  industry.  Thus  the  issue  of  management  strategy  in 
response  to  deregulation  and  of  worker  response  are  examined.  The  wider  experience 
of  European  airline  workers  is  then  examined  with  regard  to  costs  and  productivity, 
wage  premia  and  changes  in  regulation  and  management  strategy.  Finally  the 
emerging  regulatory,  product  market  and  labour  market  framework  are  discussed  in 
terms  of  the  global  product  market  convergence  model  of  employment  deregulation. 
This  allows  us  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  emerging  context  of  airline 
employment,  and  the  nature  of  both  management  and  trade  union  strategies. 
and  is  deeply  appreciated. 
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EMPLOYEES. 
As  a  BA  employee  you  will  know  that  a  great  deal  of  change  has 
occurred  and  will  continue  to  occur  with  deregulation.  Please  help  me  by 
completing  this  questionnaire  which  looks  at  employee  attitudes  towards 
employment  changes  resulting  from  deregulation.  The  questionnaire  is 
aimed  at  members  of  the  major  BA  trade  unions. 
This  is  NOT  a  management  or  trade  union  commissioned  survey  but  part 
of  a  long  term  university  research  project.  Your  co-operation  will  help  to 
provide  important  data.  Your  anonymity  is  assured,  as  the  data  will  only 
be  presented  in  statistical  form.  If  you  have  any  queries  relating  to  the 
questionnaire,  and/or  would  like  to  be  sent  a  copy  of  future  findings,  then 
please  contact  me  on  any  of  the  telephone  numbers  below. 
John  McGurk,  University  of  Glasgow,  (0141)  339  8855  ext.  2337 
evenings  (0141)  423  9324 
Please  read  the  questionnaire  carefully.  Most  questions  ask  your  attitude  towards  BA 
policies.  In  some  cases  you  may  not  feel  strongly  one  way  or  the  other  in  those  cases 
please  tick  the:  (PTO) 
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THE  EFFECTS  OF  PRIVATISATION  AND  DEREGULATION  ON  BA "Neither  agree/nor  disagree"  box 
If  you  have  no  opinion  or  cannot  answer  then  and  only  then  tick  the 
"No  opinion"  box 
1.  About  Your  JOB.  What  category  describes  your  current  job? 
Please  CIRCLE  the  box  provided 
Pilot  1 
Flight  Engineer  2 
Cabin  Crew  3 
Maintenance  and  Overhaul  4 
Ground  Handling  5 
Administration 
Sales  and  Marketing  6 
Other  (please  specify  below)  7 
2.  About  Your  LOCATION:  Where  are  you  based?  Please  CIRCLE  the  number  of 
the  box  which  describes  your  location.  If  your  base  is  a  regional  call  centre  or  sales 
outlet  then  circle  the  nearest  city. 
1.  Heathrow  5.  Manchester  8.  Aberdeen  11.  Highlands 
Islands 
2.  Gatwick  6.  Glasgow  9.  Edinburgh  12.  Cardiff 
3.  Birmingham  7.  Belfast  10.  Newcastle  13.  Other 
(please 
specify) 
3.  Which  SECTION  of  BA  are  you  cuffently  employed  within? 
Please  CIRCLE  the  section  within  which  you  work 
BA  Europe  I 
BA  World  2 
BA  Regional  3 
Euro  Gatwick  4 
BA  Engineering  5 
BAMC  6 
Cargo  6 
Other  (please  Specify  below)  7 
73 4.  About  your  TRADE  UNION  or  Staff  Association.  Please  Circle  the  number  which 
corresponds  to  your  own  organisation. 
1.  AEEU 
2.  BALPA 
3.  TGWU 
4  A. 
Which  National  Sectional  Panel  (NSP)  within  BA  represents  you  in  negotiations 
with  management? 
1.  "A"  Scales 
2.  Flight  Crew 
3.  GSS 
4.  Craft  bargaining  Unit 
5.  Non  -craft  bargaining  Unit 
6.  Cabin  Crew 
7.  Other  (please  specify) 
5.  Were  you  employed  within  a  company  that  was  taken  over  by  BA?  Please  CIRCLE  the 
number  of  the  company  within  which  you  were  previously  employed. 
BEA  I 
BOAC  2 
British  Caledonian  3 
Dan  Air  4 
other  (please 
specify  opposite) 
5 
I 
6.  If  you  previously  worked  for  an  airline  now  part  of  BA  how  did  you  view  your  general 
terms  and  conditions  of  employment  at  that  airline?  Where  they:  (Please  CIRCLE  the  box 
number  of  the  statement  you  most  agree  with). 
Better  than  now  I  iI 
No  different  from  now?  1  2 
Worse  than  now  13 
7.  How  LONG  have  you  worked  for  BA?  (Including  predecessor  companies  BEA  and 
BOAQ  (Please  enter  your  length  of  service  to  the  nearest  year  in  the  box  below. 
I 
74 8.  About  you  current  employment  tenns.  On  which  basis  are  you  currently  employed?  (Please 
CIRCLE  the  box  number  which  applies  to  you) 
Full  time  permanent  I 
Part  time  permanent  2 
Full  time  Temporary  3 
Part  time  temporary  4 
Fixed  contract  temporary  5 
Other  (please  specify)  6 
Section  2:  BA's  Current  Eml2loyment  Policies 
9.  What  is  your  opinion  of  the  following  sorts  of  employment  policy? 
recently  introduced  at  BA?  (Please  TICK  the  statement  you  most  agree  with  for  each 
category. 
Strongly  Support  Neither  Oppose  Strongly  No 
support  Support  Oppose  opinion 
nor 
oppose 
Moving  certain 
activities  to  low  cost 
areas  of  Britain  and 
Europe. 
Setting  up  regional 
operations  with 
lower  pay  and 
conditions  than 
mainline  staff. 
The  use  of  Franchise 
operators  to  provide 
certain  services. 
Greater  use  of  part 
time  and  temporary 
contracts 
Separating  off 
certain  areas  such  as 
engineering  from  the 
main  business. 
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Perhaps  you  have  your  own  particular  views  about  BA  employment  policies  as  they 
affect  you  or  your  colleagues.  Please  enter  your  views  in  the  box  below. 10.  In  common  with  other  businesses  BA  is  seeking  to  extend  the  use  of  contract  part 
time  and  temporary  staff.  In  your  opinion  regardless  of  whether  or  not  you  are 
employed  on  such  a  contract  what  will  this  mean  for  you  as  an  individual  employee? 
Strongly  Agree  Neither  Strongly  Disagree  No 
Agree  agree  nor  Disagree  Opinion 
disagre 
More  flexible 
hours  will  help 
with  commitments 
such  as  family. 
I  will  get  lower 
wages  due  to  the 
reduction  of 
hours. 
I  will  get  fewer 
benefits  than  full 
time  staff. 
Flexibility  for  the 
company  will 
mean  greater  job 
security  for 
everyone 
including  those  on 
contracts. 
The  company  will 
use  flexible  shifts 
to  cutout 
overtime  which 
will  reduce  pay 
I  will  accept  it 
because  the  airline 
business  needs 
people  to  be 
flexible. 
76 11  BA  management  is  constantly  examining  whether  certain  operations  should  be  placed  out 
with  the  airline.  If  this  happened  to  your  job  what  would  you  miss  in  being  transferred  outside 
BA?  Please  list  in  order  of  their  importance  to  you. 
Very  important  neither  Not  very  unimporta  no 
important  important  or  Important  nt  opinion 
unimportant 
BA  travel  facilities 
and  other  perks 
BA  terms  and 
conditions. 
The  common 
purpose  of  working 
exclusively  for  BA. 
The  protection  of 
national  trade 
union  agreements. 
The  job  security 
which  a  large 
airline  like  BA 
provides. 
Section  3.  BA's  Current  Global  Strategy  and  BA  Employees 
12.  The  following  business  strategies  are  being  pursued  globally  by  BA.  Please  TICK  the 
statement  within  each  row  to  indicate  whether  you  support/oppose  etc.  these  strategies. 
Strongly  Support  Neither  Oppose  Strongly  No  opinion 
Support  support/  oppose 
Oppose 
Cost  reduction  as  the 
overriding  priority 
Increasing 
productivity  as  much 
as  possible 
Offering  lower  fares 
than  other  carriers 
Involving  Staff  more 
in  the  running  of  the 
company 
Lobbying  for  access 
to  airports  and 
services  currently 
denied  to  BA. 
77 Lobbying  for  an  end 
to  state  aid  for  our 
competitors 
Taking  over  or 
acquiring  holdings  in 
other  airlines 
to  help  expand 
market 
opportunities 
Building  alliances 
with  other  carriers 
to  expand  but  not 
necessarily  using  BA 
Aircraft  and  Crews 
Moving  some 
functions  to  lower 
labour  cost  locations 
If  you  feel  staff  should  be  involved  more  in  the  running  of  the  company,  in  which  ways  would 
you  like  to  become  more  involved.  Please  use  the  box  below  to  record  your  views 
13.  Your  Views  on  what  BA's  global  business  strategy  means  for  BA  staff.  Please  TICK  the 
box/boxes  which  best  describe  your  attitude  towards  the  statements  on  the  left-hand  side. 
Agree  Strongly  Neither  Agree  Disagree  Strongly  No  Opinion 
Nor  Disa  ree  Disagree 
More  competition 
leads  to  less  job 
security 
Some  jobs  will  be 
moved  to  low  labour 
cost  countries  like 
India  and  China 
It  brings  a  new  sense 
of  purpose  knowing 
that  we  are 
competing  against 
the  big  global 
carriers. 
Alliances  could  mean 
less  flights  and 
threaten  jobs. 
78 Jobs  are  more  secure 
all  round  because  we 
can  win  new 
business. 
We  have  no  choice 
but  to  use  these 
strategies  because 
that's  the  reality  of 
the  airline  industry 
today. 
14.  What  do  you  think  BA's  business  strategy  will  mean  for  your  own  terms  and  conditions? 
(Please  TICK  the  box  or  boxes  with  your  preferred  statement  i.  e.  Agree,  Disagree  etc..  ) 
Strongly  Agree  Neither  Agree  Disagree  Strongly  No 
Agree  Nor  Disagree  Disagree  Opinion 
Reduced  wages, 
through  greater  use 
of  part  time  work 
and  contracts 
Greater  use  of  profit 
share  or  performance 
related  pay  which 
might  increase  wages. 
A  reduction  in  fringe 
benefits  such  as 
travel  concessions 
and  medical  benefits. 
Greater  flexibility  to 
allow  us  to  respond 
to  our  competitors 
Accepting  lower 
allowances  and 
enhancements  were 
applicable. 
Reduced  overtime 
and  shift  rates 
through  the  use  of 
new  shift  patterns 
such  as  annualised 
hours  and  split  shifts. 
79 15.  Which  of  the  following  do  you  think  would  result  if  BA  abolished  national  bargaining? 
41  (please  TICK  the  box  which  covers  your  opinion  of  the  changes  listed  below. 
Strongly  Agree  Neither  Disagree  Strongly  No 
Agree  Agree  Nor  Disagree  Opinion 
Disagree 
Our  power  to 
influence 
management  would 
be  severely  reduced. 
We  would  be  in  a 
better  position  to 
negotiate  through 
ourlocal 
representatives. 
We  would  be  under 
constant  threat  of 
franchising,  or 
contracting  out  if  we 
did  not  agree  to 
changes  within  our 
part  of  the  business. 
We  would  still  have 
the  unions  to 
represent  us  as 
before. 
Management  would 
try  to  bypass  the 
unions  and  negotiate 
directly  with  staff. 
We  would  be  able  to 
focus  on  our  own 
part  of  the  business. 
Pay  rates  and 
conditions  would  fall 
as  management  tried 
to  cut  costs. 
We  might  become 
more  involved  in  the 
management  of  our 
own  business  through 
employee 
shareholding,  and 
greater  involvement. 
Please  CIRCLE  1  or  2  here  to  indicate  your  gender. 
1  MALE  2  FEMALE 
80 3 
Regulated  Control:  The  Dynamics  of  Product 
and  Labour  Market  Regulation  In  the  US  and 
UK  Airline  Industries 
This  chapter  examines  the  nature  of  product  and  labour  market  developments  within 
the  US  and  UK  from  around  1920  -1978  in  the  US  and  1920-1980s  within  the  UK. 
However,  the  bulk  of  the  period  covers  the  period  from  about  1930  till  1975,  when  the 
labour  market  and  industrial  relations  was  under  varying  degrees  of  regulated  control. 
In  examining  this  era  we  look  firstly  at  the  early  growth  of  product  regulation  and 
industrial  relations  within  the  USA,  describing  their  impact  upon  the  airline  labour 
market.  We  then  shift  our  focus  to  that  same  period  in  the  UK,  examining  the  growth 
of  the  industry  and  industrial  relations  within  the  formative  period  of  airline 
development.  Having  examined  these  periods  we  then  reflect  on  the  clear  differences 
and  similarities  between  them,  in  particular,  analysing  the  role  of  the  state.  We  then 
proceed  to  analyse  the  period  of  later  regulation,  where  the  consequences  of  the 
regulatory  and  industrial  relations  structures  erected  in  the  earlier  period  become 
manifest.  Having  done  so  we  then  draw  together  some  observations  on  the  nature  of 
these  product/labour  market  regimes  building  upon  the  models  of  labour  market 
regulation  encountered  in  chapter  1.  This  provides  a  historical  and  theoretical  context 
for  later  chapters  were  the  effects  of  both  product  and  labour  market  deregulation  are 
examined  in  detail. 
In  both  contexts,  airline  industry  regulation  has  had  specific  impacts  upon  the  airline 
labour  market.  The  process  of  regulation  brought  power  and  prestige  to  key 
employees,  particularly  pilots  who,  aided  by  the  state  and  their  own  bargaining 
ability,  managed  to  command  exemplary  terms  and  conditions.  Later  as  the  industry 
grew  and  pilots  used  their  bargaining  power,  the  state  acted  to  re-align  the  balance  of 
81 power  permitting  management  to  organise  against  pilot  demands.  Throughout  the 
regulated  era,  changes  in  the  regulatory  structure  had  pronounced  effects  upon  the 
labour  market.  However,  not  until  the  process  of  deregulation,  did  the  impact  of 
changed  regulatory  structures  alter  the  labour  market  and  industrial  relations  structure 
of  the  industry  in  wholesale  fashion. 
The  story  is  similar  in  the  UK,  which  is  broadly  representative  of  the  European  model 
of  regulation,  where  the  regulatory  process  is  effected  primarily  through  state 
ownership  and  national  level  regulation.  Although  the  pilots,  and  later  other  groups 
such  as  engineers,  enjoy  a  high  level  of  bargaining  power,  this  is  contained  and 
effectively  neutralised  within  corporatist  bargaining  structures.  (Blain  1970.  ) 
Nevertheless,  the  effective  power  of  organised  labour  is  always  below  the  surface. 
Eventually,  the  combined  effect  of  product  market  and  technological  change  and  a 
perception  of  declining  fortunes  provokes  the  disruptive  power  of  pilots  and  other 
groups.  Each  change  in  the  regulatory  and  product  market  has  consequences  for  the 
labour  market  and  industrial  relations.  Given  the  position  of  the  US  originating  a 
major  airline  industry  and  its  later  role  in  leading  the  path  to  regulatory  reform,  it  is 
useful  to  examine  the  early  US  experience  of  product  and  labour  market  regulation. 
The  next  section  provides  this  essential  context  to  our  study. 
3.1.1  Early  Industry  Regulation  and  the  Labour  Market  in  the  USA 
The  US  airline  industry  grew  rapidly  from  the  mid  1900s  but  had  been  characterised 
by  an  element  of  barnstorming  chaos  and  a  lack  of  economic  stability.  (Hopkins  1992: 
12.  )  Competition  for  government  contracts  meant  carriers  operated  at  and  sometimes 
beyond  the  very  margins  of  safety.  In  order  to  ensure  growth  in  the  fledgling  industry 
administrators  created  a  regulatory  system,  which  would  deliver  both  safety  and 
stability.  Government  intervention  became  inevitable,  despite  the  free  market 
orientation  of  the  Hoover  administration  under  which  the  first  steps  to  regulation  were 
taken.  (Ibid.  )  The  principal  acts  of  product  market  regulation  involved  a  complex 
subsidy  system  for  government  mail  contracts,  which  up  till  then  accounted  for  the 
major  share  of  traffic.  However,  to  develop  the  crucial  passenger  aspect  of  air 
transport  a  more  interventionist  method  of  regulation  was  needed.  In  order  to  provide 
the  much  more  rigorous  safety  environment  needed  for  the  safe  transport  of 
82 passengers,  government  engineered  a  regulatory  framework.  Broadly,  the  new  regime 
built  on  earlier  legislation  to  formalise  mail  contracts,  guarantee  markets  and  spheres 
of  influence  to  the  airlines  and  wages  and  conditions  to  airline  labour.  (See  Kahn 
1980:  319.  )  Thus  in  the  New  Deal  period  around  1932-35,  a  swathe  of  regulatory 
initiatives  impacted  upon  the  air  transport  sector.  The  system  of  regulation  provided  a 
framework  of  collective  bargaining  and  protection  for,  and  extension  of,  work  rules. 
This  was  particularly  important  for  pilots  who  obtained  favourable  productivity  and 
scheduling  rules,  acting  in  effect  as  a  conduit  for  technical  regulation. 
The  foundations  of  labour  market  regulation  within  the  industry  were  the  Railway 
Labor  Act  (RLA)  (Title  11)  of  1936  and  various  directives  of  the  Civil  Aeronautics 
Board  (CAB)  (1938)  which  together  legislated  on  terms  and  conditions,  prescribing  a 
framework  for  the  conduct  of  collective  bargaining.  The  CAB  also  regulated  the 
wages  and  hours  of  pilots  in  its  role  as  guarantor  of  safety  and  licensing.  The 
cumulative  effect  of  both  tiers  of  regulation  was  favourable  to  labour  and,  more 
specifically,  pilots.  As  Taneja  (1976:  224)  argues,  the  adoption  of  an  award  to  pilots 
known  as  Decision  No.  83  and  passed  by  the  National  Labour  Board  (NLB)  in  1934, 
ensured  that  pilots  would  receive  a  substantial  part  of  future  productivity  increases  in 
the  shape  of  increased  wages  or  reduced  hours.  (Ibid.  ) 
Decision  83  was  the  culmination  of  an  astute  campaign  by  the  newly  formed  pilots' 
union,  the  Airline  Pilots'  Association  (ALPA).  ALPA  grew  from  pilots'  concerns  in 
the  depression  period  between  1929-1932  that  wages  would  be  ratcheted  down  and 
hours  progressively  increased.  The  prospect  of  a  general  onslaught  of  the  type, 
initiated  by  the  fervently  anti-union  entrepreneur  E.  H.  Cord  of  Century  Airlines  in 
1932,15(lbid.  )  sent  the  pilots  looking  for  political  influence  particularly  within 
Congress.  (Ibid.  )  In  fact,  the  deflation  of  the  late  1920s  actually  improved  the 
position  of  pilots  as  prices  plummeted  downwards  and  the  real  value  of  their  wages 
increased.  Though  pilots  (as  their  official  historian  George  E.  Hopkins  argues)  were 
motivated  "more  by  the  fear  of  changes  than  the  fact  of  them"  they  had  legitimate 
15  Cord  sacked  the  entire  pilot  workforce  of  the  airline  after  provoking  a  strike  ostensibly  to  that  end. 
I  lis  actions  were  instrumental  in  the  formation  of  ALPA  the  pilots  union,  and  attracted  the  distaste  of 
congress  and  of  other  operators.  The  establishment  of  a  state-regulated  floor  on  labour  conditions  was 
advanced  as  a  method  of  indirect  regulation  in  response  to  his  buccaneering  activities.  (Cohen  1990: 
308-23.  ) 
83 concerns.  (Hopkins  1992:  14.  )  By  lobbying  Congress  to  deny  a  federal  mail  contract 
to  Cord,  ALPA  was  able  to  manoeuvre  its  way  into  a  favourable  position.  There  was 
considerable  sympathy  for  this  union.  ALPA  was  able  to  marshal  support  from 
politicians  such  as  La  Guardia  and  Roosevelt  himself.  (Ibid.  )  Indeed,  La  Guardia 
publicly  criticised  Cord  for  paying  pilots  "less  than  a  union  truck  driver  gets  in  New 
York"  (Ibid.  )  This  kind  of  heavyweight  political  support  was  important  in  ALPA's 
growth  and  in  ensuring  that  technical  regulation  was  effectively  enacted  through  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  pilots.  Using  the  National  Labor  Relations  Board  (NLRB) 
code  pilots  sought  and  obtained  a  better  agreement  than  either  government  nor 
operators  were  initially  prepared  to  grant.  (Kahn  1980:  341.  )  By  1934  the  union  was 
able  to  secure  its  own  unique  deal  in  respect  of  Decision  83.  (Capelli  1987:  137.  ) 
Thus  the  role  of  the  pilot  union  was  of  crucial  importance  in  producing  a  structure  of 
product  and  labour  market  regulation,  which  benefited  labour.  In  particular,  they 
benefited  pilots  to  such  an  extent  that  the  ability  of  these  workers  to  capture 
productivity  increases  in  the  shape  of  higher  earnings  became  a  major  pre-occupation 
of  proponents  of  deregulation  in  the  1960s  and  1970s. 
Before  World  War  IL  therefore,  pilots  depended  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  support  of 
the  state.  Paradoxically,  ALPA's  bargaining  strategy  in  the  1930s  was  based  on  its 
intrinsic  weakness,  cultivating  political  support  based  on  its  prestige  and  desisting 
from  all  but  the  most  defensive  industrial  action.  Although  ALPA  had  won  the 
Century  strike against  E.  L.  Cord  in  1932,  the  union  was  wary  about  taking  further 
industrial  action.  This  was  a  rational  policy  at  a  time  of  increasing  legislation  and 
when  government  was  anxious  to  push  forward  a  new  spirit  of  corporatism  (Dubofsky 
1990).  This  position  can  be  contrasted  with  militant  use  of  the  strike  weapon  after  the 
Second  World  War. 
Government's  own  rationale  can  be  explained  by  the  structural  problems  of  the 
industry.  In  the  mid  to  late  1930s  government  was  prepared  to  tolerate  an  increasingly 
concentrated  industry  structure  in  its  attempts  to  develop  a  stable  and  profitable 
industry.  One  aspect  of  that  stability  was  a  degree  of  workplace  harmony,  in 
particular,  a  method  of  solving  disputes,  which  stopped  short  of  strikes  and  lockouts. 
84 Both  accidents  ýnd  strikes  were  all  too  common  under  the  old  subsidised  competitive 
regime  of  the  1920s,  proving  a  major  obstacle  to  industry  stability.  A  highly 
structured  and  codified  framework  of  craft-based  collective  bargaining  replaced  the 
low  trust,  purely  'contractual'  basis  of  the  earlier  employment  relationship.  As  labour 
grew  in  strength  and  organisation  and  as  the  major  airlines  benefited  from 
oligopolistie  competition,  compliance  with  the  RLA  became  a  condition  for  market 
entry.  From  1938  the  newly  created  super-regulator,  the  Civil  Aeronautics  Board 
(CAB),  made  RLA  compliance  a  prerequisite  for  the  granting  of  a  Certificate  of 
Public  Convenience  and  Necessity  (PC&N).  When  pilots  were  granted  a 
comprehensive  pay  and  productivity  deal,  in  the  shape  of  Decision  83  the  state  sought 
to  use  labour  conditions  as  a  form  of  indirect  regulation.  By  the  end  of  the  period, 
labour  had  begun  (with  the  protection  of  the  state)  to  enjoy  a  high  level  of  bargaining 
power  and  had  the  potential  to  pursue  its  demands  to  the  full. 
3.1.2  Industry  Regulation  and  Industfial  Relations:  the  UK 
The  development  of  the  UK  industrial  relations  framework  followed  a  different  track. 
In  many  ways,  macro  level  differences  such  as  the  voluntarist  nature  of  UK  Industrial 
Relations  shaped  labour  management  interaction,  complementing  developments 
within  firms  and  the  industry.  However,  the  smaller  scale,  scope  and  potential  of  the 
UK  airline  industry  compared  to  the  US  must  also  be  borne  in  mind.  Though  the  UK 
industry  was  vibrant  with  routes  offered  from  almost  every  point  in  the  country,  it  was 
consistently  unprofitable.  (Dyos  and  Aldcroft  1969:  271-283.  )  This  environment 
provided  the  background  and  context  to  the  system  of  industrial  relations.  There  were 
superficial,  if  predictable,  similarities  with  the  USA  given  the  nature  of  the  industry. 
As  in  the  USA,  pilot  disaffection  led  to  the  formation  of  the  first  and  strongest  airline 
union  in  the  UK.  Safety  concerns  were  a  major  issue  in  pilot  strikes  given  the  high 
fatality  rate  for  both  passengers  and  aircrew.  (Bagwell  1988:  271.  )  Pilots  had 
originally  been  affiliated  to  the  Transport  and  General  Workers  Union  and  the  TUC, 
through  the  Federation  of  British  Civilian  Airline  Pilots  (FBCAP).  (Blain  1971:  49.  ) 
That  union  was  involved  in  an  early  strike  against  Imperial  Airways  in  1924. 
Although  only  24  pilots  belonged  to  the  Federation,  the  employers  responded 
vigorously  with  members  of  the  fledgling  pilot  organisation  dismissed  and  blacklisted 
(ibid.  ).  The  dispute  was  ostensibly  about  remuneration,  though  a  complex  array  of 
85 grievances  and  resentments  were  expressed  through  the  pay  aspect.  The  first  airline 
union  was  defeated  in  the  strike.  According  to  an  unpublished  official  history  of  the 
successor  flight  deck  union,  the  British  Airline  Pilots'  Association  (BALPA),  the 
Federation  members  "being  mainly  ex-service  tended  to  regard  themselves  as 
'Officers  and  Gentlemen'  and  feeling  uncomfortable  having  done  something  so 
ungentlemanly  as  striking,  they  allowed  their  federation  to  quietly  die.  "  (The  Log 
1987.  )  Despite  the  earlier  setback,  the  need  for  trade  union  organisation  in  an  industry 
with  similar  problems  of  safety  and  stability  as  experienced  in  the  US  remained. 
Nevertheless,  obstacles  remained  in  respect  of  the  nature  of  pilot  representation.  In  the 
vacuum  after  the  Imperial  Airways  strike,  the  Guild  of  Airline  Pilots  and  Navigators 
(GAPAN),  represented  professional  and  technical  interests,  deliberately  eschewing  a 
trade  union  orientation,  as  its  Livery  Company  status  demanded.  However  as  pilots 
faced  a  tough  management  regime  at  the  major  carrier,  Imperial  Airways,  the 
importance  of  effective  trade  union  organisation  became  clear.  The  shortcoming  of 
GAPAN  became  all  too  apparent  as  the  new  union  sought  a  pay  deal.  Both  the 
Chairman  of  Imperial  Airways  and  his  managing  director  refused  to  recognise  the 
union  or  even  to  negotiate. 
As  The  Log  jubilee  edition  of  1987  argued,  one  of  the  problems  was  the  failure  of 
GAPAN  to  present  a  credible  threat  to  autocratic  airline  management: 
'GAPAN  had  no  teeth  with  which  to  get  its  way  and  once  commerce 
got  in  the  way  the  old  boy  network  simply  did  not  work.  Secondly,  as 
the  numbers  of  pilots  increased  it  became  impossible  to  maintain  the 
same  level  of  personal  contact  with  Management.  This  was  especially 
true  in  Imperial  Airways  as  it  expanded  rapidly  and  based  pilots  in 
several  down  route  stations,  further  weakening  lines  of  personal 
communication.  16 
This  recognition  of  the  failure  of  GAPAN's  gentlemanly  advocacy,  and  the  implied 
breakdown  in  the  traditional  paternalistic  work  culture,  prepared  the  way  for  the 
growth  of  BALPA  as  the  first  airline  trade  union.  BALPA  was  modelled  on  the  US 
pilot  union  ALPA  and  borrowed  from  the  organisational  talents  of  its  founder  David 
Behncke.  BALPA  founding  member,  Captain  Eric  Lane-Burslern  had  pursued  a  flying 
career  in  the  United  States  having  joined  ALPA  from  its  formation  in  1931.  On 
86 returning  to  the  UK  in  1933  inspired  by  this  experience,  Lane-Burslern  resolved  to 
begin  an  UK  pilot  union.  Lane-Burslern  became  even  more  convinced  after  his 
repeated  complaints  to  management  about  the  safety  of  Imperial  aircraft  were  ignored. 
Given  the  dominance  of  Imperial  in  UK  civil  aviation  these  misgivings  came  to  the 
attention  of  government  via  his  persistent  lobbying. 
As  in  the  USA,  legal  enactments  benefited  the  early  pilot  organisations.  The  Air 
Navigation  Act  (1936)  probably  operated  in  a  more  indirect  way  than  US  legislation, 
which  favoured  labour  explicitly.  Its  main  effect  was  to  enshrine  a  two-airline  strategy 
as  official  policy  with  some  labour  provisions.  The  national  government  of  the  period 
took  the  opportunity  of  introducing  a  form  of  product  market  regulation,  which  led  as 
in  the  US,  to  higher  levels  of  concentration.  Labour  regulation  can  be  viewed  as  part 
of  the  compact,  which  would  ensure  safety  and  stability.  However  the  primary 
concern  was  probably  (as  in  the  US  industry)  stability.  Nevertheless,  the  1936  act  did 
ex  tend  the  scope  of  labour  regulation  considerably,  even  if  it  only  specified  a  floor  for 
remuneration.  The  act  guaranteed  minimum  wages  and  conditions  in  the  industry, 
specifying  that: 
The  wages  paid  by  any  "subsidised  persons"  to  that  person's 
employees  in  connection  with  the  carriage  of  air  passengers  or  goods 
may  not  be  less  favourable  than  those  observed  under  (those  applying 
to)  government  contracts'(Cmnd.  1032  1936  Air  Navigation  Act.  ) 
However,  although  such  measures  were  important  to  the  extent  of  setting  a  floor  on 
wages,  remuneration  was  not  the  sole  issue.  At  the  heart  of  the  Imperial  Airways 
dispute  was  the  issue  of  power  and  prerogative.  Safety  was  often  used  as  a  proxy  for 
these  issues.  BALPA  criticised  both  the  management  and  safety  regime  that  prevailed. 
When  Lane-Burslern  himself  suffered  near  disaster  due  to  these  safety  deficiencies  in 
1936,  his  determination  to  form  an  independent  and  assertive  pilot  association  was  re- 
aff  irmed. 
However  the  extension  of  product  market  regulation,  to  control  the  UK  industry, 
provided  the  impetus  to  both  trade  union  organisation  and  labour  market  regulation. 
Again  this  has  to  be  located  within  the  national  industrial  relations  context  (Gospel 
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87 and  Palmer  1993:  155).  Both  unions  and  management  favoured  this  form  of  labour 
market  regulation  and  legislation  of  the  type  encountered  in  the  USA  would  have 
conflicted  with  this  voluntarist  tradition.  The  voluntarist  nature  of  industrial  relations 
in  the  UK  as  a  whole  has  to  be  offset  against  the  general  atmosphere  of  industrial 
relations  in  the  aftermath  of  the  general  strike  and  depression.  Despite  defeats,  labour, 
as  Fox  argues,  was  still: 
'Enjoying  the  protections  and  constraints  of  constitutionalism  and  the  rule  of 
law, 
... 
(and)  could  exercise  that  function  despite  mass  unemployment,  and 
weakened  bargaining  power.  Unemployment  had  weakened  unions  but  it  had 
not  destroyed  collective  bargaining.  '  (Fox  1985:  337.  ) 
Within  the  airline  industry,  the  truth  of  this  statement  was  verified  when  the  Cadman 
Commision  of  1938  boosted  trade  unions  and  collective  bargaining  through  the 
extension  of  Whitley  councils.  (Blain  1970.  )  The  extension  of  this  standard 
framework  of  civil  service  collective  bargaining  and  joint  consultation  was  again 
effected  at  a  time  of  further  industry  consolidation.  The  Cadman  Commission 
consolidated  all  imperial  and  European  routes  into  a  duopoly,  and  rationalised 
subsidies  and  fares.  It  was  an  attempt  to  kick  start  a  stable  air  transport  industry. 
(Dyos  and  Aldcroft  1969.  )  BALPA  was  able  to  win  substantial  majorities 
representing  the  pilots'  interest  on  those  bodies.  The  eve  of  World  War  11  therefore 
witnessed  the  formation  of  both  a  key  trade  union  and  official  recognition  of 
collective  bargaining  in  the  UK  airline  industry.  This  arose,  as  in  the  USA,  from  the 
safety  concerns  of  pilots  and  was  facilitated  not  just  by  the  goodwill  of  politicians  but 
by  the  careful  and  tactical  approach  of  the  fledgling  union. 
3.1.3  Early  Product  and  Labour  Market  Regulation  in  the  US  and  UK.  -  A  Comparison 
It  is  important  to  reflect  on  both  the  similarities  and  differences  between  the  early  US 
and  UK  experiences  of  labour  market  regulation.  As  in  the  USA,  pilots  in  Britain 
became  organised  over  safety  fears  and  the  experience  of  dealing  with  an  autocratic 
management.  To  a  great  extent,  the  issue  of  safety  and  trade  union  representation 
cannot  be  separated.  Militant  organisation  was  necessary  in  an  environment  of 
victimisation  and  managerial  autocracy.  Pilot  pushing  in  the  USA  under  the  US  Postal 
Service  led  to  the  formation  of  the  first  pilot  organisation  and  later  to  ALPA.  In  the 
88 UK  the  despotism  of  Imperial  Airways  led  pilots  to  form  their  own  militant 
association  in  1924,  though  this  was  stillborn.  GAPAN's  low  key  strategy  was 
exhausted  by  the  technical  and  organisational.  arrogance  of  Imperial,  which  their 
genteel  lobbying  was  ill  equipped  to  confront.  Furthermore  as  Blain  (1970)  contends 
increasing  complexity  within  Imperial  and  the  wider  industry  caused  alienation 
between  management  and  workers.  The  close  knit  organisational.  intimacy,  common 
in  the  airborne  services,  was  lost  and  the  previously  accepted  military  style  discipline 
and  hierarchy  was  now  being  contested. 
In  this  early  period  of  regulation  we  can  see  some  clear  similarities  between 
essentially  weakened  fledgling  unions,  seeking  and  obtaining  the  protection  of  the 
state  through  the  mechanism  of  regulation.  Bearing  in  mind  the  differences  between 
the  airline  industry  in  both  nations,  we  can  point  to  several  key  differences  in  the 
application  of  product  and  labour  market  regulation.  In  the  US,  government  chose  to 
harness  the  regulatory  system  towards  the  goal  of  industry  growth  and  stability  and 
the  clear  use  of  labour  market  regulation,  as  part  of  that  overall  blueprint  is  evident  in 
the  product  and  labour  market  legislation  discussed.  There  was  a  clear  interconnection 
in  the  USA  between  product  and  labour  market  regulation,  the  clearest  evidence  being 
the  stipulation  of  RLA  compliance  as  a  condition  for  market  entry.  The  technical 
constraints  on  efficiency  and  the  distribution  of  the  gains  of  productivity  to  labour, 
was  a  conscious  design  of  the  regulatory  system. 
In  the  UK  there  was  a  more  fitful  if  equally  extensive  form  of  product  market 
regulation,  with  the  state  encouraging  first  a  long  distance  monopoly  airline  in  the 
shape  of  Imperial  Airways,  and  then  a  'dual  airline  policy'under  Cadman.  The  smaller 
size  of  the  UK  industry  necessitated  this  level  of  concentration,  which  can  be 
contrasted  with  the  more  basically  competitive  forms  of  consolidation,  which  the  state 
sponsored  in  the  USA.  Again,  as  in  the  USA  in  response  to  pilot  and  misgivings 
about  Imperial's  cavalier  attitude  to  safety,  the  government  of  the  1930s  initiated  a 
series  of  protective  labour  clauses  within  general  industry  legislation.  These  provided 
basic  wage  and  licensing  protections  for  aircrew  and  were  later  extended  in  the  1938 
Cadman  act  to  include  the  Whitley  model  of  collective  bargaining.  There  is  less 
evidence  of  the  state  actively  using  labour  regulation  to  promote  wider  industry  goals 
as  occurred  in  the  US.  The  extension  of  a  protective  floor  to  wages  and  conditions  and 
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industrial  relations  in  the  period,  and  as  a  modem  industry  air  transport  was  subjected 
to  it. 
We  are  left  therefore,  in  analysing  the  early  period  of  regulation  with  a  clear 
divergence  between  the  liberal  corporatist  intervention  of  the  USA  and  the  quasi- 
regulated  voluntarism  of  the  UK.  Both  models  reflect  wider  state  goals  and  industry 
structures  and  much  is  explained  by  the  superior  size  and  scope  of  the  US  industry. 
Nevertheless  there  are  clear  differences  in  the  extent  to  which  the  state  is  prepared  to 
intervene  within  the  industrial  relations  environment,  even  when  its  goals  of  safety 
and  stability  are  essentially  similar.  Having  mapped  the  early  experience  of  regulation 
within  both  countries,  and  explained  the  key  product  and  labour  market  differences, 
we  now  go  on  to  examine  how  product/labour  market  regulation  actually  operated  in 
the  industry  regulated  beyday'  period,  broadly  from  the  1940s  till  the  eve  of 
deregulation  in  the  mid  1970s. 
3.2  Regulation  and  Industrial  Relations  in  the  Post  War  Period 
3.2.1  Post  War  Regulation  and  Industrial  Relations  in  the  USA 
Within  the  US,  the  foundations  provided  by  the  RLA  and  the  effects  of  industry 
regulation  secured  a  favourable  position  for  airline  labour  in  the  post  war  period.  The 
industry  reaped  the  benefits  of  passenger  growth  and  increasing  scale,  allowing  labour 
to  push  for  greater  representation.  From  1939  collective  bargaining  became 
widespread,  fundamentally  altering  the  balance  of  power  between  labour  and  capital. 
This  fact  encouraged  the  view  of  later  'deregulationist'  writers  such  as  TaneJa  (1976) 
and  Caves  (1962)  that  labour  enjoyed  despotic  power  in  the  industry.  This  has  to  be 
qualified  with  reference  to  the  labour  legislation  with  its  enforced  mediation 
provisions,  which  potentially  restricted  the  power  of  even  the  strongest  occupational 
groups.  (Kahn  1980:  343.  )  Nevertheless,  the  important  issue  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  study,  is  that  labour  enjoyed  a  period  of  considerable  power  and  influence  and  the 
state  tended  not  to  use  the  sanctions  at  its  disposal  in  order  to  challenge  that  power. 
Indeed,  according  to  Nothrup  (1977),  the  RLA  afforded  labour  too  much  power  and 
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union  competition  and  fragmented  representation,  especially  in  the  case  of  pilots 
(Northrup  1977:  364-372). 
Product  market  growth  led  to  a  huge  expansion  in  the  labour  force.  The  crisis 
conditions  of  the  immediate  post  war  period  disappeared,  replaced  by  a  precipitate 
expansion  of  world  air  travel  from  the  1950s.  In  the  US  between  1945  and  1955, 
passenger  revenue  miles  increased  six-fold  from  3.9  billion  to  24.2  billion  or  521  per 
cent  (Capelli  1985a).  Overall  between  1955  and  1985  there  were  only  6  unprofitable 
years.  (ICAO  1994.  )  Within  that  environment  of  industry  growth  and  optimism, 
labour  prospered.  Pilots  in  particular  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  growth 
conditions,  in  order  to  pursue  their  sectional  aims.  Their  strategy  was  aided  by  the 
nature  of  bargaining  within  the  industry  which  favoured  labour  groups  with  disruptive 
power  and  a  unified  representational  structure.  With  almost  total  coverage  of  the  pilot 
workforce  ALPA  benefited  from  this  bargaining  environment.  The  option  of 
substituting  high  cost  with  lower  cost  employees  was  effectively  closed-off  to 
operators  by  virtue  of  the  certification  aspect  of  regulation.  Whilst  there  would 
normally  be  an  incentive  in  any  business  to  raise  profits  by  cutting  costs,  this 
efficiency  'driver'  was  effectively  dampened  as  a  consequence  of  the  regulatory 
regime.  Capelli  describes  the  prevailing  labour  market  environment: 
In  short,  under  regulation,  employment  levels  did  not  vary  along 
with  employment  costs.  Unions  had  little  to  lose  by  pushing  up 
labor  costs,  and  the  carriers  had  little  reason  to  resist  their  doing  so 
because  industry  average  costs  were  passed  on  to  consumers 
through  fare  increases.  Although  holding  the  line  on  labor  costs 
would  have  improved  profits,  airline  managers  typically  thought 
that  profit  increases  would  not  be  worth  the  costs  of  a  potential 
strike.  '  (Capelli  1987:  139.  ) 
The  fragmented  nature  of  bargaining  in  the  US  industry  was  also  a  key  factor  in  the 
ability  of  pilots,  in  particular,  to  secure  their  demands.  (Capelli  1987:  56.  )  Using  a 
mixture  of  craft  exclusivity,  tactical  awareness  and  militancy,  US  pilots  were 
incredibly  successful  in  securing  those  interests.  Whenever  their  interests  were 
threatened,  they  were  prepared  to  strike  the  individual  carrier  until  their  demands 
were  met.  Few  workers  in  or  out  of  the  airline  industry  had  this  kind  of  bargaining 
prowess.  With  no  national  negotiating  body  given  the  differing  ownership  patterns  of 
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bargaining.  That  is  to  say,  though  individual  carriers  negotiated  with  union 
representatives  at  carrier  level,  agreements  and  disagreements  were  always  subject  to 
the  intervention  of  the  federal  authorities.  The  state  often  intervened  by  initiating 
inquiries  into  strikes  and  other  episodes  of  disharmony,  however  it  seldom  found 
against  labour  (Krolick  1966:  136). 
ALPA's  bargaining  power  grew  in  tandem  with  the  growth  in  the  overall  workforce, 
between  1950  and  1955.  The  extent  of  this  power  was  reflected  in  their  ability  to 
influence  technological  change  within  the  industry.  Larger  four  engine  piston  aircraft 
were  introduced,  and  after  intense  battles  between  the  union,  aircraft  manufacturers 
and  operators,  these  aircraft  carried  an  extra  crew  member  -  the  flight  engineer. 
(Leveen  1982.  )  However,  despite  the  victory  over  crew  complement  in  the  late  1940s, 
ALPA  faced  a  less  certain  future  than  the  frenzied  growth  of  the  1940s  and  1950s 
suggested.  The  crucial  break  period  was  the  introduction  of  jet  aircraft  around  1955- 
58,  witnessing  much  slower  growth  in  the  flight  deck  workforce,  and  a  precipitate 
expansion  in  the  growth  of  these  grades,  particularly  the  skilled  technical  and 
maintenance  staff  needed  to  service  these  high  technology  aircraft.  (Table  3.1).  In  the 
period  between  1955  and  1965  there  was  a  huge  increase  in  industry  output  expressed 
as  revenue  passenger  miles  (RPM),  but  little  corresponding  change  in  the  rough 
composition  of  staff.  Crucially,  there  is  a  mere  19  per  cent  increase  in  the  number  of 
pilots,  reflecting  the  lower  crewing  requirements  of  jet  aircraft. 
Table  3.1  Growth  of  US  Airline  Personnel,  1935-1960 
1935  8352  995  213  1518  3008  ------- 
1945  68281  5897  1046  9447  23904  20051 
1950  82786  7277  1521  12256  31138  20338 
1955  122203  10857  2762  19114  45030  29666 
1960  162771  12967  3618  42568  34855  71106 
*  Includes  co-pilots. 
**Includes  grades  such  as  purser,  stewardesses  and  stewards. 
***Includes  other  flight  personnel  (radio  operators,  navigators,  flight  engineers,  plus 
traffic  and  commercial  grades.  Source:  FAA  Statistical  Handbook  of  Aviation  1957 
and  1962 
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which  could  be  travelled,  and  the  capacity  which  could  be  offered.  But  its  least 
recognised  effect  is  the  manner  in  which  it  changed  the  nature  and  structure  of 
industry  bargaining.  This  issue  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
3.2.2  Jet  Re-Equipment  and  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact:  The  Airlines  Strike  Back 
As  the  foregoing  section  explained,  ALPA  utilised  what  have  been  referred  to  as 
'whipsawing'  tactics  on  a  regular  basis  in  the  1950s,  pursuing  a  dispute  with  one 
carrier  that  led  to  a  generalised  settlement.  (Capelli  1987:  163.  )  The  introduction  of  jet 
aircraft  rendered  the  continuation  of  this  level  of  bargaining  power  disastrous  for 
carriers.  Although  airlines  were  profitable  in  the  1950s,  there  were  problems  on  the 
horizon.  If  pilots  were  allowed  to  choose  the  method  of  compensation  for  jet  aircraft, 
if  they  could  decide  on  crew  complement,  and  if  they  secured  favourable  scheduling 
agreements  as  with  four  engine  transports,  then  jet  re-equipment  would  be  disastrous. 
Even  limited  industrial  action  would  saddle  carriers  with  massive  debts,  as  hugely 
expensive  hardware  was  immobilised.  From  a  productivity  viewpoint,  in  order  to 
make  jet  aircraft  pay,  carriers  had  to  maximise  utilisation  from  the  outset.  That  would 
mean  modifying  the  generous  scheduling  rules  the  pilot  union  had  secured.  17  It  stood 
to  reason  that  operators  had  to  effect  a  change  in  the  bargaining  situation  that 
delivered  so  much  for  pilots.  Yet  the  combined  effect  of  both  Decision  83  and  the 
crew  complement  ruling  was  to  boost  ALPA's  effective  right  of  veto  over  jet 
utilisation.  In  order  to  effect  a  change  in  the  situation,  airlines  needed  the 
acquiescence  of  government.  As  ALPA  strategy  depended  on  'picking  off  individual 
firms,  the  operators  had  to  respond  by  rendering  this  tactic  more  difficult.  They 
reasoned  that  if  pilots  were  unable  to  select  individual  carriers,  by  virtue  of  some 
strike  insurance  pact,  allowing  carriers  to  preserve  revenues  and  re-direct  passengers, 
then  the  monolithic  power  of  ALPA  could  be  challenged. 
17  Under  D83  pilots  managed  to  secure  a  maximum  monthly  flying  hours  limit  of  85  hours.  A  standard 
which  they  improved  upon,  and  which  defined  the  parameters  of  bargaining  given  the  importance  of 
scheduling  in  flight  deck  negotiations.  (See  Kahn  1979:  34  1.  ) 
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strategy.  However,  it  could  also  be  seen  as  a  first  step  in  the  eventual  re-alignment  of 
industrial  relations,  allowing  carriers  the  scope  to  challenge  cherished  work  rules  such 
as  Decision  83  and  the  crew  complement  ruling.  Under  the  agreement,  (subirtitted  for 
approval  to  the  CAB  in  1959),  operators  refunded  extra  revenues  generated  through 
the  replacement  of  a  struck  carrier.  The  pact  achieved  significant  critical  mass  as  the 
six  majors  controlling  the  bulk  of  domestic  and  international  traffic  signed  up 
immediately.  (Krolick  1966:  266.  )  All  unions  in  the  industry  protested  the  plan,  and  it 
is  interesting  to  note  their  principal  objections  and  the  attitude  of  government  as  an 
indication  of  the  changing  nature  of  regulation.  The  unions  argued  that  the  pact  would 
allow  'costless  confrontation'  on  behalf  of  carriers  and,  thus,  seriously  impair  the 
industrial  relations  environment.  Secondly,  they  argued  that  the  move  was  an  attempt 
to  impose  industry  wide  collective  bargaining  and  as  such  contravened  the  letter  of 
the  RLA.  The  act  permitted  industry  wide  bargaining  only  with  mutual  consent. 
They  also  reasoned  that  the  arrangement  for  remitting  revenues  to  struck  carriers 
constituted  unlawful  collusion  under  the  Sherman  anti-trust  legislation.  However, 
despite  these  objections,  the  CAB/FAA  and  NLB  moved  from  a  policy  of  neutrality  to 
declare  that: 
'Labour  and  management  owe  the  public  an  obligation  to  take  all 
possible  steps  to  avoid  stoppages,  especially  disputes  which  are 
of  a  jurisdictional  nature.  Or  which  result  from  the  failure  of  parties 
to  give  adequate  weight  to  the  wishes  of  Presidential  Boards. 
(Krolick  1966:  267.  ) 
The  rationale  for  allowing  the  measure  was  that  it  would  cause  parties  to  "reflect  on 
the  circumstances  of  strike  action.  "  (lbid.  )  Since  unions  tended  to  initiate  strike 
action,  all  tended  to  view  MAP  as  a  direct  assault  on  their  effective  power.  By  mid 
1960  nine  major  carriers  were  involved  in  the  pact.  The  unions'  dilemma  was  clear. 
For  a  strike  to  be  effective  it  would  have  to  be  industry  wide.  As  contract  negotiations 
were  set  on  different  dates,  it  was  impossible  for  the  unions  to  co-ordinate  in  this  way. 
The  overall  effect  of  MAP  was  to  prolong  the  duration  of  strikes  by  engendering  an 
atmosphere  of  trench  warfare.  Indeed  one  academic  critique  of  the  plan  suggested 
that  carriers  even  had  a  perverse  incentive  to  endure  industrial  action  as  many  ended 
94 up  more  profitable  during  a  strike  than  in  a  normal  operating  climate.  The  writers 
went  on  to  conclude: 
'To  date  at  least,  airline  strike  insurance, 
-appears  to  have  promoted 
escalated  costs  and  benefits,  and  encouraged  longer  strikes,  but  little 
else.  It  is  a  lesson  in  the  adverse  consequences  of  strengthening  the 
weapons  of  industrial  warfare  without  any  evidence  of  countervailing 
benefits.  '  (Unterberger  and  Koziara  1975:  26-45.  ) 
One  consequence  of  the  MAP  was  a  shift  in  the  occupational  basis  of  industrial 
action.  The  power  of  pilots  was  curtailed,  but  other  groups  of  workers  were  prepared 
to  use  the  strike  weapon  in  a  different  fashion,  often  rethinking  strategy  to  circumvent 
the  pact.  Walsh  describes  the  Machinists  strike  of  1966.  This  forty-six  day  strike  was 
conducted  against  five  carriers  in  an  attempt  to  short-circuit  the  MAP,  and  became  a 
landmark  dispute  for  other  reasons.  (1994:  57.  )  By  mutual  agreement  and  contrary  to 
the  usual  industry  practice,  the  maintenance  and  ground  crew  union,  the  International 
Association  of  Machinists  (IAM)  negotiated  jointly  on  behalf  of  employees  at  all  of 
the  carriers.  (Ibid.  )  The  targeted  airlines  were  paralysed  by  the  strike,  although  they 
did  not  attempt  to  operate.  Replacement  was  not  an  option,  even  from  the  military, 
given  the  highly  specific  certification  for  maintenance  procedures  within  individual 
carriers  and  the  acute  shortage  of  skilled  workers.  (Walsh  1994:  57.  )  The  strike  was 
only  settled  with  the  intervention  of  the  AFL-CIO.  Other  less  powerful  groups  such 
as  flight  attendants  pursued  long  strikes,  which  become  in  effect  lockouts.  The  main 
consequence  of  the  MAP  was  to  re-align  bargaining  power  within  the  industry, 
providing  evidence  of  the  ways  in  which  regulatory  action  can  impact  upon  industrial 
relations.  The  unalloyed  power  of  the  pilots  and  other  groups  under  craft  bargaining 
was  frustrated  and  contained  by  the  state's  willingness  to  licence  this  carrier  cartel. 
Whilst  still  enjoying  the  protections  of  the  regulated  era,  airline  workers  faced  an 
environment  which  was  infinitely  more  hostile.  The  state,  by  permitting  the  MAP,  in 
truth  already  signalled  the  end  of  the  bargained  corporatism  of  the  regulated  period. 
Considering  the  longer-term  effects  of  the  introduction  of  MAP  and  the  re-alignment 
of  industry  bargaining,  two  principal  questions  have  to  be  addressed.  Firstly,  did  the 
MAP  curtail  the  number  of  strikes  and  increase  the  power  of  airlines  in  relation  to 
their  employees?  Secondly,  was  there  a  pronounced  re-alignment  in  bargaining  within 
the  industry?  These  issues,  which  define  the  nature  of  employment  relations  in  the  late 
regulation  period,  are  the  subject  of  the  next  section. 
95 3.2.3  Enforced  Hartnony  or  Enforced  Conflict?  US  Airline  Industrial  Relations 
Strategies  in  the  1960s  and  1970s. 
In  discussing  the  flight  deck  industrial  relations  environment  of  the  1960s,  it  is 
difficult  to  escape  the  looming  influence  of  the  mutual  aid  pact.  ALPA  keenly  felt  the 
effect  of  the  pact.  From  the  outset  it  occasioned  a  re-alignment  in  flight  deck  union 
organisation  which  was  to  prove  detrimental  to  ALPA.  The  pact  destroyed  their 
strategy  in  the  short-term  eroding  the  unions'  two  key  advantages.  Firstly,  it 
challenged  the  whipsawing  tactic,  by  bringing  disputes  to  a  strike  when  previously 
they  had  been  settled  by  the  threat  of  a  strike.  Secondly,  and  less  commonly 
acknowledged,  the  pact  fractured  the  unity  of  ALPA,  fragmenting  the  pilot  union  into 
two  principal  constituencies  following  a  strike  at  American  Airlines  in  1963.18  The 
1963  strike  over  crew  complement  on  jet  aircraft  revolved  around  the  representation 
issue  for  third  operative  on  the  complex  jet  flight  deck.  ALPA  wanted  these  new 
workers  to  be  pilots  but  a  new  flight  engineers  union,  the  Flight  Engineers 
International  Association  (FEIA),  sought  to  represent  these  workers  separately.  As  a 
consequence  of  the  dispute,  American  Airlines  broke  away  from  ALPA  and  formed  a 
separate  company  union.  This  weakened  ALPA  for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  and 
continues  to  do  so.  (Kahn  1980  :  349.  )  In  sanctioning  the  MAP,  regulators  had  been 
persuaded  that  it  would  enforce  harmony  within  the  US  industry.  However,  as  the 
strike  record  shows,  this  was  not  the  outcome.  There  was  a  shift  from  short  duration 
strikes  where  pilots  obtained  their  aims  over  management  to  a  situation  of  prolonged 
and  embittered  standoff.  This  war  of  position,  indicated  the  reluctance  of  carriers  and 
unions  to  concede  even  on  basic  issues  and  a  hardening  of  their  bargaining  stance 
generally.  The  changing  dynamics  of  industrial  relations  within  the  industry  and  the 
fact  that  other  grades  of  airline  labour  were  becoming  involved  in  the  vanguard  of 
strikes  is  a  crucial  factor.  The  major  strikes  in  the  period  from  1970  to  1978  are  given 
in  the  chart  below. 
Is  Ile  strike  over  crew  complement  on  jet  aircraft  revolved  around  the  representation  issue  for  third 
operative  on  the  complex  jet  flight  deck.  ALPA  wanted  these  new  workers  to  be  pilots  but  a  new  flight 
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engineers  union,  the  Flight  Engineers  International  Association  (FEIA),  sought  to  represent  these  C, 
workers  separately.  As  a  consequence  of  the  dispute,  American  Airlines  broke  away  from  ALPA  and 
formed  a  separate  company  union.  This  weakened  ALPA  for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  and 
continues  to  do  so.  (Kahn  1979:  349.  ) 
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In  contrast  to  the  combative  sirate-ies  ol'other  unions,  ALPA's  hai-ainim,  strategy  in 
the  1970s  and  up  until  the  period  of  deregulation  became  one  of  caution.  (Walsh  Z, 
1994:  59.  )  However,  the  union  was  still  involved  in  major  strikes.  (Figure  3.2) 
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Many  of  the  disputes  involving  ALPA  were  around  defensive  issues  related  to  staffin" 
and  contracts,  as  carriers  responded  to  a  changing  industry  structure  in  the  1970s. 
Again,  the  interaction  between  product  market  and  labour  market  regulation  is  clear.  Z-- 
As  a  second  wave  of  jet  re-eqUipment  occurred  between  1969  and  1975,  the  operators 
took  the  opportunity  to  differentiate  their  product  by  increasing  the  level  of  service. 
Often  they  offered  larger  seats,  greater  frequency,  and  refineinents  including 
passenger  lounges  even  on  relatively  short  flights.  This  led  to  a  huge  increase  in  costs, 
incurred  primarily  in  the  purchase  of'  new  'wide  bodied'  aircraft,  well  before  the 
existing  equipment  had  depreciated.  Given  the  nature  of  airline  competition  every 
carrier  had  to  emulate  the  service  differentiation  strategy.  (Hanlon  1996:  33.  )  In  the 
midst  of  the  resulting  financial  crisis,  airlines  sought  to  reduce  labour  costs.  Figure  3.2 
above  indicates  the  share  of  working  days  lost  by  each  occupational  group, 
aggregating  strike  activity  for  any  trade  union  representing  that  group  of  workers. 
Although  pilots  seem  to  account  for  a  disproportionate  amount  of  strike  activity, 
excluding  the  Alaskan  action,  they  account  for  only  12  per  cent  of  disputes.  Obid.  ) 
Other  groups  of'  airline  workers,  particularly  flight  attendants  and  maintenance  1ýý 
98 personnel,  were  responsible  for  much  strike  activity  in  the  late  1960s  to  mid  1970s. 
Later,  regulatory  adjustments  to  rate  setting  and  market  entry  all  presented  problems 
for  carriers  and  continued  to  expose  their  cost  structures. 
The  overall  bargaining  environment  of  the  late  1950s,  1960s  and  1970s  had  changed 
markedly.  Changes  in  the  product  market,  adjustments  in  the  regulatory  regime  and 
the  proliferation  of  jet  aircraft  represented  a  significant  departure  from  the 
environment  of  the  previous  decade.  The  employment  relationship  became  more 
conflictual  with  the  impact  of  the  MAP  lengthening  and  entrenching  strikes,  and  the 
economic  and  operating  environment  compelling  the  state  to  re-align  the  bargaining 
environment  in  favour  of  employers.  In  the  process,  the  state  went  from  a  position  of 
upholding  single  carrier  bargaining  and,  therefore,  ALPA's  strength,  to  undermining 
that  position.  Unions  continued  to  lobby  and  adopted  new  strike  strategies.  By  the 
1970s,  therefore,  the  regulatory  environment  had  changed  significantly;  from  one 
which  favoured  the  untrammelled,  bargaining  power  of  organised  labour,  to  one 
which  allowed  carriers  to  actively  resist  that  pressure.  This  marked  a  significant  break 
from  the  period  of  the  1930s  to  the  1950s.  Before  going  on  to  discuss  the  implications 
for  our  models  of  labour  market  regulation  it  is  necessary  to  describe  the  course  of 
product  and  labour  market  regulation  within  the  UK. 
3.3  UK  Regulation  and  Industrial  Relations  in  the  Post  War  Period 
3.3.1  Industry  Growth  and  the  Development  of  Collective  Bargaining 
As  the  UK  aviation  industry  matured  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  11,  its  industrial 
relations  structure  also  matured.  The  industry  was  nationalised  in  1946  in  various 
stages  with  a  European  and  a  transcontinental  carrier  in  the  shape  of  British  European 
Airways  (BEA)  and  the  British  Overseas  Airways  Corporation  (BOAQ  forming  the 
core  of  the  industry.  This  policy  of  nationalised  duopoly  effectively  describes  the 
method  of  product  market  regulation,  with  prices,  routes  and  schedules  tightly 
controlled  through  various  government  ministries.  Again,  however,  the  product 
market  and  the  nature  of  regulation  had  significant  impacts  upon  the  industrial 
relations  and  labour  market  environment. 
99 Collective  bargaining  was  embedded  within  the  Civil  Aviation  Act  of  1947.  The  act 
extended  and  strengthened  collective  bargaining,  creating  a  new  body,  the  National 
Joint  Council  for  Civil  Aviation  (NJC  CAT).  These  revamped  industrial  relations 
structures  provided  stability  and  predictability  in  airline  labour  market  as  other  forms 
of  regulation  did  in  the  product  market.  The  NJC  CAT  laid  down  an  elaborate 
bargaining  framework  for  the  air  corporations,  and  the  wider  industry,  extending  the 
Whitley  Council  model  as  recommended  by  the  Cadman  Report  of  1938.  Its  structure 
was  characterised  by  the  national  level  bodies,  sectional  panels  and  local  councils, 
pursuing  issues  of  local  concern.  Like  most  such  negotiating  forums,  the  NJC  CAT 
prescribed  a  resort  to  arbitration  in  cases  of  disagreement  between  the  parties.  This 
usually  meant  reference  to  the  industrial  courts  with  a  binding  decision.  Whilst  these 
issues  were  dealt  with  under  the  heading  of  negotiation,  wider  issues  including  staff 
welfare,  health  and  safety  and  company  efficiency  were  the  subjects  of  consultation. 
(HMSO1  Onnd.  6605.  )  This  clear  split  between  negotiation  and  consultation  allowed 
management  effectively  to  retain  sole  power  over  strategic  decision  making  within  the 
various  airlines.  Nevertheless  the  new  structures  were  popular  with  management  and 
union  representatives.  Investigation  of  the  annual  reports  of  both  major  air 
corporations  show  the  commitment  of  management  and  unions  to  the  operation  of  the 
new  system  in  an  industry  previously  identified  with  poor  industrial  relations.  In  its 
1946-47  Annual  Report,  BEA  is  laudatory: 
The  subjects  dealt  with  have  covered  the  whole  range  of  the 
corporation's  activities,  specific  agreements  have  already  been 
concluded  on  a  whole  range  of  issues  and  in  only  one  case  has  it  been 
necessary  to  refer  a  question  to  the  industrial  court.  It  can  therefore  be 
said  that  the  National  Joint  Council  is  one  of  the  most  successful 
examples  of  its  kind  and  unlike  most  others,  covers  all  sections  of 
staff.  '(BEA  1946/47.  ) 
Crucially,  the  bargaining  framework  afforded  stability  in  a  difficult  period  as  the 
inflationary  effect  of  the  Korean  War  led  to  a  generalised  wage  push  throughout 
British  industry.  The  constitutionalist  nature  of  the  bargaining  machinery  ruled  out  all 
but  the  most  official  strikes,  and  then  only  after  an  elaborate  series  of  referrals  to 
conciliation  and  arbitration.  Such  controls  and  limits  on  potential  disruption  were  well 
appreciated  by  the  airline: 
'A  measure  of  its  success  (NJC)  is  that  of  the  large  number  of  complex  staff 
100 problems  which  arise  in  complex  organisations  of  this  kind.  In  the  present 
inflationary  period  only  eight  differences  were  recorded  at  Local  Panel 
Committees  for  reference  to  national  panels.  '(BEA  195  1.  ) 
In  addition  the  presence  of  the  NJC  CAT  and  the  corporatist  bargaining  environment 
allowed  carriers  to  control  costs  in  a  period  of  extreme  instability.  In  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  concentration  of  the  industry  into  a  dual  monopoly  increased  the 
importance  of  labour  costs  as  a  component  of  overall  costs.  19  As  the  short  haul 
operator  in  a  highly  competitive  route  structure,  British  European  Airways  (BEA)  had 
a  keen  interest  in  securing  cost  reductions.  The  table  below  gives  the  labour  costs  as  a 
proportion  of  major  operating  costs  for  selected  years. 
Table  3.2  Simplified  Operating  Cost  Breakdown  For  BEA  1953/4-1955/6. 
Pay  and  Allowances  42%  38.5%  39.5% 
Maintenance  and  Overhaul  9%  10.3%  10.3% 
Fuel  and  Oil  15%  12%  11.5% 
Source:  BEA  Annual  Reports  1953/54,1954/55,1955/56. 
The  importance  to  companies  like  BEA  and  BOAC  of  controlling  labour  costs  was 
linked  with  their  need  to  enhance  productivity,  which  helped  both  airlines  to  eke  out 
an  existence  in  an  industry  which  though  growing,  was  often  marginal  and  cyclical. 
(See  BEA  Annual  Report  1956-57  for  an  illuminating  passage  on  the  cyclical  nature 
of  the  industry.  )  (1958  HC  251/252.  )  As  Gourvish  (1991:  128)  indicates  labour 
productivity  in  both  BEA  and  BOAC  outstripped  that  of  UK  nationalised  industries 
generally,  averaging  14  per  cent  between  1948  and  1958.  However  this  performance 
owed  much  to  the  development  of  technology.  As  Lyth  (1994)  indicates  that 
technology  required  a  corresponding  increase  in  demand,  which  though  buoyant  was 
not  inexhaustible.  (1994:  83.  )  In  addition,  there  were  considerable  differences  in  costs 
between  the  long  haul  and  short  haul  arms  of  the  industry.  When  we  examine 
operating  costs  (table  3.2)  we  can  see  that  they  account  for  about  60  per  cent  of 
overall  costs.  Crucially,  operating  costs  are  the  most  variable  or  'escapable'  costs,  that 
is  a  reduction  in  these  costs  can  reduce  overall  costs  in  the  short  term.  (See  Doganis 
1995:  120-22  for  a  discussion.  ) 
I'M  'dual  monopoly'concept  is  the  most  accurate  description  of  two  separate  zonal  monopolies  BEA 
and  BOAC  whittled  down  from  a  tri-monopoly  after  the  merging  of  BSAA  and  BOAC  in  1949. 
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101 Whilst  the  industrial  relation  structure  of  the  industry  provided  a  stable  environment, 
its  stability  was  premised  upon  the  containment  of  the  aspirations  of  the  various 
grades  of  airline  labour.  Like  their  US  counterparts,  key  skilled  groups  such  as  pilots 
and  maintenance  staff  had  considerable  disruptive  power  and  as  long  as  they  were 
contained  within  the  NJC  CAT,  the  airline  corporations  would  continue  to  derive  the 
benefits  of  stability  on  labour  costs  and  to  minimise  disputes.  However,  if  these 
labour  groups  decided  to  exercise  their  power,  that  stability  was  immediately 
threatened.  The  next  section  describes  how  the  relative  docility  of  pilots  turned  to 
aggressive  militancy  as  they  sought  to  remedy  a  perceived  deterioration  in  their 
relative  position. 
3.3.2  Conscious  Pilots:  Pilots  versits  Management  in  the  1950s  and  1960s 
Industrial  relations  in  the  UK  airline  industry  in  the  1950s,  as  in  the  USA,  were 
dominated  by  flight  deck  concerns.  At  issue  were  familiar  questions  of  cockpit 
complement  and  crew  scheduling.  Whilst  other  groups  of  airline  workers,  such  as 
engineering,  ground  staff  administration  and  sales  where  developing,  cockpit  crews 
continued  to  be  at  the  forefront.  In  the  1950s  British  airlines  which  had  favoured  the 
faster  turboprop  aircraft  over  US  piston  types  faced  a  similar  set  of  crew  complement 
problems  as  their  American  counterparts.  The  introduction  of  aircraft  such  as  the 
Bristol  Britannia  leading  to  the  phasing  out  of  specialist  functions,  such  as  the  radio 
operator  and  later  navigator  on  long  haul  flights,  was  one  issue.  The  airlines  favoured 
a  multi-skilled  third  operative  who  would  sit  between  the  pilots  and  share  technical 
and  navigational  workloads.  BOAC  pilots  however  wanted  to  obtain  additional 
payments  for  supervising  these  additional  workers.  Eventually  these  functions  were 
integrated  into  the  job  of  the  pilot  often  with  considerable  acrimony  between  pilots 
and  other  flight  deck  grades.  The  parallels  with  the  US  situation  and  earlier  crewing 
disputes  are  apparent.  (See  Blain  1970:  323  for  a  detailed  discussion.  )  The  problems 
caused  by  turboprop  aircraft  were  trivial  however  compared  to  those  posed  by  the 
introduction  of  jet  aircraft  in  the  UK.  Jet  re-equipment  in  the  UK  came  early  to  long 
haul  operations  in  the  early  to  late  1950s.  Britain  led  with  the  introduction  of  the 
102 world's  first  passenger  airliner  the  De  Havilland  Comet.  20  BEA  however  made  do 
with  the  relatively  advanced  turboprops  until  the  1960s  when  competitors  and 
passenger  demand  made  it  impossible  not  to  operate  jets  even  on  short  haul  routes. 
This  introduction  of  jet  aircraft  again  had  major  consequences. 
Given  the  consequences  of  their  introduction  the  need  for  higher  productivity  from  jet 
aircraft  was  paramount  in  UK  airline  strategy.  As  we  have  seen  from  the  change  in 
management  bargaining  posture  during  the  jet  transition  period  in  the  USA,  this 
technical  advance  drove  a  great  deal  of  industrial  relations  change.  It  is  no  accident 
that  the  only  prolonged  period  of  strife  in  the  British  airline  industry  followed  the 
introduction  of  jets.  Jets  created  pilot  unemployment  and,  more  importantly,  they 
slowed  the  entire  promotion  process  for  junior  pilots.  As  Blain  argues,  the  issue  of 
scheduling  was  at  the  root  of  pilot  concerns. 
Management  in  the  UK  airlines  wanted  to  use  scheduling  as  an  element  of  'non  price' 
competition,  reflecting  the  need  to  concentrate  on  costs  and  productivity  in  order  to 
deliver  some  form  of  profitability.  Using  the  technical  licensing  standards  of  the  UK 
regulator  and  the  collective  bargaining  machinery,  pilots  had  successfully  constructed 
a  web  of  restrictive  work  rules,  as  had  their  counterparts  in  the  USA.  UK  pilots, 
however,  had  fallen  behind  considerably  in  the  pay  league  and  felt  (with  some 
justification)  that  their  higher  productivity  should  be  better  rewarded.  As  jet  aircraft 
increased  the  required  skill  and  responsibility  of  the  pilot,  they  developed  an  acute 
occupational  consciousness.  Pilots  had  tended  to  see  themselves  as  flyers  and  aviators 
before  jet  technology,  with  the  low  speeds  of  piston  aircraft  allowing  more  room  for 
motor  based  flying  skills.  The  jet  era  demanded  a  different  type  of  pilot,  one  trained  in 
technology  systems  and  complex  procedures,  whose  job  was  related  more  to  the 
efficient  and  safe  planning  and  operation  of  flights  than  the  physical  operation  of 
aircraft.  Increased  complexity  in  air  traffic  control  accompanied  the  growth  of  jet 
fleets,  producing  a  perception  among  pilots  that  these  new  skills  needed  to  be 
recognised. 
2'  Comets  were  introduced  in  1949  on  prestige  routes  but  were  withdrawn  after  a  series  of  disasters, 
C, 
notably  Rome  in  1953.  The  US  built  Boeing  707  then  shared  these  routes  from  the  late  50s  with  later 
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from  other  airline  workers.  These  attitudes  led  to  a  temporary  withdrawal  from  the 
NJC  CAT  in  1967  and  a  series  of  bitter,  prolonged  and  effective  strikes  by  pilots. 
(Blain  1970:  321.  )  The  main  reason  for  strike  action  in  the  late  1960s  was  the  issue  of 
pay.  Though  pilots  were  able  to  cornmand  an  average  differential  in  1968  of  38  per 
cent  over  other  airline  workers,  excluding  management,  they  felt  underpaid.  (Blain 
1970:  327.  )  Blain  argues  that  management  of  the  time,  as  in  other  industries,  resisted 
pilot  demands  because  of  the  'spilllover'  effect  on  the  wage  expectations  of  other 
employees.  This  feature  of  the  airline  labour  market  meant  that  an  increase  of  10  per 
cent  in  pilot  salaries  led  to  a  'spillover'  of  2.5  per  cent.  Given  government's  desire  to 
impose  pay  restraint  and  the  need  for  companies  to  contain  cost  pressures,  a  pay 
campaign  by  pilots  was  a  serious  threat.  Furthermore,  BALPA  was  in  a  more 
favourable  position  to  secure  its  aims  than  its  American  counterpart.  The  structure  of 
the  nationalised  airline  industry  allowed  BALPA  to  close  down  the  bulk  of  the 
scheduled  airline  industry  instantaneously.  Short  one-day  strikes  and  work  to  ntle 
actions  had  the  effect  of  dislocating  the  airline's  domestic  and  international  route 
networks.  Against  a  general  background  of  financial  problems  for  the  major  carriers, 
these  disputes  would  bring  the  concerns  of  pilots  before  Parliament.  The  government 
initiated  two  major  inquiries  into  particular  disputes  at  BOAC.  (HMSO  Onnind 
3789.  )  The  enquiry  on  the  BOAC  strikes  recommended  closer  lines  of  communication 
between  BOAC  and  its  pilots,  but  it  also  severely  criticised  BALPA  for  its  bellicosity. 
(Blain  1970:  327.  ) 
The  union  was  certainly  in  no  mood  for  compromise  before  the  strikes  began.  The 
May  1967  edition  of  The  BOAC  Pilot  Local  Council  (PLC)  newsletter  warned  that: 
'This  year  will  be  a  year  of  decision  for  us  all.  Before 
it  is  ended  we  shall  have  had  to  choose  between  two 
alternatives.  Either  accept  token  salary  increases  and 
resign  ourselves  to  a  lower  position  in  the  company 
than  any  other  airline  pilot  outside  Britain,  or  we  can 
establish  ourselves  as  a  strong  and  n-fflitant  body  prepared 
to  use  all  legal  means  to  obtain  a  just  reward.  '  (Blain  1970:  518.  ) 
(and  safer)  comet  variants.  Short  haul  jets  were  not  widespread  until  about  1963  onwards.  (See  Davies 
1964) 
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local  representatives  (pilot  stewards)  were  given  negotiating  authority  within  the 
BALPA  constitution  often  prolonged  disputes.  The  power  of  local  stewards  to  disrupt 
and  undermine  nationally  agreed  structures  of  negotiation,  often  at  variance  with  the 
wishes  of  their  national  leadership,  was  a  focus  of  the  influential  Donovan  report  on 
industrial  relations  of  the  period.  The  structure  of  pilot  representation  illustrated 
local/national  bargaining  tension  par  excellence.  An  inquiry  under  Sir  Jack  Scamp  in 
1968,  identified  BALPA's  representational  structure  as  a  major  factor  in  the  disputes. 
Full-time  officials  within  the  association,  such  as  the  General  Secretary,  were  allowed 
to  negotiate  only  on  PLC  orders.  (HMSO  Cmmnd.  3551.  )  The  1968  strikes  alone,  cost 
the  carrier  some  E15  million.  (BOAC  1968/9 
.  )21  The  airline  was  eventually  pressured 
into  conceding  to  BALPA  demands.  Ironically  considering  that  BALPA's  withdrawal 
from  the  NJCCAT  was  the  touch  paper  for  their  action,  it  was  intervention  on  the  part 
of  other  unions  which  brokered  a  settlement.  22  (BOAC  1969no.  )  New  pay  and 
scheduling  agreements  were  introduced  from  1969  in  response  to  the  main  pilot 
concerns.  Strikes  at  BEA  and  BOAC  were  mimicked  by  strikes  at  various 
independent  carriers,  reflecting  seepage  of  industrial  relations  unrest  into  the  private 
sector.  (Blain  1970.  ) 
The  pilot  strikes  turned  the  spotlight  onto  the  UK  airline  industry,  and  soured  its 
reputation  for  good  industrial  relations.  Other  workers  followed  the  lead  of  pilots. 
BEA  engineering  staff  conducted  a  work  to  rule  policy  in  protest  at  the  wage  freeze; 
fire  crews  employed  by  the  British  Airports  Authority  (BAA)  struck,  closing  down 
Heathrow  in  early  1969.  BAA  baggage  handlers  also  struck  in  the  winter  of  1968. 
(Ibid.  )  There  is  some  evidence  of  an  imitation  effect  of  pilot  strikes  on  other 
occupational  groups,  as  evidenced  from  US  pilot  strikes  in  the  early  to  mid  1960s. 
BOAC  faced  a  pilot  boycott  of  the  new  Boeing  747,  which  was  only  later  resolved 
with  the  concession  of  a  generous  bonus  system  for  flying  these  heavier  aircraft.  In 
securing  this  award,  BALPA  was  securing  the  gains  of  increased  weight,  speed  and 
range  in  an  agreement,  which  set  the  scene  for  later  long  haul  allowances. 
2  'BOAC  Annual  Report  and  Accounts  1968-69  HC  379. 
22BOAC  Annual  Report  and  Accounts  1969-70  HC  45 
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the  end  of  the  1960s.  At  a  time  of  increasing  workforce  militancy  in  general,  airline 
workers  were  at  the  forefront  of  industrial  action.  Praise  for  the  adaptability  and 
flexibility  of  the  system  was  replaced  on  the  management  side  by  anger  at  the  way  in 
which  the  machinery  allowed  various  groups  of  workers  to  maximise  disruption  at 
different  times.  With  increased  flight  frequency  and  massive  capital  investment  in  jet 
fleets,  the  harmful  effect  of  strike  action  was  enhanced.  In  addition  the  changing 
product  market  and  technology,  increased  conflict  as  airlines  sought  to  increase 
utilisation  and  therefore  profitability.  (BEA  Annual  Report  and  Accounts  1970.  ) 
Successful  strikes  were  often  followed  by  the  action  of  another  occupational  group, 
destroying  the  stability  and  cost  containment,  which  the  industry  had  previously 
enjoyed.  Airlines  were  faced  with  the  problem  of  escalating  equipment  costs  and  an 
increasingly  militant  workforce. 
In  a  spirit  of  dogged  optimism,  the  Edwards  Report  of  1969  into  the  Civil  Aviation 
Industry  strongly  defended  the  collective  bargaining  framework  of  the  industry.  The 
report  even  identified  the  lack  of  inclusion  of  independents  within  the  NJC-CAT  as 
the  biggest  problem  facing  the  industry.  (HMSO  1969  Cmmnd  4018.  )  Subsequent 
policy  developments,  in  particular  the  creation  of  a  single  unified  state  carrier  in  the 
shape  of  British  Airways  in  1973n4,  led  to  a  greater  concentration  of  bargaining 
power  within  the  various  occupational  groups.  However,  encouraged  by  the  various 
enquiries,  the  pilots  revamped  their  organisational  structures,  employing  a  full  time 
general  secretary  and  professional  industrial  relations  officers,  in  order  to  develop  a 
more  constructive  industrial  relations  strategy  with  the  new  airline.  The  relative 
quiescence  of  pilots  in  the  period  after  1970  indicates  that  they  were  successful  in 
this,  although  major  pay  deals  in  settlement  of  the  earlier  strikes  played  their  part.  In 
the  UK  the  mantle  of  industrial  action  passed  towards  less  skilled  grades,  particularly 
cabin  crew  and  baggage  handlers,  whose  combative  strikes  of  the  late  1970s  and  early 
1980s  mirrored,  to  an  extent,  a  similar  pattem  of  pre-deregulation  strike  activity  in  the 
US.  This  also  reflected  the  power  of  the  Transport  and  General  Workers  Union 
(TGWU),  whose  objections  to  the  low  cost  strategy  of  the  pre-privatisation  chairman 
Sir  Roy  Watts  in  1979  led  to  its  withdrawal.  (British  Airways  1980/81.  )  Nevertheless 
the  push  towards  commercial  objectives,  and  the  progressive  withdrawal  of  the  state 
from  the  airline  meant  that  by  privatisation  in  1987,  there  was  relative  industrial 
106 relations  peace,  although  as  we  shall  see,  the  effective  power  and  influence  of  the 
unions  was  preserved.  Having  examined  the  UK  case  the  concluding  section  draws 
together  our  discussion  by  relating  this  to  the  models  of  product  market/labour  market  0 
regulation  operating  in  the  post  war  period. 
3.4  Comparing  Post  War  Product  and  Labour  Market  Regulation  in  the 
USA  and  UK 
3.4.1  Airline  Labour  Regulation  in  the  USA:  Strong  Regulated  Control? 
In  the  USA  the  pre-war  legislation,  which  enshrined  collective  bargaining,  carried 
many  more  implicit  and  explicit  labour  market  effects  than  in  the  UK.  Labour  market 
regulation  in  the  US  was  much  more  interventionist,  producing  a  particular  set  of 
employment  relations.  Though  the  RLA  was  central,  there  was  also  the  role  of  the 
National  Mediation  Board  and  other  aspects  of  the  New  Deal  legislation.  In  the  1940s 
and  1950s,  pilots  exploited  the  power,  which  the  system  of  collective  bargaining  and 
the  structure  of  regulation  afforded  them.  Employers  acted  to  confront  that  threat 
through  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact  in  1958.  The  process  of  collective  bargaining  was  altered 
fundamentally.  Instead  of  pilots  whipsawing  all  operators  into  a  general  settlement, 
through  judicious  use  of  the  strike  weapon  at  a  key  carrier,  strikes  became  more 
entrenched  and  less  susceptible  to  early  settlement.  In  effect,  each  side  had  roughly 
similar  power.  The  state  by  permitting  the  MAP,  allowed  a  significant  re-alignment  of 
industry  bargaining  structures,  and  through  this  distinct  change  in  regulatory  policy 
cncouraged  a  step  change  in  industrial  relations  within  the  industry.  The  reform, 
however,  did  not  necessarily  produce  industrial  relations  peace,  nor  did  it  cause  the 
sides  to  re-evaluate  their  position,  rather  it  led  to  further  entrenchment  and  a 
lengthening  in  the  average  duration  of  strikes. 
How  can  this  system  be  viewed  in  terms  of  the  models  of  labour  market 
regulation/deregulation  discussed  in  Chapter  I?  Given  the  characteristics  of  high  level 
industry  regulation,  the  existence  of  oligopoly  power  in  the  shape  of  the  big  five' 
trunk  carriers,  and  the  power  of  organised  labour,  the  US  situation  can  be  analysed  as 
an  example  of  the  regulated  control  model.  To  be  more  specific,  the  US  example 
describes  a  situation  of  strong  regulated  control.  Initially,  the  impact  of  the  state  upon 
107 labour  through  its  use  of  the  apparatus  of  regulation  and  through  the  operation  of 
wider  labour  market  regulation,  was  to  encourage  the  growth  of  collective  bargaining 
and  unionisation  in  the  formative  period  of  industry  growth.  By  1938,  however, 
through  the  principal  regulatory  body  the  Civil  Aeronautics  Board,  the  state  oversaw  a 
significant  re-alignment  in  labour's  favour  through  various  aspects  of  legislation.  It 
can  be  speculated  that  in  providing  a  framework  for  collective  bargaining,  and  in 
encouraging  the  craft  power  of  the  pilots  in  particular,  the  state  was  providing  some 
measure  of  balance  to  the  potential  power  of  the  carriers.  Furthermore,  the  state  was 
persuaded  by  the  safety-based  arguments  of  the  pilots  on  issues  such  as  Decision  83 
and  crew  complement.  Pilots'  harvested  this  combination  of  state  protection  to 
promote  their  interests.  By  the  late  1950s  however  changes  in  the  product  market  and 
technical  environment  caused  the  state  to  permit  an  employer  strike  insurance  pact 
(MAP).  Given  the  later  economic  problems  of  the  jet  re-equipment  period,  and  the  oil 
crises,  this  was  probably  to  be  expected  given  the  states  overall  aim  which  was  to 
oversee  the  health  and  stability  of  the  industry.  In  any  case  the  strong  regulated 
control  model  adequately  describes  a  situation  where  the  labour  market  and  industrial 
relations  were  directly  affected  by  decision  taken  in  the  regulatory  arena. 
3.4.2  Airline  Labour  Regulation  in  the  UK.,  Weak  Regulated  Control? 
In  the  UK,  by  contrast,  even  in  the  post  war  period,  the  state  regulated  the  labour 
market  primarily  through  the  mechanism  of  ownership,  with  the  nationalisation  of  the 
industry  in  1946.  However  with  nationalisation  the  state  took  a  more  interventionist 
role  in  prescribing  a  strengthened  framework  for  national  bargaining.  Again,  the 
nature  of  collective  bargaining  in  the  UK  industry  was  much  weaker  than  the  craft 
bargaining  of  the  US  industry.  The  voluntarist  nature  of  UK  industrial  relations 
explains  much  of  this,  but  so  does  the  relative  size  of  both  the  industry  and  its 
workforce.  In  the  US  the  industry  was  much  more  high  profile,  as  passenger  services 
grew,  compared  to  the  UK,  which  showed  relatively  low  growth  even  in  the 
immediate  post  war  period. 
The  pattem  of  industrial  relations  was  totally  different  from  that  of  the  USA,  with 
national  bargaining  actually  constraining  and  limiting  the  power  of  key  occupational 
groups,  and  disappointing  the  expectations  of  pilots  in  particular.  In  the  1960s,  with 
108 the  impact  of  technology  and  national  pay  policy,  throughout  the  state-run  industries, 
there  was  a  backlash  from  pilots  and  skilled  staff.  The  state's  solution  to  these 
problems  was  to  strengthen  the  structures  and  coverage  of  collective  bargaining.  This 
faith  in  voluntarist  methods  of  industrial  relations  was  typical  of  industrial  relations 
policy  in  the  period.  Thus,  in  the  UK,  the  state  continued  to  believe  that  the 
preservation  of  national  collective  bargaining  could  provide  a  framework  of  stability 
for  the  industry.  Further  developments  arising  from  the  Edwards  Report  of  1970, 
culminating  in  the  creation  of  a  unified  nationalised  airline  in  the  shape  of  British 
Airways,  reinforced  this  policy. 
From  the  foregoing  discussion,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  development  of  both  product 
and  labour  market  regulation  within  the  USA  and  UK  diverge  markedly.  In  the  USA 
the  system  of  product  market  regulation  was  more  systematic  and  structured  than  the 
generally  ad  hoc  and  reactive  system  which  arose  in  the  UK.  US  product  market 
regulation  was  concerned  with  rectifying  market  failure  and  was  designed  to  produce 
viable  trunk  carriers  whose  market  position  and  profits  were  assured  and  who  were 
largely  insulated  from  the  threat  of  competition.  One  area  where  regulatory 
intervention  was  strong  was  in  the  area  of  mergers  and  acquisitions,  with  laws 
forbidding  the  merging  of  route  structures.  This  aspect  of  economic  regulation  has  to 
be  seen  in  tandem  with  the  effects  of  technical  regulation,  which  in  many  ways 
boosted  the  power  of  organised  labour.  The  crucial  aspect  of  compliance  with  the 
principal  labour  market  statutes  of  the  industry  dictated  the  pattern  of  industrial 
relations,  as  craft  based  and  unionised.  The  system  of  technical  regulation  also 
benefited  specific  groups  of  organised  labour.  The  award  of  Decision  83  allowed 
pilots  to  obtain  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  'rents'  extracted  from  consumers  in 
higher  fares.  Their  ability  to  influence  crew  complement  in  the  1940s  further 
cnhanced  that  power.  It  might  be  argued  that  government  saw  labour  market 
regulation  as  a  way  of  pursuing  goals  of  safety  and  stability.  This  also  reflected  a 
New  Deal  consensus,  which  encouraged  big  labour  and  big  capital  to  come  together, 
but  with  an  emphasis  on  protecting  labour  from  the  power  of  the  large  airlines. 
The  UK  industry  was  smaller  and  more  diffuse  and  given  the  parlous  state  of  the 
product  market  only  state  control  could  provide  a  framework  of  growth. 
Paradoxically,  although  there  was  a  nominally  higher  level  of  intervention  in  the  UK, 
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weaker  in  its  influence  over  both  the  product  and  labour  market,  than  the  American 
model.  In  other  words  the  effect  of  intervention  is  more  important  than  its  extent. 
Although  this  is  very  much  a  question  of  degree,  the  degree  of  difference  between  the 
two  systems  is  crucial  to  understanding  how  labour  regulation  occurred. 
The  passive  'control'model  of  the  UK  with  its  'one  off'product  market  initiatives  and 
voluntarist  industrial  relations  solutions,  can  be  contrasted  with  the  active  legislation 
and  market  intervention  of  the  USA.  To  explore  this  point  we  have  to  consider  both 
the  labour  and  product  markets.  In  product  market  terms,  compared  to  the  muscular 
activism  of  US  policy,  UK  regulation  was  relatively  ineffectual.  The  UK  industry 
was  still  insignificant  and  faced  a  struggle  to  develop  competitive  pricing  strategies  in 
order  to  compete  realistically  with  inland  and  sea  transport.  (See  Dyos  and  Aldcroft 
1969:  374-396.  )  In  the  early  period  there  was  only  one  significant  large  firm, 
Imperial  Airways,  which  was  allowed  to  operate  as  a  private  company,  though  prices, 
particularly  for  freight  and  mail  were  closely  controlled.  By  1938  and  the  Cadman 
Commission  a  duopoly  of  Imperial  Airways  and  British  Airways  had  been  established 
as  the  'chosen  instruments'  (Dyos  and  Aldcroft  1969:  389).  Notwithstanding  a  period 
of  total  monopoly  when  Lord  Reith  assumed  the  Chairmanship  of  Imperial  (later 
BOAC),  the  UK  policy  was  one  of  reluctant  if  generous  state  subsidy.  While  product 
market  regulation  was  in  evidence  it  was  effected  primarily  through  subsidy  and  the 
control  of  mail  rates.  However  it  did  not  regulate  the  industry  to  the  extent  seen  under 
the  weaker  era  of  US  regulation  before  the  CAB.  In  effect  the  British  state's 
regulatory  interventions  were  reactive  and  episodic  demonstrating  little  of  the 
sophisticated  stewardship  witnessed  in  the  USA.  The  relative  insignificance  of  the 
UK  industry  however  did  not  forestall  controversy,  especially  when  the  fledgling  pilot 
organisations  rebelled  in  the  face  of  management  autocracy  and  the  perceived  safety 
failings  of  Imperial.  Yet  the  government's  solution  was  rooted  entirely  in  the  spirit  of 
British  industrial  relations  voluntarism,  with  one  exception.  The  floor  on  industry 
wages,  enshrined  in  the  1936  Air  Navigation  Act  appeared  to  be  an  attempt  to  filter 
out  the  unsafe  smaller  operators,  though  the  later  monopolisation  superseded  this. 
More  typical  was  the  extension  of  the  Whitley  system  into  the  industry,  bringing  a 
similar  industrial  relations  framework  to  the  nationalised  utilities  and  the  civil  service. 
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the  pre-war  labour  market  regulation  enacted  by  the  US  Government. 
This  can  be  contrasted  with  the  domestic  and  international  vibrancy  of  the  US 
industry,  which  had  graduated  from  the  nursery  of  subsidy  and  was  becoming  viable 
and  profitable.  The  wide  scope  and  variety  of  regulatory  initiatives  on  both  product 
and  labour  market  reflected  this.  With  post-war  nationalisation  and  the  development 
of  the  NJC,  the  costs  and  conflict  within  the  industry  were  contained  and  channelled. 
The  disaffection  of  pilots  in  particular,  but  later  other  groups  of  workers,  led  to  an 
increase  in  costs  and  conflict.  In  contrast  to  the  USA,  the  different  structure  of  the  UK 
industry  allows  pilots  to  take  advantage  of  the  jet  re-equipment  period  in  order  to  push 
their  demands. 
Throughout  the  period  we  can  view  the  UK  system  as  one  of  weak  regulated  control, 
with  neither  labour  nor  capital  enjoying  particularly  strong  support  from  the  state,  and 
with  the  state  unable  to  use  product  market  regulation  to  prod  the  parties  in  its 
preferred  direction.  With  the  state  unable  to  use  regulation  directly,  to  develop  a 
stable  and  profitable  industry  environment,  this  can  only  be  provided  by  the  industrial 
relations  system.  The  NJC  CAT  and  the  bargaining  structure  work  for  a  time,  but 
when  the  industry  context  changes  with  jet  re-equipment,  and  as  pilots  begin  to  assert 
their  power  independently  of  the  machinery,  this  method  of  indirect  ad  hoc  regulation 
is  found  wanting.  Though  the  state  does  have  some  influence  and  uses  this  through 
the  development  of  committees  of  enquiry  and  wider  industrial  relations  legislation,  it 
is  incapable  of  exercising  power  over  the  industry  as  witnessed  in  the  US.  The 
industrial  relations  situation  reflects  this. 
Conclusion 
The  clear  trend  in  both  countries  was  for  product  market  regulation  to  have 
pronounced  direct  and  indirect  effects  upon  the  labour  market.  However,  as  the 
chapter  has  shown,  clear  differences  existed  between  both  nations  and  although  we 
can  use  the  regulated  control  model  to  explain  how  the  labour  market  was  affected  by 
product  market  regulation,  we  need  to  differentiate  between  the  strong  and  weak 
variants.  The  strength  and  weakness  of  these  labour  market  effects  can  be  seen  in  both 
III industry  regulation  and  the  industrial  relations  legislation  affecting  the  industry.  The 
consequences  of  these  systems  of  regulation  can  be  seen  in  the  response  of  both 
labour  groups  and  management  at  specific  periods.  There  were  clear  periods  in  the 
USA  when  labour  was  in  the  ascendancy  and  enjoyed  almost  untrammelled  power, 
but  arguably  its  power  was  licensed  and  authorised  by  the  state.  When  the  state 
allowed  airlines  to  challenge  that  power  by  permitting  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact,  pilots' 
faced  a  less  certain  bargaining  environment.  Nevertheless  they  continued  to  profit 
from  regulatory  statutes  such  as  Decision  83  which  directed  productivity 
improvements  into  flight  deck  pay,  and  from  generous  scheduling  rules.  The  UK 
pilots  were  much  less  successful.  However  the  state's  support  in  helping  the  spread  of 
trade  unionism  and  later  developments  in  collective  bargaining,  helped  pilots  establish 
a  voice  from  a  position  of  marginal  influence.  Industry  regulation  had  much  less 
impact  in  the  UK  beyond  certain  licensing  and  technical  requirements.  The  pilots  in 
the  UK  did  have  bargaining  power,  certainly  from  about  the  1940s,  but  they  were 
constrained  within  the  system  of  industrial  relations  introduced  in  1946.  Thus,  in  both 
nations  the  combined  impact  of  industry  regulation  and  industrial  relations  determined 
the  nature  of  employment.  Within  both  nations,  the  regulated  control  model  can  be 
used  to  examine  these  developments  and  with  appropriate  modifications  describes  the 
type  of  labour  market  regulation,  which  operated  in  the  period  up  till  the  onset  of 
deregulation.  Did  the  onset  of  deregulation  represent  a  decisive  break  with  the 
industrial  relations  of  the  regulated  period?  The  next  chapter  considers  the  impact  of 
deregulation  and  examines  these  impacts,  again  by  concentrating  on  the  experience  of 
pilots. 
112 0  Appendix  3.1  Dynamics  of  Product/Labour 
Market  Regulation  in  the  USA  1920-1977: 
Strong  Regulated  Control 
Period  Industry  Employment  Employer  Employee  Level  of  Effect  on 
structure  relationship  strategy  strategy  labour  bargaining 
market  power  of 
regulation  parties 
1920s  multi-firm  Unitarist/low  Redefine  pay  Seek  to  Non-  Employers  in 
competitive/  trust/cost  cutting  formula/  oppose  existent,  ascendancy/ 
subsidy  Individualised  increased  through  some  labour 
based/unstable  pay  structures/  work  unionisation  regulation  of  dependent 
high  risk/reward  intensification/  political  external 
wage  lobbying/  safety  etc. 
reduction/  seek  to 
oppose  govt  secure 
labour  market  labour 
intervention  legislation 
Mid  Stable  Pluralist/low  Seek  to  Seek  Increasin-  Labour  enjoys 
1930s  regulated  trust  promote  imposition  with  D  83  increased 
multi-firm  on  legislation  of  RLA  on  (1934)and  power 
basis  of  postal  which  will  basis  of  D83  schedule 
contracts  superseded  limitations 
prolabour  and  section 
clauses/resist  12  and  13  of 
1934  Air 
Mail  Act 
Late  Regulated 
.P 
Pluralist  Seek  to  resist  Seek  to  have  CAB  Labour  enjoys 
1930s  oligopoly  with  imposition  of  D83  and  (section  40  1)  high  level  of 
controlled  D83  RLA  imposes  bargaining 
market  entry  enshrined  in  D83/protects  power  , 
and  exit/rate  new  right  to  through 
regulation  regulatory  bargain  for  legislative 
framework  better  protection 
deal/imposes  employer 
RLA  freedom  to 
compliance  alter  labour 
as  condition  market 
of  PC&N  I  restricted 
_J 
113 Period  Industry  Employment  Employer  Employee  Level  of  Effect  on 
structure  relationship  strategy  strategy  labour  bargaining 
market  powerof 
regulation  parties 
1940s  ReoUlated  Pluralist  Seek  to  Seek  to  Cab  sets  Labour  enjoys 
oligopoly  with  With  conflict  mitigate  C  extend  D83  D83  very  high  level 
CP 
controlled  legislation/  to  account  decision  for  of  BP,  and  of 
market  deploy  new  forincreased  new  legislative 
entrylexittrate  technology  to  speed  generation  support. 
regulation  undercut  weight/  aircraft/  Employers 
labours  increase  FAA  makes  constrained 
bargaining  base  wages  80,001b  seldom  win 
strength  by  through  rule/  strikes 
forming  strategic  eliminates 
employers  strikes  etcJ  direct 
association  seek  to  subsidies  to 
(ANC)  retain  fli-ht  carriers 
deck 
complement 
on  new  tech. 
aircraft 
Late  As  above  with  Conflictual/  Seek  to  Seeklegal 
0 
CAB  Labour  faces 
50s-70s  tighter  price  pluralist  introduce  injunction  permits  reduced 
controls  MAP  against  MAP  MAP,  and  bargaining 
allows  power  because 
increased  costs  of 
coverage  disputes  are 
and  scope  increased. 
Leadsto 
prolonged 
strikes  etc. 
Employers  are 
strengthened 
etc.  but  strikes 
I  continue 
FAA  Federal  Aviation  Administration;  set  up  in  addition  to  CAB  as  technical  and 
safety  regulator  of  the  Airline  industry.  (1958) 
MAP  Mutual  Aid  Pact;  Employers  strike  insurance  organisation  set  up  1958. 
TAM  International  Association  of  Machinists.  The  main  mechanics  (ground 
engineer)  union. 
ANC  Airline  Negotiating  Conference  (Employers  bargaining  front  abandoned 
1947). 
114 Appendix  3.2  Dynamics  of  Product/Labour 
Market  Regulation  in  the  UK  1920-1977:  Weak 
Regulated  Control. 
Period  Industry 
structure 
Employment 
relationship 
Employer 
strategy 
Employee 
strategy 
Level  of 
labour 
market 
regulation 
Effect  on 
bargaining 
power  of 
parties 
Private  Unitarist  low  Maximise  Defend  Non  Employers  in 
1920s  subsidised  trust  aircraft  existing  existent,  ascendancy/ 
carriers  later  utilisation  and  wage  some  labour 
developed  into  staff  control,  structure  indirect  dependent 
state  offload  based  on  regulation  of 
controlled  surplus  staff  retainer  plus  external 
monopoly  flying  pay/  safety  etc. 
promote 
professional 
interest 
through 
GAPAN/ 
Limited 
strikes  at 
Imperial 
(1924)  over 
pay  cuts. 
Short  lived 
militant 
unionism. 
1930s  Nationalised  Unitarist/low  Maximise  Seek  to  Increasing 
C' 
Employee 
monopoly  on  trust/cost  cutting  aircraft  oppose  with  Air  power 
major  long  Cý  utilisation  and  through  Navigation  tý  enhanced,  but 
and  short  haul  crew  unionisation  Act  (1936)  labour  still 
routes  schedules/  Political  providing  dependent 
suppress  lobbying/  wage  floor 
unionisation/  seek  to  based  on 
uphold  secure  imperial/ 
managerial  labour  Cadman 
prerogative  legislation/  Ctee  (1938) 
focus  on  extends 
safety  Whitleyism 
to  airlines  I 
115 Period  Industry  Employment  Employer  Employee  Level  of  Effect  on 
structure  relationship  strategy  strategy  labour  bargaining 
market  powerof 
regulation  parties 
1940s  Nationalised  Bargained  Seek  to  focus  on  Seek  better  Increasing  Weak  labour 
duopoly,  corporatism  commercial  terms  for  with  CAA  enjoys 
restricted  by  aspects  of  employees  and  (1948).  recognition 
treasury  operation  union  Section  22  and 
imposed  cash  including  labour 
t,  recognition  for 
r5 
Inaugurates 
C,  enhances 
limits  costs  and  unrecognised  NJC  and  effective 
rationalisation  groups  national  bargaining 
craft  based  power 
bargainin.  c, 
Licensing 
rules  also 
uphold 
labour 
1950s  Nationalised  Bargained  Focus  on  cost  Depends  on  Govt  Labour 
duopoly  corporatism  reduction,  large  craft.  intervention  bargaining 
increasingly  scale  job  losses  Pilots  seek  at  level  of  power 
threatened  by  and  productivity  enhancements  Dept  of  contained. 
macroeconomic  increases.  forreduced  Labour  into  Pilots' 
instability  and  Seek  to  refer  fli-ht  deck 
0 
lon-  runnin-  00  wages  fall 
C, 
poor  equipment.  outstanding  complement.  disputes  sets  behind 
(Differences  disputes  to  Mechanics  norms,  comparators, 
between  long 
C,  government  increased  which  are  mechanics 
and  short  haul.  )  arbitration.  basic  rates  normally  on  below 
resist  incomes  employers  industry 
policies  etc.  side.  rates. 
Navigators  Employers 
and  Radio  have  upper 
Officers  seek  hand. 
to  defend  jobs 
etc.  1953 
1960-  Nationalised  Bargained  Seek  to  increase  Mechanics  Govt.  sets  up  Craft  labour 
1970s  monopoly  corporatism  productivity  and  and  pilots  seek  boards  of  has  high 
subject  to  utilisation  of  to  obtain  enquiry  level  of  BP, 
increasing  cash  pilots,  increased  pay  (Scamp,  and  of 
limits.  mechanics,  and  bonuses  Pearson)  to  legislative 
cabin  crew  etc.  /oppose  mediate  on  support. 
with  increased  pilots'  Employers 
introduction  of  utilisation.  dispute,  forced  to 
jets.  Pilots  launch  major  concede 
Reorganise  breakaway  enquiry  into  demands  on 
corporation  from  NJC  and  industry.  pay  and 
structure  to  initiate  series  Recommend  scheduling, 
prioritise  labour  of  strikes  greater  Craftlabour 
management  arbitration.  has  upper 
etc.  I  etc.  I  hand. 
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Pilots  and  Management  Under  Deregulation: 
The  USA  and  Europe 
4.1.  Pilots  and  Deregulation  in  the  USA 
In  our  previous  discussion  we  examined  regulation  and  collective  bargaining  within 
the  US  and  UK  focusing  on  pilots.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  consider  the 
effects  of  deregulation,  again  by  focusing  on  pilots.  Has  there  been  an  erosion  in  their 
bargaining  position  as  deregulation  gives  rise  to  managerial  empowerment,  non-union 
competition  and  other  pressures  for  restructuring?  Have  these  key  workers  managed 
to  defend  core  terms  and  conditions  benefiting  from  high  skill  specificity  and  the 
general  expansion  in  demand  for  their  services?  Pilots  present  an  interesting  and 
indicative  example  of  the  effects  of  deregulation  upon  the  labour  market.  Thus  it  is 
useful  to  try  and  chart  their  bargaining  fortunes  in  the  USA  and  Europe  as  a  barometer 
of  the  effects  of  deregulation  on  a  key  airline  group.  The  product  market/labour 
market  framework  used  in  the  previous  chapter  will  be  used  to  evaluate  the  nature  of 
labour  management  relations  in  both  countries. 
In  order  to  examine  the  experience  of  pilots  under  deregulation  a  three-pronged 
approach  is  necessary.  Firstly,  we  will  evaluate  the  evidence  on  pilot  wages  because, 
as  the  previous  chapter  indicated,  under  regulation  both  US  and  European  pilots  were 
deemed  to  have  captured  significant  benefits  as  a  result  of  their  uniquely  potent 
bargaining  power.  Such  'rents'  (if  they  existed)  might  be  expected  to  decline  as 
deregulation  promoted  an  environment  of  cost  control  and  competition.  Pilot  earnings 
117 provide  a  good  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  this  has  actually  occurred.  Secondly, 
we  will  look  at  the  extent  to  which  pilots  in  both  settings  have  been  able  to  protect 
their  bargaining  position.  In  particular  we  look  at  the  post-deregulation  effect  on  long 
standing  work  rules  particularly  in  the  area  of  scheduling.  This  will  provide  a  good 
indication  of  the  extent  to  which  the  position  of  pilots  has  been  maintained  or 
otherwise.  Thirdly,  it  is  interesting  to  look  at  the  extent  to  which  pilots  have  altered 
their  negotiating  stance,  directing  attention  towards  issues  such  as  job  security  and 
involvement  as  opposed  to  the  strategy  under  regulation  which  concentrated  upon  the 
boosting  of  wage  levels  and  the  protection  of  work  rules.  In  examining  the  nature  of 
deregulation  we  will  again  build  on  the  models  introduced  in  Chapter  1.  Whilst 
recognising  initial  differences  and  nuances  between  the  USA  and  UK  experience,  we 
point  towards  an  emerging  convergence  towards  a  more  global  pilot  labour  market. 
In  order  to  commence  our  investigation  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  trend  in  pilot 
earnings  in  both  the  USA  and  Europe.  This  will  allow  us  to  provide  a  context  to  later 
discussions  of  bargaining  and  provide  an  essential  reference  point  for  later  discussions 
of  the  fortunes  of  other  airline  workers. 
4.1.1  Pilots  and  Deregulation  in  the  USA 
Increasing  disenchantment  with  the  US  regulated  airline  industry  culminated  in  the 
Airline  Deregulation  Act  passed  by  the  Carter  government  in  1978.  The  act  lifted 
barriers  to  entry  and  price  setting  within  an  industry  used  to  the  dominance  of  major 
trunk  carriers.  For  the  forty  years  of  its  existence  the  CAB  did  not  allow  a  new  entrant 
on  any  city-pair  route.  (Hanlon  1996:  33.  )  The  service  and  frills  competition  which 
characterised  the  regulated  era,  had  left  a  legacy  of  rising  fares  rendering  arguments 
of  deregulationists,  such  as  Caves  (1962),  Kahn  (1970),  that  the  measure  would  lead 
to  lower  fares  unanswerable.  The  experience  of  unregulated  intra  state  carriers  such 
as  Pacific  Southwest  proved  that  lower  fares  were  possible.  (Levine  1965.  )  The 
immediate  results  were  impressive  and  bore  out  the  predictions  of  'prophets  of 
deregulation'  such  as  Caves  and  Kahn.  There  was  a  three  and  a  half  fold  increase  in 
the  number  of  carriers  offering  trunk  service  between  1978  and  1986.  The  market 
share  of  the  largest  trunk  operators,  the  big  five'.  fell  by  17  per  cent  over  the  same 
period. 
118 Pilots,  like  other  labour  groups,  were  fairly  ambivalent  about  deregulation.  They  saw 
the  opportunity  to  roll  back  the  hated  Mutual  Aid  Pact  and  to  take  advantage  of  their 
bargaining  power.  From  the  outset  of  deregulation  pilot  unions  were  instrumental  in 
inserting  a  clause  into  the  Airline  Deregulation  Act  known  as  Section  43,  which 
sought  to  protect  labour  from  the  consequences  of  deregulation.  The  act  sought  to 
ensure  that  employees  directly  affected  by  deregulation  would  be  compensated  for 
any  adverse  consequences.  (Capelli  1985:  316-38.  )  Unfortunately,  section  43  proved 
a  dead  letter.  The  provisions  of  the  clause  were  not  implemented  as  there  was  a  clear 
methodological  problem  for  labour  courts  in  assigning  a  particular  set  of  job  losses  or 
pay  cuts  to  a  complex  phenomenon  such  as  'deregulation'.  As  Cordes  et  al  (1989) 
argue,  this  looked  like  sleight  of  hand: 
'Skepticism  is  warranted  because  the  provisions  were  at  least  in  part 
included  in  the  legislation  to  buy  off  the  legislative  opposition  of 
employees  likely  to  be  hurt  by  deregulation.  '  (Cordes  et  al  1989:  35- 
55.  ) 
These  writers  go  on  to  argue  that  once  deregulation  was  in  full  swing  there  was  no 
need  to  take  account  of  the  labour  constituency  which  had  effectively  been  neutralised 
by  the  clause.  In  operation  it  was  difficult  to  identify  effects,  as  measurements  of  job 
loss  were  conducted  on  an  industry  wide  rather  than  a  firm  level  basis.  (Ibid.  ) 
Nevertheless,  despite  the  weakness  of  the  labour  protection  clause,  the  fact  that  it 
became  enshrined  in  the  deregulation  legislation  shows  that  pilots  had  some  input  into 
the  process,  even  if  they  were  unable  ultimately  to  influence  the  process.  Whilst  the 
legislative  protections  for  collective  bargaining  and  negotiation  continued  in  the  shape 
of  the  Railway  Labor  Act,  these  applied  only  to  the  pre-deregulation  trunk  carriers. 
Consequently  a  new,  non-union,  sector  was  unleashed  upon  the  industry.  As 
Northrup,  a  fervent  proponent  of  labour  market  deregulation,  argued: 
'By  the  end  of  1981...  the  labour  market  climate  in  the  airline  industry 
had  changed  substantially.  A  sizeable  group  of  new  carriers  entered  the 
market,  many  of  which  were  non-union,  or  operated  as  non-union 
adjuncts  of  unionised  carriers  (double-breasted).  A  non-union  'alter 
ego'  subsidiary  of  Texas  International  called  New  York  Air  was 
created  and  regional  carriers  expanded.  Major  carriers  suffered  serious 
losses  and  enormous  pressure  was  put  on  unions  to  reduce  wages, 
abolish  restrictive  work  rules  and  modify  their  demands.  The  nature  of 
competition  had  change  from  that  of  service  to  price,  putting  pressure 
on  carriers  and  unions.  ' 
119 Ehrenberg  had  earlier  questioned  the  view  that  airline  workers  captured  significant 
rents  within  the  regulated  period.  Firstly,  he  pointed  to  the  statistical  problem  of 
isolating  an  effect  such  as  regulation  from  the  interaction  of  other  variables.  Secondly, 
he  believed  that  negotiated  wage  increases  did  not  immediately  translate  into  higher 
fares,  giving  management  an  incentive  to  resist  labour  demands.  Thirdly,  he  asserted 
that  price  increases  were  granted  upon  an  industry-wide  basis  rather  than  on  a  firm 
basis.  With  no  pattern  bargaining,  he  argued  carriers  had  an  incentive  to  resist  wage 
demands.  (Ehrenberg  1979.  )  Though  his  latter  point  appears  to  ignore  the  ability  of 
strong  unions  to  deliver  pattern  bargaining  through  the  whipsaw  strategy,  Ehrenberg's 
findings  suggest  that  the  unionised  rents  postulated  by  the  deregulationists  were  not  a 
clear-cut  issue.  Such  an  interpretation  would  see  the  subsequent  resilience  in  earnings 
as  proof  that  regulation  had  not  significantly  boosted  earnings.  Whilst  Ehrenberg  may 
be  right  about  earnings  his  analysis  concerns  the  late  regulation  period  which  was 
qualitatively  different,  from  the  'heyday'  period  of  regulation.  The  later  stages  of 
regulation  from  about  1970  onwards,  when  overcapacity,  expensive  re-equipment  and 
rising  fuel  prices  forced  airlines  to  confront  labour,  and  when  the  mutual  aid  pact 
allowed  them  the  ability  to  combat  the  whipsawing  strategies  of  ALPA  and  the  IAM, 
is  a  distinct  period  in  the  industry's  regulated  history.  As  such  it  has  to  be  viewed 
distinctly  from  the  'heyday'  period  of  regulation  where  earnings  were  boosted  through 
the  effects  of  regulation  and  state  sponsored  unionisation  and  collective  bargaining.  23 
Thus  the  rents  identified  by  writers  such  as  Caves  (1962),  and  Taneja  (1976)  were 
real  and  pronounced.  This  temporal  qualification  provides  yet  another  example  of  the 
problem  in  using  earnings  in  airline  labour  market  research.  We  will  now  go  on  to 
examine  the  evidence  on  earnings. 
4.1.2  The  Literature  on  Deregulation  and  Earnings 
The  seminal  study  on  deregulation,  Morrison  and  Winston's  (1986)  counterfactual 
exploration  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  reform,  argued  that  deregulation  delivered 
$8.5  billion  savings,  at  1977  prices,  with  two  thirds  of  those  accruing  to  passengers. 
(Morrison  and  Winston  1986.  )  These  two  writers  re-confirmed  their  thesis  with  some 
2'  This  period  is  to  be  measured  as  pertaining  roughly  between  the  late  thirties  and  the  late  sixties.  C, 
120 qualification  when  in  1995  they  revisited  the  deregulation  debate.  (Morrison  and 
Winston  1995.  )  However,  most  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  this  chapter  is  the 
hypothesis  advanced  by  Morrison  and  Winston  that  deregulation  did  not  significantly 
affect  the  earnings  of  airline  workers.  Basing  their  analysis  on  the  real  earnings 
position  of  1977  with  that  of  1985,  Morrison  and  Winston  saw  no  "significant 
reduction"  in  earnings  for  any  labour  group.  (Morrison  and  Winston  1986.  )  Whilst  the 
use  of  earnings  has  become  a  proxy  for  labour's  fortunes  in  the  industry,  the  effects  of 
deregulation  go  well  beyond  the  question  of  earnings  and  issues  such  as  bargaining 
environment  and  the  relative  power  of  labour  and  capital  within  the  industry  have  to 
be  considered.  Indeed  a  central  argument  was  made  that  it  was  the  prevalence  of  high 
wages  and  restrictive  work  rules  which  caused  operators  to  increase  fares.  With  the 
threat  of  these  low  cost  carriers  and  the  influx  of  non-union  low  cost  operators  such  as 
People  Express  and  New  York  Air,  we  would  expect  to  see  downward  pressure  on 
pilot  earnings.  To  what  extent  has  this  actually  occurred?  Bailey  and  her  colleagues 
examined  the  union  relative  wage  effect  for  pilots  at  larger  airlines.  24  Low  cost 
operators  paid  their  pilots  less  whilst  utilising  them  more  intensively,  as  figure  4.1 
below  demonstmtes. 
Table  4.1  Costs  Per  20OMile  Flight  for  Major  US  Operators  on  Boeing  737 
Aircraft  1984. 
AIRLINE  Costs  per  200  mile  on  B737  (1984) 
Southwest  $1,900 
Piedmont  $2,667 
United  $3,613 
Source:  Bailey  et  al  1985. 
It  would  be  reasonable  to  assume,  therefore,  that  the  entry  of  low  cost,  non-union 
carriers  would  affect  pilot  terms  and  conditions.  Nevertheless,  earnings  are  the  only 
consistent  data  available  and  by  focusing  on  the  earnings  experience  of  US  pilots,  we 
can  begin  to  build  an  understanding  of  the  effects  of  deregulation  upon  labour 
earnings  in  general.  To  what  extent  did  deregulation  affect  pilots?  Did  their  fortunes 
fall,  rise  or  remain  neutral?  What  was  the  effect  on  incomes  and  bargaining  of  the 
24  The  URWE  is  simply  the  difference  in  average  earnings  between  workers  employed  in  a  union  firm 
C,  C, 
as  compared  to  a  non-union  firm.  Labour  economists  Freeman  and  Medoff  compared  a  range  of 
estimates  and  settled  on  an  overall  US  Figure  of  8-10  %,  premium  for  unionised  workers.  For  airline 
workers  the  premium  is  much  higher.  (See  Bailey  et  al  (1985:  102)  whose  (1980)  estimate  of  the 
0 
C, 
121 wave  of  new  entry  which  took  place  between  1978  and  1986?  To  what  extent  if  any, 
was  - 
labour  affected  by  the  later  trend  towards  bankruptcy,  take-over  and 
consolidation?  In  highlighting  the  experience  of  pilots  we  should  be  able  to  arrive  at  a 
measured  assessment  of  these  effects.  The  first  task  is  to  examine  the  evidence  on 
flight-deck  earnings. 
4.1.3  Pilot  Earnings  Under  Deregulation:  The  Evidence 
Pilot  wages  and  conditions  preoccupied  many  early  commentators  on  US  airline 
deregulation.  In  an  early  study  Hendricks  et  al  (1980)  predicted  little  change  in  the 
bargaining  environment  when  they  assessed  the  impact  of  deregulation  in  the  early 
years.  Indeed  these  writers  argued  that  after  controlling  for  skill  levels,  experience, 
unionisation  and  the  level  of  industry  concentration,  there  was  no  significant 
difference  in  earnings  between  airline  employees  and  external  employees.  (Hendricks 
ct  al  1980:  67-81.  )  This  finding  was  in  line  with  Card's  earlier  research  on  the  wages 
of  mechanics,  which  noted  no  significant  decline  in  earnings  for  the  first  five  years  of 
deregulation.  (Card  1986:  527-38.  )  Yet  earlier  Hendricks  had  demonstrated 
pronounced  positive  effects  upon  airline  earnings  arising  from  regulation.  (Hendricks 
1977:  483-96)  (Thornicroft  1989:  165-181).  Dooley  (1994:  169-90  )  also  offered 
optimistic  assessments  of  post  deregulation  labour  earnings  and  bargaining  power  and 
Northup  even  argued,  albeit  rather  early  in  the  process,  that  deregulation  would 
benefit  labour.  (Northrup  1983:  167-181.  )  Capelli,  however,  did  demonstrate  the 
extent  of  concession  bargaining,  which  eroded  pre-deregulation  earnings.  (Capelli 
1985:  316-38.  )  Given  the  conflicting  assessments  of  the  position  of  pilots  within  the 
deregulated  environment  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to  look  at  the  evidence  on  long- 
term  wage  rates  for  pilots.  This  analysis  is  used  as  a  framework  with  which  to  explore 
more  qualitative  issues. 
The  official  evidence  on  pilot  earnings  seems  to  suggest  that  wages  have  not  been  that 
affected  by  deregulation  per  se.  If  we  take  average  earnings  in  the  'big  six'  US 
carriers,  as  shown  in  table  4.2  below,  we  can  clearly  see  that  earnings  have  continued 
to  rise.  This  is  true  basing  earnings  on  1980,  as  the  early  period  of  deregulation  and  on 
airline  premium  identified  a  pilots'  premium  of  59%  over  their  military  equivalent,  mechanics  28% 
and  cleaners  82%). 
122 1985  as  the  high  point  of  concession  bargaining.  On  both  indexes  we  can  clearly see 
that  earnings  continued  to  rise. 
Table  4.2  Pilot  Earnings  in  the  US  Airline  Industry  1978-1997  (Constant  US 
1978  1980  1985  1995  1997  1 
American  68,898  49,365  95,587  115,484  135,319 
US  Air  48,192  68,516  99,031  128,971  136,810 
Continental  31,4501  59,037  41,888  90,461  124,152 
Delta  41,938  65,537  104,225  129,329  131,507 
Northwest  41,937  67,143  87,536  154,586  125,414 
TWA  44,765  71,477  106,577  85,240  89,306 
United  45,909  84,242  90,317  140,280  152,408 
Average  43,034  66,473  89,380  120,621  127,845 
Index 
1980=100 
65  100  134 
1 
181 
1 
192 
1 
Index 
1985=100 
48  74  1  100  134  143 
Source:  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  Data 
The  first  task  is  to  compare  eamings  between  the  regulated  and  deregulated  period. 
The  seminal  work  was  Card's  (1989)  study  of  the  impact  of  deregulation  on  airline 
earnings.  Building  on  earlier  work  which  had  concentrated  on  mechanics,  he  found 
between  1977  and  1988  an  overall  decline  in  real  earnings  for  all  employees  of  about 
10  per  cent.  Recent  work  by  labour  economists  has  afforded  a  more  long-term  view  of 
earnings,  supplementing  earlier  analyses.  Peoples  (1990),  for  example,  found  that  the 
earnings  advantage  enjoyed  by  airline  employees  was  eroded  by  nearly  a  quarter  for 
craft  workers  and  about  7  per  cent  for  clerical/non-craft  workers. 
Johnson  (1991)  argues  that  the  only  significant  declines  in  earnings  for  any  group 
including  pilots  were  in  the  early  period  from  about  1978-84,  which  she  attributes  to 
changes  in  flight  schedules  and  a  (probable)  corresponding  reduction  in  overtime.  She 
concludes  analysing  both  the  early  and  late  deregulation  periods  that:  "The  aggregate 
analyses  provide  limited  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  earnings  decreased  with 
deregulation,  but  there  is  only  minimal  evidence  of  significant  decreases  by  craft  in 
either  data  set".  (Ibid.  )  Nevertheless,  for  pilots  her  regression  results  show  that 
deregulation  accounted  for  12  per  cent  of  the  downward  variation  in  earnings  between 
1978  and  1984.  This  compares  to  a9  percent  fall  for  mechanics  and  a  slight  increase 
123 in  earnings  for  flight  attendants.  (Johnson  1991:  Table  4 
. 
)25  Johnson  also  provides 
additional  evidence  of  decreased  union  fortunes  under  deregulation.  26 
Using  a  more  comprehensive  dataset  Cremieux  (1996:  223-242)  examined  the  effect 
of  deregulation  upon  wages  over  a  much  longer  period.  In  contrast  to  most 
approaches,  which  used  cross-sectional  data,  Cremieux's  analysis  looked  at  time 
trends  over  some  34  years  of  regulation  and  deregulation  (  years  1959-92).  His  sample 
covered  85  per  cent  of  industry  revenues  and  the  range  of  occupational  groups  and 
represents  the  most  comprehensive  analysis  to  date.  Criticising  the  smoothing  bias  of 
cross  sectional  models  Cremiueux  counsels  us  to  be  aware  that  fluctuations  in 
earnings  are  experienced  as  falls  at  some  point  in  the  earnings  cycle.  Finding  similar 
earnings  levels  in  1975  and  1983  he  cautions  might  mean  the  peak  was  in  1980  with 
very  pronounced  fluctuations  either  side  of  that  year.  Another  problem  he  sees  with 
existing  data  is  lack  of  sufficient  post  deregulation  observations,  further  hampering 
analysis.  Cremiuex  is  thus  concerned  to  examine  the  earnings  data  in  the  light  of  this 
problem.  Using  this  long-term  methodology  he  finds  that  deregulation  eroded  the 
earnings  of  pilots  by  around  12  and  22  per  cent.  Cremiuex's  data  is  obviously  more 
useful  for  long-term  trends,  but  is  also  worthwhile  despite  limitations  in  the  short- 
term  data,  as  identified  by  Cremiueux,  to  examine  how  wages  were  affected  in  the 
short  term. 
25  However,  as  Ehrenberg  (1979)  argues,  it  is  almost  mathematically  impossible  to  dissagregate  the 
effects  of  deregulation  from  other  industry  processes  and  labour  market  variables.  Johnson's 
sophisticated  and  thorough  statistical  analysis  does  not  avoid  that  problem,  though  it  provides  a 
reasonable  estimate. 
26  Another  aspect  of  Johnson's  study  investigates  union  expenditures;  this  throws  some  interesting  light 
on  the  fortunes  of  occupational  groups  under  deregulation.  The  rationale  for  examining  union 
expenditures  is  that  deregulation  is  supposed  to  make  the  industry  harder  to  organise  by  (theoretically) 
ending  the  union  monopoly,  and  it  also  incurs  higher  expenditures  in  maintaining  its  current 
membership  as  (again  theoretically)  existing  unionisation  and  collective  bargaining  come  under  threat.  C,  C,  C, 
On  this  measure  a  union  which  incurred  low  increases  in  union  expenditure  would  be  doing  relatively 
well  under  deregulation,  as  it  does  not  have  to  confront  the  challenges  referred  to  above.  The  results 
indicate  that  pilots  incurred  minimal  extra  union  expenditures  during  deregulation.  The  less  skilled  and 
more  replaceable  flight  attendants  incurred  expenditures  35  per  cent  greater  than  under  deregulation. 
These  workers  faced  the  threat  of  non-union  organisation  and  competition  for  members  from  other 
unions.  We  can  see  therefore  that  on  these  measures  only  flight  attendants  faced  a  more  difficult 
C, 
situation  in  the  wake  of  deregulation.  (Johnson  199  1:  Table  5.  )  However,  these  aggregate  figures 
conceal  considerable  variation  within  different  airlines  and  even  within  the  same  broad  occupational 
groups.  Although  they  provide  a  reasonable  picture  of  earnings  between  the  late  regulated  and  early 
deregulated  period,  Ionger-term.  analysis  which  covers  the  heyday  period  of  regulation  and  the  mature 
period  of  deregulation  might  provide  better  estimates.  (Johnson  1991:  154-165.  ) 
124 As  we  know  considerable  pressures  were  exerted  upon  pilot  remuneration  throughout 
deregulation.  How  then,  did  the  widely  acknowledged  combination  of  non-union 
competition  in  the  early  phase  of  deregulation,  and  concession  bargaining 
environment  of  the  mid  to  late  1980s  threaten  pilot  compensation?  Again  differing 
methodologies  and  time  frames  are  employed  and  there  are  a  variety  of 
interpretations.  For  example,  Johnson's  research  points  to  resilience  in  flight  crew 
wage  levels.  For  Johnson,  pilots  emerge  in  a  relatively  good  position,  when  weighted 
against  general  declines  in  wage  levels  in  the  production  labour  force.  (Johnson  1995: 
103.  )  The  change  in  wage  levels  for  senior  pilots  is  given  in  Figure  4.1  below. 
Figure  4.1  Pilot  Earnings  At  Major  US  Carriers  1984-91  (  1982  actual  $US) 
Upper  Scale  Hourly  Real  Wages  of  Pilots  at 
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Source:  Collated  by  Johnson  from  Airline  Industrial  Relations  Conference 
(AIRCON)  data.  Table  9.4  (pg.  108)  In  Capelli  ed.  (1995) 
So  although  the  real  earnings  level  of  senior  pilots  shows  a  significant  fall,  Johnson 
attributes  this  to  the  overall  decline  in  wage  levels  in  non-farm  employment. 
Measured  in  constant  prices,  non-farm  incomes  (using  1982  dollars)  declined  in  real 
terms  by  some  13  per  cent  between  1979  and  199  1.  The  decline  for  top  scale  pilots  at 
4  per  cent  was  less  than  a  quarter  of  that  for  industrial  workers  generally.  Yet  a 
decline  of  8  per  cent  was  registered  in  the  year  1988  compared  to  a  fall  of  3  per  cent 
125 in  general  earnings.  If  non-farm  earnings  and  airline  pilot  earnings  are  compared  from 
1984  to  1990  they  declined  at  exactly  the  same  rate  (5  per  cent).  This  indicates  that 
the  decline  in  wages  as  Johnson  argues,  was  not  out  of  line  with  industry  trends  when 
taken  over  the  entire  period.  (Ibid.  ). 
The  established  pilot  wage  data  might  simply  indicate  the  ability  of  senior  pilots  to 
protect  their  position.  A  better  measure  of  the  impact  of  deregulation  upon  earnings 
might  be  found  by  examining  the  trend  in  entry-level  wages.  In  an  insider  labour 
market,  characterised  by  high  levels  of  seniority  we  would  expect  any  effects  to 
manifest  themselves  at  the  bottom  of  the  pay  scale,  where  workers  are  not  protected 
by  their  seniority  and  we  might  reasonably  expect  any  downward  pressure  to  be 
evident  within  junior  pay  scales.  However  if  we  look  at  entry  level  pay  for  airline 
pilots  (Fig.  4.2)  we  see  that  on  this  indicator  too  pilots  have  maintained  their  position. 
Examination  of  wages  for  entry-level  pilots  over  the  same  comparison  period  of  1984 
to  1990  shows  an  increase  of  7  per  cent.  As  Johnson  argues,  the  rise  in  pilot  wages  at 
the  bottom  may  simply  reflect  the  fact  that  post  deregulation  expansion  significantly 
increased  the  demand  for  pilots.  (Ibid.  103.  )  The  real  increases  are  fairly  spectacular 
given  the  context.  Nonetheless,  this  trend  seems  to  reinforce  the  Morrison/Winston 
thesis  that  airline  deregulation  in  and  of  itself  has  not  significantly  eroded  the  earnings 
power  of  pilots.  (Morrison  and  Winston  1986.  )  If  anything,  the  effect  has  been  on  the 
insiderlsenior  pilots,  contrary  to  what  might  be  expected.  Such  research,  however, 
fails  to  capture  the  longer-tenn  transition  between  a  regulated  and  deregulated 
environment. 
126 Figure  4.2  Entry  Level  Wages  At  Major  US  Carriers  1984-1991  (1982  actual 
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Source:  Collated  by  Johnson  from  Airline  Industrial  Relations  Conference 
(AIRCON)  data.  Table  9.4  (pg.  108)  In  Capelli  1995  (ed.  ) 
Deregulation  initially  leads  to  market  entry  and  some  labour  shortage  as  carriers 
expand,  thus  in  the  short  term  the  earnings  effects  can  appear  neutral.  However,  a 
longer-term  perspective  with  base  years  in  the  regulated  and  deregulated  periods 
provides  a  more  complex  interpretation. 
Returning  to  Cremieux's  measure  of  the  effect  of  deregulation  on  pilot  incomes 
(Cremieux1996:  233)  we  note  the  ambiguity  of  deregulation's  effect  on  earnings. 
Processes  can  have  seemingly  contradictory  effects.  Firstly,  the  removal  of 
bankruptcy  protection  and  rapid  market  entry  will  tend  to  exert  downward  pressure. 
Secondly,  there  should  be  an  improvement  in  labour's  bargaining  strength  as  a 
consequence  of  hub  concentration  and  the  abolition  of  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact.  (Ibid.  ) 
Controlling  for  all  of  these  effects,  Cremieux's  measure  is  more  pessimistic,  finding 
that  when  measured  at  two  points  in  the  deregulatory  cycle  1985  and  1992,  earnings 
were  some  12  per  cent  and  22  per  cent  lower  respectively  over  the  period.  (Ibid.  ) 
Again,  Cremieux  rightly  cautions  "much  of  the  loss  in  pilot  earnings  is  consistent  with 
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16.2  16.4  16.6  16.8  17  17.2  17.4  17.6  17.8  18  18.2 slower  growth  of  earnings  for  comparable  workers,  and  is  not  necessarily  attributable 
to  deregulation  itself'  (Cremieux  1996:  235.  )  Nevertheless,  his  longer-term  analysis 
provides  a  richer  set  of  observations  on  which  to  base  our  analysis. 
On  earnings  we  can  summarise  that  whilst  deregulation  led  to  falls  in  pilot 
compensation  they  do  not  appear  to  have  been  drastic.  Whilst  there  are  falls  and,  as 
Cremieux  argues,  these  might  well  have  been  large  at  some  points  in  the  bargaining 
cycle,  they  are  no  higher  than  those  of  general  industry  when  we  control  for  other 
factors.  Whilst  there  is  considerable  difficulty  and  ambiguity  in  the  measurement  of 
earnings,  we  now  have  a  basis  for  examining  how  the  pilot  workforce  experienced 
these  falls.  Arguably,  a  more  thorough  understanding  of  the  impact  of  deregulation 
requires  analysis  of  the  bargaining  environment.  The  shifts  in  bargaining  which  we 
noted  under  the  regulated  period  also  occurred  within  the  deregulated  period.  Product 
market  deregulation  exercises  effects  upon  the  labour  market,  which  influence  the 
bargaining  environment.  In  the  next  section  we  look  at  these  trends  in  bargaining  to 
assess  the  impact  upon  pilots. 
The  analysis  here  has  concentrated  primarily  on  the  demand  side  as  influenced  by 
product  market  and  regulatory  change.  However  the  supply  side  is  also  important,  as 
increased  demand  had  definite  effects  on  the  labour  market.  Clearly,  the  increased 
passenger  demand  would  occasion  an  increase  in  demand  for  pilots,  and  labour 
market  theory  would  suggest  that  the  supply  of  pilots  and  the  elasticity  of  that  supply 
would  ultimately  affect  earnings.  With  an  increased  demand  for  pilots,  and  an 
effective  union  duopoly,  and  a  highly  regulated  training  system  the  supply  was 
limited  in  any  case.  However  restrictions  on  work  rules,  which  pertained  throughout 
the  deregulated  period  meant  that  pilot  unions  were  able  to  control  the  supply  of 
trained  pilots.  The  non-union  companies  either  ended  up  part  of  the  union  monopoly 
through  merger  and  acquisition  or  had  to  increase  wages  to  cope  with  the  problem  of 
turnover.  The  ability  of  the  pilots  not  just  to  regulate,  but  to  effectively  control  the 
supply  of  pilots  was  therefore  an  important  aspect.  This  dimension  is  addressed  in  the 
next  section,  which  looks  at  the  bargaining  fortunes  of  US  pilots. 
128 4.1.4  Bargaining  Under  Duress?  US  Pilot  Fortunes  in  the  Bargaining  Arena.  1978- 
1997 
Flight  deck  terms  and  conditions  were  identified  as  the  major  labour  cost  within  the 
industry.  (Bailey  et  al  1985.  )  Pilots  had  seemingly  captured  the  benefits  of  increased 
aircraft  size,  whilst  maintaining  effective  control  over  issues  such  as  flight  duty  hours 
and  crewing.  (See  chapter  3.  )  These  advantages  accrued  over  time  as  Bailey  et  al 
indicate  in  their  1985  analysis.  Firstly,  despite  technological  advance,  pilots  flew 
fewer  productive  hours  in  the  1980s  than  they  did  in  the  1930s.  The  table  below  gives 
pilot  hours  throughout  and  the  permitted  ceiling  on  flying  hours. 
Table  4.3  Average  Pilot  Hours  and  Federal  Limits  1930-1980. 
Year  Average  Monthly  Flying  hours  Permitted  Monthly  flying  hours 
1930  85  85 
1950s  75  85 
1960s  60-65  100 
1970s  50  100 
1980s  44.3  100 
Source:  Bailey  (et  al  1985) 
Airlines  continued  to  face  constraints  in  their  utilisation  of  pilots  who  benefited  from 
a  complex  web  of  work  rules  and  regulatory  dispensations.  (Ibid.  )  Deregulationist 
literature  expected  market  liberalisation  to  diminish  such  costs.  Just  as  the  fares 
charged  by  intrastate  carriers  were  much  lower  than  the  trunk  carriers,  so  too  were 
their  compensation  structures.  27  Evaluating  cost  differentials  between  the  low  cost 
carrier  Southwest  and  two  established  operators  Bailey  et  al  (1985)  illustrated  the 
likely  effect  of  the  lower  cost  carriers.  (  See  Table  4.1  above.  ) 
Although  there  is  some  disagreement  about  the  overall  effect  of  deregulation  on  flight 
deck  earnings,  evidence  for  the  bargaining  arena  indicate  that  US  pilots  came 
increasingly  under  pressure  after  deregulation.  As  the  highest  paid  airline  workers, 
they  faced  enormous  pressure  for  concessions  as  airlines  faced  plummeting  revenues 
and  spiralling  fuel  costs  especially  in  industry  downturns.  (Capelli  1985:  316-318.  ) 
27  Early  deregulatory  initiatives  allowed  interstate  carriers  to  be  established,  primarily  Southwest  in 
Texas.  Although  their  impact  on  the  trunk  carrier  was  negligible  and  they  competed  mainly  with  other 
transport  modes,  their  freedom  in  pricing  and  their  concentration  on  efficiency  made  them  an  important 
benchmark  against  which  the  larger  carriers  measure  their  labour  costs.  Bailey  (et  al)  showed  that 
Southwest  pilot  costs  were  a  third  lower  than  that  of  Piedmont  and  about  half  that  of  United  for  the 
same  aircraft  type.  (Bailey  et  al  1986.  ) 
129 Whereas  before  operators  could  pass  such  price  rises  onto  consumer  fares,  the 
competitive  environment  rendered  this  tactic  impossible.  (Ibid.  )  Airlines  had  to  turn 
towards  internal  costs  and  efficiency,  and  labour  costs  especially  those  of  more 
privileged  groups  were  an  obvious  target.  Between  1980  and  1988,  as  new  entrants 
grew  on  the  basis  of  lower  wages,  greater  utilisation  and  flexibility,  managers  at  the 
major  trunk  carriers  were  encouraged  to  seek  labour  costs  concessions. 
Studies  of  concession  bargaining  in  the  industry  point  to  a  universal  trend  with  most 
operators  seeking  wage  cuts,  the  introduction  of  two  tier  wage  levels,  pay  and 
pensions  restructuring  and  less  successfully,  changes  in  work  rules.  In  an  econometric 
analysis  of  concessions,  Nay  (1991)  considered  the  impact  of  institutional,  strategic 
choice  and  other  factors,  in  order  to  determine  how  concession  bargaining  had 
affected  the  US  airline  industry.  (1991:  307-23.  )  She  concluded  that  'ability  to  pay' 
measures  were  the  best  predictors  of  concession  bargaining.  In  other  words,  carriers 
under  financial  duress  were  most  able  and  likely  to  exact  'embedded'concessions  such 
as  two  tier  wage  agreements,  lower  entry-level  wages  and  long  term  wage  freezes. 
Thus,  carriers  such  as  Eastern,  Continental,  TWA  and  Pan  Am  exacted  a  large  number 
of  concessions  mainly  in  the  form  of  wage  cuts  and  benefit  reductions  merely  to  stay 
afloat.  Pilots  bore  much  of  the  concession  burden.  (Walsh  1994:  73-75.  ) 
However,  though  ability  to  pay  factors  were  at  the  heart  of  much  concession 
bargaining,  this  explanation  understates  the  opportunistic  nature  of  management  wage 
bargaining  strategy  throughout  much  of  the  1980s  and  1990s.  28  In  many  cases  airlines 
with  a  reasonably  sound  financial  position  sought  opportunistically  to  exact  major 
concessions,  lending  credence  to  Daniel  Mitchell's  argument  about  demonstration 
effects.  (1986:  43.  )  Continental  Airlines,  for  example,  was  thrown  into  bankruptcy 
proceedings  in  the  summer  of  1985  allowing  existing  labour  contracts  to  be 
abrogated.  It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  the  parent  company,  Texas  Air 
Corporation,  used  the  ultimate  sanction  of  bankruptcy  after  a  strike  by  the 
International  Association  of  Machinists.  (See  chapter  8  for  a  more  involved  discussion 
of  bankruptcy  and  its  effects  on  labour.  )  However  the  Continental  policy  represented 
2s  Mitchell  (1991  435474)  in  a  key  analysis  of  concession  bargaining  pointed  to  the  existence  of 
demonstration  effects  as  firms  in  profitable  sectors  such  as  hotels  and  food  processing  demanded 
130 a  paradigm  shift  in  bargaining  strategy  by  airline  management.  The  carrier  was  able  to 
ride  out  an  almost  total  strike  by  unionised  pilots  and  flight  attendants  and  to  continue 
operating  with  non-union  labour.  (See  Cohen  1990  308-323.  )  In  part  the  effectiveness 
of  the  carrier's  stance  was  due  to  its  divide  and  rule  strategy  in  take-over  situations. 
Continental  skilfully  manipulated  inter-union  rivalries  within  the  carrier  therefore, 
fracturing  potential  solidarity.  (Walsh  1994:  53.  ) 
Increasingly,  as  carriers  perceived  weakness  amongst  organised  labour,  they  pushed 
for  concessions  even  when  these  were  not  strictly  necessary  with  'demonstration 
effects'  again  coming  into  play.  The  types  of  concession  sought  from  pilots  ranged 
from  wage  cuts  to  lay-offs.  The  type  of  concession  sought  varied  with  the  industry 
and  business  cycle.  For  example,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  in  the  years  1981-86  wage 
cuts  were  the  most  prominent  form  of  concession  sought  by  most  carriers  bargaining 
throughout  those  years.  These  were  years  of  relative  recession  and  downturn. 
Published  bargaining  data  indicates  that  average  wage  cuts  for  pilots  under  major 
collective  bargaining  contracts  (i.  e.  in  excess  of  1000  workers)  were  in  the  order  of  15 
and  20  %.  29  (Calculated  from  Monthly  Labor  Review  1981-1986.  ) 
This  evidence  calls  into  question  the  earnings  data  discussed  above,  and  indicates  that 
major  falls  in  pilot  terms  and  conditions  did  occur  outside  the  periods  referred  to  by 
most  writers.  Data,  which  begins  in  the  years  1984  and  1985,  simply  fails  to  capture 
the  marked  decline  in  fortunes  of  pilots  and  other  grades  of  airline  labour  which 
occurred  primarily  from  about  1981  to  1986.  In  many  settings  pilots  at  both  the  entry 
and  senior  levels  did  suffer  quite  severe  cuts  in  wages  and  conditions. 
concessions.  Furthermore  he  argues  that  these  concessions  became  institutionalised,  to  the  extent  that 
even  in  the  growing  economy  of  the  mid  eighties,  wages  remained  depressed. 
C,  0  29  Monthly  Labor  Review  1981-86.  Calculated  from  available  negotiation  data  in  various  issues. 
C, 
131 To  obtain  a  more  meaningful  overview  of  the  bargaining  fortunes  of  pilots  we  have  to 
examine  the  range  of  concessions  made  and  not  just  overall  earnings  trends. 
Table  4.4  Occurrence  Level  of  Types  of  Concession  in  the  US  Airline  Industry 
1981-95 
Type  of  Concession  Occurrence  Level  in  Major  Bargaining 
1981-86  1987-95 
Wage  cuts 
Wage  Freeze 
Two  Tier  Wage 
Fringe  Benefit  Reduction 
Pay  Supplement  Reduction 
Change  in  Working  Conditions/Work 
Rules 
Reduction  in  Job  Security  (Lay-offs) 
Source:  Calculated  from  Monthly  Labor  Review  1982-95. 
Total  Coverage  **  Majority  Coverage  *  Low  Coverage 
Table  4.4  gives  an  outline  of  the  types  of  concession  secured  from  the  pilot 
workforce  in  major  contracts  between  1981  and  1995.  It  can  be  seen  that  wage  cuts 
were  almost  universal  in  the  first  period  1981-86,  becoming  less  common  in  the  years 
1987-95.  Wage  freezes,  though  less  universal  than  in  the  first  period,  continued  to  be 
used  extensively  up  till  1995.  However  most  of  the  carriers  who  secured  freezes  did 
so  for  relief  from  imminent  bankruptcy  or  collapse  as  in  the  case  of  TWA  and 
Continental.  By  the  late  eighties  and  nineties  airlines  were  less  concerned  in  securing 
crisis  concessions  than  in  instigating  long-term  work  rule  changes,  which  became  an 
increasing  feature  of  the  period.  Operators  were  well  aware  that  concessions  extracted 
in  crisis  periods  might  be  'clawed  back'  in  better  times  and  therefore  sought  to  vary 
wages  and  conditions  permanently  through  two  tier  wage  agreements.  Capelli  (1985: 
316-38)  and  Card  (1986:  527-38)  have  argued  that  these  concessions  brought  no  cost 
to  incumbent  workers  and  in  many  cases  guaranteed  union  expansion  as  carriers 
developed  new  services  on  the  basis  of  lower  costs. 
The  idea  that  such  concessions  were  costless  to  existing  employees  has  to  be 
qualified.  Reductions  in  entry  level  wages  erode  the  position  of  established  employees 
by  instituting  lower  wage  rates  at  the  bottom,  which  may  well  exercise  an  effect  on 
more  senior  workers.  Pilot  unions  are  aware  of  this,  which  is  why  many  negotiations 
involve  'catch  up'  or  parity  clauses  for  lower  tier  employees.  Many  agreements  are 
132 confined  to  certain  types  of  aircraft,  in  order  to  avoid  encroachment  on  upper  scales.  30 
In  addition,  as  Walsh  argues,  when  introducing  two  tier  wages  airlines  often  had 
designs  above  and  beyond  the  restructuring  of  wage  costs.  Two-tier  wages  for  cabin 
crew  were,  he  argues,  not  just  intended  to  restructure  the  cabin  service  career  structure 
and  increase  turnover.  They  were,  he  argues,  partly  designed  to  signal  an  end  to  the 
bargaining  and  labour  market  environment  of  the  regulated  era.  (Walsh  1989:  50-62.  ). 
For  pilots,  the  use  of  two  tier  wage  rates  can  be  viewed  similarly  with  the  benefit  of 
compressed  pay  scales  was  much  more  practical  in  a  highly  paid  seniority  based 
workforce. 
For  management,  the  value  of  these  agreements  in  terms  of  institutionalised  low  costs 
can  be  seen  in  table  4.5  below.  This  1986  data  provides  evidence  on  two-tier 
agreements  when  they  were  most  prolific  within  the  industry.  The  data  list  key 
airlines,,  giving  approximate  level  of  reduction  and  year  of  parity  (when  lower  tier 
scales  are  equalised  with  existing  scales).  In  those  agreements  involving  a  higher  and 
lower  range,  the  average  reduction  in  1986  was  some  24.5  per  cent.  This  represents  a 
significant  cost  saving  for  airlines  available  at  a  less  fraught  price  than  reductions  in 
existing  wage  levels. 
Comparable  two  tier  contracts  were  negotiated  for  mechanics  across  the  same  number 
of  carriers,  whilst  flight  attendants  average  reduction  was  22  per  cent  across  a  smaller 
sample  of  carriers.  31 
30  These  attitudes  are  clear  from  the  negotiations  studied  and  from  subsequent  research. 
31  Thomas  et  al  (1996)  (2)  pointed  to  the  fact  that  financial  markets  tended  to  value  wage  cuts  in  their  C, 
assessment  of  carrier  viability  above  more  Istructural'changes  in  wage  costs.  Structural  factors  involve 
those  changes,  which  lead  to  a  permanent  lowering  of  wage  costs,  rather  than  temporary  savings.  The 
implementation  of  two  tier  wage  agreements  discussed  above  is  one  such  innovation.  This  seems 
counter-intuitive  given  the  evidence  on  the  resilience  of  wages  over  the  long  term.  Short-term  wage 
cuts  are  by  their  very  nature  unstable.  They  often  include  restoration  clauses  (snapback  provisions), 
which  may  or  may  not  coincide  with  a  carrier's  ability  to  pay.  In  many  cases,  a  carrier  unable  to  meet 
snapback  provisions  (such  as  Northwest  Airlines  in  1994)  faces  industrial  action,  which  certainly 
erodes  the  benefit  of  any  short-term  wage  cut.  Nevertheless,  the  perceptions  of  finance  capital  are  of 
major  importance  in  the  viability  of  airlines.  By  valuing  wage  cuts,  Wall  Street  seems  to  be  applauding 
tough  strategies  ftom  airline  management  regardless  of  the  overall  effectiveness  of  such  strategies  at  a 
business  level.  On  the  other  hand,  the  institutions  may  well  be  devaluing  the  impact  of  two  tier  wage  0  C, 
agreements  as  they  tend  to  lead  to  a  competitive  expansion  on  the  basis  of  lower  costs,  and  do  not  add 
significantly  to  profits.  (Thomas  et  al  1996:  203-217.  ) 
133 Table  4.5  Two  Tier  Wage  Agreements  1986 
Carrier  Approximate  pay  Year  of  Parity 
reduction 
Aloha  15%  5  years 
American  50%  Future  negotiations 
Frontier  10%  6  years 
Piedmont  21%  Future  negotiations 
Republic  11%  Future  Negotiations 
TWA  15%  Future  Negotiations 
Unit 
, 
ed  34-50%  Future  Negotiations 
US  Air  40-45%  Future  Negotiations 
Western  25%  Does  not  reach  parity 
Source:  AIRCON  Data  March  1986 
In  addition,  airline  unions  bargained  away  Cost  of  Living  Adjustments  (COLA),  and 
increasingly  accepted  lump  sum  payments  in  lieu  of  percentage  rate  increases. 
Although  these  concessions  were  relatively  minor,  they  do  indicate  a  marginal  decline 
in  bargaining  fortunes.  32  Another  area  where  concessions  have  been  prevalent  within 
the  airline  industry  is  in  the  area  of  benefits.  The  incidence  of  reduced  paid  vacation 
time,  curtailed  health  benefits  and  weakened  pension  provision  has  been  a  facet  of 
concession  bargaining.  The  reductions  have  particularly  affected  pilots  given  their 
higher  level  of  remuneration,  rendering  small  reductions  in  benefits  important,  as  cost 
savings.  Reductions  in  holiday  pay  and  pension  fund  bolidays'  originated  with  crisis 
stricken  carriers  such  as  Eastern,  which  reduced  entitlements  at  particular  periods  of 
crisis.  Other  carriers,  such  as  Delta  and  United,  began  to  exact  similar  concessions 
towards  the  late  eighties  and  early  1990s,  as  financial  crisis  particularly  with  the  onset 
of  the  Gulf  War  gripped  the  industry.  The  situation  within  the  US  industry,  therefore, 
is  contradictory,  when  we  consider  the  overall  impact  on  pilots.  The  quantitative 
evidence  indicates  that  entry-level  wages  rose,  whilst  there  were  slight  falls  in  wages 
of  senior  personnel.  This  evidence  suggests  little  effect  on  overall  earnings  in  terms  of 
real  wage  trends  within  the  US  economy.  Contrasting  this  relatively  short  run 
32  Indeed  if  we  look  at  those  other  deregulation  affected  industries  we  can  see  that  the  incidence  of 
lump  sum  payments  is  as  correspondingly  high  as  COLA  payments  are  low.  The  average  of  lump  sum 
payments  for  all  private  industries  is  45  per  cent  and  the  airline  industry  is  well  below  this  average. 
Railroads  however  with  96  per  cent  of  workers  covered  Urban  Transit  with  79  per  cent  and  trucking  C, 
with  62  per  cent  of  workers  covered,  have  well  above  average  levels.  This  suggests  that  deregulated 
C, 
industries  are  subject  to  the  twin  scissors  of  falling  cost  of  living  adjustment  payments  (which  though  000 
less  important  in  disinflationary  periods  may  assume  more  importance  in  future)  and  the  increasing 
Cý 
prevalence  of  non-compounded  wage  increases.  Either  way  this  can  be  seen  as  a  decline  in  bargaining. 
fortunes.  (  Monthly  Labour  Review  Bargaining  Agreements  in  US  industry  (1978-1997). 
134 evidence,  with  the  longer  run  evidence  of  Cremieux  suggests  that  the  effects  of 
deregulation  on  pilots  have  been  fairly  profound.  It  is  difficult,  however,  within  the 
context  of  general  wage  and  labour  market  trends  since  the  late  1970s  to  ascribe  this 
decline  to  deregulation.  More  qualitative  evidence  on  the  effects  of  deregulation  can 
be  obtained  from  detailed  analysis  of  the  bargaining  data,  which  indicates  wage  cuts, 
wage  restructuring,  and  changes  in  work  rules.  This  data  provides  a  long  run 
representation  of  bargaining  fortunes  at  the  firm  level,  and  as  such,  provides  more 
insight  than  average  earnings  trends  alone  can  provide. 
Labour  was  able  to  recoup  some  of  this  lost  ground  as  the  industry  grew  more 
competitive,  and  as  external  economic  conditions  began  to  affect  the  sector  but 
managers  increasingly  looked  towards  deeper  forms  of  restructuring  as  well  as 
profound  reform  of  working  practices.  This  move  towards  restructit  ring,  rather  than 
short-term  concessions,  represented  a  new  phase  in  the  labour  market  impact  of 
deregulation.  The  fact  that  labour  costs  dropped  from  43  per  cent  of  industry  costs  to 
around  a  third  by  1990,  at  a  time  of  rapidly  plummeting  fuel  prices,  indicates  that 
, 
major  savings  were  made.  (Morrison  and  Winston  1995.  )  This  change  in  the  industry 
cost  structure  reflects  a  wider  long  term  reshaping  of  the  airline  bargaining 
environment,  where,  traumatised  by  the  impact  of  bankruptcy  and  wage  cuts,  airline 
unions  have  attempted  to  adopt  a  more  dynamic  bargaining  stance.  Pilots  have  been  at 
the  forefront  of  this  new  more  integrative  bargaining  agenda,  looking  to  trade  wages 
and  work  rules  for  job  security  and  participation.  This  late  deregulation  phase  of 
industrial  relations  is  discussed  in  the  next  section,  bringing  our  analysis  of  the  effects 
of  deregulation  on  US  pilots  up  to  date. 
4.1.5  United  We  Stand?  US  Pilots  and  Management  in  the  Era  of  Late  Deregulation 
The  changed  competitive  environment  of  the  1990s  has  led  to  a  major  re-appraisal  of 
airline  management  strategy.  Where  even  in  the  immediate  post-deregulation  period 
management  had  been  content  to  bargain  on  short  term  issues  such  as  temporary  wage 
cuts  and  the  like,  their  approach  in  the  1990s  reflected  an  increasing  impatience  with 
the  institutional  resilience  which  characterised  labour  long  term  bargaining.  The 
comments  of  the  former  chairman  of  United  Airlines,  Stephen  Wolfreflect  this  new 
turn  in  managements'  labour  relation  strategies: 
135 "Without  question  traditional  labour  management  relationships  have  been 
successful  in  producing  an  airline  industry  that  historically  has  afforded  its 
employees  an  unparalleled  combination  of  benefits  and  working  conditions.  It  is 
an  achievement  that  can  be  pointed  to  with  pride.  Neither  labor  nor  management 
however,  can  afford  to  sit  back  and  assume  that  approaches  that  worked  in  the 
past  will  continue  to  produce  such  positive  results  in  a  markedly  changed 
operating  environment.  Established  carriers  are  under  assault  from  all  sides  and 
losses  of  the  magnitude  the  industry  has  experienced  in  the  early  1990s,  cannot 
long  be  sustained.  Failure  to  compete  effectively  with  lower-cost  competitors 
will  force  established  carriers  into  permanent  decline  or,  alternatively,  result  in 
significant  structural  change.  "  (Wolf  1995:  231-22.  ) 
Whilst  management  sought  to  attain  control  of  labour  costs  and  to  rescind  work  rules 
it  viewed  as  inflexible  and  costly,  labour  traditionally  sought  to  protect  these.  Given 
the  perishability  of  airline  services,  the  catastrophic  effect  of  airline  strikes  on  both 
service  and  employee  morale  and  the  fiercely  competitive  operating  environment,  a 
different  approach  has  become  necessary.  Such  a  policy  might  be  viewed  as  one  of 
limited  and  strategic  co-optation.  Policies  such  as  ESOPS  typify  this  approach,  as  do 
other  forms  of  limited  financial  participation  and  worker  involvement.  Pilots  are  often 
the  main  targets  of  such  policies,  as  pilot  labour  is  extremely  powerful  and  union 
density  is  extremely  high.  33  However,  these  cost  reduction  strategies  apply  across  the 
whole  airline  labour  force. 
ESOP  programmes  have  increased  in  importance.  In  1989,  for  example,  employees 
held  only  4  per  cent  of  airline  stock;  by  1995  when  the  United  deal  was  finalised,  that 
proportion  had  risen  to  21  per  cent.  The  United  deal,  which  delivered  $5  billion  in 
cost  savings  for  a  majority  employee  stake,  builds  on  an  earlier  trend.  This  growth  in 
'equity  based  concession  bargaining'  can  be  traced  back  to  the  early  1980s  where 
virtually  every  airline  included  some  kind  of  ESOP  programme,  with  shares  traded  for 
wage  and  benefit  cuts.  (Wever  1989:  600-609.  )  Though  as  Wever  argues  in  the  case 
of  Western,  the  ESOP  programme  could  be  a  long  term  restructuring  policy,  the 
normal  trend  was  to  use  ESOP  in  a  more  short-term  fashion.  Distressed  carriers, 
whose  financial  position  meant  at  best  a  long  wait  for  capital  gain,  were  more  likely  to 
offer  such  programmes.  If  anything  the  ESOP  programmes  of  the  early  to  mid  eighties 
33  Even  the  most  recalcitrant  anti-union  employers  such  as  Delta  and  America  West  have  been  unable 
to  stop  pilot  unionisation,  even  where  they  have  steadfastly  refused  to  recognise  unions  for  other 
employee  groups. 
136 were  symbolic.  Pilots  favour  ESOPS  in  particular  because  they  provide  a  more 
multilateral  context  for  bargaining.  ESOPs  can  be  viewed  as  equity  based  concession 
bargaining  where  labour  is  co-opted  into  the  process  of  restructuring,  in  return  for 
large-scale  concessions.  These  concessions  are  often  of  such  magnitude,  that  they 
could  not  be  delivered  during  'normal'  concession  bargaining.  In  return  for  equity 
however,  labour  has  been  prepared  to  concede  major  changes  on  wages  and  work 
rules.  These  work  rules  have  proved  much  more  resilient  in  unionised  carriers  such  as 
Northwest,  TWA  and  United  than  at  other  carriers,  but  resistance  is  not  confined  to 
these  higher  cost  carriers.  In  1996  Delta,  for  example,  succeeded  in  having  pilots  (the 
sole  unionised  group)  agree  to  the  formation  of  a  low-cost  subsidiary  with  higher 
utilisation  levels,  significantly  lower  pay  and  longer  flight  hours  (Airline  Business 
November  1996). 
Despite  its  similarities  with  other  ESOP  deals,  the  United  Airlines'  Employee  buyout 
can  be  seen  as  a  landmark  example  in  employee  participation.  It  was  expressly 
designed  to  co-opt  both  pilots  and  mechanics,  the  highest  skilled  groups  into  the 
management  structure.  Given  their  level  of  remuneration,  industry  specific  skills,  and 
socio-economic  status,  pilots  tend  to  be  the  main  drivers  in  employee  buy-out 
programmes.  (Wichman  1994.  )  One  'supply  side'  reason  for  the  prevalence  of  pilots 
within  buy-out  situations  is  the  fact  that  they  tend  to  offer  greater  concessions  than 
other  airline  workers  given  that  they  account  for  a  higher  proportion  of  labour  costs. 
Whilst  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  rhetoric  about  partnership  and  co-management, 
the  deal  has  allowed  wage  reductions  for  ALPA  members  of  nearly  16  per  cent.  This 
has  enabled  the  carrier  to  establish  a  low  cost  airline,  with  a  no  strike  agreement  and  a 
commitment  to  emulate  the  productivity  and  wage  structure  of  Southwest  airlines. 
(Avmark September  1994:  13-16.  )  Viewing  the  concession  over  the  longer  term,  the 
cost  reductions  are  severe.  Salary  reductions  will  amount  to  $3.95  billions  of  benefit 
reductions  to  $1.2  billions,  and  work  rule  changes  to  $1.5  billions.  (ibid.  ) 
Whatever  the  reasons,  ESOPs  have  become  increasingly  popular  and  are  increasingly 
driven  and  even  controlled  by  pilots.  Even  though  the  entry  fee  into  the  management 
structure  is  high,  pilots  are  prepared  to  pay  the  price,  as  they  see  greater  rewards  in  the 
future.  Pilots  have  traditionally  sought  to  gain  influence  within  the  political  arena  and 
within  regulatory  structures  such  as  safety  and  technical  bodies.  They  continue  to  try 
137 and  influence  these  bodies  and  have  been  successful  in  maintaining  licensing 
conditions  and  protecting  scheduling  rules.  However,  the  ESOPS  trend  sees  pilots 
seeking  influence  within  the  firm.  This  would  suggest  that  US  pilots  have  traded  some 
degree  of  compensation  for  job  security  and  accepted  a  level  of  renewed  influence 
within  the  industry,  rather  than  resolutely  defending  work  rules.  This  is  an  adaptation 
to  the  new  regulatory  environment,  where  tightly  oligopolistic  competition  demands 
efficiency  in  labour  costs  and  new  forms  of  risk sharing.  In  a  cyclical  industry,  the  full 
irnport  of  this  shift  in  bargaining  strategy  will  only  become  clear  over  time.  Overall, 
however,  pilots  managed  to  maintain  their  earnings  though  at  specific  periods  they 
faced  significant  reductions  in  wages  and  conditions.  This  evidence  should  be  borne 
in  mind  when  we  commence  our  analysis  of  the  effect  of  European  deregulation  on 
the  pilot  workforce,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  next  section. 
4.2  Europe:  Restructuring  the  Flight  Deck 
The  progress  of  the  European  airline  industry  towards  deregulation  has  been  less  rapid 
than  in  the  USA.  However,  the  change  in  the  fortunes  of  organised  labour  has  to  an 
extent  been  more  pronounced.  This  can  be  explained,  firstly,  by  the  nature  of 
ownership  within  the  European  industry,  with  a  long  history  of  state  control  exercised 
through  nationalisation.  With  economic  reform  and  the  advent  of  EU  competition 
doctrine,  particularly  that  relating  to  subsidy,  carriers  have  been  forced  to  restructure 
costs  more  quickly  than  in  the  US.  Secondly,  the  wages  and  productivity  of  European 
airline  workers,  accounting  for  differences  in  stage  length  and  equipment  type,  have 
been  diagnosed  as  more  generous  and  the  productivity  performance  inferior  to  that  of 
their  US  counterparts.  Thirdly,  a  process  of  globalisation  and  concentration,  following 
deregulation,  has  superimposed  itself  on  an  already  difficult  environment.  It  is 
important  to  briefly  sketch  the  development  of  European  airline  deregulation,  which  is 
more  complex  than  the  straightforward  'one  offreform  of  the  US  industry.  We  will 
then  chart  the  effects  of  regulatory  reform  on  pilots  as  a  key  occupational  group. 
Again  we  will  analyse  the  earnings  and  bargaining  fortunes  and  the  regulatory  and 
political 
, 
influence  of  pilots  within  the  European  industry.  For  earnings,  we  will  use 
the  official  earnings  statistics  collated  by  ICAO,  which  despite  gaps  and  omissions 
allow  companson  with  the  US  data.  We  will  therefore  examine  general  trends  for  key 
138 years  1975  and  1995.  These  are  convenient  comparison  points,  providing  evidence  of 
the  late  period  of  regulation,  the  initial  deregulation  period  around  1980s  and  the  later 
European  deregulation  period  from  about  1990,  commencing  with  the  first  package  in 
1988  and  1995,  and  later  developments. 
In  the  USA  we  used  comparison  data  between  entry  level  and  senior  pilots  in  order  to 
chart  whether  there  had  been  generalised  effects  on  pay  at  the  top  or  bottom  of  the 
pilot  occupational  scales.  As  consistent  aggregate  data  on  entry-level  wages  is 
unobtainable,  for  Europe  we  will  look  at  the  BALPA  pilot  pay  survey  for  the  same 
years  as  the  ICAO  survey  data  1995,  in  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  there  has 
been  a  trend  towards  fragmentation  in  flight  deck  pay.  In  addition,  we  will  be 
concerned  with  more  qualitative  aspects  such  as  effects  on  bargaining  and  industrial 
relations.  We  will  then  assess  the  manner  in  which  flight  deck  staff  reacted  to  the  new 
regulatory  environment  in  terms  of  issues  such  as  crew  hours,  cross  border  licensing, 
and  training  in  order  to  defend  their  interests.  Although  the  issues  confronting 
European  flight  deck  staff  are  slightly  different  and  the  data  are  not  comparable,  we 
should  be  able  to  outline  the  contours  of  a  comparison,  which  can  be  more  fully 
developed  in  our  discussion  in  chapter  7  on  European  restructuring. 
4.2.1  Deregulating  European  Air  Transport:  Liberalising  In  The  Face  Of  Constraints. 
Unlike  US  deregulation,  which  was  rapidly  introduced  as  a  sort  of  policy  experiment, 
European  initiatives  were  steadfastly  cautious,  due  to  the  divergence  between  the 
various  countries  and  between  those  who  favoured  outright  deregulation  and  a  more 
measured  approach.  (Button  et  al  1998:  11.  )  The  co-existence  of  a  vibrant  low  cost 
charter  sector  and  limited  deregulation  with  certain  EU  countries  had  already  exposed 
the  high  cost  nature  of  the  industry  and  high  consumer  fares  in  the  1960s  and  1970s. 
The  trend  towards  deregulation  of  European  air  transport  services  can  be  seen  within 
the  context  of  four  distinct  phases.  (Button  et  al  1998:  28.  )  Firstly,  there  were  a  series 
of  domestic  reform  initiatives  coupled  with  privatisation  and  state  divestment,  most 
notably  in  Britain  and  the  Netherlands.  In  the  mid  1980s  the  UK  regulator,  the  Civil 
Aviation  Authority,  sanctioned  limited  market  entry  and  fare  setting  to  allow  smaller 
airlines  limited  scope  to  compete.  (UK  CAA  1988.  )  Secondly,  privatisation,  coupled 
with  labour  market  deregulation  within  the  wider  context  of  liberal  labour  market 
139 regimes,  allowed  flag  carriers  such  as  British  Airways  and  KLM  the  potential  to 
operate  on  the  basis  of  lower  costs  and  higher  productivity.  A  more  liberal 
environment  of  bilateral  air  service  agreements,  notably  between  the  UK  and  the 
Netherlands  (1984),  UK/Belgium  (1985)  and  UK/Ireland  (1988)  accompanied  this 
phase.  Barrett  (1997:  67-73)  estimated  that  the  benefits  in  terms  of  lower  fares  from 
the  latter  agreement  amounted  to  E42  millions  by  1996.  Thirdly,  this  limited  zonal 
deregulation  was  accompanied  by  a  more  encompassing  and  supranational  series  of 
regulatory  initiatives  notably  the  ongoing  'Open  Skies'  agreements  between  the  UK 
and  the  US/Canada  in  1994.  (Button  et  al  1998:  30.  )  However  it  has  to  be  emphasised 
that  although  the  trend  is  towards  liberalisation  the  industry  still  operates  on  a 
mercantilist  basis  with  states  protecting  and  upholding  the  rights  of  their  flag  carriers 
and  major  airlines.  The  apparent  success  of  US  deregulation  was  tempered  with 
concern  about  market  failures  and  the  European  project  was  designed  to  avoid  the 
perceived  failures  of  US  deregulation.  As  Button  et  al  argue,  the  debate  has  often  been 
characterised  as  a  choice  between  the  shock  therapy  of  the  US  solution  and  the  more 
measured  gradualism  of  European  policy.  (1998:  54.  )  European  authorities  were 
constrained  by  geography  and  topography,  as  well  as  the  divergence  of  state 
competition  and  labour  market  policies.  These  issues  and  contexts  are  covered  by 
other  accounts  (Button  et  al  1998),  (McGowan  and  Seabright  1989:  283-344). 
140 For  the  purposes  of  the  current  work  it  is  necessary  to  outline  these  liberalising 
measures,  although  the  very  real  interplay  between  such  policies  and  the  labour 
market  is  fully  analysed  in  Chapter  7.  The  principal  deregulatory  packages  are 
outlined  below  in  Table  4.6 
Table  4.6  EU  Air  Transport  Reform:  The  Three  Packages. 
Ist  package  (Jan  1988)  21  package  (Ist  Nov  1990)  3  rd  package  (Ist  Jan  1993) 
Fares  Discounting  of  up  to  Improved  automatic  non-  Powers  to  intervene  against 
45%  without  regulatory  approved  discounts  excessive  basic  fares  (in  relation 
approval  to  long  run  costs).  Continued 
downward  development  of  fares 
Designation/capacity  Multiple  according  to  Reduced  flight  and  passenger  All  designation  capacity 
passenger  numbers  and  numbers  for  multi-  restrictions  removed 
flights:  designation. 
45/55  capacity  split  Jan  Gradual  increase  in  capacity 
88  share  up  to  60%,  allows 
40/60  Oct  1989  increase  of  7.5%  p.  a. 
Access.  1competition  Improved  3"j,  40'and  5  th  Enhanced  3"  and  4"  Full  access  to  all  EU  routes*, 
freedoms  freedoms,  5h  freedom  up  to  unrestricted  cabotage  from  April 
Limited  capacity  co-  50%  of  capacity.  1997. 
ordination,  rules  on  slot  PSO/protection  new  regional  Reformed  PSOs. 
allocation,  CRS  and  routes/scope  for  distribution  Greater  scope  for  traffic 
ground  handling  control  on  environmental  distribution  intervention  re: 
grounds  congestion  and  environmental 
factors 
Licensing  Not  addressed  in  earlier  packages  Uniform  across  EU,  notion  of  EU  I 
ownership,  lighter  regulatory 
I 
requirements  for  smaller  carriers 
Source:  Summarised  from  table  2.5  in  Button  et  al.  1998 
*  excluding  Greek  islands  and  Azores 
It  can  be  seen  from  table  4.6,  that  the  process  of  deregulation  was  attended  f  irstly  by  a 
relaxation  of  restrictions,  benefiting  flag  carrier  airlines.  Secondly,  there  was  a 
gradual  introduction  of  fare  discounts,  and  greater  freedoms  to  operate  services  within 
other  European  countries.  Complete  liberalisation  was  signalled  by  the  removal  of  all 
restrictions  and  designations  with  full  fare  setting  authority  and  the  ability  to  operate 
between  and  within  other  European  states.  Within  this  context  of  market 
liberalisation,  we  can  ask  the  same  broad  questions  about  the  outcome  for  labour. 
Given  the  identification  of  pilots  with  a  culture  of  high  earnings  and  low  productivity, 
how  did  pilots  fare  under  deregulation?  The  first  task  is  to  examine  the  impact  on 
eamings. 
141 4.2.2  European  Pilots:  Flying  On  Borrowed  Time? 
Following  the  US  literature  on  regulated  industries,  Windle  (1991:  31-49)  and  Neven 
and  Roller  (1995:  933-940)  identified  rent  sharing  between  management  and  unions 
as  a  significant  factor  in  the  higher  relative  costs  of  European  airlines.  In  common 
with  others,  such  as  McGowan  and  Seabright  (1989:  283-344),  Windle  (1991:  31- 
49)(),  they  identify  significantly  lower  productivity  and  correspondingly  higher  wages 
for  Europe  than  for  the  US  industry.  As  we  have  seen,  US  pilots  under  regulation  and 
in  the  immediate  post  deregulation  period  were  viewed  as  less  productive.  Managers 
have  regarded  their  European  counterparts  as  both  overpaid  and  less  productive.  As  in 
the  US,  the  legacy  of  a  web  of  regulatory  rules,  national  labour  market  policies  and 
the  significant  bargaining  power  of  pilots  themselves  has  benefited  them  enormously 
as  a  group. 
In  order  to  develop  our  analysis  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  nature  of  pilot  earnings 
in  Europe  over  key  comparison  points  between  the  regulated  and  the  deregulated 
period.  The  first  task  is  to  look  at  the  official  data,  which  in  the  case  of  European 
carriers  is  incomplete.  ICAO  data  on  fleet  and  personnel  used  here  has  been  analysed 
by  estimating  mean  earnings  firstly  for  all  European  carriers  listed,  and  secondly  for 
flag  carrier  airlines,  where  high  earnings  have  traditionally  been  prevalent. 
142 These  raw  data  are  given  below. 
Table  4.7  Estimated  Flight  Deck  Earnings  in  the  European  Airline  Industry 
1978-1997  (Constant  US  $) 
1978  1980  1985  1995  1997 
Sabena  62,606  49,365*  76,639  80,637  75,243 
Air  France  52,437  94,652  71,297  218,791  **  75,243* 
Lufthansa  31,450*  49,365*  57,750*  80,637*  75,243* 
Aer  Lingus  24,608  35,750  46,955  80,637*  75,243* 
Alitalia  42,533  49,365*1  57,750*  80,637*  75,243* 
KLM  31,450*  116,062  95,747  80,637*  75,243* 
TAP  28,422  49,365*  41,392  144,970  126,650 
SAS  50,145  85,004  57,750*  161,950  159,378 
Iberia  42,688  75,577  60,6021  192,383  75,243* 
Swissair  56,280  108,681  94,5581  76,972  75,243* 
British  Airways  16,186  42,802  38,436  111,719  119,766 
British  Midland  14,756  39,125  27,383  78,614  86,362 
Air  UK  31,450*  23,079  57,750*  80,637*  56,979 
Virgin  -----  ------  34,600  82,432  79,372 
Mean  39,727  66,736  62,969  102,527  94,650 
Index 
(1980--100)  60  100  94  154  142 
Index 
(1985=100)  63  105  100  163  150 
Source:  calculated  from  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  Statistics  inclusive  years. 
*  Missing  data  with  mean  value  for  year  inserted  to  allow  comparison. 
"Affected  by  Air  France  take-over  of  UTA  and  Air  Inter. 
TABLE  4.8  Estimated  Flight  Deck  Earnings  within  European  Flag  Carrier 
Airlines  (Constant  US  $) 
1975  1980  1985  1995  1997 
Aer  Lingus  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
Alitalia  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
Air  France  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
A  16,186  42,8021  38,436  111,719  119,766 
befia  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
m  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
fthansa  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
abena  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
AS  50,145  85,004  88,123  161,950  159,378 
ww  issair  44,450*  77,682*  88,123  140,332*  144,523* 
AP  23,942  77,682*  41,392  144,970  126,650 
it  ean  44,587  82,694  87,293  154,129  156,197 
nc 
11  9 
dex 
9W-100)  54  100  105  186  188 
ndex  ý1985=100) 
51  95  100  177  179 
143 Examining  the  index  for  all  European  pilot  earnings  in  table  4.7  we  can  see  that 
earnings  appear  to  have  fallen  in  two  distinct  periods.  Firstly,  between  1980  and  1985 
when  the  effects  of  the  business  cycle  occasioned  cost  cutting,  secondly,  and  more 
importantly,  between  1995  and  1997,  the  most  intensive  period  of  restructuring.  This 
is  the  case  where  the  rate  of  change  is  calculated  using  both  1980  and  1985  as  base 
years.  However  given  the  incomplete  nature  of  the  ICAO  data  the  real  level  may  well 
be  downplayed  by  the  fact  that  industry  mean  earnings  have  been  substituted  for 
missing  data.  The  base  year  of  1975  has  been  chosen  for  the  European  flag  carrier 
comparison,  because  the  data  were  more  complete.  Since  much  of  this  missing  data 
relates  to  high  earning  state  run  carriers  the  mean  is  artificially  low.  Assuming  that 
average  earnings  increased  at  the  same  rate  as  other  flag  carriers,  and  we  have  reason 
to  suspect  that  they  in  fact  outpaced  other  flag  carriers,  we  can  provide  a  more 
meaningful  if  still  imperfect  comparison,  given  in  table  4.9.  Here  the  average 
earnings  of  the  highest  European  carriers  were  compounded  with  the  mean  earnings 
of  US  big  six'carriers  shown  earlier  in  table  4.2.  The  index,  which  is based  on  1985 
earnings,  the  high  point  for  European  earnings,  shows  that  there  has  been  a  steady 
upward  trend  throughout  most  of  the  comparison  period  with  a  pronounced  slowing  of 
earnings  growth  over  recent  years.  On  the  face  of  it,  both  this  data  and  the  US  data 
suggest  that  the  long  term  effect  of  deregulation  is  to  increase  pilot  earnings.  The 
ICAO  data  for  Europe  are  much  less  complete  than  for  US  carriers  who  tend  to  report 
their  earnings  more  frequently  and  accurately.  34  The  data  are  also  more  complete  for 
the  US  giving  a  truer  reflection  because  of  the  better  response  from  US  carriers. 
European  earnings  data  are  patchy  and  inconsistent,  we  can  therefore  only  take  these 
data  as  indicative  guides  . 
34  A  factor  in  European  carrier  under-reporting  is  the  pronounced  reticence  of  employee  groups  and 
management  at  high  cost  airlines  to  divulge  earnings  data  lest  they  provide  ammunition  for  critics.  The 
author  continues  to  find  a  reluctance  to  secure  this  data  in  his  current  position  as  head  of  research  for 
the  British  Airline  Pilots  Union. 
144 Comparing  the  US  and  I-Airopean  data  we  can  see  that  the  Irend  in  earnings  growth  is 
remarkably  similar. 
Table  4.9  Comparison  of  European  Flag  carrier  and  US  'Big  Six'  Carriers. 
Flight  Deck  Earnings  using  (index  base  =  1980/1985) 
1975  1980  1985  1995  1997 
Europe  1980  54  100  105  186  188 
US  1980  65  100  134  181  192 
Europe  1985  51  95  100  177  179 
US  1985  48  74  100  134  143 
Source:  Constr  ucted  from  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  Statistics  (inclusive  years). 
There  are  of  course  differences  between  the  earnings  trends  for  both  the  US  and 
Europe.  These  reflect  the  fact  that  both  nations  experience  essentially  the  same  statre  L- 
of  deregulation,  and  its  labour  market  effects,  namely  competitive  disengagement  at 
different  times.  The  US  pilot  workfOrce  experienced  this  stage  of'  deregulation 
C-  -- 
between  1980  and  1985,  whilst  in  Europe  the  same  period  is  roughly  between  1995 
and  1997.  The  overall  effect  thOLIgh  is  reasonably  neutral.  The  period  should  be  seen 
as  an  'adjustment'  rather  than  as  a  fundamental  re-alignment  of  earnings.  I 
Figure  4.3  Trend  in  European  and  US  Earnings  1978-1997  (base  =1980) 
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It  is  however  clear  that  earnings  for  flight  deck  crews  have  tailed  off  somewhat 
towards  the  end  of  the  comparison  period.  It  is  difficult  at  this  stage  to  tell  whether 
this  is  an  indication  of  deregulation  exerting  a  downward  trend,  or  whcther  this  later 
145 stage  represents  a  blip  as  the  period  1985-1990  clearly  does  in  Europe.  However  the 
convergence  evident  between  the  two  in  the  late  1990s  suggest  the  beginning  of  a  re- 
alignment  of  air  transport  earnings. 
Looking  at  country  level  data  we  can  focus  to  a  greater  extent  on  any  changes.  The 
levelling  off  trend  is  again  apparent  for  the  major  flag  carrier  airline  in  this  case 
British  Airways.  Figures  4.4  to  4.6  below  provide  a  trend  comparison  of  basic  salaries 
for  UK  airline  captains.  Looking  at  entry-level  salaries  for  example  (figure  4.4  and 
4.5)  it  is  clear  that  pay  within  this  category  has  indeed  levelled  off  after  a  strong 
upward  trend  between  1985  and  1990.  (figure  4.5.  )  After  those  years  airlines, 
especially  the  larger  operators  such  as  British  Airways  and  Britannia,  the  largest 
inclusive  tour  operator,  introduced  lower  salaries  for  new  entrants,  in  part  reflecting 
the  increased  costs  of  training.  A  levelling  off  is  also  apparent  in  middle  scale  salaries, 
again  after  growth  between  1985  and  1990.  At  the  upper  scale  there  is  a  continued 
upward  trend  reflecting  the  increased  returns  to  seniority  and  the  fact  that  many  more 
operators  are  involved  in  long  haul  flying,  particularly  the  charter  operators.  (figure 
4.6.  )  Only  British  Midland  whose  operations  during  the  survey  period  where 
exclusively  short  to  medium  haul  were  excluded  from  this  trend.  Therefore  any 
increase  in  pay  for  captains  has  tended  to  go  towards  the  top  of  the  seniority  scale. 
This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the  picture  revealed  by  Johnson  in  her  analysis  of  US 
pay  where  we  saw  an  effect  on  the  top  scale  pilot  earnings.  Looking  at  co-pilot 
earnings  we  can  see  that  the  picture  is  similar  with  salary  growth  at  this  level  within 
British  Airways  slowing  to  reflect  the  increased  cost  of  training  at  the  entry  level  of 
the  market. 
146 Fig  4.4.  Entry  Level  Salary  Comparison  1975-1978  (captain) 
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Fig  4.6  Top  Scale  Salary  Comparison  1975-1998  (captain) 
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Fig  4.8.  Middle  Scale  Salary  Trend  1975-1998  (co-pilot) 
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13  BA  0  British  Mcland  13  Britannia  13  Monarch Salaries  for  the  middle  scale  of  pilots  have  tailed  off  but  the  upward  trend  seems  set  to 
continue.  There  is  increased  demand  for  relatively  experienced  pilots  given  the 
buoyant  labour  market. 
Deregulation  therefore  seems  to  have  been  accompanied  not  by  an  increase  in  pilot 
earnings  generally,  but  in  a  redistribution  of  earnings.  Again  the  top  scale  of  co-pilots 
continue  to  enjoy  high  earnings.  These  earnings,  especially  the  middle  scale,  relate 
mostly  to  jet  aircraft  and  large  scheduled  or  charter  carriers.  These  are  used  because 
they  have  been  in  existence  for  the  life  of  the  survey,  and  data  is  readily  available. 
However  there  is  another  story  indicating  pressure  on  pay  at  the  lower  end  of  the 
spectrum.  This  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
4.2.3  Pilot  Pay  in  Bfitain  and  Europe:  Pressurefrom  Below 
Ile  data  in  figures  4.6  to  4.8  provide  only  evidence  of  the  impact  on  salaries  at  the 
top  end  of  the  airline  market.  Given  the  influence  of  a  few  high  salaries  within  an 
airline,  such  data  can  lead  to  severe  distortion.  In  order  to  provide  a  more  realistic 
comparison  of  the  effects  of  deregulation  upon  flight  deck  earnings  it  is  necessary  to 
introduce  some  supplementary  data  which  consider  the  impact  upon  earnings  at  the 
lower  end  of  the  industry.  The  UK  flight  deck  union  BALPA  has  published  yearly 
pilot  pay  analyses  since  1975.  These  give  data  on  minimum  and  maximum  salary 
levels,  providing  an  illuminating  insight  into  the  development  of  pilot  remuneration. 
The  data  compare  base  salaries  at  the  entry  and  n-dddle  level  for  British  Airways,  the 
UK  flag  carrier,  and  for  a  number  of  independent  airlines  for  whom  corresponding 
data  exist.  The  trend  shows  that  pilot  remuneration  has  in  fact  increased  since  1975 
with  a  levelling  out  in  this  pay  trend  towards  the  end  the  1990s.  This  may  reflect  a 
lower  inflation  environment;  there  is  no  evidence  that  it  reflects  lower  pay  for  flight 
deck  crews,  either  at  the  top,  bottom  or  middle  of  the  scale. 
However  across  the  range  of  airlines  salaries  for  comparable  aircraft  types  (Boeing 
737)  can  be  as  much  as  one  third  lower.  Pilots  are  very  sensitive  to  pay  variations  for 
149 identical  aircraft  types  on  identical  route  networks.  The  variation  can  be  seen  even 
more  clearly  if  we  compare  BA  Regional  with  British  Midland  (BM).  British  Midland 
operates  a  network  of  short  haul  business  routes  from  London  Heathrow  in 
competition  with  BA.  Its  fleet  mix  is  identical  to  that  of  BAR,  but  comparing 
maximum  salaries,  British  Midland  captains  are  some  19  per  cent  behind  their 
counterparts  at  BAR.  Easyjet  salaries  however  are  even  lower  with  much  higher 
productivity.  Again  comparing  the  salaries  of  Boeing  737  captains,  we  can  see  from 
table  4.10  that  Easyjet  pilot  salaries  are  some  31  per  cent  lower  than  those  of  BAR. 
One  of  the  major  pressures  on  pilot  salaries  is  the  effect  of  regionalisation.  and 
franchising.  For  example  salaries  again  for  the  ubiquitous  737  at  Maersk,  a  BA 
franchise,  are  only  65  per  cent  of  those  for  BA  Regional,  demonstrating  the  threat  to 
flag  carrier  type  salaries  from  this  sort  of  business  strategy.  Jet  salaries  for  the  BA 
regional  operations  Euro  Gatwick  and  British  Airways  regional  (BAR)  differ 
markedly  from  those  of  other  regional  airlines.  Importantly,  Manx,  GB  Air,  and 
Maersk  are  all  BA  franchise  operations.  This  shows  the  extent  of  the  possible  threat  to 
pilot  salaries  at  BA.  The  case  of  Maersk,  the  Danish  owned  regional  carrier  operating 
a  radius  of  European  routes  from  Birmingham,  confirms  the  fear  that  trade  unions  had 
when  the 
_BA 
threatened  to  sell  the  regional  business  to  this  operator.  Maersk 
maximum  pilot  salaries  are  some  20  per  cent  lower.  Many  regional  operators  offer 
lower  salaries  than  established  carriers  such  as  BA  and  British  Midland.  However, 
within  BA  the  pilots'  union,  BALPA,  has  been  able  to  gradually  recoup  the  lower 
regional  and  Gatwick  salaries,  culminating  in  a  'snapback  provision'  for  Gatwick  and 
regional  salaries.  Operative  from  1999,  this  deal  ironically,  part  of  the  pilots'  business 
efficiency  savings,  has  restored  regional  and  Gatwick  based  pilots  back  into  the 
fcommon  pilot  workforce'.  The  deal  suggests  that  concession  bargaining  of  the  type 
seen  in  the  USA  is  at  least  as  prevalent  in  the  UK. 
This  follows  a  trend  established  in  the  US,  whereby,  commuter  carriers  were 
integrated  into  major  operators,  in  order  to  feed  main  hubs.  In  Europe  however,  the 
trend  has  been  one  of  dis-integration  as  the  regional  operations  are  spun  out  as 
profit/cost  centres,  often  with  lower  pay.  Nevertheless,  there  remain  pockets  of 
relative  low  pay  on  the  flight  deck,  and  the  threat  from  low  cost  operators  is  very  real. 
Using  current  (1998)  data  for  jet  salaries,  we  can  see  the  threat  to  pilot  salaries  from 
150 the  bottom  of  the  airline  market.  Many  of  the  operators  paying  lower  salaries  are  BA 
franchise  operators  and  their  activities  have  extended  recently.  Many  are  new 
entrants.  Significantly  the  long  standing  scheduled  operators  such  as  British  Midland 
and  the  charter  operators  Britannia  and  Monarch  are  much  closer  -to  the  BA  regional 
salary. 
Nevertheless  even  Virgin  long  haul  pilots  are  quite  significantly  below  BA  salaries 
especially  when  allowances  and  increments  are  taken  into  account. 
Table  4.10  1998  Upper  Scale  Jet  Pilot  Salaries  for  UK  Regional  Operators 
Operator  Max  salary 
Capt. 
Index  deficit 
BAR 
Max  salary 
FO, 
Index  deficit 
BAR 
Maersk*  53,278  66  34,695  62 
British  Midland  64,257  79  40,383  73 
British  Regional  Airlines  52,509  65  36,500  66 
CityFlyer  Express*  48,760  60  30,475  55 
British  Airways  (Regional)  81,207  100  55,610  100 
Easyjet  56,000  69  35,500  64 
KLM  UK  63,111  78  38,256  69 
Jersey  European  53,400  66  32,000  58 
Virgin  Atlantic  73,950  91  48,070  86 
Average  Jet  salary  exc.  58,158  72  36,984  66 
BAR 
Source:  BALPA  Annual  Pay  Survey  December  1998 
The  basic  salary  level  is  a  good  indication  of  the  trend  in  remuneration  within  the 
pilot  profession.  Those  carriers  paying  high  basic  salaries  tend  to  have  higher  levels  of 
incremental  benefit  and,  conversely,  the  lower  paying  carriers  offer  a  limited  range  of 
benefits.  The  discussion  of  pilot  pay  would  suggest  that  pilot  earnings  have  been 
variable  within  the  UK.  This  might  be  expected  given  the  extent  of  deregulatio  n 
within  the  UK  and  the  existence  of  an  independent,  low  cost  and  charter  sector. 
However  in  other  European  countries  there  is  still  a  strong  perception  of  high  earnings 
and  low  productivity.  This  has  led  to  constant  attempts  by  airlines  to  seek  concessions 
from  pilots.  These  issues  are  examined  in  the  next  section 
151 4.2.4  Productivity  and  Efficiency  in  The  European  Pilot  Workforce 
Pilot  productivity  has  always  been  a  source  of  dispute  between  airlines  and  flight 
crew  unions.  Depending  on  the  measure  used  very  different  results  can  be  obtained  in 
any  measurement  process.  The  output  of  pilots  conforms  to  the  basic  framework  of 
airline  economics,  namely  decreasing  costs  over  a  longer  distance  and  vice  versa. 
Various  measures  control  for  the  effects  of  distance  and  time,  the  most  commonly 
used  by  management  is  costs  per  block  hour.  This  measure  records  only  productive 
'seat  time'and  ignores  unproductive  periods  in  between.  Pilots  are  reluctant  to  use  this 
as  the  sole  measure  as  it  underestimates  the  preparation  and  planning  which  goes  into 
a  flight.  A  1995  comparative  study  by  consultants,  Towers  Perrin,  for  KLM 
management  for  example  showed  that  pilot  costs  per  block  hour  for  comparable 
aircraft  types  were  20  per  cent,  30  per  cent  and  40  per  cent  higher  than  those  at 
Lufthansa,  British  Airways  and  Singapore  Airways  respectively.  A  rival  study 
conducted  by  Cranfield  University  and  Deloitte  Touche  showed  that  KLM  pilot  costs 
were,  on  average,  25  per  cent  below  those  of  the  other  eleven  airlines  and  their  net 
income  half  that  of  the  other  carriers.  (Odell  1997  :.  )  The  measurement  of  pilot 
productivity  is  therefore  fraught  with  methodological  problems  given  the  complexity 
of  different  output  measures,  and  interacting  variables  such  as  route  length,  aircraft 
type  and  speed.  However  despite  disagreement  over  the  type  of  measure  most 
analyses,  have  found  that  European  pilots  considerably  underperform  compared  to  US 
and  Asian  counterparts.  However,  in  an  analysis  of  world  airline  labour  costs,  Merz 
(1995)  indicates  that  the  negative  performance  of  European  flight  deck  staff  in  this 
regard  is  exaggerated. 
Table  4.11  Pilot  Labour  Costs  at  Major  Airlines  1980-1991 
Total  staff 
1980(%) 
Total  labour  cost 
1980(%) 
Total  staff 
1991(%) 
Total  labour  cost 
1991(%) 
USA  11  20  10  26 
EUROPE  6  17  6  17 
ASIA  7 
1 
18  9  21 
Source:  Merz  and  Lufthansa  (1995)  in  Capelli  (ed.  )  Airline  Labour  Relations  in  The  Global 
Era.  (Pg.  9  1). 
152 Merz  indicates  that  European  pilot  labour  costs,  as  a  percentage  of  total  airline  labour 
costs,  have  remained  stable  whilst  the  percentage  of  pilots  and  other  flight  deck  staff 
of  the  total  workforce  has  fallen  slightly.  The  trend  in  recent  years  has  been  for  pilot 
costs  to  increase,  however,  these  increases  in  the  size  of  the  workforce  have  been 
accompanied  by  rises  in  productivity.  (Alamdari  and  Morell  1997  53-66.  )(Vass  1997.  ) 
Though  there  are  many  omissions  in  the  data  due  to  under-reporting,  the  International 
Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO)  collects  data  periodically  on  staff  costs.  Using 
this  data  to  look  at  the  total  expenditure  on  flight  deck  wages  as  a  proportion  of 
overall  labour  costs,  provides  an  imperfect  but  useful  comparison  . 
35  Table  4.12 
(below)  provides  an  outline  comparison  of  costs.  Whilst  US  pilot  costs  as  a  proportion 
of  total  labour  costs  have  fallen  overall  since  1980,  costs  in  Europe  have  risen  albeit 
from  a  lower  level.  In  the  US,  pilot  wage  costs  actually  rose  as  a  proportion  of  overall 
wage  costs,  throughout  most  of  the  deregulated  period,  but  started  falling  by  1995. 
This  reflects  the  long  run  effect  of  deregulation.  We  might  expect  to  see  a  similar 
trend  within  Europe,  with  deregulation  being  accompanied  by  a  rise  in  flight  deck 
costs,  falling  only  after  a  long  period  of  adjustment,  where  a  lower  cost  base  is 
established.  However  the  overall  trend  evident  from  table  4.12  and  4.13,  below, 
which  takes  the  analysis  up  to  1995,  is  one  of  pilot  expenditure  rising  as  a  proportion 
of  total  labour  costs. 
Table  4.12  Long  Run  Comparison  of  Pilot  Wage  Costs  1980-1995 
%  of  total  labour  cost  %  of  total  labour  cost  %  of  total  labour  cost 
1980  1991  1995 
USA  20  26  22 
EUROPE  17  17  23 
Source:  calculated  from  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  1981,1992,1996 
The  trends  suggest  that  expenditure  on  pilots  including  their  training  and  expenses 
becomes  greater  as  traffic  and  route  networks  expand  under  deregulation.  Ibis  is  clear 
from  the  increase  in  pilot  cost  in  the  USA.  It  also  reflects  the  fact  that  the  bargaining 
35  The  ICAO  data  on  fleet  and  personnel  costs  are  incomplete.  The  data  is  good  for  the  USA  were  most 
airlines  report  fully  and  consistently  over  time.  For  Europe  however,  there  is  seldom  continuity 
between  years  for  the  same  carrier  and  data  on  major  operators  such  as  Air  France,  Alitalia  and 
Lufthansa  are  missing  completely.  The  proportion  of  pilot  expenditure  for  Europe  has  therefore  been 
extrapolated  from  the  previous  percentage  difference  between  the  two  years  for  the  available  carriers. 
The  average  difference  was  then  calculated  for  those  carriers  for  whom  data  is  missing.  C, 
153 power  of  pilots  has  increased,  as  deregulation  has  grown  the  market.  This  explains  the 
pattern  of  rising  post  deregulation  earnings,  and  pilot  wage  costs. 
Table  4.13  Comparison  of  Total  Labour  Expenditure  Pilots  1991  and  1995 
Airline  Total  Expenditure 
on  Flight  deck 
costs 
1991  ($US) 
%  of  overall 
staff  costs 
1991 
Total 
Expenditure  on 
Flight  deck 
costs1995  ($US) 
%  of 
overall 
staff  costs 
1995 
United  732,541  17  1,033,299  20 
US  Air  558,622  22  589,915  21 
Delta  820,848  20  1,079,509  26 
TWA  204,590  14  179,631  15 
Continental  272,777  19  341,037  26 
Iberia  283,410  19  222,972**  22 
Swissair  212,769  17  N/A  23** 
Austrian  N/A  N/A  N/A  23** 
Lufthansa  N/A  N/A  N/A  23** 
SAS  171,719  14  233,475  21 
TAP  59,124  17  63,787  24 
Finnair  45,292  17  ----  23** 
British 
Airways 
290,580  18  342,782  17 
Virgin  Atlantic  9,509  15  22,911  24 
Lauda  Air  3,433  24  26** 
Source:  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  Statistics  **  extrapolated.  (See  footnote  10) 
An  examination  of  differences  between  the  USA  and  Europe  shows  that  pilots  in 
Europe  have  faced  greater  short-term  pressure  on  wages  and  work  rules  than  those  in 
the  USA.  There  are  several  pressures  combining  to  affect  the  European  pilot 
workforce.  FirstlY,  the  ongoing  pressure  of  restructuring  and  privatisation  and 
secondly,  the  effect  of  new  global  management  strategies.  (See  Hanlon  1996:  Chapter 
7)  and  Verchere  EfU  1993.  ) 
Table  4.13  indicates  the  level  of  expenditure  on  pilot  costs  undertaken  by  major 
carriers.  Many  of  the  highest  paid  pilots,  such  as  those  of  Iberia,  operate  in  the  state 
sector.  Although  even  in  carriers  where  there  is  a  nominal  state  holding,  high  levels  of 
remuneration  exist.  For  example  Swissair  where  there  is  a  20  per  cent  holding,  have 
high  levels  of  remuneration.  However,  as  the  case  of  TAP  indicates  state  ownership 
need  not  go  together  with  'excessive'  levels  of  remuneration.  The  comparison 
between  1991  and  1995  shows  a  closing  of  the  remuneration  gap  between  European 
154 and  US  pilots.  For  instance  the  gap  between  the  highest  paid  US  pilots  was  almost  50 
per  cent  in  1991  and  is  now  just  over  a  quarter.  But  European  flight  deck  earnings 
are  set  to  come  under  pressure  as  management  deploy  business  strategies  which 
threaten  the  compensation  and  work  rules  enjoyed  by  European  pilots.  This  issue  is 
explored  in  the  next  section. 
4.2.5  Management  Strategy  and  Employee  Resistance  in  Europe 
In  Europe,  pilots  currently  face  a  number  of  related  pressures.  Firstly,  restructuring 
and  privatisation  have  led  carriers  to  exact  wage  and  benefit  cuts  in  short  term  cost 
reduction  programmes.  How  permanent  these  cost  reductions  will  be  is  as  yet 
unknown.  Secondly,  the  pressure  of  deregulation  and  liberalisation  has  licensed  a 
new  breed  of  low  cost  operator,  many  of  whom  tend  to  be  non-union,  thus  threatening 
the  union  wage  as  established  carriers  seek  to  replicate  such  strategies.  Thirdly,  as 
carriers  adapt  to  the  deregulated  and  globalising  airline  market,  they  are  trying  to 
internalise  low  costs.  This  is  being  achieved  through  the  use  of  franchising  and  by  the 
creation  of  low  cost  regional  subsidiaries.  In  most  cases  pilots  are  coming  under 
increasing  pressure  to  provide  wage  cuts  and  productivity  improvements.  But,  more 
importantly,  pilots  face  continued  pressure  to  alter  the  pay  structure,  through  the  use 
of  two-tier  strategies  and  through  demands  for  increased  productivity.  Pilots  at  BA 
demonstrated  this  in  1996  when  they  threatened  to  strike  ostensibly  over  the  company 
pay  deal,  but  essentially  as  a  warning  shot  to  BA  not  to  proceed  with  its  plans  to 
introduce  differentiated  pay  scales  for  pilots.  The  fact  that  pilots  at  Euro  Gatwick  and 
BAR  secured  proportionately  larger  wage  increases  than  those  in  the  mainline  fleet, 
indicates  the  extent  to  which  pilots  value  the  importance  of  holding  the  line  on  wages 
and  conditions  as  operators  sought  to  reduce  costs.  Nevertheless  they  face  an 
impatient  and  often  nervous  set  of  management,  who  see  an  environment  of  fierce 
competition  coupled  with  pressure  on  yields. 
In  responding  to  the  changed  competitive  environment  of  deregulation  carriers  have 
responded  in  several  ways.  Arguably,  the  major  strategy  for  airlines  has  been  the 
development  of  franchising  and  the  creation  of  low  cost  subsidiaries.  The  use  of  such 
strategies  allows  carriers  to  procure  lower  costs  and  at  the  same  time  to  demonstrate 
the  possibility  of  lower  costs  to  the  parent  airline.  These  strategies  have  become  more 
155 common  as  strong  carriers  such  as  British  Airways  and  KLM  utilise  them  to  bring 
down  costs.  In  a  deregulated  European  airline  market  other  carriers  have  to  respond. 
Alitalia,  which  faces  massive  restructuring  problems,  has  been  forced  to  trade  equity 
for  concessions  in  the  manner  of  many  US  carriers.  Cuts  of  $340m.  over  four  years 
have  been  given  in  exchange  for  equity  stakes  of  between  20  and  30  per  cent  (Airline 
Business  November  1996).  The  carrier  is  also  actively  an  internal  low  cost  airline, 
through  the  launch  of  Alitalia  Team.  Pilots  normally  able  to  insulate  themselves  from 
the  demand  for  labour  concessions  have  been  among  the  most  severely  affected. 
Athough  the  pilots'  union  ANPAC  orchestrated  concerted  action,  including  a  mass 
'sickout'  in  the  summer  of  1996,  the  plans  have  been  pushed  through.  (Hill:  1995.  )  As 
a  result  of  the  restructuring  programme  many  will  be  transferred  to  Team  under 
contracts  assuring  productivity  levels  of  30-40  percent  greater  for  lower  wage  rates. 
However,  pilots  have  escaped  relatively  lightly  compared  to  cabin  staff  who  face 
wage  cuts  of  50  per  cent.  (Ibid.  )  Given  that  the  carrier  will  operate  long  haul  as  well 
as  short  haul  routes,  it  may  well  supersede  Alitalia  completely.  Such  policies  are  akin 
to  'double  breasting',  as  pursued  in  the  USA,  only  in  most  cases  the  realities  of 
European  industrial  relations  are  respected  by  allowing  unions  to  exist  at  such 
secondary  carriers.  In  another  case  of  the  use  of  low  cost  strategies,  Iberia  has  utilised 
its  low  cost  subsidiary  carrier,  Viva  Air,  as  a  direct  competitor  against  the  state  carrier 
in  major  markets  such  as  Barcelona-Madrid.  36  With  restructuring  and  privatisation, 
pilots  face  downward  pressure  on  wages  and  conditions.  The  potential  for  major 
reductions  in  pilot  salaries  across  Europe  is  most  pronounced  in  the  state  owned 
airlines  where  both  costs  and  productivity  are  a  problem  and  where  industrial  relations 
structures  are  largely  unreformed.  Iberia  pilots,  for  example,  struck  in  1995  against 
management  plans  to  reduce  pilot  salaries  by  as  much  as  40%.  At  KLM,  pilots  forced 
management  to  drop  plans  for  an  extension  of  the  retirement  age  by  undertaking  strike 
action,  the  first  time  since  1958.  (Van  De  Krol  1995.  )  Pilot  strikes  also  took  place  at 
SAS,  Air  France  and  Air  Inter,  largely  over  issues  of  restructuring.  The  withdrawal  of 
36  Productivity  at  charter  carriers  is  often  far  superior  to  those  of  scheduled  operators.  Charter  carriers 
tend  to  have  higher  levels  of  utilisation  of  both  aircraft  and  staff  and  incur  lower  infrastructure  costs,  as 
they  tend  to  operate  from  secondary  airports.  These  factors  allow  them  to  harvest  significant 
productivity  gains.  According  to  the  International  Air  Charter  Association  (IACA)  an  Iberia  pilot  might 
fly  45  hours  per  year  whilst  a  Spanish  charter  carrier  will  fly  some  800  hours.  Increasingly,  carriers  are 
pinpointing  such  low  cost  comparisons  in  negotiations. 
156 state  aid  and  the  insistence  of  the  European  Commission  that  subsidy  could  only  be 
used  for  'one  last  time'  restructuring  was  a  major  factor  in  industrial  action. 
In  the  Southern  European  carriers  the  pressure  for  restructuring  was  more  acute  and 
the  level  of  conflict  higher.  Here  the  state  retained  its  involvement  both  as  an  owner 
of  airlines  and  gatekeeper  of  bilateral  rights,  gradually  relinquishing  these  as 
liberalisation  took  hold.  In  Europe  the  higher  pay  and  lower  productivity  of  the 
regulated  era  was  tackled  by  major  restructuring  initiatives.  Commencing  in  the 
1990s,  the  position  of  Europe's  pilots  was  challenged  by  a  series  of  concerted 
restructuring  initiatives.  These  were  met  by  a  series  of  strikes  and  threatened  strikes, 
continual  dispute  over  new  business  strategies,  which  threatened  to  undermine 
common  pilot  remuneration  structures.  External  threats  from  low  cost  carriers, 
competition  from  other  flag  carriers  and  the  removal  of  subsidy,  led  to  an  internal 
focus  on  costs.  In  the  northern  European  context  carriers  such  as  BA,  KLM  and  SAS 
and  Lufthansa  deregulation  gave  rise  to  a  number  of  cost  reduction  initiatives  which 
broadly  followed  those  developed  in  the  US.  The  development  of  franchising  and  the 
creation  of  internal  low  cost  operations  was  met  with  concerted  challenge  by  powerful 
pilot  unions  but  ultimately  pilots  have  been  able  to  control  and  police  these  strategies 
firstly  by  using  'scope'  clauses  to  protect  employment,  and  secondly  by  utilising  their 
bargaining  power  to  push  for  equalisation  of  pilot  salaries.  Nevertheless  this  has  not 
halted  a  general  erosion  of  pilot  salaries  from  the  low  cost  and  regional  operators 
whose  lower  earnings  and  greater  utilisation  present  a  constant  threat. 
Conclusion 
The  discussion  commenced  with  a  central  question.  Has  deregulation  helped  or 
hindered  the  fortunes  of  airline  pilots?  This  question  was  addressed  by  investigating  a 
number  of  sub-questions  such  as  those  on  flight  deck  earnings,  the  preservation  of 
work  rules  and  bargaining  power.  In  order  to  conclude  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  the 
bargaining  environment  product/market  model  developed  in  chapter  2.  (See  appendix 
1).  In  the  USA,  government  and  regulators,  by  outlawing  the  MAP  and  instituting 
limited  labour  protection  statutes,  seemed  on  the  face  of  it  to  strengthen  labour's 
position.  -  However,  government  increasingly  intervened  via  presidential  board 
157 decrees,  forcing  labour  into  rearguard  negotiation.  Deregulation  with  rapid  entry, 
bankruptcy  and  consolidation,  fostered  an  employment  relationship  characterised  by  a 
high  degree  of  contestation.  Employers  sought  to  undermine  union  power  and 
conditions  through  the  use  of  benchmark  comparisons  with  the  low  cost  providers, 
whilst  unions  defined  the  labour  contract  and  sought  to  protect  work  rules  in  the  face 
of  this  onslaught.  The  environment  was  typified  by  concession  bargaining,  which 
unions  often  treated  as  tactical  withdrawal  to  be  recouped  in  good  times.  The  overall 
effect  of  such  an  environment  was  to  benefit  capital  within  the  industry,  but  to  leave 
labour  in  a  state  of  relative  combativity  and  to  preserve  the  potency  of  its  bargaining 
power.  By  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  a  situation  of  'mature  deregulation'  had 
been  reached  with  the  onset  of  oligopoly  and  hub  domination.  Industrial  relations 
within  this  environment  were  more  negotiated,  with  a  tendency  towards  equity  based 
concession  bargaining,  as  employers  sought  to  co-opt  unions  into  restructuring. 
Unions  prioritised  job  security  and  the  protection  of  union  contracts,  often  negotiating 
on  that  basis.  Those  factors  explain  the  resilience  of  pilot  earnings,  which  despite 
'adjustments'in  the  wake  of  deregulation,  have  always  been  restored,  especially  in  the 
wake  of  industry  expansion.  These  issues  come  across  in  the  earnings  data  analysed 
earlier. 
However  whilst  many  wage  concessions  could  be  refunded  through  'snapbacks'.  these 
can  in  turn  be  claimed  back  in  recessionary  times.  The  overall  effect  of  deregulation 
on  US  pilots  has  been  firstly,  to  open  pilots  up  to  non-union  competition,  which 
though  currently  weak  could  re-emerge  as  a  threat  if  some  major  carriers  were  to 
derecognise  the  pilots'  union.  Secondly,  pilots  have  been  forced  to  accept  wage  rates 
and  contracts  which  are  largely  dictated  by  the  business  environment  of  the  airline 
concerned.  No  longer  does  the  'cost  plus'  pricing  model,  identified  by  Capelli  and 
others,  operate.  Thirdly,  the  precarious  economics  of  the  industry  means  the  threat  of 
another  major  series  of  bankruptcies  and  consolidations  is  a  constant  threat,  especially 
in  downturns.  Pilots  have  also  gained  new  influence  and  involvement  within  the 
industry  as  indicated  in  their  driving  role  within  ESOP  programmes.  Given  their  role 
within  ESOPs,  it  could  be  expected  that  other  airline  workers  might  be  expected  to 
surrender  more  under  the  next  wave  of  concession  bargaining.  The  involvement  of 
pilots  as  a  driving  force  in  major  ESOP  programmes  such  as  that  of  United  indicates  a 
158 search  for  influence  within  the  firm,  as  explicit  regulatory  intervention  becomes  more 
opaque. 
By  the  late  1990s  the  industry  benefited  from  a  much  more  inclusive  and  less 
nominally  adversarial  industrial  relations  environment.  Most  typical  are  the 
restructuring  plans  at  Northwest  (1994)  and  TWA  (ongoing),  which  have  resulted  in 
worker  representation  on  airline  boards  and  limited  equity  in  exchange  for  major 
concession  on  wages  and  work  rules.  Less  typical,  but  perhaps  symbolic  is  United 
Airlines  where  massive  labour  concessions  ($5.3  billions)  have  been  traded  for  a 
controlling  employee  ESOP.  However  the  key  fact  is  that  as  predicted  by  Hendricks  et 
al  at  the  outset,  labour's  bargaining  power  within  the  industry,  especially  that  of 
pilots,  has  been  preserved  and  even  enhanced.  Arguably,  that  power  has  been 
preserved  by  a  judicious  policy  of  co-operation,  although  there  have  been  many 
examples  of  more  combative  strategies.  The  recent  American  pilots'  action  against 
commuter  pay  structures,  and  the  victory  of  Northwest  pilots  in  restoring  pay  cuts  and 
eradicating  two  tier  wages,  indicate  the  continued  power  of  combative  militant  action 
within  US  bargaining.  (See  Airline  Business  November  1998.  ) 
European  deregulation  affects  pilots  in  different  nations  to  varying  degrees  as  befits  a 
diverse  environment.  The  labour  market  environment  in  countries  such  as  the  UK  and 
the  Netherlands  was  characterised  by  enhanced  product  market  regulation  but  this  did 
not  stop  pilots  from  securing  and  enhancing  collective  agreements.  The  situation  is 
one  of  relative  stability,  where  labour  is  prepared  to  co-operate  in  strengthening  the 
carrier's  global  position  at  a  crucial  time,  and  management  is  prepared  to  uphold  the 
unified  nature  of  the  firm.  Nevertheless,  management  increasingly  seeks  to  develop 
low  cost  strategies  such  as  franchising  and  regionalisation  in  order  to  serve  lower 
yield  markets  on  a  more  cost-efficient  basis.  The  phased  introduction  of  deregulation 
allows  a  more  measured  adjustment  in  nations  like  the  UK,  Netherlands  and  Ireland. 
A  marked  change  occurs  in  the  1990s,  although  there  have  been  minor  episodes  of 
restructuring  in  the  1980s,  most  notably  the  re-organisation  of  BA's  Highland  services 
(Colling 
, 
1995).  By  the  early  1990s,  international  and  domestic  competition 
intensifies,  and  management's  search  for  cost  reductions,  produced  several  episodes 
of  industrial  action  most  notably,  a  threatened  BALPA  strike  in  July  1996  and 
disputes  involving  pilots  at  KIM  (See  Airline  Business  July  1996). 
159 In  the  other  European  airlines,  mostly  those  in  Southern  Europe,  there  is  much  more 
conflict  and  contestation  over  restructuring.  Pilots  at  Air  France,  Iberia  and  Alitalia 
are  among  those  most  involved  in  industrial  action  as  they  seek  to  insulate  themselves 
from  restructuring  and  cost  reduction.  As  state  airlines  seek  to  survive  in  a  hostile 
climate  these  pilots  have  become  a  major  target,  given  their  traditionally  high  levels 
of  remuneration  and  low  productivity.  Again,  carriers  try  to  develop  low  cost 
strategies,  using  internal  subsidiaries  to  undermine  the  higher  terms  and  conditions  of 
pilots  with  limited  success.  The  disruptive  capacity  of  the  pilot  unions,  whose  ability 
to  disrupt  carriers,  to  challenge  restructuring  and  to  concede  much  less  in  relative 
terms  than  other  airline  workers,  is  a  constant  concern  of  both  management  and  other 
unions.  (See  Blyton  et  al  1998b.  )  European  pilots  face  an  additional  unified  threat 
from  regulatory  changes.  Most  notably,  as  the  EU  contemplates  increased  flight  duty 
hours,  under  the  JAROPS  proposals.  BALPA,  for  example,  adopts  a  strategy  of 
seeking  to  protect  pilot  wage  levels  and  of  pressuring  regulators  in  order  to  protect 
work  rules.  Another  threat  comes  in  the  shape  of  cross  border  registration  and  the  so- 
called  'flag  of  convenience'  issue.  Pilots  also  face  attempts  to  harmonise  certification 
and  licensing,  although  these  are  generally  welcomed  as  aiding  mobility. 
One  key  similarity  between  the  US  and  Europe  is  witnessed  in  the  interaction 
deregulation  and  business  strategy.  In  the  USA  the  low  cost  threat  was  provide  by  the 
new  entrant  carriers,  encouraged  into  the  market  by  deregulation.  Regulators  wished 
to  see  a  direct  challenge  to  the  high  cost  major  carriers,  and  operators  such  as  People 
Express  and  New  York  Air  provided  it  for  a  time.  However  with  merger  and 
consolidation  the  low  cost  carriers  were  absorbed  into  the  majors,  but  as  they  faced 
the  threat  of  Southwest  and  the  former  Valujet  the  majors  themselves  introduced  low 
cost  internal  subsidiaries.  Many  perished  on  the  rock  of  employment  relations.  For 
example  Continental  Lite  and  Shuttle  by  United,  were  hampered  by  the  fact  that  they 
tried  to  in-fitate  southwest,  but  were  unable  to  garner  the  labour  flexibility  and 
commitment,  which  the  widely  admired  carrier  enjoyed.  (Pfeffer  1998:  57.  )  They 
relied  on  lower  wage  rates  with  corresponding  low  morale.  Pilots  were  among  the 
most  disgruntled  employees,  given  their  attachment  to  common  compensation  scales. 
160 In  Europe  majors  instigated  low  cost  internal  operations  themselves  primarily  to  pre- 
empt  the  low  cost  threat  of  Ryanair,  EasyJet  and  a  host  of  smaller  airlines.  BA's 
creation  of  GO  at  Stansted  and  KLM's  attempt  to  use  a  low  cost  subsidiary  to  operate 
services  from  Stansted  are  pertinent  examples.  (Gallagher  1999:  11)  The  ratchet  effect 
of  this  rush  to  the  low  cost  route  has  driven  BA  to  allocate  many  Gatwick  short-haul 
routes  to  its  wholly  owned  ultra  low  cost  subsidiary  Cityflyer  Express,  and  again 
pilots  are  the  most  directly  affected.  Though  the  routes  will  be  operated  by  Cityflyer 
staff  who  earn  on  average  30  per  cent  less  than  BA  short  haul  pilots,  the  move  is  a 
threat  to  the  future  of  short  haul  services.  Other  flag  carriers  will  probably  attempt  to 
follow  this. 
As  in  the  USA,  pilots  in  Europe  have  not  lost  a  great  deal  under  deregulation.  They 
have  lost  some  of  the  regulated  rents,  which  they  previously  enjoyed  (as  the  case 
studies  of  Iberia,  Alitalia  and  Sabena  pilots  indicate).  They  also  continue  to  face  many 
threats  to  their  labour  market  position.  The  bargaining  power  of  pilots  has  been 
crucial  in  protecting  them  from  the  worst  ravages  of  the  new  airline  labour  market. 
However,  the  emerging  market  structure  of  interfirm  collaboration  and  free  market 
entry  within  prescribed  regulatory  jurisdictions  could  provide  the  co-ordinated 
counterpoint  where  national  bargaining  power  might  be  irrelevant.  Open  skies  and 
globalisation  may  yet  allow  management  to  break  open  the  cockpit  door.  Nevertheless 
the  relative  success  which  stronger  pilot  unions  within  the  more  successful  flag  carrier 
airlines  have  had  in  controlling  and  confining  the  spread  of  regionalisation  and 
internal  low  cost  carriers  suggests  that  in  the  long-run  pilots  may  preserve  their 
position  even  where  they  appear  to  have  lost  ground. 
The  issues  of  franchising,  regionalisation,  the  creation  of  internal  low  cost  carriers, 
and  the  spectre  of  outsourcing  are  crucial  for  airline  labour.  The  attitudes,  perceptions 
and  response  of  employees  to  such  change  are  crucial  in  evaluating  the  future  of 
airline  restructuring  policies.  As  yet,  there  has  been  no  systematic  attempt  to  gauge 
employee  views,  which  can  be  seen  as  crucial  given  the  highly  unionised  context  of 
the  industry.  Although  we  have  used  pilots  as  an  exemplar  of  the  contrast  between  a 
regulated  and  a  deregulated  employment  environment,  their  high  degree  of  skill 
specificity  and  potent  bargaining  power  renders  them  more  able  to  protect  themselves, 
and  therefore  less  ill-disposed  to  management  policies  in  many  cases.  Policies  such  as 
161 outsourcing  and  regionalisation  have  tended  to  affect  more  general  airline  workers 
such  as  those  employed  within  ground  handling,  engineering  and  support  services, 
whose  non-industry  specific  skills  render  them  more  vulnerable.  Premium  wages  and 
conditions  for  these  workers  have  been  increasingly  eroded  as  airlines  seek  to 
restructure  costs.  In  the  next  two  chapters  these  issues  will  be  addressed  using  the 
case  of  British  Airways,  whose  restructuring  policies  have  increasingly  led  the 
industry,  particularly  in  Europe. 
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Deregulation,  Business  Strategy  and 
Employment  Change  At  British  Airways: 
Context  and  Issues 
5.1  Globalisation,  Deregulation  and  The  Deregulation  of  Employment 
The  previous  chapter  considered  the  impact  of  deregulation  upon  pilots  as  the  most 
powerful  occupational  group  within  the  airline  industry.  We  now  turn  our  attention 
towards  the  general  labour  force  within  the  industry  by  examining  a  case  study  of 
employment  change  and  employee  attitudes  at  British  Airways.  As  the  previous 
chapter  has  shown  British  Airways  (BA)  typifies  the  emerging  global  trend  towards  a 
deregulated  global  airline  industry.  The  carrier  has  benefited  from  early  privatisation 
and  the  UK's  'liberal'  labour  relations  environment,  and  has  grown  through 
concentration  and  acquisition  on  a  European  and  global  level.  With  the  freedom 
accorded  it  in  the  UK,  BA  has  pioneered  a  number  of  management  strategies,  namely 
franchising,  regionalisation,  the  creation  of  separate  business  units  and  outsourcing. 
These  strategies  are  becoming  widespread  in  the  European  and  global  airline  industry. 
In  all  of  these  measures  BA  has  been  the  'first  movee  within  Europe  changing  and, 
adapting  to  the  pattern  in  the  US  and  arguably  going  further.  In  fact,  US  trunk  carriers 
have  been  slow  to  outsource  and  have  had  difficulty  in  introducing  internal  low  cost 
operations,  due  to  the  power  of  airline  unions.  British  Airways  has  pushed  these 
changes  to  a  greater  extent,  benefiting  from  the  UK  institutional  context. 
Nevertheless,  this  apparent  model  of  corporate  change  and  adaptability  has  to  be 
164 qualified.  Until  the  early  1990s,  British  Airways  managed  to  push  through  most  of  its 
desired  restructuring  objectives  with  a  minimum of  conflict.  This  ability  to  implement 
change  was  a  consequence  of  product  market  buoyancy  but  the  structures  of  industrial 
relations  were  also  important.  Collective  bargaining  and  the  industrial  relations 
systems  of  the  regulated  era  helped  the  carrier  to  restructure  regional  operations,  to 
outsource  major  maintenance,  to  absorb  a  number  of  other  carriers  and  smoothed  the 
process  of  redundancy  in  periodic  downturns.  Whilst  unions  protested  these  changes, 
they  have  generally  been  willing  to  submit  to  restructuring  in  the  face  of  adversity. 
(interview  TGWU  11.9.98.  )  Thus  significant  changes  were  carried  through  at 
Highland  Division  in  1988,  at  BA  Regional  in  1991  and  in  Gatwick  short  haul 
operations  in  1993.  Normally  there  has  been  a  backdrop  of  crisis  and  possible  threat 
to  concentrate  union  minds.  For  example,  the  1988  restructuring  of  Highland  services 
took  place  within  the  context  of  a  threat  to  sell  these  loss-making  routes  to  Loganair 
or  Manx.  The  Regional  operations  were  created  under  the  threat  of  transfer  to  the 
Norwegian  low  cost  operator  Maersk.  Similarly,  the  Gatwick  operations  were 
restructured  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Dan  Air  bankruptcy.  The  carrier  took  advantage  of 
this  situation  to  develop  a  low  cost  route  network  from  Gatwick,  in  order  to  rival  and 
expose  operations  at  London  Heathrow.  In  all  of  these  situations  the  unions  were  on 
the  defensive  and  agreed  to  restructuring.  In  mainstream  operations,  however, 
especially  those  based  around  the  buoyant  Heathrow  services,  management  has  found 
change  a  difficult  and  protracted  process.  Whilst  there  has  been  progress  in  cost 
reduction,  the  prevailing  story  has  been  one  of  high  labour  costs,  based  partly  on 
expectations  derived  from  the  regulated  and  less  competitive  era.  This  phenomenon, 
which  can  be  termed  'the  regulatory  overhang,  exists  in  most  airlines.  and  can  be 
viewed  as  a  set  of  perceptions  held  by  employees,  unions  and  to  extent  managers, 
about  the  nature  of  the  labour  contract  in  the  airline  industry.  These  issues  are 
discussed  in  the  next  section. 
5.1.1  The  British  Airways'  Bargaining  Environment:  Regulatory  Overhang  and 
Stnictural  Necessity 
As  we  have  seen  in  chapter  3,  during  the  regulated  era  an  often-cumbersome  set  of 
industrial  relations  institutions  delivered  an  element  of  stability,  with  unions  operating 
as  intermediaries  in  brokering  change  to  groups  of  workers  for  the  benefit  of  a  wider 
165 constituency.  In  advance  of  greater  commercialisation  and  eventually  privatisation, 
management  attempted  to  refashion  the  organisational  culture.  This  involved  the 
introduction  of  human  resource  management  initiatives  to  create  an  essentially 
unitarist  culture  beneath  the  traditional  frameworks  of  trade  unionism  and  collective 
bargaining.  Unitarist  employment  policies  had  to  be  reconciled  with  the  strong  and 
voluble  presence  of  trade  unions.  This  situation  of  ditalism,  was  a  typical  response  to 
the  high  levels  of  unionisation  found  in  the  industry.  (See  Blyton  and  Turnbull  1998.  ) 
Lundy  and  Cowling  describe  this  process  of  cultural  change  within  BA  with  its 
emphasis  on  training  for  front  line  employees.  (Lundy  and  Cowling  1996:  355.  )  This 
type  of  cultural  change  subtly  shifted  the  emphasis  towards  corporate  identity  and  a 
customer  focus.  However,  whilst  the  role  of  culture  has  been  an  important  one  in 
undermining  and  short-circuiting  trade  union  involvement,  the  situation  at  BA,  as  in 
many  dualist  environments,  was  more  complex. 
BA  management  of  the  1980s  were  both  pragmatic  and  opportunistic  about  the  role  of 
trade  unions,  de-emphasising  their  role  as  much  as  possible,  but  exhorting  them  to 
"help  manage  change"  when  financial  crises  such  as  the  1991  GAP  closure 
programme  made  this  necessary.  (Blyton  and  Turnbull  1998:  74.  )  Management  of  that 
period,  which  can  be  termed  the  King-Marshall  era  after  the  serving  Chairman  and 
Chief  Executive,  made  no  concerted  attempt  to  vanquish  trade  unionism,  nor  did  they 
make  any'noticeable  attempt  to  try  and  estrange  BA  workers  from  their  trade  unions. 
In  any  case,  past  experience  suggested  that  the  company  would  not  have  been  able  to 
push  unions  out  of  the  picture.  37 
Interestingly,  the  period  of  the  1980s  was  similar  at  least  structurally  to  the  era  of 
regulation.  In  Europe,  combined  growth  rates  for  domestic  and  international  traffic 
averaged  5  per  cent  between  1978  and  1988.  The  Asia  Pacific  market  averaged  8  per 
cent  within  the  same  period.  (Doganis  1991:  8,  table  1.2.  )  Throughout  most  of  the 
period  the  industry  was  regulated  on  a  global  and  regional  basis.  BA  had  virtually 
37  The  previous  chief  executive,  Roy  Watts,  saw  his  price  cutting/low  cost  strategic  change  programme 
sunk  by  trade  union  opposition.  (Lundy  and  Cowling  1996:  355.  )  Watts  wanted  to  shift  the  marketing  0  C; 
emphasis  towards  leisure  traffic,  which  he  wished  to  see  account  for  80  per  cent  of  BA  traffic 
(Campbell-Smith  1986:  12.  )  The  trade  unions  and  middle  management  frustrated  this  plan  which 
included  a  recruitment  freeze,  arguing  for  expansion  in  international  and  high  yield  markets.  (Ibid.  ) 
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166 unchallenged  control  of  two  of  Europe's  major  airports;  there  was  only  intermittent 
competition  from  niche  carriers  such  as  Virgin  Atlantic.  Low  cost  carriers  did  not 
exist  and  city  pair  routes  were  shared  in  revenue  pooling  arrangements.  As  Bass 
argues: 
'Despite  the  rhetoric  of  market  forces  attending  privatisation, 
significant  product  market  competition  was  virtually  absent 
both  before  and  long  after  flotation.  During  the  eighties,  civil 
aviation  was  a  highly  regulated  market  and  competition  was 
managed  through  close  though  not  always  harmonious 
relationships  between  airlines,  their  competitors  and 
governments.  '  (Bass  1991  cited  in  Button  et  al  1998.  ) 
Where  competition  existed  on  the  main  transatlantic  routes  only  Virgin  Atlantic 
posed  a  significant  threat.  The  leading  U.  S.  carriers,  such  as  Pan  Am  and  TWA, 
though  undercutting  BA  in  terms  of  price,  were  less  able  to  capture  the  higher  yield 
business  passengers.  Heathrow  was  the  major  European  international  hub  and  the 
code  sharing  and  alliance  building  that  became  so  prevalent  in  the  1990s  was  little 
more  than  a  strategic  blueprint  for  most  airlines.  British  Airways  was  challenging  to 
operate  across  borders  and  to  enter  markets  where  it  felt  there  was  insufficient 
competition.  The  carrier  pursued  a  strategy  of  becoming  the  quality  international 
carrier  and,  backed  by  often  inspired  marketing,  became  a  major  profitable  global 
airline.  This  'choice'  of  business  strategy  is  crucial  in  understanding  later 
developments.  Capelli  (1987)  and  Kochan  et  al  1986,  explain  how  choice  of  business 
strategy  ultimately  impacts  upon  industrial  relations.  Their  observations  on  the  US 
industry  of  the  1980s  can  now  be  applied  to  the  global  airline  industry,  although  one 
would  be  wary  of  shoehorning  carriers  within  the  sorts  of  typology  developed  by 
Capelli  (1987).  Nevertheless,  this  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of  product  market  strategy 
and  labour  market  change  is  a  useful  one;  Kochan  (et  al)  argue: 
"in  the  airline  industry  as  in  other  industries,  the  middle  tier  of 
industrial  relations  are  affected  not  only  by  changes  in  the 
environment,  but  also  by  diverse  strategic  business  decisions  made  at 
higher  levels.  In  turn,  in  some  cases  the  quid  pro  quo  for  concessions 
have  produced  fundamental  changes  in  the  structure  of  industrial 
relations  within  the  firm,  by  re-aligning  the  roles  of  management  and 
unions  at  strategic  and  workplace  levels.  This  provides  further  support 
for  our  thesis  that  a  complex  interaction  occurs  between  the 
competitive  environment  and  the  shaping  of  key  business  decisions, 
interaction  that  produces  options  and  diversity  in  IR  outcomes". 
(Kochan  et  al  1986:  127-128.  ) 
167 The  King-Marshall  strategy  was  based  on  quality.  These  strategy  choices  shaped  the 
industrial  relations  policies  of  the  company.  However,  they  did  not  solely  define  it.  As 
Colling  argues,  even  in  the  1980s,  when  the  company  was  pursuing  an  avowedly  high 
quality  strategy  they  could  not  simply  choose  a  strategy  from  a  menu  of  options,  often 
that  choice  was  constrained  by  structural  necessities  like  the  airline's  role  as  the  UK 
flag  carrier.  So,  whilst  the  strategic  choice  framework  is  a  helpful  one,  it  should  be 
seen  as  a  heuristic  device  rather  than  a  distinctive  category.  Whilst  the  industry  and 
product  market  environment  changed  markedly  with  privatisation  and  limited 
deregulation,  the  system  of  industrial  relations  persisted  because  the  1980s,  though  a 
period  of  great  change  and  dynamism  in  UK  industrial  relations,  was  a  period  of 
relative  stability  within  the  airline  industry. 
This  is  an  important  issue,  as  there  is  a  crude  tendency  to  associate  rapid  product  and 
regulatory  change  with  weakened  unions.  There  is  an  assumption  that  product  market 
and  regulatory  reform  automatically  decrease  the  bargaining  power  of  trade  unions. 
(See  chapter  1.  )  However,  for  labour's  fortunes  to  be  affected  there  has  to  be  a 
complex  combination  of  changes  affecting  the  regulatory,  firm  and  product  market 
environment  at  different  levels,  changes  as  described  in  chapter  8. 
Having  looked  at  the  impact  of  change  on  the  macro/industry  level  it  is  important  to 
consider  the  impact  of  such  changes  on  unionised  workforces.  What  do  unionised 
workers,  those  who  are  most  expected  to  change,  actually  think  of  the  process  of 
regulatory  and  product  market  reform?  Are  workers  opposed  to  these  policies  since 
such  policies  are  assumed  to  undermine  union  bargaining  power,  thus  ultimately 
wages  and  conditions?  Within  these  general  driving  questions  are  a  number  of 
specific  questions,  which  are  listed  in  the  methodology  section.  It  would  be  interesting 
to  examine  this.  It  is  argued  in  the  next  section  that  such  a  focus  is  of  value  in 
assessing  these  issues. 
168 5.1.2  Putting  Profit  First?  Changing  the  Industrial  Relations  Structure  in  an  Altered 
Competitive  Environment 
BA's  competitive  environment  has  changed  significantly  since  the  1980s.  In  the  first 
place,  the  weakened  and  limited  competition  of  inefficient  state  carriers  has  given 
way  to  a  more  efficient  challenge  as  even  the  weaker  carriers  restructure.  Secondly, 
competition  on  lucrative  transatlantic  routes  from  weakened  carriers  such  as  Pan  Am 
and  TWA,  which  pertained  for  much  of  the  1980s,  has  been  replaced  by  the  vigorous 
impact  of  carriers  such  as  United,  American  and  Delta.  The  bilateral  accords,  which 
locked  many  of  the  more  efficient  US  carriers  out  of  BA's  Heathrow  hub,  have  also 
benefited  BA's  virile  long-haul  competitor,  Virgin  Atlantic.  Thirdly,  domestic  and 
European  competitors  have  formed  alliances  with  some  of  the  stronger  US  and 
European  carriers,  feeding  UK  originating  tmffic  into  their  major  hubs.  The  growth  of 
the  Star  alliance  with  two  giant  and  efficient  carriers,  United  and  Lufthansa  at  its 
ccntre,  benefits  BA's  domestic  and  European  competitor,  British  Midland,  which 
profits  from  its  links  with  SAS,  and  later  Lufthansa  as  a  Star  Alliance  'partner.  British 
Midlands'  stated  intention  to  operate  transatlantic  routes  from  Spring  2000,  is  yet 
another  challenge  to  BA.  Indeed  the  combined  transatlantic  dominance  of  BA's 
principal  alliance  partner,  American  Airlines  continues  to  inhibit  a  formal  alliance.  In 
addition  to  these  carriers,  which  compete  for  overseas  long  haul  traffic,  a  number  of 
highly  innovative  and  nimble  low  cost  carriers  spawned  by  the  new  regulatory 
environment  now  compete  with  BA  on  major  European  leisure  routes. 
Driven  by  such  global  product  market  pressures,  British  Airways  management  has 
emphasised  the  need  for  flexibility  and  adaptiveness.  In  pursuit  of  those  goals, 
management  are  building  their  own  network  of  alliance  partners  instituting  a 
competing  low  cost  carrier  and  accelerating  the  process  of  outsourcing  and 
franchising.  They  seek  to  alter  employment  conditions  with  an  implicit  threat  to  the 
management  union  compact,  which  previously  existed.  Management  has  become 
increasingly  impatient  at  what  they  perceive  to  be  the  rigidities  of  historically 
imposed  industrial  relations  systems.  The  airline's  Chief  Executive,  Robert  Ayling, 
recently  criticised  what  he  termed  the  "civil  service  bureaucracy  pervading  the 
operation.  "  "It's  more  hierarchical  than  I  remember  the  civil  service  being  and 
certainly  more  than  some  of  the  better  managed  British  companies  of  today.  " 
169 (Davidson  1995;  54.  )  Ayling's  criticism  was  not  solely  directed  at  the  management 
structures,  which  had  become  hierarchical  and  were  comprehensively  re-shaped.  (See 
Airfinance  Journal  1996:  8.  )  There  was  also  an  implied  criticism  of  the  collective 
bargaining  apparatus,  which  continued  to  pervade  the  airline  and  a  new  impatience 
with  the  'baggage'  of  the  regulated  era.  This  admission,  after  a  decade  of  privatisation 
and  (what  appeared  to  external  observers  to  be)  a  period  of  avowed  cultural  change,  is 
testimony  to  the  resilience  of  systems  which  might,  in  Metcalf's  words,  have  been 
expected  to  "wither  on  the  vine"  given  the  raft  of  legislative  changes  in  the  bargaining 
arena.  (Metcalf  1991:  1-31.  )  Nevertheless,  it  reflects  the  survival  of  traditional 
industrial  relations  in  the  wake  of  privatisation  as  witnessed  in  other  industries. 
(Pendleton  1999.  ) 
Traditionally,  airlines  have  operated  as  'primary'  firms  with  little  segmentation  and 
differentiation  in  labour  market  terms  and  conditions.  Airlines  tended  to  be  vertically 
integrated  entities.  Workforce  reductions,  work-rule  changes  or  adjustments  in  terms 
and  conditions  were  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  cyclical  factors.  An  example  would  be 
the  period  of  pre-privatisation  where  employment  was  dramatically  reduced. 
(Campbell  Smith  1986:  42.  )  A  later  example  was  the  GAP  closure  programme  (See 
chapter  6)  of  the  early  1990s  when  there  was  major  redundancy  and  significant 
restructuring.  (Colling  1995:  26.  )  It  is  argued  here,  that  trade  unions  accepted  such 
cyclical  cost  reduction  as  inevitable,  given  the  peaks  and  troughs  of  the  airline 
industry,  and  even  accepted  a  limited  degree  of  outsourcing  and  the  establishment  of 
internal  business  units  in  order  to  preserve  job  security,  structures  of  bargaining  and 
trade  union  involvement.  Their  acceptance  of  such  change  was  largely  conditional 
upon  the  type  of  regulatory  and  product  environment  witnessed  in  the  pre- 
privatisation  period  and  in  the  1980s.  In  this  era,  employees  obtained  insider 
conditions  and  would  be  expected  to  view  any  segmentation  and  fragmentation  of 
corelprimary  labour  market  conditions  negatively.  This  'primary/unified'  firm  focus 
persisted  after  privatisation,  particularly  when  there  were  first  mover  advantages  such 
as  access  to  hubs,  a  favourable  labour  market  environment  and  the  ability  to  finance 
long  run  change.  These  structural  certainties  reduced  the  'costs  of  agreement'  for 
labour  in  accepting  large-scale  change. 
170 This  structural  labour  market  environment  had  several  effects  at  the  level  of  the 
workplace.  Firstly,  workers  become  accustomed  to  certain  job  characteristics  and  a 
certain  framework  of  employment  relations.  Any  worker  entering  British  Airways 
until  the  early  1990s  would  be  accustomed  to  higher  wages  than  those  outside  for  the 
same  job  (the  airline  premium,  see  chapter  7).  Secondly,  workers  would  be  used  to 
national  collective  agreements  albeit  within  the  framework  of  dualism  described  by 
Storey.  (1992:  243.  )  Thirdly,  workers  would  be  employed  in  a  unified  BA.  Fourthly, 
that  worker  would  be  competitive  in  terms  of  unit  labour  costs  with  most  other 
European  carriers.  (See  Vass  1997.  )  Within  such  a  context,  management  pursued  a 
strategy  based  on  quality,  emphasising  training  and  culture,  as  they  sought  to  change 
the  mindset  of  employees  towards  a  'premium'  service  orientation.  Deregulation  and 
industry  restructuring  have  changed  all  of  this.  As  Blyton  and  Turnbull  argue: 
The  emphasis  on  human  resource  management  shifted 
discernibly  from  quality  to  cost,  and  changes  to  collective 
agreements  within  the  company  are  geared  to  facilitating  what 
is  visibly  a  more  hard-nosed  commercial  approach.  '  (B  lyton  and 
Turnbull  1998:  74.  ) 
Within  the  emerging  competitive  environment,  there  is  new  focus  on  labour  flexibility 
and  efficiency.  This  goes  beyond  the  traditional  model  of  'cyclical/crisis  cost 
reduction'where  periodic  downturns  would  lead  to  an  attempt  to  rein  in  costs;  rather 
the  situation  is  one  of  'constant/dynamic  cost  reduction.  Such  are  the  competitive 
threats  in  the  deregulated  global  environment,  costs  need  to  be  reduced  well  in 
advance  of  any  obvious  crisis,  and  the  need  to  manage  costs  is  independent  of  any 
business  cycle.  This  reality  has  given  rise  to  an  ongoing  process  of  restructuring  as 
carriers  seek  to  adapt  to  the  new  competitive  environment.  It  is  a  process  that  has,  to 
varying  degrees,  been  played  out  across  other  European  carriers  (see  chapter  7). 
BA's  position  is  especially  significant,  given  the  carrier's  early  adaptation  to  this 
changed  environment,  and  the  strength  of  its  trade  unions.  An  interesting  way  to 
analyse  management's  intention  to  alter  the  character  of  industrial  relations  is  to 
consider  the  cycle  of  union  derecognition.  One  of  the  key  writers  in  the  area  argues 
that  employers  go  through  phases  of  derecognition,  starting  with  reduced  union 
influence  within  collective  fora,  the  creation  of  new  structures  to  bypass  unions  and 
171 culminating  in  management  determination  to  avoid  unionisation  of  uncovered 
workers.  Finally  the  process  of  derecognition  is  implemented.  (Beaumont  1986:  33- 
34.  )  Beaumont's  view  ascribes  most  of  the  agency  to  employers,  though  unions  often 
dictate  the  continuation  of  unionisation  in  the  face  of  employer  hostility  but  his 
observations  are  useful  when  studying  British  Airways.  Management  have 
'streamlined'  existing  collective  bargaining  procedures  by  abolishing  the  National 
Joint  Council  for  Civil  Aviation  (NJCCAT),  in  1996.  This  was  undertaken  in  the  face 
of  concerted  union  opposition  which  frustrated  management's  goal  of  abolishing  both 
the  NJC  CAT  and  the  more  strategically  important  National  Sectional  Panels  (NSPs), 
effectively  undermining  national  bargaining.  The  NJC  CAT,  which  had  become 
redundant  in  the  face  of  the  withdrawal  of  other  UK  airlines,  has  been  replaced  by  a 
consultation  forum,  which  acts  mainly  as  a  communication  outlet. 
Most  bargaining  is  now  conducted  at  local/business  unit  level  but  through  National 
Sectional  Panels,  which  preserve  the  essential  features  of  national  bargaining.  There 
is,  however,  considerable  local  variation  within  these  nominally  national  structures  of 
negotiation.  For  example,  there  is  no  unified  pay  and  conditions  structure  for  ground 
handling  staff,  all  such  staff  have  a  minimum  framework  agreement  but  wages  and 
conditions  are  negotiated  according  to  business  needs.  (Interview  TGWU  21.9.98.  )  In 
addition,  the  structure  of  bargaining  with  key  product  areas  such  as  engineering  is 
undergoing  a  process  of  transformation  towards  a  more  explicitly  unitarist 
'partnership'  focus  whereby  union  and  management  agree  to  conduct  negotiations 
around  an  agreed  priority  of  business  need.  This  involves  the  development  of 
negotiating  skills  for  union  stewards  but  directed  much  more  towards  the  efficient 
functioning  of  the  workplace,  than  the  negotiation  of  terms  and  conditions.  (Interview 
AEEU  6.8.98.  )  The  company  has  also  developed  structures,  such  as  product  groups 
and  company  briefings,  to  enhance  communication  at  local  level,  with  a  sole  emphasis 
on  business  processes.  Similar  structures  of  representation  exist  within  regional 
subsidiaries,  which  given  the  perilous  nature  of  regional  services,  are  often  dominated 
by  exhortations  from  management  for  increasing  cost  efficiency.  (Interview  TGWU 
8.10.98.  )  Whilst  trade  unions  have  been  suspicious  of  BA  motives  in  this  regard, 
arguing  that  there  is  an  agenda  of  derecognition,  there  is  as  yet  little  evidence  for  this. 
The  unions  are  still  firmly  entrenched  within  the  various  occupational  groups  and 
though  there  may  be  rationalisation  of  union  representation  within  product  areas,  it  is 
172 unlikely  that  derecognition.  is  being  considered.  A  more  insidious  threat  to  union 
organisation  is  to  be  found  in  the  policy  that  the  unionisation  of  future  activities  will 
be  on  management  terms.  In  this  regard,  Beaumont's  point  about  the  process  of 
derecognition  being  presaged  by  an  employer  desire  to  resist  the  unionisation  of 
unorganised  employees,  can  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  new  low  cost  carrier  GO. 
Established  in  1997  to  operate  low  cost  routes  out  of  a  new  Stansted  hub  in 
competition  with  Ryanair  and  EasyJet,  the  recognition  arrangements  at  GO  indicate  an 
adaptation  to  the  changed  industrial  relations  environment  under  the  new  Labour 
government.  The  fairness  at  work  agenda  of  the  late  1990s  makes  it  difficult  for 
employers  to  avoid  recognition,  but  they  can  pre-empt  that  process  by  a  number  of 
means,  which  can  be  divided  into  suppressionist  and  substitutionist  approaches. 
(Beaumont  1991.  )  Suppression  strategies  towards  union  organising  include  policies  of 
intimidation  and  unequal  treatment  of  union  and  non-union  members.  Substitution 
strategies  involve  the  replacement  of  the  union  demand  by  the  creation  of  a 
comprehensive  pay  and  conditions  package,  which  at  least  replicates  and  usually 
exceeds  the  union  mark-up.  (See  also  Gall  and  MacKay  (1994:  433-48)  4However, 
companies  can  also  use  a  strategy  of  'co-optation',  choosing  a  union  'partner'  who  will 
embody  a  more  moderate  approach  as  occurred  within  Nissan  and  the  Docklands 
Light  Railway.  (see  Garahan  and  Stewart  1992.  )  The  latest  manifestation  of  this 
strategy  is  BA's  decision  to  select  the  AEEU  as  the  representing  union  for  non-pilot 
grades  at  GO.  The  AEEU  has  agreed  a  three-year  pay  freeze  for  employees  it  has  yet 
to  recruit.  (Walsh  1998:  9.  )  The  GO  concept  is  synonymous  with  greenfield 
developments  in  this  regard  and  suggests  that  rather  than  derecognition,  the  company 
is  pursuing  a  policy  of  containment  against  the  principal  trade  union  the  TGWU,  in 
this  case  co-opting  one  of  its  main  industrial  and  political  rivals.  The  representation 
contest  between  the  TGWU,  Amalgamated  Engineering  and  Electrical  Union 
(AEEU),  Manufacturing  Science  and  Finance  union  (MSF)  and  the  General  and 
Municipal  Workers  (GMB)  was  arguably  designed  to  exclude  the  major  general 
union.  The  decision  reflects  the  impatience  of  management  with  the  principal  union, 
the  TGWU  and  its  desire  to  shape  the  structures  of  bargaining  to  a  much  greater 
extent.  Within  the  GO  concept  is  a  clear  commitment  to  flexibility,  new  terms  and 
conditions  and  a  different  employment  relationship.  The  GO  episode  represents  a 
significant  development  within  airline  trade  unionism  and  industrial  relations. 
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In  pushing  forward  changes  in  bargaining  structure,  management  intends  to  disrupt 
and  fragment  the  corporatist  bargaining  structures  of  the  post  war  period,  identifying 
within  these  structures  the  roots  of  a  high  cost  airline  culture.  In  forcing  the  trade 
union  to  bid  for  representation  at  GO,  the  airline  signalled  its  desire  to  influence  the 
behaviour  of  the  trade  unions  themselves.  BA  wishes  therefore  to  create  a  much  more 
dynamic  and  flexible  airline  culture  within  which  it  expects  employees  to  accept  and 
even  embrace  change.  In  seeking  to  influence  employees  and  to  create  an  appropriate 
culture  for  the  challenging  environment  it  now  faces,  management  has  increasingly 
emphasised  the  background  of  deregulation,  competition  and  globalisation  when 
communicating  with  the  workforce.  This  strategic  shift  in  management  labour 
relations  was  apparent  from  the  early  1990s  but  was  accelerated  in  autumn  1996  with 
a  number  of  major  decisions;  primary  among  them  a  massive  cost  reduction 
programme  known  as  the  Business  Efficiency  Programme  (BEP).  BEP  was  a  five 
year  programme  which  sought  to  deliver  cost  savings  across  the  whole  of  BA  to  the 
tune  of  1.5  billion  pounds.  BEP  was  articulated  as  a  major  change  programme,  which 
would  go  beyond  productivity  improvements,  fundamentally  altering  the  entire  cost 
structure  of  the  airline.  Thus  it  involved  regrading  and  delayering  within  management 
and  administrative  roles  and  the  introduction  of  two  tier  wages,  wage  freezes, 
outsourcing,  and  more  intensive  work  schedules  within  operational  grades. 
This  strategic  shift  in  policy  towards  cost  reduction  has  obvious  consequences  for 
employees.  Embodied  within  it  is  a  fundamental  attempt  to  dismantle  the  employment 
certainties  of  the  regulated  era.  Firstly,  the  creation  of  separate  regional  carriers  and 
the  extension  of  franchising,  outsourcing  and  benchmarking  challenges  the  'unified 
firm'nature  of  terms  and  conditions.  Secondly,  the  ongoing  challenge  to  patterns  of 
trade  unionism  and  industrial  relations  undermines  the  power  of  unions  to  enforce 
unified  terms  and  conditions.  Thirdly,  management  is  seeking  to  undermine  premium 
terms 
' 
and  conditions  of  employment,  and  fourthly,  the  improved  productivity  and 
efficiency  of  European  carriers  is  eroding  the  justification  for  those  terms  and 
conditions  as  BA  seeks  greater  productivity  and  efficiency.  Thus  the  entire  edifice  of 
regulated  airline-  employment  has  come  under  threat.  However,  the  existence  of  this 
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constraint  on  management's  desired  strategy,  and  the  commitment  of  workers  to  the 
BA  type  employment  package  means  that  these  terms  will  not  be  surrendered  lightly. 
Whilst  a  good  deal  of  research  has  been  carried  out  on  management  strategies  and  the 
efficiency  aspects  of  airline  restructuring,  little  detailed  work  has  been  done  on 
employee  attitudes.  Arguably,  these  attitudes  which  help  define  the  regulatory 
overhang  are  crucial  in  the  study  of  restructuring,  and  for  that  reason  the  remainder  of 
this  chapter  and  the  next  chapter  will  concentrate  on  this. 
Employee  attitudes  have  tended  to  be  ignored  in  the  airline  employment  debate. 
Indeed,  so  far  as  a  debate  can  be  deemed  to  have  taken  place,  it  has  very much  been 
without  the  input  of  employees.  Many  studies  have  been  conducted  at  a  high  level 
using  aggregate  data  and  have  therefore  not  considered  employee  responses.  (Mertz 
1995:  79.  )  This  study  seeks  to  address  the  imbalance  and  to  locate  employee  interests 
and  viewpoints  within  a  wider  debate  about  the  future  direction  of  the  industry. 
Employee  surveys  are  a  useful  method  for  eliciting  the  views  of  employees  and 
challenging  assumptions  that  such  workers  think  alongside  either  management  or  the 
union  hierarchy.  Hopefully,  to  paraphrase  E.  P.  Thompson,  "rescuing  worker  attitudes 
from  the  enormous  condescension  of  history".  (Thompson  1969:  13.  ) 
There  are  signs  that  BA  staff  and  their  trade  unions  were  beginning  to  adopt  an 
increasingly  sceptical  attitude  towards  employment  change.  Staff  had  previously  been 
willing  to  accept  crisis  led  cost  reduction,  but  with  BEP  the  cost  reductions  were 
asked  for  when  the  airline  was  enjoying  consistently  high  rates  of  profitability.  Most 
interestingly,  in  lessons  learned  directly  from  the  US,  many  staff  are  seeking  a  new 
type  of  employment  relationship  based  on  greater  employee  participation  before  they 
agree  to  changes.  Given  these  cross-currents,  a  survey  was  distributed  looking  at  the 
attitude  of  employees.  (See  methodology  section  chapter  2.  )  Autumn  1996  was  a 
particularly  apposite  time  to  evaluate  the  attitudes  of  unionised  employees,  as  many  of 
the  issues,  which  were  to  occasion  conflict,  such  as  the  pilots'  threatened  strike  of 
July  1996,  were  'live'  at  the  time.  In  addition,  although  BEP  savings  targets  had  not 
been  distributed  until  October,  survey  returns  were  being  received  well  into  December 
giving  these  issues  time  to  bed  down  into  the  consciousness  of  respondents. 
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The  survey  was  based  on  a  sample  of  BA  employees  (see  Chapter  2  for  methodology 
section  for  detailed  description).  The  following  section  describes  the  issues  examined 
and  the  results  obtained,  the  remainder  of  this  short  chapter  outlines  the  context  of  the 
issues  examined. 
Internal  business  units,  outsourcing  and  franchising 
This  issue  was  investigated  due  to  the  salience  of  low  cost  business  strategies  within 
the  airline  industry.  Firstly,  cost  reduction  strategies  primarily  involve  segmentation 
into  different  product  markets  based  largely  on  yield.  The  strategies  being 
implemented  to  this  end  are  regionalisation  and  franchising.  In  order  to  service  lower 
yield  routes  from  airports  such  as  Manchester,  Birmingham  and  Glasgow,  BA  has 
introduced  regional  pay  rates  to  reflect  the  low  profitability  of  these  services. 
Regionalisation  also  involved  particular  functions  such  as  telemarketing  and 
Information  Technology  (IT)  which  it  was  felt  could  be  sourced  from  lower  cost 
locations  whilst  maintaining  quality.  Initiatives  have  included  the  relocation  of 
telemarketing  call  centres  to  Newcastle  and  Glasgow.  (Interview  Nov.  18  1996 
TGWU.  )  Similar  initiatives  are  being  undertaken  at  the  carrier's  European  based 
operations,  indicating  management's  intention  to  exploit  regional  labour  market 
factors  across  Europe.  In  Germany,  the  former  shipbuilding  area  of  Bremen  was 
chosen  as  a  call  centre  location  in  preference  to  relatively  'high  cost'  Berlin. 
(Interview  BA  management  June  23  1996.  )  Thus  worker  attitudes  to  this  sort  of  policy 
might  be  influenced  by  the  region  and  bargaining  unit  within  which  workers  are 
employed.  Secondly,  the  airline  has  pursued  a  policy  of  expansion  into  regional 
markets  relying  primarily  on  the  use  of  franchising.  Franchised  operators  such  as 
Brymon,  Cityjet  and  Loganair  often  have  much  lower  costs  than  BA,  but  staff  are  to 
all  intents  and  purposes,  BA  staff.  The  franchised  carrier  then  becomes  a  direct 
comparator  for  the  cost  structure  of  the  main  airline  where  similar  routes  are  operated. 
Employee  attitudes  are  vital  in  assessing  the  implications  of  such  strategies. 
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The  next  major  issue  was  the  question  of  flexibility.  One  of  the  consequences  of  the 
'unified  firm  focus'  has  been  the  preservation  of  an  almost  universal  pattern  of  full 
time  patterns  of  tenure.  In  an  era  of  shifting  competition,  uncertainty  and  where  cost 
reductions  become  a  major  priority,  management  require  greater  flexibility  and 
diversity  in  employment  tenure.  That  way  labour  can  be  deployed  more  effectively, 
thus,  management  will  seek  greater  temporal  flexibility.  Other  types  of  flexibility, 
such  as  cross  utilisation,  are  also  being  attempted  but  a  simple  and  understandable 
measure  of  management's  demand  for  flexibility  is  the  extension  of  atypical  contracts. 
Interestingly,  most  workers  are  employed  on  full  time  tenure,  which  renders  their 
attitudes  towards  the  extension  of  atypical  contracts  a  simple  comparison. 
Outsourcing 
As  airlines  seek  to  reduce  costs  in  the  face  of  increasing  global  competition,  they  seek 
to  concentrate  on  core  high  yield  routes  and  to  outsource  non-core  functions  such  as 
catering,  cleaning,  engineering  and  maintenance.  Just  what  services  are  core  and  non- 
core  is  the  subject  of  some  debate  (Feldman  1997:  51-55.  )  Exploratory  interviews 
with  employees  found  almost  universal  opposition  to  the  policy  of  outsourcing  and  it 
was  decided  to  frame  the  question  in  terms  of  what  workers  would  miss  compared  to 
working  for  a  core  carrier  like  British  Airways.  It  was  hypothesised  in  an  exploratory 
fashion  that  workers  would  miss  various  aspects  of  being  outsourced  and  having  their 
conditions  transferred  to  a  contractor.  One  major  issue,  which  arose  from  interviews 
with  union  officers  and  rank  and  file  workers,  was  the  perceived  loss  of  job  security 
and  identity  of  working  for  a  large  airline  like  BA.  It  would  be  interesting  to  see 
whether  employees  ranked  this  above,  say,  the  protection  of  national  level  wages  and 
conditions  or even  the  loss  of  travel  facilities,  which  proved  crucial  in  the  July  1997 
outsourcing  of  long  haul  catering. 
The  threat  of  subcontracting  is  increasingly  used  as  a  bargaining  tactic,  often  to  secure 
union  co-operation  in  radical  cost  reduction.  In  many  ways,  this  is  a  process 
analogous  to  the  compulsory  tendering  process  in  public  services,  whereby  employees 
bid  down  existing  wages  and  conditions  to  retain  a  contract  'in  house.  '  (Crabbe  1992: 
11.  )  Often  the  threat  of  contracting  out  was  more  apparent  then  real  though  the 
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the  way  of  legislative  and  regulatory  controls  on  employer  power,  most  workers  in 
such  services  delivered  the  desired  cost  reductions. 
Within  BA  this  has  been  the  case  with  the  creation  of  BA  Regional  where  a  threat  to 
spin  off  the  operation  which  in  management's  words,  "concentrated  minds"  on 
delivering  the  appropriate  cost  reductions.  (Interview  BA  management  23.1.96.  )  The 
formation  of  British  Airways  Maintenance  Company  (BAMC)  at  Cardiff,  to 
undertake  heavy  maintenance  and  inspection  work  on  Boeing  747s,  was  negotiated 
under  the  threat  of  sell  off.  BAMC  was  set  up  in  1992  as  a  separate  company  with  its 
own  terms  and  conditions  although  it  was  eventually  sold  to  the  engineering 
conglomerate  GEC  in  1995.  (Interview  notes  AEEU  27.2.96.  )  In  the  case  of  BA, 
benchmarking  on  the  basis  of  market  rates  was  used  to  threaten  staff  within  ground 
handling.  Similar  threats  were  being  used  to  secure  cost  reductions  in  line 
maintenance  operations  within  BA  Regional.  38  Implicit  within  staff  attitudes  at  such 
times  is  a  feeling  of  the  loss  of  working  for  a  carrier  which,  for  all  its  faults,  is  viewed 
as  one  of  the  few  globally  viable  operators.  Related  to  this  question  was  a  set  of 
questions  on  how  BA  policies  might  impact  specifically  on  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment.  In  other  words,  did  unionised  workers  feel  that  their  conditions  would 
be  enhanced  or  reduced?  A  number  of  questions  were  designed  to  elicit  employee 
attitudes  to  this.  For  example,  how  would  workers  see  cuts  in  wages,  increases  in 
flexibility,  the  introduction  of  new  payment  systems  and  other  such  issues? 
Attitudes  towards  globalisation 
The  development  of  the  world  airline  industry  from  one  of  stable  regulated 
competition  towards  one  of  increasingly  global  competition  has  been  seen  as 
something  which  workers  in  strong  carriers  such  as  BA  would  support,  given  their 
superior  position  (at  the  time)  in  having  a  network  of  global  alliances  and  the 
possibility  of  large  scale  alliances  with  other  carriers.  It  could  thus  be  hypothesised 
that  workers  will  support  'general'  types  of  global  policy  such  as  the  formation  of 
alliances,  the  take-over  and  acquisition  of  other  carriers  and  fare  strategies.  These 
38BADocument-  Aircraft  replacement[Business  efficiency  programme;  Future  of  RegionalAirport 
Ground  Handling.  (Presentation  to  UK  Business  Group,  December  1996.  )  0 
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and  thus  increase  the  position  of  unionised  inside  workers.  Thus  globalisation  for 
workers  in  large  carriers  can  be  seen  as  a  way  of  continuing  and  reinforcing  core 
terms  and  conditions,  as  the  market  grows  and  their  own  carriers  assume  a  dominant 
position.  Yet  there  are  very  real  threats  to  employment  from  the  spread  of 
globalisation,  discussed  below. 
Globalisation:  Specific  employment  impacts 
As  these  issues  are  posed  in  terms  of  employment,  the  response  may  be  more 
ambiguous.  Unionised  workers  are  less  likely  to  be  in  favour  of  globalisation  policies 
when  they  are  phrased  in  terms  of  direct  employment  effects  such  as  outsourcing  and 
code  sharing.  There  has  been  relatively  little  outsourcing  of  airline  functions  to  low 
labour  cost  countries  since  the  survey  was  conducted.  BA  moved  computer 
diagnostics  to  India,  but  other  threats  of  outsourcing  failed  to  materialise. 
Nevertheless,  at  the  time  of  the  survey  the  issue  was  live  and  attitudes  towards  the 
policy  are  interesting. 
Future  of  Collective  Bargaining. 
The  strong  position  of  trade  unions  is  a  major  obstacle  to  British  Airways 
management  in  terms  of  their  attempts  at  corporate  restructuring  in  the  face  of 
deregulation  and  globalisation.  National  collective  bargaining  is  the  fulcrum  of  this 
system  underpinning  the  institutionalised  power  of  trade  unions.  A  simplistic  rent- 
sharing  hyp  othesis  would  imply  that  when  management  is  empowered  -through 
privatisation  and  product  market  reform,  unionised  workers  will  lose  the  rents  they 
previously  enjoyed.  (Neven  and  Roller  1996:  933-940.  )  This  is  patently  not  yet  the 
case,  at  least  in  aggregate.  Airline  industry  remuneration,  in  which  BA  is  the  UK 
market  leader,  remains  considerably  higher  than  in  other  industries  and  seems  robust. 
There  is  no  basis  to  assume  that  management  would  automatically  seek  to  drive  down 
wages  and  conditions,  as  there  are  a  wide  range  of  considerations  to  be  taken  into 
account  such  as  the  impact  on  service  quality,  turnover,  and  worker  commitment. 
However,  management  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  promote  change  through 
policies  such  as  regionalisation,  outsourcing,  increased  flexibility  and  franchising. 
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Unions  increased  the  cost  of  introduction  of  such  policies,  neutered  and  controlled 
their  effects,  and  often  extracted  protective  agreements  to  ensure  that  immediate  cost 
savings  would  not  result.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  King-Marshall  era  was  one  in 
which  the  focus  of  management  on  service  quality  and  productivity  improvement 
made  it  easier  to  work  with  trade  unions  although  management  still  sought  to  pare  the 
national  negotiating  machinery.  Under  the  new  management  regime  of  Robert  Ayling, 
with  its  emphasis  on  corporate  restructuring  and  dynamic  cost  reduction,  national 
trade  unions  and  collective  bargaining  have  been  seen  as  a  fetter  on  corporate  change. 
Thus,  the  carrier  embarked  on  a  major  campaign  to  reform  bargaining,  in  effect 
proposing  the  abolition  of  national  collective  bargaining  and  its  replacement  with  a 
series  of  'business  units'.  Management's  intention  was  to  orient  these  new  bargaining 
forums  away  from  their  previous  role  of  negotiation  and  consultation  to  one  of 
information  and  communication.  These  new  business  units  would  provide  a  forum 
where  employees  could  meet  to  discuss  the  aims  of  the  business.  Thus  it  would  be 
interesting  to  obtain  the  views  of  unionised  employees  -a  broad  driving  hypothesis 
might  lead  us  to  believe  unionised  employees  will  oppose  the  abolition  of  national 
bargaining  as  a  threat  to  premium  wages  and  conditions. 
Finally,  the  survey  provides  some  evidence  of  the  nature  of  employee  perceptions  of 
the  employment  impacts  of  the  transition  from  a  regulated  to  a  deregulated 
environment.  The  overall  survey  evidence  provides  an  insight  into  the  regulatory 
overhang  which,  as  later  chapters  will  show,  hinders  airline  industry  restructuring 
throughout  Europe.  Attempts  by  management  to  reduce  costs  and  encourage  greater 
productivity  are  hindered  by  the  view  of  workers  across  the  range  of  occupations,  that 
airlines  should  pay  higher  wages  and  offer  better  terms  and  conditions  than  outside 
industries. 
Having  contextualised  the  principal  issues  for  investigation  we  now  proceed  in 
Chapter  6  to  the  detailed  survey  evidence.  Given  the  time  period  in  which  the  survey 
was  conducted  we  should  be  wary  of  reading  back  from  recent  events,  especially  the 
recent  cabin  crew  strike,  but  the  survey  provides  a  broad  analysis  of  some  of  the 
issues  which  have  been  implemented  as  well  as  those  yet  to  be  resolved. 
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Deregulation  and  Employment  Change  in  the 
Global  Airline  Industry.  Employee  Attitudes  at 
British  Airways.  Results 
6.1  Introduction 
As  chapter  5  indicates,  the  nature  of  employment  restructuring  at  BA  was  examined 
using  a  large-scale  survey  and  detailed  interviews  with  both  managers  and  trade  union 
officials.  A  total  of  700  questionnaires  were  distributed.  400  were  sent  to  members  of 
the  Transport  and  General  Workers Union  (TGWU)  and  150  members  each  at  the 
British  Airline  Pilots  Association  (BALPA)  and  the  Amalgamated  Electrical  and 
Engineering  Union  (AEU).  Returns  were  variable  with  the  best  response  achieved 
from  the  TGWU,  from  whom  193  returns  were  obtained  (34%  rounded).  Returns  from 
other  unions  were  much  lower  with  around  10%  from  each.  Due  to  access  problems, 
distribution  was  facilitated  via  trade  union  officials.  These  'gatekeepers'  were  given 
instructions  on  stratified  sampling  to  allow  an  equal  representation  on  the  basis  of 
skill,  region  and  gender.  This  forced  choice  obviously  has  several  methodological  and 
practical  implications  which,  with  other  limitations  of  the  study,  are  addressed  in  the 
methodological  section.  If  used  with  care  and  qualification,  the  survey  facilitates  a 
snapshot  of  feeling  among  airline  workers  at  a  crucial  stage  in  the  deregulation  and 
corporate  change  process,  allowing  an  insight  into  employee  attitudes  at  a  critical 
period  in  the  restructuring  of  the  industry.  The  questionnaire  categories  are  analysed 
below. 
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Initial  analysis  was  undertaken  utilising  basic  descriptive  statistics,  cross-tabulations, 
and  exploratory  bivariate  measures,  such  as  Spearman's  Rho  and  Chi  square. 
Problems  of  low  cell  frequency  in  many  observations  made  it  difficult  to  justify  the 
use  of  Chi  square  as  a  measure  of  independence,  even  when  the  data  was  collapsed. 
These  tests  are  therefore  omitted  and  the  frequencies  are  used.  This  problem  in  the 
data  indicates  an  asymmetric  pattern  of  responses  with  answers  tending  to  go  in  a 
certain  direction.  This  problem  of  low  cell  frequency  could  be  corrected  using  Lawal's 
1980  method,  which  boosts  the  cell  frequency  by  using  the  geometric  mean.  (Lawal 
1980:  292-298.  )  It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  these  statistics  are  non  parametric, 
i.  e.  they  do  not  represent  a  given  distribution  and  therefore  can  only  provide  some 
meaningful  snapshots  of  employee  attitudes.  The  data  is  described  in  turn  below  with 
some  of  the  main  measures  used  in  its  analysis. 
6.1.2  The  Key  Independent  Variables 
Occupation 
The  majority  of  workers  are  employed  on  ground  handling  tasks  (71%)  although  a 
significant  proportion  are  also  involved  in  the  maintenance  function  (26%).  The 
AEEU  represents  mainly  craft  workers  in  the  engineering  and  electrical  trades.  A 
residue  of  TGWU  respondents  was  involved  in  administration.  The  categories  of 
ground  handling  and  maintenance  staff  present  a  reasonably  full  range  of  occupations 
for  analysis.  Significantly,  no  returns  were  received  from  cabin  crew  members.  There 
is  no  reason  at  this  stage  to  suspect  any  other  reason  than  inadequate  distribution  for 
this  anomaly. 
Table  6.1  below  gives  an  occupational  breakdown  for  the  survey  on  the  left-hand  side, 
whilst  opposite  a  range  of  examples  in  the  two  foremost  categories  is  included. 
182 Table  6.1  Breakdown  of  Principal  Occupational  Categories 
Principal  Categories  GROUND  HANDLING  MAINTENANCE  & 
OVERHAUL 
Maintenance/  Overhaul  26  Baggage  handler  Storeperson 
Ground  handling  71  Ground  despatcher  Spares  support 
Maintenance  3  Push  back  driver  Labourer 
Flight  Deck  I  Ground  transfer  and  staff  Semi-  skilled  mechanics 
transport  driver 
Cargo  handling  Maintenance  clerk 
Customer  service  Driver 
Refuelling  Vehicle  mechanic 
It  can  be  seen  that  these  categories  of  worker  provide  a  good  cross  section  of  the 
range  of  non-specialist  functions  within  the  airline,  precisely  those  most  subject  to  the 
demands  of  deregulation  and  internal  labour  market  reform  than  more  specialised 
labour.  The  occupational  range  goes  from  baggage  handlers,  who  are  in  many  ways 
analogous  to  those  of  general  skilled/semi-skilled  labour,  through  to  those  involved  in 
'frontline'  customer  relations,  particularly  terminal  staff.  On  the  maintenance  side, 
respondents  tended  to  be  within  the  less-skilled  categories,  given  the  Amalgamated 
Electrical  and  Engineering  Union  (AEEU)  role  in  representing  more  skilled 
categories. 
6.1.3  Location,  Region  and  Section 
In  terms  of  location,  76%  were  located  at  the  main  base,  Heathrow,  and  a  combined 
24%  were  located  at  the  regional  bases  of  Manchester,  Glasgow  and  Birmingham. 
When  asked  to  choose  which  section  of  BA  they  operated  under,  most  indicated  BA 
mainline  principally  the  airline's  worldwide  and  European  operations.  About  13% 
saw  themselves  as  currently  employed  by  BA  Regional.  The  figure  for  ground 
handling  staff  was  higher  than  for  other  groups  because  those  groups  were  able  to 
retain  their  employment  with  the  mainline  carrier  after  the  main  BAR  agreements  of 
February  1995.  (Interview  TGVVU  6.2.96.  ) 
183 Table  6.2  Location  and  Section  Employed. 
LOCATION  SECTION 
London  76  13A  Furope  30 
Heathrow 
Manchester  5  BA  World  26 
Birmingham  7  BA  Revional  13 
Glasgow  II  Euro  Gatwick  0.5 
Gatwick  BA  Enoinecring  24 
BAMC  5 
Caroo  6 
6.1.4  Bargaining  Group  and  Tenure 
Bargaining  units  within  BA  are  defined  as  National  Sectional  Panels  (NSP)  covering  a  L- 
wide  range  of  airline  workers  and  negotiating  on  national  issues.  Recent  modifications 
to  the  bargainin,  -  procedure  have  seen  NSPs  inarginalised  and  the  effective 
undermining  of  national  level  pay  bargaining.  However,  national  level  bargaining  still  C,  4-1  C,  -1 
operates  on  key  issues  such  as  annual  pay  negotiations,  pensions  and  restructuring.  A 
basic  breakdown  of  the  NSP  units  covered  within  the  questionnaire  is  given  below. 
These  need  explanation.  The  summary  table  is  given  in  figure  6.1  below. 
Z- 
Figure  6.1  Bargaining  Group  of  Respondent 
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'A'  scale  covers  a  large  subgroup  of  employees  ranging  from  chauffeurs  to  computer 
processing  staff'.  It  is  broadly  an  administrative  grade  covering  the  majority  of  such 
184 staff,  but  also  covers  those  in  support  functions  and  within  recently  expanded  areas 
such  as  sales  and  marketing.  GSS  stands  for  Ground  Services  Staff  and  covers  those 
involved  in  most  ground  handling  functions.  There  is  considerable  jurisdictional 
overlap  with  the  'A'scales,  especially  for  newly  defined  categories  of  staff.  The  craft 
and  non-craft  bargaining  units  respectively  cover  those  employed  within  the 
maintenance  sector  and  together  account  for  a  significant  proportion  of  the  sample. 
6.1.5  Seniority  and  Tenure 
Seniority  is  an  important  variable  in  employment  research,  as  it  is  often  assumed  that 
newer  workers  are  more  'proactive'and  prepared  to  embrace  change  more  readily  than 
older  workers  are.  Some  methodological  and  theoretical  assumptions  underpin  this 
notion.  Older  workers,  by  virtue  of  their  longevity,  are  often  assumed  to  be  more 
conservative  in  defence  of  union  objectives  than  younger  workers,  as  they  are 
assumed  to  be  less  prone  to  unemployment  resulting  from  higher  wage  demands,  or 
the  defence  of  work  rules,  than  junior  workers.  (Farber  1986:  1043.  )  For  the  study, 
seniority  is  important  as  it  allows  workers  to  be  separated  into  pre-  and  post- 
deregulation  cohorts.  More  senior  workers  have  invested  more  of  their  lives  and  effort 
within  the  firm,  have  previously  enjoyed  more  'generous'terms  and  conditions,  and 
are  less  mobile  due  mainly  to  age  discrimination  within  the  labour  market.  Although 
there  is  evidence  that  age  and  wage  effects  are  smaller  than  theory  would  postulate, 
the  combined  effect  of  increased  fringe  benefits  and  protection  from  redundancy 
benefit  more  senior  workers.  (Freeman  and  Medoff  1984:  131.  )  In  the  case  of  BA 
workers,  their  earning  position  might  not  be  replicated  at  another  airline.  BA  has 
made  a  concerted  attempt  through  early  retirement  and  accelerated  recruitment  to  alter 
the  distribution  in  favour  of  more  junior  workers.  These  assumptions  can  be  tested 
using  the  BA  data.  The  seniority  variables  are  given  below  in  figure  6.2. 
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It  can  be  seen  that  in  terms  of  seniority.  those  with  service  of  11-30  years  account  for 
almost  60%  of  the  employees  who  responded.  Newer  workers,  defined  as  those  with 
up  to  ten  years  service,  account  for  below  40%.  With  privatisation  occurring  in  1987, 
those  in  the  11-30  age  group  have  served  under  the  nationallsed  carrier  and  its 
predecessors  BEA  and  BOAC.  Correspondi  naly,  those  with  less  than  10  years  service 
have  known  only  a  privatised  regime.  Those  in  the  seniority  range  of  1-5  years  have 
been  'weaned'  in  a  deregulatory  environment.  They  have  witnessed  policies  such  as 
regional  i  sation,  franchising,  outsourcing,  and  emergency  cost  cutting  initiatives  such 
as  the  Gap  Closure  programme  of  1993.  Are  these  workers  more  inured  to  change  and 
more  adaptable  than  those  who  have  grown  up  under  a  regulated  industry?  The  survey 
will  shed  some  light  on  this  issue. 
With  its  coverage  of  unionised  workers,  the  sample  is,  by  definition,  biased  towards 
those  on  full  time  tenure.  Given  the  foregoing  discussion  of  change  within  the 
industry,  we  might  expect  more  workers  than  turned  out  to  be  the  case,  to  be 
employed  on  other  than  full  time  permanent  employment.  The  overriding  majority 
(93%)  are  employed  full  time,  whilst  only  the  remainder  are  on  so  called  atypical 
contracts,  such  as  part  and  full  time  temporary  work  and  those  on  fixed  contracts.  The 
accepted  threshold  of  20  hours  as  the  full  time  working  benchmark  may  well  have 
been  ignored  and  a  question  qualifYin,  o  actual  hours  worked  may  well  have  provided 
186 better  information.  Nevertheless,  the  amount  of  part  time  and  temporary  work  remains 
low.  This  may  well  be  because  the  sample  is  unionised  and  unions  tend  to  represent 
full  time  workers  more  than  part  time  workers.  It  may  also  reflect  the  increasing 
correction  from  empirical  evidence  of  the  true  extent  of  atypical  work  within  the  UK. 
According  to  one  labour  market  observer,  the  level  of  part-time  working  has  not 
significantly  altered  since  195  1.  (Robinson  1997.  )  Certain  assumptions  are  often  made 
in  the  labour  market  literature  about  workers  on  atypical  contracts.  They  are  expected 
to  be  more  flexible  and  less  resistant  to  change  then  full  time  workers,  again  owing  to 
their  lower  level  of  'investment'  within  the  firm,  and  their  tendency  to  be  recruited 
from  those  groups  less  inclined  to  identify  with  'traditional'  male  dominated  trade 
unionism.  This  will  be  tested  in  the  subsequent  analysis. 
The  high  degree  of  full  time  tenure  identified  within  the  sample  is  nonetheless  an 
interesting  finding  and  has  a  number  of  implications.  According  to  the  principal  study 
of  UK  industrial  relations,  (Millward  et  al  1992:  338,  table  9.4)  18%  of  UK  workers 
were  covered  by  atypical  contracts.  Numerical  flexibility  is  the  aim  of  many 
employers  and  airlines,  with  their  seasonal  nature  and  variation  in  daily  traffic  flows, 
might  be  expected  to  benefit  from  this,  as  have  other  service  industries.  (Beatson 
1995:  12-13.  )  Is  this  lack  of  proliferation  of  such  flexibility  a  function  of  trade  union 
resistance,  management  inaction,  or  is  it  simply  impractical  given  the  shifting  nature 
of  the  airline  industry?  Such  issues  can  be  examined  in  the  survey. 
6.2  Staff  Attitudes  towards  Business  Strategies  and  Deregulation 
Having  described  in  outline,  the  main  nominal  variables,  we  will  now  go  on  to 
investigate  staff  attitudes  towards  specific  policies.  The  analysis  is  broken  down  into 
six  sections.  Attitudes  were  measured  along  a  Likert  scale  with  the  categories  strongly 
support,  support,  neither,  oppose,  strongly  oppose  and  no  opinion,  representing 
respectively  scales  of  agreement,  indifference/neutrality  and  disagreement. 
The  attitudes  explored  related  to  the  following  broad  areas: 
Internal  outsourcing,  regionalisation  and  franchising 
Flexibility 
187 "  Management  strategy 
"  Globalisation 
"  Outsourcing 
"  Future  of  collective  bargaining 
6.2.1  Attitudes  Towards  Internal  Outsourcing,  Regionalisation  and  Franchising 
The  first  set  of  variables  tested  attitudes  towards  internal  restructuring.  One  might 
expect  to  identify  a  regional  variation  in  levels  of  acceptance  towards  such  policies  as 
outsourcing,  franchising  and  the  creation  of  regional  operations.  Those  employed 
within  the  regions  may  welcome  investment  of  this  sort  and  we  might  expect  to  see 
hostility  from  those  at  mainline  bases.  Regional  cross  tabulations  might  be  expected 
to  show  a  distinct  difference  between  regions  when  these  initiatives  are  considered. 
One  regional  engineering  official  termed  the  London  bases  as  "the  black  hole  where 
all  the  good  jobs  go  and  we  are  left  with  the  rubbish"  (interview  with  regional  AEEU 
steward  November  12  1996).  The  threat  of  lower  wages  and,  or,  terms  and  conditions 
is  therefore  implied  with  the  relocation  of  maintenance  capacity  from  the  London 
bases  to  the  regions. 
Workers  within  the  sample  will  oppose  regionalisation  on  lower  pay  rates,  which 
will  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  segment  the  labour  market.  There  will  be  few 
occupational  differences  within  the  sample  and  there  will  be  no  differences  in 
terms  of  location. 
Only  8%  of  workers  sampled  declared  support/strong  support  for  outsourcing 
initiatives  of  this  type,  whilst  an  overwhelming  majority  (combined  82%)  were 
opposed/strongly  opposed  to  such  initiatives.  On  the  question  of  establishing  regional  0 
operations,  fewer  than  4%  were  in  favour  and  93%  were  against.  The  descriptive 
statistics  for  all  the  variables  in  this  set  are  given  below. 
188 Table  6.3  Attitudes  towards  Outsourcing:  Regionalisation  and  Franchising(%) 
Variable  Description  Strongly 
Support 
Support  Neither  Oppose  Strongly 
Oppose 
BALOCOST  Moving  certain  C, 
8  5  5  31  51 
activities  to  low  cost 
areas  of  Britain  and 
Europe 
BAREGOPS  Setting  up  regional  1  3  4  20  73 
operations  with  lower 
pay  and  conditions  than 
mainline  staff 
BAFRANC  The  use  of  franchise  1  14  14  21  50 
operators  to  provide 
certain  services 
BATEMP  Greater  use  of  part  time  1  6  5  23  64 
and  temporary  contracts 
BAOUT  Separating  off  certain  1  2  4  17  75 
areas  such  as 
engineering  from  the 
main  business 
Importantly,  those  at  the  major  bases  of  Heathrow  and  Gatwick  are  equally  concerned 
about  regional  changes.  Again  these  questions  will  be  addressed  in  subsequent 
detailed  analysis.  Two  thirds  were  opposed  to  franchising,  another  policy  which  is 
increasingly  being  used  by  British  Airways.  Increasingly,  franchise  operators  are 
being  used  to  operate  regional  routes  (O'Toole  1998:  34.  )  Employees,  especially 
unionised  ones,  can  be  expected  to  be  opposed  to  a  policy  which  in  effect 
subcontracts  routes  which  they  might  have  operated  to  an  external  carrier,  often  using 
lower  paid,  mainly  non-union  labour.  Another  aspect  of  the  impact  of  both 
regionalisation  and  franchising  can  be  identified  from  the  Summer  1997  cabin  crew 
strikes.  Here,  franchise  operators,  such  as  Brymon  and  Maersk,  effectively 
undermined  strike  action  at  Gatwick.  Taken  with  the  routes  operated  by  regional 
subsidiaries,  Euro  Gatwick  and  BA  Regional,  Gatwick  was  largely  immune  from 
strike  action  which,  given  its  role  as  a  major  and  growing  hub,  should  be  a  matter  of 
alarm  for  airline  unions.  Regardless  of  the  individual  feelings  of  many  employees, 
laws  on  secondary  action  make  it  difficult  for  co-ordinated  national  action  to  take 
place,  although  the  unions  have  shown  adeptness  in  tabling  major  issues,  facilitating 
coincidental  action,  albeit  over  differing  issues.  Should  franchising  and  internal  low 
cost  operations  make  greater  inroads  into,  say,  shuttle  services  or  short  haul  European 
routes,  then  effective  trade  union  action  could  be  further  undermined.  Employee 
189 misgivings  about  franchising  and  low  cost  operations  can  be  understood  within  this 
context.  Figure  6.3  indicates  the  strength  of  opposition  to  the  policy  detected  in  the 
sample. 
Figure  6.3  Employee  Attit  tides  Towa  rds  Franchising 
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Crosstabulations  and  Associations. 
In  order  to  consider  any  differences  which  might  arise  between  employees  in  the 
sample,  a  number  ofindependent  variables  were  used  to  enable  cross-tabulations  to  be 
made.  Thus  the  key  trade  union,  regional,  gender  and  skill  variables  were  utilised.  In 
terms  of  the  proliferation  of'  low  cost  strategies,  the  REGION  variable  was  used  to  C- 
look  at  levels  of  opposition  evldcnt  in  the  initial  frequency  distribution.  In  particular, 
the  results  were  examined  to  see  if  there  were  differences  between  London  and 
regional  locations.  Using  as  the  key  dependent  variable  BAREGOPS  (see  appendix), 
there  was  little  difference  in  terms  of'  levels  of  opposition  or  acceptance  of  regional 
operations  when  considered  in  terms  of  location.  Those  in  the  London  area,  who 
might  have  been  expected  to  be  less  opposed  to  regional  operations  given  their 
insulation  from  such  policies,  were  as  opposed as  those  employed  in  the  regions.  This 
is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  London  based  workers  perceive  regionalisation  as  both 
the  thin  end  of  the  wedge  in  terms  of  cost  reduction  and  a  threat  given  the  high  cost 
nature  of  most  London  locations.  The  London  bases  carry  high  overall  costs, 
particularly  when  earnings  premiums  are  taken  into  account. 
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Strongly  SI  Ippol  Neithet  Oppose  Strongly 
support  oppose It  can  be  seen  that  within  this  sample  of  unionised  workers,  those  at  the  London  bases 
are  roughly  as  opposed  (91%),  than  those  in  the  regions  (100%).  39  However,  it  does 
provide  a  comparison  between  two  of  the  principal  groups  on  the  use  of  temporary 
contracts  which  would  be  a  feature  of  regional  policies.  Again,  a  rough  concordance 
of  opposition  was  found  between  regional  and  London  based  workers.  A  similar  story 
emerges  on  low  cost  carriers  where  both  sets  of  workers  are  equally  opposed  to  the 
policy.  In  terms  of  overall  levels  of  opposition,  only  franchising  has  levels  of 
disagreement  below  80%,  though  again,  the  differences  between  the  respondents  in 
the  sample  is  small  (about  10%).  In  terms  of  the  average  overall  difference  within  the 
sample  on  all  measures  of  regional  isation,  the  difference  is  about  8%. 
Table  6.4  Attitudes  to  Internal  Low  Cost  Strategies  by  Region 
LONDON  REGIONS 
Temporary 
contracts 
Outsourcing 
Regional 
operations 
Internal  low 
cost  carriers 
Franchising 
Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Agree  Neutral 
4(7)  7(11)  89  (140)  2  (1)  7  (3) 
2  (3) 
2(3) 
4(7)  94  (160)  4(2)  7(3) 
2(3)  96(156) 
12(20)  6(10)  83  (142)  6(3) 
16  (28)  1109)  73(124)  13(6) 
11(5) 
21  (10) 
Disagree  X, 
91(42)  3.481 
89(41)  446 
100  (47)  3.393 
83(39)  3.243 
66(31)  4.948 
Plain  numbers  are  percentages  summed  from  row  total.  Parentheses  are  overall  cell  frequencies, 
summed  from  row  total. 
**  X2  insufficient  cell  frequency  for  Chi  square  test.  AM  Chi  square  tests  are  insignificant  at  the  0.05 
level  unless  otherwise  stated. 
6.2.2  Seniority 
In  terms  of  seniority  we  earlier  hypothesised  that  we  might  expect  to  see  some 
difference  between  those  workers  who  were  recruited  in  the  previous  era  (before 
privatisation  and  deregulation)  and  those  recruited  in  the  privatised/deregulated  era. 
The  precise  frequencies  for  the  re-coded  seniority  variable  are  given  below.  We  could 
hypothesise: 
39  Due  to  a  structured  asymmetry  in  cell  values  (too  many  people  are  opposed  to  distribute  cell 
frequencies  evenly  to  give  a  distribution  for  the  chi  square  test)  this  finding  has  no  statistical  0 
significance  from  an  inferential  or  confirmatory  point  of  view.  Problems  with  the  distribution  method 
191 Those  employees  within  the  sample  who  are  more  accustomed  to  the  regulated  and 
collectively  bargained  conditions  of  the  pre-privatisation  era  (the  31  years  plus 
group),  would  be  more  likely  to  oppose  policies  of  regionalisation,  than  those 
workers  at  the  other  end  of  the  seniority  distribution  (1-10  years)  who  have 
experienced  only  eitherprivatisation  or  ýre-privatisation'. 
In  the  event,  the  results  suggest  little  difference  within  the  sample  in  terms  of 
seniority,  with  97%  of  the  1-10  year  group  registering  opposition  to  the  proposal  and 
90%  of  the  older  seniority  group.  Indeed  the  small  gap  between  the  'newer'and  'older' 
employees  shows  that  the  evidence  is  going  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  which  we 
might  have  expected.  Younger  (or  newer)  workers  are  usually  expected  to  be  less 
'conservative'  towards  change  than  their  older  counterparts,  this  result  contests  that 
finding.  The  explanation  might  lie  in  the  fact  that  workers  within  the  former  group 
have  experienced  a  great  deal  of  change  and  have  perhaps  become  as  embittered  as 
the  more  senior  workers.  Another  explanation  is  that  junior  workers,  with  less 
seniority  in  a  seniority  driven  context,  would  be  more  affected  by  policies  such  as 
regionalisation,  bearing  the  brunt  of  the  lower  wage  rates  for  example.  Either  way,  the 
evidence  from  the  sample  shows  that  young  workers  are  if  anything  more  ill  disposed 
towards  the  policy  than  the  older  cohort. 
In  trade  union  terms,  we  might  reasonably  assume  that  the  general  union  (TGYVIU), 
with  less  industry  specificity  and  less  skilled  workers  than  the  more  specialist  unions 
(BALPA  and  AEEU),  might  perceive  a  greater  threat  from  regionalisation.  Of  the 
TGWU  workers  in  the  sample,  72%  opposed  "the  creation  of  regional  operations  with 
lower  pay  rates  than  mainline";  57%  of  AEEU  respondents  opposed,  whilst  78%  of 
BALPA  members  were  opposed.  BALPA's  opposition  might  be  described  in  terms 
of  the  threat  to  pilot  incomes  and  conditions  of  early  regionalisation  such  as  BAR. 
AEEU  workers  may  be  less  opposed  because  of  an  acceptance  of  the  inevitability  of 
regional  operations.  The  AEEU  has  already  accepted  outsourcing  of  the  core  747 
heavy  maintenance  programme  to  GEC  in  1991  along  with  vehicle  maintenance, 
undercarriage  and  avionics.  Given  this  empirical  difference  between  the  occupational 
groups,  we  can  compare  the  bargaining  group  variable  (NSP)  which  allocates  workers 
to  specific  bargaining  units  based  on  occupation.  Can  we  detect  a  lower  level  of 
mean  that  no  inferences  can  be  made.  Subsequently  chi  square  results  are  presented  for  information 
only.  (See  methodology  chapter.  ) 
192 opposition  to  regional  operations  from  the  craft  bargaining  units?  These  cover 
primarily  AEEU  members  whilst  'A'scales  GSS  and  'non-craft'category  more  likely 
to  cover  TGWU  members.  The  survey  suggests  that  within  the  sample,  AEEU 
members  are  no  different  in  their  opposition  than  TGWU  members  (92%  and  93% 
respectively).  In  terms  of  gender  there  is  no  difference  between  male  and  female 
workers  in  their  levels  of  opposition  to  regional  operations  with  lower  pay  rates. 
6.2.3  Employee  Attitudes  towards  Flexibility 
The  next  set  of  variables  sought  staff  attitudes  towards  flexibility.  The  term  flexibility 
needed  to  be  operationalised  to  reflect  workers'  perceptions  and  experiences.  The 
item  tested  attitudes  on  the  extension  of  part-time  and  temporary  work,  so  called 
teinporalflexibility  as  an  aspect  of  flexibility.  Given  the  nature  of  traffic  flows  and  the 
cyclical  nature  of  the  industry,  the  attainment  of  more  atypical  working  patterns  can 
be  seen  as  a  management  goal.  Conversely,  the  retention  of  full  time  jobs  would  be 
expected  from  unions  and  their  members,  notwithstanding  gendered  preferences  for 
part  time  work  identified  in  the  flexibility  literature.  (Beatson  1995  196  table  2.4.  ) 
A  variety  of  reasons  might  account  for  supply  side  aspects  of  atypical  work.  The  jobs 
ponfolio  trend,  which  many  labour  market  analyses  point  to,  might  to  some  extent 
lessen  opposition.  (Beatson  1995  Jbid.  )  The  portfolio  argument  posits  an 
increasingly  varied  and  fragmented  set  of  job  choices  with  the  holding  of  multiple 
jobs  a  feature.  Again  there  was  a  very  small  incidence  of  part  time  workers  within  the 
sample. 
Those  workers  who  are  employed  on  such  contracts  might  be  expected  to  be  less 
hostile  to  atypical  work  seeing  it  as  an  accepted  part  of  their  pattern  of  working.  (See 
Hewitt  1993:  23.  )  However,  in  general  we  might  expect  the  following  attitudes  to  be 
displayed: 
193 Workers  within  the  sample  will  resist  the  extension  of  atypical  work,  seeing  this  as 
an  attempt  to  create  a  segmented  workforce.  Regardless  of  gender  or  conditions, 
they  willfavour  a  fidl  time  job  andfidl  time  wage. 
Table  6.5  Employee  Attitudes  Towards  Increased  Use  of  Temporal  Flexibility 
Variable  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree  Neither  Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
FLEXFAM  More  flexible  hours  will  help  2  11  14  34  37 
with  comn-dtments  such  as 
family. 
FLEXREDN  I  will  get  lower  wages  due  to  38  43  2  4  11 
the  reduction  of  hours. 
FLEXBEN  I  will  get  fewer  benefits  than  41  37  8  5  7 
full  time  staff. 
FLEXSECU  Flexibility  for  the  company  4  8  10  29  49 
will  mean  greaterjob  security 
for  everyone  including  those 
on  contracts. 
FLEXCUT  Flexibility  for  the  company  42  34  4  14  5 
will  mean  cuts  in  jobs  and 
benefits. 
FLEXWILL  I  will  accept  it  because  the  2  11  20  42  24 
airline  business  needs  people 
to  be  flexible. 
Rows  may  not  sum  to  100  due  to  rounding  and  missing  values.  a 
Only  13%  of  respondents  were  of  the  opinion  that  more  flexible  working  would  help 
with  family  commitments  (a  popular  social  justification  for  the  introduction  of  part 
time  work),  with  around  71%  disagreeing  that  this  would  be  the  case.  Some  81%  felt 
the  policy  would  lead  to  a  reduction  in  hours  and  thus  pay.  Only  12%  agreed  that 
flexible  working  hours  would  mean  greater  job  security.  Some  workers  might  seek 
part  time  working  as  a  consequence  of  childcare,  and/or  lifestyle  factors.  We  would 
then  expect  to  find  some  gender  difference  if  women  regard  part  time  and  atypical 
work  less  suspiciously  than  men  do. 
194 The  crosstabulation  technique  was  used  to  assess  differences  by  gender  as  this  was 
felt  to  be  the  most  important  independent  factor  in  the  analysis. 
Table  6.6  Attitudes  to  Use  of  Temporal  Flexibility  by  Gender  (%) 
0-  Male  Female 
Agree  Neutral  Disagree 
t5l 
Agree  Neutral  Disagree  el  X, 
FLEXBENI  77(145)  14(26)  10(18)  65(17)  15(4)  19(5)  2.446 
FLEXFAMI  14(27)  18(34)  68(130)  24(6)  32(8)  4401) 
. 
455** 
FLEXCUTI  77(149)  7(14)  16(30)  69(18)  8(2)  23(6) 
. 
988** 
FLEXREDI  78(147)  7(14)  15(28)  88(23)  4(l)  8(2)  1.576** 
FLEXSECI  12(23)  9(18)  79(152)  19(5)  27(7)  54(14)  9.050 
FLEXWILL  12(23)  22(42)  66(127)  15(4)  23(6)  62(16) 
. 
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Plain  numbers  are  percentages  summed  from  row  total.  Parentheses  are  overall  cell  frequencies, 
0 
summed  from  row  total.  "Insufficient  cell  frequency  for  Chi  square  test.  All  Chi  square  tests  are 
insignificant  at  the  0.05  level  unless  otherwise  stated. 
The  number  of  female  respondents  in  the  survey  was  small  (26)  given  the  distribution 
of  returns  mostly  from  male  dominated  occupational  areas.  Nevertheless,  the 
frequencies  can  be  compared  within  the  sample.  On  the  question:  "I  would  get  less 
benefits  than  full  time  workers"  (FLEXBEN1),  there  was  a  minor  (statistically 
insignificant)  difference  between  male  and  female  workers.  Over  three-quarters  of 
male  workers  agreed  whilst  about  65%  of  female  workers  agreed.  This  constituted  a 
16%  difference.  There  was  a  slightly  bigger  difference  between  male  and  female 
workers  on  the  question  of  whether  increased  flexibility:  "Would  help  with 
commitments  such  as  family"  (FLEXFAMl).  Given  the  role  of  women  in  the  family, 
a  quarter  of  female  respondents  agreed  compared  to  14%  of  men,  amounting  to  a  35% 
difference.  The  most  consistent  finding  in  terms  of  gender  here  is  the  overall 
difference  between  male  and  female  workers  within  the  sample  (22%)  although  these 
results  cannot  be  inferred  outside  the  sample. 
195 6.2.4  Contracting  Out  and  Outsourcing 
Another  major  issue  within  the  airline  is  the  question  of  outsourcing.  Outsourcing 
takes  many  forms.  Subcontracting  either  to  a  new  supplier  or  'spinning  out'  an  'in 
house'provider  as  an  independent  business  unit  are  examples.  The  intention  being  to 
place  such  activities  at  'arms-length'  from  the  core  operation.  This  is  an  attractive 
proposition  for  management,  bringing  lower  costs  and  perhaps  more  importantly, 
greater  overall  cost  transparency,  helping  efficiency  at  least  in  the  short  run.  Arguably 
higher  transaction  costs  can  be  associated  with  outsourcing.  As  the  Department  of 
Employment  Flexibility  Study  indicates: 
'However,  there  are  also  costs  involved  in  monitoring  subcontractors' 
performance  and  ensuring  that  agreed  standards  are  met  and  these  can 
exceed  the  costs  of  direct  employment.  Furthermore,  once  a  contract  is 
entered  into  it  may  be  difficult  to  change  (and  hence  inflexible).  ' 
(Beatson  1995:  11.  ) 
The  concept  of  higher  transaction  costs  would  most  apply  to  areas  where  highly 
regulated  and  codified  'procedural'  operations  are  outsourced.  For  example,  in 
engineering  certification  requirements,  regulatory  rules  on  periods  of  inspection  and 
the  airline's  own  quality  standard  increase  the  monitoring  costs  of  such  operations. 
The  recent  Valujet  crash  in  Florida  in  1996  has  prompted  a  rethink  amongst  advisers, 
given  the  co-ordination  problems  involved  in  a  span  of  32  suppliers  (ITF  1997).  (See 
also  chapter  7.  )  With  less  complex  operations,  however,  such  as  catering  and 
cleaning,  lower  costs  can  be  achieved  by  outsourcing.  The  introduction  of  market 
rates,  albeit  temporarily  protected  by  legislation  such  as  TUPE,  brings  a  rapid 
reduction  in  costs.  However,  in  service  industries  a  separate  issue  arises  in  terms  of 
commitment.  Will  outsourced  employees,  providing  services  for  a  wide  range  of 
suppliers,  achieve  the  same  focus  and  commitment  as  in-house  employees?  Cost 
reductions  can  of  course  be  achieved  in  highly  processed,  procedural  and  technical 
areas  such  as  engineering.  The  tendency  is  towards  new  work  techniques  based  on 
variants  of  lean  production/Business  Process  Re-engineering  (BPR).  For  example, 
within  engineering  a  variant  of  BPR  known  as  Fully  Engineered  Task  (FET)  has 
enhanced  the  jobs  of  both  licensed  engineers  whose  roles  have  become  more 
196 enriched,  and  those  of  less  skilled  engineering  labour.  (Interview  AEEU  steward 
19.3.97.  ) 
In  each  case  costs  are  reduced,  though  the  primary  focus  is  not  on  cost  reduction.  Yet 
the  carrier  could  well  outsource  line  maintenance  as  it  has  with  heavy  overhauls  on 
specific  aircraft  types.  Whilst  engineering  functions  have  been  subjected  to  new  work 
initiatives,  reform  of  other  functions  is  by  contrast  in  terms  of  reduced  labour  costs, 
'working  cheaper'rather  than  smarter.  It  can  be  hazarded  at  this  stage,  however,  that 
BA  preferred  outsourcing  rather  than  internal  labour  market  flexibility  as  their 
preferred  strategy.  This  desire  to  obtain  flexibility  through  contracting  was  at  the 
centre  of  the  dispute  between  BA  and  its  catering  employees,  resulting  in  the 
outsourcing  of  the  mainline  catering  function  to  Swissair's  catering  subsidiary  Gate 
Gourmet.  (Hill  1997:  105.  ) 
Although  these  savings  can  be  exaggerated  when  the  protective  effect  of  legislation 
such  as  the  Acquired  Right  Directive  (TUPE)  is  taken  into  account,  they  are 
increasingly  used  as  a  virility  symbol  to  external  competitors  and  outside  interests  that 
management  literally  mean  business.  At  the  time  of  the  survey  in  autumn  1996, 
management  were  putting  forward  various  outsourcing  options,  so  staff  attitudes 
towards  these  initiatives  should  prove  interesting.  40  We  might  hypothesise  that: 
Workers  will  be  nwst  concerned  about  the  loss  o  the  tenns  and  conditions  when  f 
considering  the  possible  outsourcing  of  theirjob. 
Employees  value  working  for  a  large  carrier  such  as  BA,  seeing  security  and 
advancement  within  such  a  large  company.  However,  it  became  clear  from  interviews, 
that  whilst  the  BA  identity  was  important,  it  was  difficult  to  pinpoint  which  aspects  of 
working  for  the  carrier  were  perceived  as  most  important  in  the  event  of  outsourcing. 
Most  are  opposed  to  outsourcing,  as  became  evident  from  earlier  exploratory 
interviews,  thus  the  question  was  framed  to  gather  information  on  those  aspects  of 
working  for  BA  which  were  most  valued. 
40  A  number  of  initiatives  including  the  outsourcing  of  ground  fleet  maintenance,  Heathrow  catering  0  C" 
and  the  possible  extension  of  outsourcing  to  ground  services  were  being  put  forward  by  BA 
C, 
management. 
197 A  useful  measure  of  the  concept  would  be  one  which  ascertained  the  importance 
which  employees  placed  on  certain  facets  of  their  employment  with  BA.  The 
preliminary  results  are  given  below. 
Table  6.7  Respondent  Ranking  of  Factors  in  Working  for  BA  (%) 
Variable  Description  Very 
important 
Important  Neither  Not  very 
Important 
Unimportant 
TRANTRAV  BA  travel  facilities  34  34  12  12  8 
and  other  perks 
TRANTERM  BA  terms  and  67  24  4  2  1 
conditions. 
TRANCOM  The  common  52  31  8  3  3 
purpose  of  working 
exclusively  for  BA. 
TRANPROT  The  protection  of  67  23  4  2  2 
national  trade  union 
, reements.  ag 
TRANSECU  The  job  security  77  17  1  3  1 
which  large  airlines 
like  BA  provides. 
Rows  may  not  sum  to  100  due  to  rounding  and  missing  values.  0 
One  of  the  major  areas  often  highlighted  by  staff  themselves  when  subjected  to  the 
threat  of  outsourcing  is  the  fear  that  they  may  lose  core  conditions.  Travel  facilities, 
long  seen  by  the  wider  public  as  one  of  the  most  significant  fringe  benefits  in  airline 
employment,  are  less  of  a  priority  within  the  sample.  41  Nearly  a  fifth  of  the  sample  see 
the  loss  of  such  benefits  as  either  not  very  important  or  unimportant,  with  the 
proportion  who  regard  such  benefits  indifferently  bringing  this  up  to  a  third.  Whilst 
more  precise  statistical  tests  will  be  needed  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the 
relationship,  this  roadmap  of  the  data  does  point  to  a  direct  convergence  of  views  for 
those  who  ranked  BA  terms  and  conditions  and  the  protection  of  national  trade  union 
agreements  as:  "Very  important.  "  Around  70%  of  respondents  ranked  these  variables 
exactly  equally  in  importance  (see  table  6.7  above).  This  might  suggest  that  BA  terms 
and  conditions  and  the  protection  of  national  trade  union  agreements  are  viewed 
similarly.  There  would  be  good  intuitive  reasons  for  this.  The  phrase  terms  and 
conditions  tend  to  be  associated  with  union  negotiation,  and  collective  bargaining. 
Trade  unions  may  be  the  passive  beneficiaries  of  employee  identification  of  both. 
The  principal  issue  in  the  August  1997  outsourcing  dispute  between  BA  and  Heathrow  catering  staff  C00 
was  the  desire  of  staff  many  who  have  families  in  the  Indian  subcontinent  to  retain  staff  travel 
facilities,  which  constitute  a  core  condition.  The  outsourcing  agreement  preserved  these  perks  for  a 
limited  period. 
198 However,  the  unionised  bias  within  the  sample  means  we  cannot  make  too  much  of 
this  finding,  though  we  can  look  at  the  overall  level  of  union  membership  within  the 
airline  which  is  high.  42  Interestingly,  there  was  relatively  less  support  for  the  notion  of 
losing  the  'common  purposeof  working  for  a  large  company  like  BA.  This  variable 
was  designed  to  give  some  idea  of  'unitarist'  views  of  the  employment  situation, 
although  a  unitarist  frame  of  mind  need  not  be  a  prerequisite  for  such  a  view.  Workers 
may  well  see  common  purpose  as  neutral  and  simply  relate  to  the  statement  about  BA. 
In  any  case,  respondent  ranking  gives  some  idea  of  the  importance  attached  (52% 
strongly  agreed).  When  company  identification  variables  are  made  more  explicit,  for 
example,  converted  in  terms  of  job  security,  then  a  different  initial  picture  emerges. 
For  the  statement  that  an  employee  would  miss  the  job  security  of  a  large  carrier  like 
BA,  77%  ranked  this  as  'very  important'. 
This  finding  is  not  surprising  given  the  success  of  BA,  and  its  steady  expansion. 
Table  6.8  Ranking  of  Factors  in  Working  for  BA  by  Trade  Union 
TGWU  AEEU 
Important  Neither/no  Not  so  Important  Neither/no  Not  so  X, 
opinion  important  opinion  important 
TRANCOMI  84(145)  15(9)  7(12)  74(20)  19(5)  7(2)  3.418 
TRANPROI  91(155)  4  (7)  5(9)  96(26)  4(l)  -  3.627** 
TRANSECI  94(161)  1(2)  5(8)  93(25)  7(2)  2.317** 
TRANTERI  90  (152)  6  (10)  4(6)  100(26)  -  -  5.493 
TRANTRAI  66(144)  12(20)  22(38)  81(22)  15(4)  4(l)  5.493 
Plain  numbers  are  percentages  summed  from  row  total.  Parentheses  are  overall  cell  frequencies, 
summed  from  row  total.  **  Insufficient  cell  frequency  for  Chi  square  test.  All  Chi  square  tests  are 
insignificant  at  the  0.05  level  unless  otherwise  stated. 
Table  6.8  provides  and  crosstabulates  the  views  of  the  major  trade  unions,  TGWU  and 
AEEU,  on  the  issue,  bearing  in  n-tind  the  problems  in  the  data  due  to  the  large 
difference  in  response  rates.  As  expected  from  the  frequencies,  high  prioritisation  is 
placed  upon  the  protection  of  national  agreements  and  the  terms  and  conditions 
42Union  densities  as  at  the  time  of  the  survey  are  as  follows:  Administrative  Staff  50%  (which  includes 
front  line  Customer  Service  Staff),  Engineering  70%,  Ground  Support  Staff  90%,  Cabin  Crew  80% 
Flight  Crew  90%. 
199 offered  by  a  large  employer  like  BA.  There  is  little  difference  between  AEEU  and 
TGWU  members  in  their  prioritisation  of  aspects  of  being  employed  by  BA.  Only  on 
travel  facilities  is  there  a  significant  gap  between  the  two,  with  AEEU  members 
placing  greater  priority  on  travel  benefits.  This  could  be  explained  by  the  larger 
impact  on  engineering  workers  of  outsourcing  at  the  time  of  the  survey.  Some 
engineering  workers  have  seen  the  perk  of  travel  facilities  eroded  with  the  outsourcing 
of  BAMC  and  are  therefore  more  aware  of  the  issue.  In  any  case,  travel  facilities  tend 
to  be  less  valued  than  terms  and  conditions  and  the  protection  of  national  agreements. 
The  results  for  BALPA  members  were  almost  identical.  Not  surprisingly,  workers  are  4-:  - 
overwhelmingly  wedded  to  the  concept  of  employment  with  a  major  carrier  such  as 
BA. 
6.3  Attitudes  towards  British  Airway's  Global  Strategies 
6.3.1  Employee  Perception  of  General  Global  Strategies 
The  views  expressed  above  could  change  with  further  restructuring  within  the  global 
market,  requiring  greater  segmentation  and  the  eventual  disintegration  of  the  'whole 
airline  concept'  to  which  workers  are  so  attached.  Thus  employee  attitudes  towards 
wider  policies  affecting  the  airline  product  market  shoul 
,d 
be  of  interest  to  the  research 
on  airline  employment.  Do  workers  actually  support  policies  of  globalisation?  There 
is  evidence  that  within  the  framework  of  an  increasingly  concentrated  international 
industry,  unionised  workers  support  general  policies  of  globalisation,  often  reasoning 
that  this  increases  job  security  within  the  carrier,  at  least  for  those  employed  within 
the  core.  Globalisation  policies,  which  include  'expansionary'  strategies  such  as  take- 
overs,  alliance  building,  and  the  development  of  'fortress  hubs,  can  be  seen  as  a 
continuation  of  the  stability  discussed  in  relation  to  the  regulated  and  post 
privatisation  era.  With  the  growth  of  large  'constellation  alliances,  '  the  industry  is 
developing  on  the  basis  of  interfirm  collaboration,  thus  reducing  the  uncertainty  of 
competition.  Such  strategies  may  find  favour  with  the  employees  of  carriers  well 
placed  to  reap  such  advantages.  Thus  it  is interesting  to  look  at  employee  perceptions 
in  this  context. 
As  the  airline  industry  assumes  a  global  form,  so  do  employment  relations.  Many 
within  the  industry  assume  that  employees  of  airlines  such  as  BA  are  more  committed 
200 to  a  global  strategy  and  thus  to  far  reaching  employment  change  than  at  other  airlines 
such  as  Air  France  and  Lufthansa.  (Hill  1996:  23.  )  It  is  widely  believed  that  BA 
employees,  through  privatisation,  have  become  more  adaptable  and  less  resistant  to 
change,  perceiving  such  change  to  be  in  their  own  ultimate  interest.  (Reed  1989, 
Corke  1990.  )  In  order  to  examine  this  assumption,  a  set  of  questions  attempted  to 
ascertain  the  level  of  commitment  of  this  group  of  employees  and  whether  they 
agreed  with  the  perceived  aims  of  a  global  strategy.  The  elements  of  this  strategy 
were  specified  within  the  question  categories  to  include  the  most  widely  cited  types  of 
policy  pursued  by  the  carrier.  The  guiding  hypothesis  was  framed  thus: 
Workers  within  the  sample  will  support  general  management  strategy  on 
globalisation.  Stich  strategies  are  perceived  to  be  expansionary  enhancing  the 
wages  andjob  security  of  workers. 
These  included  policies  such  as  continuous  cost  reduction  and  continuous 
improvements  in  productivity,  acquiring  other  carriers,  forging  global  alliances  and 
the  relocation  of  certain  activities  to  low  labour  cost  countries.  The  initial  results  are 
graphed  in  figure  6.4  below.  Significantly  a  large  proportion  of  staff,  34%,  support  the 
notion  of  cost  reduction  as  the  'overriding  priority'.  with  a  further  22%  registering 
either  neutrality  or  indifference  on  the  issue.  This  is  an  important  finding  suggesting 
that  answers  reflect  the  generality  of  such  strategies.  Later  questions  address  more 
localised  and  specific  aspects  such  as  the  effect  on  employment.  Although  we  must  be 
mindful  of  the  preliminary  nature  of  the  data,  there  is  strong  support  for  the  notion  of 
'increasing  productivity  as  much  as  possible'.  Two  thirds  of  respondents  agreed  with 
this  statement  indicating  broad  general  support  for  the  need  for  increased  performance 
in  a  more  threatening  global  environment  (table  6.9). 
201 Figure  6.4  Employee  Perceptiolls  of  BA  Global  Strategies  (f7c) 
Globalisation  means  more  alliances  and  fewer  home 
based  jobs. 
Strongly  disagree  4 
Disagree  17 
C 
U  Neither  122 
CD 
CL 
Strongly  agree  21 
Agree  34 
05  10  15  20  25  30  35  40 
Note:  See  chapter  2.4ppendIX  /  for  variable  descriptions 
Table  6.9  Employee  Attitudes  towards  Global  Business  Strategies(%) 
Variable  Description  StrongI3  Support  Neither  Oppose  Stronglý 
Support  Oppose 
STRATCOST  Cost  redtiction  as  the  3  30  20  30  15 
overriding  priority 
STRATPROD  Increasing  productivity  as  L- 
9  65  13  8  4 
much  as  possible 
STRAFARE  Offerino  lower  fares  than  9  39  29  15  5 
other  carriers 
STRASTAFF  Involvino  staff  more  in  the  54  39  4  1  I 
running  ofthe  company  C, 
STRATLOB  Lobbying  for  access  to  43  44  5  1  1 
airports  and  services 
cLirrently  denied  to  BA 
STRATAID  Lobbying  for  an  end  to  slate  LI  55  27  10  1  3 
aid  for  onr  competitor,.,, 
STRATAKO  Taking  over  or  acquiring  V  Z' 
24  49  17  5  4 
holdings  in  other  airlines  to 
help  expand  market 
opportunities 
STRATAL  Milding  alliances  with  other  9  34  26  17  13 
carriers  to  expand  bill  not 
necessarily  tising  BA  aircraft 
and  crews 
STRACHEA  Moving  some  functions  to  4  8  8  37  40 
lower  labour  cost  locations 
Rows  may  not  slim  to  100  dne  to  rounding  and  inissing.  values. 
202 We  must  be  aware,  however,  of  whether  this  is  a  case  of  general  agreement  with  one 
of  the  industry's  often  repeated  verities,  or  if  workers  in  fact  would  concede  on 
certain  issues  in  order  to  increase  productivity.  In  addition,  we  must  be  mindful  of  the 
notion,  often  encountered  in  trade  union  circles,  that  productivity  improvement  is 
costless  to  current  employees.  The  negotiating  rhetoric  over  efficiency  savings  during 
the  introduction  of  the  1996  Business  Efficiency  Plan  (BEP)  saw  the  unions 
emphasise  productivity  almost  as  a  costless  solution.  However,  management  has 
increasingly  focused  on  core  terms  and  conditions  as  the  only  true  reflection  of  a 
reduced  cost  base  (interview  TGWU  steward  21.3.97).  It  is  difficult  to  discern 
whether  employees  are  reacting  to  management's  agenda  of  increased  efficiency  or 
the  unions  of  increasing  productivity.  Such  issues  can  be  explored  from  other  angles. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  look  at  cross  tabulations  and  associations  around  the 
globalisation  variables.  It  would  be  interesting  to  explore  this  issue  in  terms  of 
skilled/industry  specific  or  unskilled  categories  of  workers  who  might  be  expected  to 
have  different  views.  To  investigate  this  issue  a  new  variable  (SKILL)  was 
constructed.  This  involved  merging  the  craft  bargaining  and  flight  crew  units  as  those 
who  represent  industry  specific  skills  and  who  might  be  expected  to  be  more  secure  in 
a  stable  oligopolistic  industry.  The  non-craft,  GSS  and  'A'  scales  workers  might 
expect  (with  global  alliances  perhaps  reducing  duplicated  staff)  to  be  less  favourable 
on  a  general  basis  towards  management  strategy  of  globalisation.  Was  this  actually 
the  case? 
Interestingly,  there  was  a  lower  level  of  support  and  higher  opposition  from  the  more 
skilled  workers  as  table  6.10  below  demonstrates. 
203 Unsurprisingly,  both  industry  specific  and  non  industry  specific  workers  are  opposed 
to  strategies  which  involve  moving  operations  to  low  labour  cost  countries 
(STRATCHEM),  an  increasing  threat  even  in  skilled  areas  of  employment.  0 
Table  6.10  Attitudes  to  Globalisation  Policies  by  Skill  Category 
NON  INDUSTRY  SPECIFIC  INDUSTRY  SPECIFIC 
Support  Neither/no  Oppose  Support  Neither/no  Oppose  X-' 
opinion  opinion 
STRATPROI  76(121)  13(21)  9(14)  62(38)  16(10)  21(13)  7.024 
STRAFARI  50(77)  32(50)  18(28)  44(27)  30(18)  26(16)  1.804 
STRASTAI  97(152)  3(4)  0.63(l)  85(52)  10(6)  5(3)  10.104 
STRATLOI  92(140)  7(10)  1(2)  87(53)  10(6)  3(2)  1.639 
STRATAII  83(129)  13(20)  4(6)  85(51)  10(6)  5(3) 
. 
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STRATAKI  73(113)  20(31)  7(11)  75(46)  13(8)  11(7)  2.194 
STRATALI  44(67)  26(40)  30(46)  43(26)  28(17)  11(18) 
. 
067 
STRACIIEAI  13(20)  7(11)  80(123)  13(8)  13(8)  74(45)  1.972 
STRACTCOI  34(52)  21(32)  46(71)  33(20)  22(36)  46(28) 
. 
017 
Plain  numbers  are  percentages  summed  from  row  total.  Parentheses  are  overall  cell  frequencies, 
surnmed  from  row  total.  **  Insufficient  cell  frequency  for  Chi  square  test.  All  Chi  square  tests  are 
insignificant  at  the  0.05  level  unless  otherwise  stated. 
6.3.2  Attitudes  Towards  Specific  Global  Strategies 
Again,  a  further  set  of  variables  seek  to  measure  more  specific  attitudes.  Alliance 
building,  equity  holdings,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  take-overs  are  major  features  of  the 
emerging  pattern  in  the  airline  industry.  At  the  time  of  writing,  BA  has  received 
government  approval  for  a  major  alliance  with  American  Airlines,  in  addition  to 
major  equity  holdings  in  QANTAS  and  a  myriad  of  smaller  operators.  The  survey 
sought  staff  attitudes  towards  such  strategies.  Are  staff  broadly  supportive,  as  they 
might  be  expected  to  be  in  a  large  long  haul  'network  carrier'such  as  BA?  Do  staff 
perceive  a  threat  to  their  own  position  from  such  strategies?  The  variables 
STRATAKO  and  STRATAL  ascertain  employee  attitudes  on  both  types  of  strategy. 
There  seems  to  be  more  support  for  take-overs  and  equity  holdings  (74%)  than  for 
alliances,  which  often  imply  expansion  using  the  alliance  partners'  routes  and 
204 equipment.  Though  the  employment  effects  of  global  alliances  are  as  yet  untested,  the 
perception  among  many  workers  is  that  such  arrangements  could  lead  to  job  losses. 
(ITF  1992:  33.  )  This  condition  is  specified  in  the  variable  STRATAL  and  support  for 
the  alliance  strategy  is  much  less  strong  (43%),  although  those  who  are  either  neutral 
or  indifferent  account  for  over  a  quarter  of  the  sample.  Only  a  third  of  workers  are 
opposed  to  this  strategy.  Again  these  variables  can  be  crosstabulated  with  other 
measures  of  globalisation  as  it  specifically  affects  employment.  So  far  we  have  looked 
at  generic  business  issues'  rather  than  specific  labour  market  ones  to  see  whether 
employees  accord  with  or  dispute  the  management  agenda  for  the  future  of  the  airline. 
It  is  now  necessary  to  look  at  employee  views,  in  order  to  examine  the  labour  market 
issues  introduced  in  chapter  one.  When  the  implications  of  global  business  strategy 
are  operationalised  into  specific  employment  effects,  we  can  analyse  these  labour 
market/employment  aspects.  The  labour  market  implications  of  globalisation  are 
addressed  in  the  next  set  of  questions,  which  ask  employees'  views  of  globalisation  as 
it  affects  BA  staff.  Here  the  findings  are  different,  seeming  to  confirm  the  intuitive 
point  that  the  very  generality  of  the  previous  statements  may  have  been  responsible 
for  high  levels  of  agreement.  Descriptive  statistics  are  given  below  (table  6.11). 
I 
Table  6.11  Employee  Perceptions  of  Broad  Employment  Impact  of  Globalisation 
Strategies  (%) 
Variable  Description  Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
Neither  Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
GLOBCOMP  More  competition  leads  31  13  24  24  6 
to  less  job  security 
GLOBOUT  Some  jobs  will  be  moved  23  26  6  13  31 
to  low  labour  cost 
countries  like  India  and 
China 
GLOBPURP  It  brings  a  new  sense  of  29  10  30  18  9 
purpose  knowing  that  we 
are  competing  against  the  C,  big  global  carriers  C, 
GLOBAL  Alliances  could  mean  33  20  23  18  4 
fewer  flights  and  threaten 
jobs 
GLOBSEC  Jobs  are  more  secure  all  17  8  23  38  13 
round  because  we  can 
win  new  business 
GLOBREAL  We  have  no  choice  but  to  13  5  26  35  19 
use  these  strategies 
because  that's  the  reality 
of  the  airline  industry 
today 
Rows  many  not  sum  to  100  due  to  rounding  and  missing  values.  0  C, 
205 6.3.3  Perceptions  of  Competition  and  Collaboration 
The  variable  GLOBCOMP  asked  employees  whether  more  competition  would  lead 
to  less  job  security.  A  combined  45%  felt  that  it  would,  but  most  interesting  here  is 
the  level  of  neutrality  and/or  indifference  with  24%  of  respondents  opting  for  the 
neither  column.  If  we  combine  these  with  the  disagree  responses,  we  can  say  that  the 
majority  do  not  believe,  or  are  indifferent  to,  the  notion  that  more  competition  leads  to 
less  job  security.  Further  light  is  thrown  on  this  issue  by  responses  to  a  subsequent 
statement.  A  small  majority  of  this  sample  of  unionised  airline  workers  disagreed,  or 
were  indifferent  to,  the  notion  that  jobs  would  be  moved  to  low  labour  cost  nations. 
Some  44%  felt  jobs  would  not  be  moved  abroad.  This  is  interesting  in  the  sense  that 
the  unions  sampled  represent  many  workers  most  vulnerable  to  such  activities.  Even 
so,  the  majority  of  the  sample  are  employed  within  'sunk'  functions  such  as  ground 
handling  which  by  definition  cannot  be  moved  abroad.  Though  these  functions  are 
vulnerable  to  domestic  outsourcing,  the  concept  of  international  outsourcing  may  not  4:  1 
be  sufficiently  understood  as  a  threat  to  existing  jobs.  A  small  majority  felt  that 
alliances  would  mean  fewer  flights  and  fewer  jobs  (GLOBAL).  As  yet  there  is  little 
indication  from  BA's  current  global  alliances  of  an  effect  on  home-based 
employment. 
Unions  within  the  industry  fear  that  alliance  activity,  by  combining  flights  between 
carriers  to  some  destinations,  will  lead  to  an  overall  net  decrease  in  jobs,  unless  there 
is  a  corresponding  net  increase  in  services.  (ITF  1992:  23.  )  This  concern,  notably  of 
trade  unions,  sees  alliances  as  a  form  of  rationalisation.  It  is  particularly  feared  that 
there  will  be  such  a  rationalisation  of  capacity  on  some'lower  yield'  routes.  (Cameron 
1997:  50-52.  )  The  explicit  motivation  in  building  strategic  alliances  is  to  build  joint 
marketing  relationships.  However,  implicit  motives,  such  as  pooled  training 
maintenance,  marketing  effort  and  aircraft  servicing,  could  impact  upon  employment. 
Many  carriers  already  operate  'crew  sharing'  arrangements  whereby  the  staff  of  both 
carriers  are  represented  in  the  cabin  crew  complement.  At  the  moment,  costs  are 
higher  given  the  diverse  levels  of  regulation  on  issues  such  as  crew  rest,  but  these 
practices  could  become  more  widespread.  (Ibid.  )  Employees  at  BA  have  yet  to  be 
involved  in  an  alliance  where  their  employees  have  lost  out.  BA  staff  replaced  US  Air 
206 in  long  haul  routes  such  as  London-Philadelphia  and  Charlotte  after  BA's  now 
discarded  alliance  with  US  Air.  However,  with  the  BA/American  alliance  there  could 
be  a  different  outcome.  Rationalisation  may  well  take  place  with  carriers  assigning 
each  other  routes  for  the  sake  of  efficiency  and  to  avoid  duplication. 
The  message  propagated  by  airline  management  is  that  globalisation  might  lead  to 
greaterjob  security.  A  related  question,  therefore,  asked  respondents  to  record  their 
level  of  agreement  with  the  notion  that  jobs  would  be  more  secure  all  round  as  a  result 
of  globalisation  (GLOBSEC).  Management  and  industry  analysts  often  argue  that 
despite  the  short  term  impact  of  global  integration  leading  to  a  reduction  in  home 
based  employment,  globalisation  as  a  strategy  will  bring  more  jobs,  expanding  the 
overall  market  and  thus  allowing  a  massive  expansion  of  services.  This  assumption 
behind  the  globalisation  policies  of  most  airlines  is  often  articulated  to  staff  as  an 
"expanding  market  more  jobs"  argument  or  more  negatively  as  the  "bottom  line"  or 
"reality"  of  the  airline  industry  today.  Both  assumptions  are  measured  in  the  variables 
GLOBSEC  and  GLOBREAL.  Excluding  the  neither  category,  a  narrow  majority 
disagrees  with  the  former  statement,  with  just  under  a  quarter  of  the  sample  agreeing. 
On  the  latter  variable  about  54%  disagree,  whilst  only  18%  agree.  The  difference  is 
not  large  and  seems  to  indicate  that  both  statements  are  viewed  as  analogous  to  each 
other.  This  initial  finding  may  again  indicate  a  lack  of  apparent  employment  effects 
with  globalisation  to  date.  So  far  there  has  been  no  systematic  attempt  to  measure  the 
effect  of  the  main  globalisation  strategy  of  code  sharing  and  alliance  building  upon 
employment. 
6.3.4  Perception  On  Link  Between  Overall  Policy  On  Local  Terms  And  Conditions 
Question  14  asks  employees  what  they  believe  will  be  the  effects  of  BA's  business 
strategy  on  their  own  terms  and  conditions.  In  constructing  this  set  of  variables,  it  was 
hoped  to  obtain  some  measure  of  employee  perceptions  of  the  employment  changes, 
which  might  arise  from  BA  business  strategy.  This  was  yet  another  way  of  attempting 
to  cross  measure  employee  attitudes  towards  change,  taking  the  question  from  the 
global  business  environment  right  down  to  the  level  of  individual  workers'  jobs. 
Workers  within  the  sample  will  be  less  favoltrable  towards  global  policies  when 
posed  directly  in  tenns  of  employment. 
207 When  these  issues  are  posed  in  terms  of  the  immediate  effect  on  terms  and  conditions, 
the  response  of  unionised  workers  becomes  pessimistic.  A  set  of  questions  which 
elicited  employment  response  on  the  perceived  effect  upon  their  own  terms  and 
conditions  of  management  policies  under  deregulation,  was  based  on  the  following 
hypothesis: 
When  operationalised  in  terms  of  effects  on  specific  tenns  and  conditions 
employees  within  the  sample  would  be  expected  to  be  pessimistic  about  the  effect 
on  their  own  terms  and  conditions. 
The  questions  asked  respondents  to  indicate  their  view  on  the  impact  of  BA's 
business  strategies  on  their  own  terms  and  conditions.  The  responses  are  given  below 
in  table  6.12 
Table  6.12  Employee  Perceptions  of  Effect  of  Global  Business  Strategy  on  Their 
Own  Terms  and  Conditions  (%) 
Variable  Description  Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
Neither  Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
OWNWAGE  Reduced  wages,  through  53  25  3  12  7 
greater  use  of  part  time 
work  and  contracts 
OWNPRP  Greater  use  of  profit  share  8  25  15  33  17 
or  performance  related 
pay,  which  might  increase 
wages 
OWNFRING  A  reduction  in  fringe  29  38  8  11  13 
benefits  such  as  travel 
concessions  and  medical 
benefits 
OWNFLEX  Greater  flexibility  to  allow  7  27  26  29  8 
us  to  respond  to  our 
competitors 
OWNALLOW  Accepting  lower  19  19  13  28  18 
allowances  and 
enhancements  where 
applicable 
OWNSHIFr  Reduced  overtime  and  32  19  5  20  23 
shift  rates  through  the  use 
of  new  shift  patterns  such 
as  annualised  hours  and 
SDlit  shifts 
Rows  may  not  sum  to  100  due  to  rounding  and  missing  values  0a 
Around  80%  felt  their  wages  would  be  reduced  through  the  use  of  greater  part-time 
work  and  contracts.  Half  of  the  sample  believed  that  such  policies  would  mean 
reduced  overtime  and  shift  premia,  with  the  introduction  of  annualised  hours  and  split 
208 shifts.  About  38%  believed  it  would  mean  accepting  lower  allowances  and 
enhancements,  though  a  larger  proportion  disagreed  that  this  would  be  the  outcome. 
Significantly  (given  the  low  coverage  of  such  arrangements  within  the  manual  grades 
at  BA),  around  a  third  believed  that  the  changes  might  lead  to  increased  wages 
through  profit  sharing  and  performance  related  pay  (PRP).  The  same  proportion  of  the 
sample  responded  positively  to  the  statement  that  'greater  flexibility  will  allow  us  to 
respond  to  our  competitors'.  Given  the  unionised  nature  of  the  sample  and  the  type  of 
workers  it  represents  this  is  initially  a  very  interesting  finding.  It  may  well  be  a  case 
of  respondents  adopting  the  language  of  deregulation,  but  it  may  also  represent  a  shift 
in  attitudes  towards  a  more  unitarist  employee  mentality.  This  may  be  simple 
pragmatism,  given  the  competitive  environment  of  which  employees  are  well 
informed.  Nevertheless,  the  survey  was  carried  out  before  BA's  Business  Efficiency 
Programme  (BEP)  of  November  1996  was  put  to  the  workforce.  This  radical  cost 
reduction  plan  might  have  led,  in  the  post  survey  period,  to  a  considerable  hardening 
of  employee  attitudes  given  the  unionised,  less  skilled  nature  of  the  sample.  On  the 
question  of  reduced  fringe  benefits  long  associated  with  the  airline  industry,  including 
discounted  travel,  social  clubs  and  health  facilities,  about  67%  saw  these  as 
threatened.  BA  has  already  curtailed  travel  facilities  for  many  grades  of  staff,  hedging 
their  availability  with  restrictions. 
Table  6.13  below  provides  a  crosstabulation  of  views  between  the  two  main  unions  - 
TGWU  and  AEEU.  AEEU  members  tend  to  be  less  pessimistic  about  the  possibility 
of  wage  reductions,  although  a  majority  still  felt  this  might  occur.  Four  fifths  of 
TGWU  members  within  the  sample  felt  that  this  would  be  the  case.  TGWU  members 
were  also  more  pessimistic  on  the  future  of  shift  premia  with  over  half  believing  that 
these  would  be  reduced  as  a  result  of  management  policies.  AEEU  members, 
reflecting  their  moderacy  in  comparison  to  the  TGYvIU,  were  less  prepared  to  accept 
the  proposition  that  "greater  flexibility  will  allow  us  to  respond  to  our  competitors", 
an  oft-quoted  management  statement  to  which  approximately  half  of  AEEU  members 
in  the  sample  objected. 
209 Table  6.13  Employee  Perception  of  Impact  of  Management  Policies  On  Their 
Own  Jobs  and  Conditions  by  Trade  Union 
TGIVU  AEEU 
Agree  Neither/  Disagree 
P5 
Agree  Neither/  Disagree  X' 
no  no 
opinion  opinion 
OWNFLEXI  34(58)  30(51)  36(62)  29(8)  21(6)  50(14)  3.102 
OWNALLOI  38(64)  16(27)  46(76)  32(9)  14(4)  54(15)  2.470** 
OWNFRINI  67(16)  9(16)  23(40)  68(19)  7(2)  25(7) 
. 
847** 
OWNPRPI  34(59)  17(29)  49(84)  21(6)  14(4)  64(18)  8.210 
OWNSHIFI  52(91)  5(9)  42(73)  39(11)  7(2)  54(15)  20.621  ** 
OWNWAGI  80(138)  2(3)  18(32)  68(19)  7(2)  25(7)  10.076** 
**  Denotes  insufficient  cell  frequency  for  chi-square  test. 
Overall,  the  hypothesis  that  employees  would  view  the  effect  of  globalisation  more 
negatively  when  posed  in  the  context  of  their  own  terms  and  conditions,  is  proven. 
Posing  the  question  in  terms  of  direct  pay  and  benefits  effects  leads  to  a  markedly 
more  negative  response  than  that  obtained  when  generalised  questions  of  globalisation 
were  presented  in  the  subsequent  chapter.  The  link  between  globalisation  and  terms 
and  conditions  brings  us  to  the  next  section,  which  examines  the  views  of  workers 
towards  proposed  changes  in  collective  bargaining.  Arguably  changes  in  the  nature 
and  role  of  trade  unions  and  collective  bargaining  could  have  major  impacts  upon  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  respondents.  In  order  to  evaluate  this  hypothesis  section  6.4 
addresses  those  perceptions. 
6.4  Employee  Perceptions  of  Proposed  Changes  to  Collective  Bargaining 
During  the  completion  period  of  this  survey,  BA  management  proposed  a  complete 
overhaul  of  collective  bargaining  within  the  airline  as  chapter  7  indicates.  The  airline 
tried  in  the  Summer  of  1996  to  move  away  from  national  collective  bargaining 
towards  a  system  of  local  business  unit  based  bargaining.  In  effect,  this  would  mean 
the  abolition  of  National  Sectional  Panels  (NSPs)  and  the  devolution  of  major 
bargaining  areas  such  as  pay  and  conditions  to  local  level.  Whilst  the  unions  have 
conducted  a  national  campaign  to  resist  these  measures,  there  has  been  a  creeping 
erosion  of  national  bargaining.  Major  items  such  as  pay  are  still  subject  to  national 
210 level  negotiation  but  the  trend  is  towards  localised  bargaining.  Both  trade  unions  and 
management  have  advanced  a  number  of  arguments  on  the  question  of  the  future  of 
collective  bargaining.  The  questions  were  formulated  to  the  general  hypothesis: 
Employees  within  the  sample  will  resist  the  break  up  of  national  bargaining, 
perceiving  it  to  lead  to  lower  terms  and  conditions  and  to  threaten  stability  of 
employment. 
Table  6.14  Employee  Perceptions  of  the  Effects  of  Abolition  of  National 
Bargaining  (%) 
Agree  Strongly  Neither  Disagree  Strongly 
C,  C,  C, 
BARGINF  Our  power  to  influence  67  26  4  1  2 
management  would  be 
C, 
severely  reduced 
BARGBET  We  would  be  in  a  better  2  6  7  36  47 
position  to  negotiate  through 
our  local  representatives 
BARGTHRE  We  would  be  under  constant  55  26  6  6  6 
threat  of  franchising  or 
contracting  out  if  we  did  not 
agree  to  changes  within  our 
part  of  the  business 
BARGTU,  We  would  still  have  the  9  13  16  36  26 
unions  to  represent  us  as 
before 
BARGDIR  Management  would  try  to  60  26  6  6  2 
bypass  the  unions  and 
negotiate  directly  with  staff 
BARGBUB  We  would  be  able  to  focus  4  7  21  39  27 
on  our  own  part  of  the 
business 
BARGPAY  Pay  rates  and  conditions  72  22  2  3  1 
would  fall  as  management  C, 
tried  to  cut  costs 
BARGESOP  We  might  become  more  7  10  13  36  33 
involved  in  the  management 
of  our  own  business  through 
employee  shareholding  and 
greater  involvement 
Rows  may  not  sum  to  100  due  to  rounding  and  missing  values  C, 
6.4.1  Perceptions  of  Role  of  Unions  Without  National  Bargaining 
There  was  a  strong  level  of  agreement  with  the  trade  union  argument  that  the  abolition 
of  national  bargaining  would  lead  to  employees  being  marginalised.  (BARGINF) 
(98%).  This  may  reflect  the  unionised  nature  of  the  sample  or  the  success  of  the  joint 
union  campaign  to  raise  awareness  of  the  threat  to  bargaining  among  their 
211 memberships.  43  In  seeking  to  move  away  from  national  bargaining,  management  has 
emphasised  the  benefits  of  local  negotiation,  typically  arguing  that  local  negotiations 
would  be  more  attuned  to  local  needs  than  centralised  and  bureaucratic  national 
procedures.  Given  that  a  limited  form  of  devolved  bargaining  had  already  been 
introduced  within  the  regions  with  the  establishment  of  BA  Regional  in  1992, 
operating  on  different  pay  and  conditions  from  the  mainline  operation,  it  would  be 
interesting  to  see  if  there  where  any  differences  between  the  regions  and  the  London 
area.  It  can  be  seen  from  table  6.14  that  workers  within  the  sample  who  are  based  at 
regional  locations  are,  if  anything,  more  hostile  to  the  proposed  changes.  The 
abolition  of  national  bargaining  has  great  significance  to  workers  within  the  airline  as 
chapter  4  indicates. 
Table  6.15  Perceptions  of  Abolition  of  National  Collective  Bargaining  by  Region 
LONDON  REGIONS 
Agree  Neither/  Disagree  Agree  Neither/  Disagree  X, 
no  no 
opinion  opinion 
BARGBUBI  11(18)  24(41)  65(110)  13(6)  17(8)  71(34) 
. 
330 
BARGBETI  11(18)  24(41)  65(110)  13(6)  17(8)  71(34) 
. 
210** 
BARGDIRI  88(149)  6(10)  6  (11)  82(41)  8(4)  10  (5) 
. 
330 
BARGESPI  17(29)  17(28)  66(111)  16(8)  12(6)  71(35) 
. 
816 
BARGINFI  84(159)  5  (8)  3(4)  96(47)  4(2)  -  1.473 
BARGPAYI  95(162)  2(4)  3(5)  92(46)  2(l)  4  (2) 
. 
956** 
BARGTIIREI  78(132)  8(13)  15(25)  84(42)  8(4)  4  (8) 
. 
977 
BARGTUI  25(42)  17(29)  58(98)  22(11)  14(7)  63  (31)  1.106 
Plain  numbers  are  percentages  summed  from  row  total.  Parentheses  are  overall  cell  frequencies, 
summed  from  row  total.  **  Insufficient  cell  frequency  for  Chi  square  test.  All  Chi  square  tests  are 
insigpificant  at  the  0.05  level  unless  otherwise  stated. 
The  employee  responses  to  this  statement  are  given  below  in  figure  6.5.  One  of 
management's  key  positions  in  the  bargaining  debate  was  that  without  the 
impediment  of  national  bargaining,  workers  would  be  able  to  focus  on  their  own 
business  unit.  The  harsh  realities  of  the  marketplace  in  that  particular  segment,  it  was 
43  The  unions  launched  a  campaign  in  the  summer  of  1996,  which  included  a  well-stag 
., 
ed  lobby  of  the 
company  AGM,  and  a  number  of  major  publicity  and  propaganda  campaigns.  The  principal  mover  was  00 
the  TGWU,  and  other  general  unions.  The  AEEU  though  supporting  the  campaign,  had  already  000 
accepted  the  principle  of  business  unit  bargaining  at  outsourced  subsidiaries,  and  the  NJC  was  C, 
increasingly  being  marginalised  by  business  unit  level  negotiations.  The  NJC  has  since  been  abolished, 
although  other  levels  such  as  the  National  Sectional  Panels  (NSPs)  have  been  preserved.  The  NJCs 
replacement,  the  BA  Forum,  has  no  negotiating  role,  although  the  NSPs  remain  powerful  organs  of 
national  level  collective  bargaining. 
212 argued.  should  drive  pay  and  conditions  rather  than  national  level  negotiations.  Fioure 
6.5  below  sou-ht  views  on  the  Introduction  ol'bus'ineSS  unit  based  bar-ainim, 
Figure  6.5  Perceptions  of  The  Abolition  of  National  Bargaining 
We  would  be  in  a  better  position  to  negotiate  through 
local  representatives 
The  high  level  of  disagreement  fi-om  this  view  would  suggest  that  management's 
message  about  independent  hLlSines,  -,  UnIt,  has  not  been  well  receked  aniong  the 
unionised  workforce.  Less  than  10'/(  accorded  aoreement  with  the  statement  and  the 
low  level  of  ncutrality/indiffercnce  is  a  fLn-ther  indication  of  strength  of  feeling.  The 
response  to  another  statement  (BARTHRE)  may  provide  some  clues  to  this.  The 
trade  unions  responded  to  management's  advocacy  of  local  or  'business  unit 
bargaining'  by  highlighting  the  isolation,  which  would  result.  Management,  they 
-1  --  I-  Z- 
argued,  would  use  the  threat  ofcontracting  out  and  franchising  to  secure  aereemen(  to 
any  change  they  fell  necessary,  whilst  there  would  be  no  national  organisation  to  co- 
ordinate  resistance. 
213 6.4.2  Trade  Union  and  Management:  The  Battle  for  Hearts  and  Minds 
The  high  level  of  agreement  with  the  statement,  that  'without  co-ordinated  national 
bargaining,  employees  would  be  constantly  under  threat'  indicates  the  success  of  trade 
union  responses.  Management,  to  a  certain  extent,  foresaw  this  perception  and 
cmphasised  the  continuing  role  of  the  trade  unions  in  local  negotiations.  Again  the 
trade  unions  argued  that  organised  labour  would  be  frozen  out  and  marginalised.  Only 
about  20%  agreed  that  trade  unions  would  still  retain  a  prominent  representational  4-ý 
role,  with  over  60%  believing  they  would  be  unable  to  perform  their  current  role.  The 
trade  unions  also  emphasised  the  threat  to  pay  and  conditions  with  the  abolition  of 
national  collective  bargaining. 
The  overwhelming  majority  of  those  sampled  (95%)  believed  that  pay  rates  and 
conditions  would  fall  in  the  absence  of  national  bargaining.  The  lack  of  ambiguity  on 
this  question  is  reflected  in  the  low  level  of  neutral  responses  (2%).  Another  factor, 
which  has  often  emerged  from  the  bargaining  debate,  is  the  extent  to  which  local 
managers  and  workers  might  share  in  the  risks  and  rewards  of  their  own  business. 
Management's  emphasis  on  segmentation  into  product  areas  has  provoked  a  great 
deal  of  insecurity  from  workers  across  the  airline  who  are  unsure  whether  their  part  of 
the  operation  in  a  standalone  sense  would  be  profitable  enough  to  maintain  existing 
pay  and  conditions. 
One  possible  way  in  which  management  might  overcome  this  suspicion  and  unease  is 
through  the  introduction  of  greater  employee  participation,  perhaps  involving 
ManagementlEmployee  Buy  Outs  (MEBOS)  and  Employee  Share  Ownership 
Programmes  (ESOP).  Management  and  analysts  have  been  the  main  advocates  of  this 
view  and  trade  unions  have  been  largely  critical,  arguing  that  workers  would  be 
forced  into  concessions  with  little  real  prospect  of  reward.  In  fact,  BA  is  adamantly 
opposed  at  the  moment  to  the  use  of  ESOP  within  the  business,  believing  it  would 
lead  to  conflict  and  a  dilution  of  shareholder  interests.  44  Evidence  from  the  United 
States  suggests  the  policy  is  also  responsible  for  a  great  deal  of  inter-union  conflict. 
44  The  pilots  union  BALPA  is  actively  pursuing  an  ESOP  programme  with  BA,  and  is  much  more 
positive  towards  the  issue  than  general  unions  like  the  TGWU. 
214 (NValsh  1994:  126.  )  However,  one  of  the  strategies  in  promoting  bargaining  refon-n 
has  involved  alluding  to  increased  employee  involvement.  The  questionnaire  revealed 
that  only  17%  of  employees  actually  believed  that  they  would  become  more  involved 
in  this  way. 
6.5  Employee  Attitudes:  Wider  Issues 
The  preliminary  findings  point  to  a  high  level  of  scepticism  and  anxiety  about  the 
effects  of  deregulation  on  employment.  Whilst  management  has  sought  to  engineer  a 
culture  of  acceptance  of  change  among  employees,  there  is  often  a  feeling  among 
employees  that  'change  has  gone  too  far'  or  is  for  'change's  sake'.  This  feeling  comes 
across  in  many  of  the  written  comments  on  the  questionnaire.  Many  employees  feel 
that  a  profitable  and  successful  airline  should  not  ask  employees  to  bear  the  burden  of 
deregulatory  change.  Employee  comments  were  invited  in  the  questionnaire  and  these 
provide  some  interesting  observations.  A  selection  of  such  comments  is  given  below. 
These  comments  related  both  to  employment  policies  and  to  company  strategy  and 
practice.  One  ground-handling  employee  complained: 
"Since  privatisation,  BA  has  followed  a  year  on  year 
programme  of  segregation  and  off-loading  of  certain  key 
elements  and  performance  areas  bringing  us  to  this  point  in  time 
whereby  a  massive  cost-cutting  package  is  BA's  next  target  in 
reducing  costs  and  increasing  profits.  Employees  will  instead  of 
feeling  proud  and  happy  to  have  worked  for  BA,  now  be  feeling 
robbed  and  cheated  working  for  a  franchise  or  subsidiary 
company.  '945 
6.5.1  Employee  Perceptions  of  Shareholder  Orientation  and  Short  Terinism. 
A  common  complaint  concerned  the  shareholder  orientation  of  BA  management.  A 
z-;, 
privatisation  success  of  the  1980s,  BA  has  always  prided  itself  on  delivering 
'shareholder  value'.  Perhaps  influenced  by  recent  debates  on  stakeholding  and 
employee  involvement,  employees,  many  themselves  shareholders,  object  to  a  narrow 
shareholder  orientation.  The  following  comment  is  typical: 
45  Employee  comments  questionnaire 
215 "As  a  union  member  I  feel  the  board  should  listen  to  workforce 
ideas  instead  of  trZing  to  please  the  shareholder  at  any  cost  to 
the  labour  force.  'A 
A  common  issue  was  the  perceived  effect  on  morale  amongst  employees  who  felt 
they  were  being  subjected  to  constant  and  disruptive  change.  An  employee  articulated 
the  fears  and  concerns  of  many,  and  also  their  hostility  towards  management  whom 
they  perceived  to  be  insulated  from  those  effects: 
"Staff  are  the  human  cost  in  this  search  to  please  shareholders  and 
the  City  of  London,  while  the  staff  get  poorer  working  conditions 
and  pay,  the  directors  get  richer  i.  e.  their  pay  and  conditions,  share 
options  etc.  This  trend  (changes  in  employment  terms)  makes  your 
whole  life  unstable  and  takes  away  your  ability  to  plan  for  the 
future.  The  feeling  of  insecurity  is  a  terrible  strain  on  life  and 
relationships.  " 
often  this  was  ascribed  to  a  prioritisation  of  shareholder  value  over  employee 
commitment.  Another  Heathrow  based  ground  handling  employee  wrote: 
"The  company  no  longer  respects  or  appreciates  the  hard  work  put 
in  by  employees  ...  the  general  feeling  at  the  present  time,  is  the 
company  couldn't  care  less  for  its  employees  only  it's 
,  A7  shareholders. 
One  pilot  paraphrased  the  views  of  a  famous  'quality  of  workforce'  guru  in  advice  to 
company  Chief  Executive  Robert  Ayling: 
"He  would  do  well  to  read  the  works  of  Dr.  Edwards 
Demming:  Quality  is  more  important  than  saving  a  few  bob. 
Cheap  labour  =  lower  quality,  lower  morale  and  a  poorer 
quality  product  to  the  customer.  An  engineer  employed  by 
BA  itself  will  cost  a  bit  more  than  one  hired  on  the  cheapest 
rates  outside  the  company,  but  the  quality  of  work  on  one 
flight  (due  to  motivation,  morale,  pride  in  company  etc. 
alone)  will  pay  the  difference,  and  it  will  bring  the  customer 
,  A8  back  next  time. 
Another  employee  within  ground  handling  articulated  the  same  point.  He  also 
highlighted  the  paradoxical  effect  on  shareholder  value  of  such  employment  policies: 
46  Employee  comments  questionnaire 
47  Employee  comments  questionnaire 
48  Employee  comments  questionnaire 
216 "Employment  policies  have  changed  to  the  point  that  they  promote 
mistrust  and  are  destabilising  attitudes  to  work.  Instead  of 
concentrating  on  your  job,  you  (are  preoccupied  with)  fear  for  your 
job,  fanffly  and  way  of  life.  None  of  this  can  be  good  for  the 
company.  BA  no  longer  cares  for  its  employees,  which  in  the  long 
run  will  force  conflict  to  the  point  that  the  airline's  money  base,  i.  e. 
share  price  etc.  will  be  badly  damaged.  "49 
6.5.2  Cost  Reduction  in  Crisis  and  Cahn:  The  Perceptions  and  Beliefs  of  Employees 
Most  employees  sampled  accepted  the  need  for  cost  reductions  and  increased 
productivity,  but  a  common  complaint  was  the  manner  in  which  change  was 
introduced.  Many  complained  of  a  lack  of  consultation.  Several  respondents  referred 
to  "only  reading  about  changes  to  your  own  job  in  the  papers.  '950  Others  complained 
of  a  lack  of  concern  from  BA  managers  of  the  'human  impact'  of  employment 
changes.  This  finding  would  accord  with  the  perception  now  widely  held  among 
many  staff  of  management  arrogance  and  high-handedness,  a  factor  which  was  said  to 
be  crucial  in  the  propaganda  battle  between  management  and  the  TGWU  in  the  cabin 
crew  strike  of  Summer  1997.  The  dispute  has  been  ascribed  to  a  breakdown  in  trust 
between  BA  and  its  employees  (Milne  Financial  Times  14.7.97). 
The  following  comment  from  a  ground  services  worker  at  Heathrow  was  fairly 
typical: 
"in  general,  I  think  staff  are  aware  of  the  need  to  reduce  costs  and 
increase  productivity.  What  happens  in  the  real  world  is  that  staff 
are  not  consulted  but  dictated  to  by  both  management  and  trade 
union.  I  feel  it  is  time  to  find  a  way  in  which  the  company  can  talk 
to  staff  in  an  open  and  honest  way  without  a  hidden  agenda.  "51 
it  is  interesting  that  the  respondent  cites  both  trade  union  and  management  as 
complicit  in  the  perceived  problem  of  'lack  of  consultation.  BA  management  may 
well  argue  that  the  employment  changes  they  wish  to  effect  are  necessary  in  the 
longer  term  for  survival  in  an  industry  characterised  by  famine  and  feast.  Although 
there  is  at  least  an  acceptance  by  staff  of  the  need  for  change,  scepticism  does  point  to 
at  least  a  lack  of  staff  accord  with  the  way  in  which  change  is  managed.  In  many 
49  Employee  comments  questionnaire  (author's  words  in  brackets) 
`0  Employee  comments  questionnaire 
51  Employee  comments  questionnaire 
217 ways  BA  is  experiencing  the  problem  identified  by  Hopfl  et  al  of  reconciling  staff 
commitment  and  organisational  change.  (1992:  24-38.  )  These  authors  conducted  a 
climate  survey  during  the  autumn  of  1991  in  the  wake  of  BA's  'Gap  closure 
programme'.  This  cost  cutting  initiative  was  implemented  to  'close  the  gap'  between 
revenues  and  costs  and  involved  the  disposal  of  4,500  staff  and  the  temporary  layoff 
of  some  2,000.  Gap  closure  was  one  of  the  most  painful  episodes  of  corporate 
restructuring  in  the  airline  industry.  The  survey  concluded  that  employees  had  not 
seen  this  traumatic  period  of  downsizing  as  a  betrayal  of  company  values  promoted  in 
the  1980s.  (Ibid.  29) 
The  divergence  between  the  Hopfl  et  at  survey  and  the  initial  findings  of  this  survey 
present  an  interesting  conundrum.  How  do  we  explain  the  hostility  and  disaffection 
apparent  within  this  sample  of  BA  staff,  and  their  findings  in  1992?  Furthermore, 
what  if  anything  does  it  tell  us  about  the  effects  of  deregulation  upon  employment 
generally?  In  terms  of  methodology,  this  study  provides  a  comprehensive  survey  of 
unionised  employee  attitudes,  whilst  the  earlier  study  examined  the  process  of 
restructuring  at  the  corporate  level,  mainly  by  observing  cultural  change  and  the 
actions  of  managers.  The  Hopfl  et  at  study  was  interview  based.  They  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  most  employees,  whilst  reluctant  to  accept  job  cuts  and  lay-offs, 
understood  the  need  for  such  change.  The  ad  hoc  and  crisis  nature  of  the  1991  episode 
was  apparent,  as  the  Gulf  War  had  effectively  killed  off  international  air  travel  for  a 
period.  (ATW  March  1990.  )  A  crisis  situation,  which  was  obvious  to  the  work-force, 
allowed  radical  cost  surgery  with  reluctant  union  support. 
The  present  day  situation  is  radically  different.  Airlines,  such  as  BA,  in  pursuing  their 
global  strategies,  are  asking  staff  to  accept  ongoing  and  relentless  cost  reductions  at  a 
time  when  the  airline  is  profitable.  Staff  are  much  less  amenable  to  such  demands. 
Furthermore,  whilst  in  the  wake  of  1991,  the  carrier  began  to  implement  its 
deregulation  strategy,  inaugurating  regional  operations,  acquiring  stakes  in  European 
carriers,  and  pushing  for  changes  in  the  bargaining  machinery,  it  is  now  clear  that  the 
company  -wants  to  go  much  further.  Policies  of  global  and  local  outsourcing, 
extended  use  of  franchising  and  code  sharing,  greater  proliferation  of  atypical 
contracts  and  demands,  pay  restructuring  for  cabin  crew  and  general  calls  for  much 
greater  flexibility  have  all  been  prominent. 
218 The  carrier  has  become  much  more  forceful  in  demanding  changes  to  work  rules  and 
conditions.  As  the  recent  call  for  staff  cost  reductions  in  the  order  of  fl.  5Bn  (BEP) 
indicates,  the  carrier  is  determined  to  alter  employee  terms  and  conditions  to  fit 
business  needs.  These  employment  changes,  designed  to  obtain  cost  leadership  rather 
than  survival,  are  not  as  well  understood  or  accepted  by  employees,  who  see  a 
profitable  and  healthy  airline  offloading  the  burden  of  change  to  its  staff.  Pilots  in 
balloting  for  strike  action  in  July  1996  indicated  their  own  disaffection  with  this  new 
culture  of  constant  cost  reduction.  BALPA  secured  a  huge  mandate  (94%)  for  strike 
action.  A  strike  was  only  narrowly  avoided.  As  this  initial  analysis  suggests, 
management  determination  to  deliver  ongoing  reductions  in  labour  costs  has  met 
further  employee  opposition  with  the  summer  strikes  of  cabin  crew  and  ground  staff. 
Management  has  been  developing  contingency  plans  to  deal  with  strike  action  by 
ground  handling  staff.  Managers  were  recently  trained  at  a  Ministry  of  Defence 
facility  ostensibly  to  replace  striking  baggage  handlers  (Independent  16.1.97). 
Management  has  been  reluctant  to  negotiate  on  changes  which  they  see  as  necessary 
for  business  survival.  One  issue  of  the  company's  house  magazine,  BA  News,  pointed 
to  dire  consequences  if  cabin  crew  pay  restructuring  and  the  outsourcing  of  catering 
did  not  take  place  (BA  News  27.6.97).  At  the  same  time  the  company  entered  into  a 
compact  with  the  pilots'  union,  BALPA,  which  seemed  designed  to  cultivate  the 
pilots  as  the  most  potentially  powerful  labour  grouping.  (Taylor; Financial  Times  July 
4  1996.  )  Pilots  are  looking  enviously  across  the  Atlantic  towards  the  United  and 
Northwest  Employee  Share  Ownership  Programmes  (ESOPs)  whereby  the  carrier  has 
traded  equity  and  worker  representation  on  the  company  board  for  significant 
concessions. 
Many  written  comments  in  the  questionnaire  refer  to  an  obsession  with  shareholder 
value  often  stating  a  desire  for  some  kind  of  employee  participation.  There  are 
indications,  however,  that  BA  is  hostile  to  the  notion  of  further  worker  participation 
of  this  sort.  The  company  believes  in  employee  share  options  as  an  incentive  and 
discipline  for  its  workforce  but  is  unconvinced  about  the  viability  of  an  ESOP  type 
deal.  Yet  in  the  written  comments  from  the  questionnaire,  many  workers  openly 
advocate  the  use  of  an  ESOP  as  a  way  in  which  they  might  be  bought  in  to  major 
219 changes.  These  have  been  the  preferred  mechanism  of  restructuring  at  Air  France, 
United,  Northwest,  Aer  Lingus  and  a  host  of  other  carriers,  which  have  managed  to 
effect  large  scale  restructuring  without  large-scale  industrial  action. 
Conclusion 
The  identification  of  firm  level  responses  implicit  within  this  chapter  provides  a  rich 
context  to  wider  discussion  about  deregulation  and  employment.  In  particular,  the 
inclusion  of  employee  attitudes,  albeit  on  the  basis  of  a  unionised  sample,  allows 
some  key  propositions  about  deregulation  and  employment  to  be  tested.  We  have  seen 
that  in  general,  workers  tend  to  view  local  initiatives  such  as  regionalisation  and 
increased  numerical  flexibility,  largely  negatively,  probably  because  they  provide  a 
direct  and  material  manifestation  of  the  effects  of  deregulation.  At  the  global  level  the 
issues  becomes  less  definite.  Employees  in  this  sample  accord  with  many  of  the 
broader  management  strategies,  but  when  these  are  'operationalised'at  the  local  level, 
the  belief  is  that  jobs  and  conditions  will  suffer.  The  broad  view  is  one  of  scepticism 
towards  management  and  a  belief  that  conditions  are  under  attack.  Few  workers 
believe  management  assurances  about  deregulation  and  it  is  viewed  as  a  process  of 
worsening  employment  conditions. 
These  perceptions  are  in  line  with  the  existence  of  the  regulatory  overhang 
representing  a  defence  of  regulated  terms  and  conditions  and  scepticism  about  market 
driven  employment  change.  This  determination  to  defend  the  core  terms  and 
conditions  of  the  regulated  era  is  a  constant  whether  we  are  considering  the  regional 
bases  where  change  (at  the  time  of  writing  and  subsequently),  had  made  the  greatest 
inroads),  and  at  the  mainline  London  locations,  where  the  threat  was  as  readily 
apparent.  It  is  apparent  in  every  dimension  of  the  questionnaire  ranging  from  the  local 
effects  of  franchising,  outsourcing  and  low  cost  strategies,  and  the  globalisation 
strategies  driving  the  industry.  At  the  time  of  the  survey  strong  employee  resistance 
was  reflected  in  the  defeat  of  proposals  for  outsourcing  engineering  and  ground 
handling,  although  concessions  were  made,  and  the  BEP  programme  made  some 
inroads  into  regulated  terms  and  conditions.  However  the  fact  of  the  regulatory 
overhang  mean  that  these  changes  were  often  superficial  and  time  specific, 
representing  often  little  more  than  the  periodic  downsizing  witnessed  in  other  periods. 
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address  the  issues  of  employment  restructuring  within  Europe  where  the  regulatory 
overhang  is  deeper  more  embedded,  and  organically  linked  to  a  recent  history  of  state 
ownership  and  subsidy.  The  European  context  is  explored  in  chapter  7. 
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Deregulation  and  Labour  Market  Restructuring 
in  the  European  Airline  Industry 
7.1  Deregulation  and  Labour  Market  Change  in  Europe:  Context 
and  Issues 
"Distressed  state  airlines  in  Europe  at  least,  are  characterised  by  very  powerful 
unions  and  often  by  a  multiplicity  of  different  unions.  Their  power  stems  from 
the  ability  of  almost  every  specialised  group  of  workers  to  bring  an  airline  to  a 
halt.  The  union  leaders  have  traditionally  used  their  power  and  the  threat  of 
strike  action  to  influence  management  decisions  at  every  level.  " 
(Doganis  1996:  26.  ) 
in  the  previous  chapter  we  looked  in  detail  at  management  strategy  and  employee 
attitudes  at  British  Airways.  The  airline  was  used  as  a  critical  case  study  of  the 
emerging  pattern  of  employment  deregulation  within  the  European  airline  industry. 
Building  upon  this  case  study  we  now  widen  our  discussion  to  look  at  the  process  of 
employment  change  within  the  European  airline  industry.  Whilst  the  picture  within 
British  airways  was  of  relatively  trouble  free  restructuring,  despite  the  impact  of  the 
high  profile  cabin  crew  strike,  in  the  wider  European  context  this  is  far  from  the  case. 
The  comments  of  Professor  Rigas  Doganis  above,  an  academic  economist,  made 
shortly  after  his  resignation  in  1996  as  chairman  of  the  struggling  Greek  carrier 
Olympic,  are  indicative  of  the  intractable  nature  of  European  airline  restructuring. 
They  reflect  his  disenchantment  at  the  power  of  government  and  trade  unions  to 
frustrate  changes  he  believed  were  crucial  to  the  airline's  very  survival.  Doganis's 
comments  provide  a  useful  starting  point  for  our  assessment  of  the  nature  of 
deregulation  and  labour  market  change  in  Europe  (Skapink-er  1996).  Other  airline 
222 
h.  - executives  face  this  problem  of  managing  restructuring  in  a  context  of  labour  unrest. 
Thus,  industrial  relations  have  become  a  central  feature  of  the  airline  scene. 
Such  restructuring  episodes  and  others  at  Sabena,  Alitalia  and  Iberia  seem  to  confirm 
the  stereotype  of  European  airline  unions  presented  in  most  of  the  rent  seeking 
literature.  The  unions  are  deemed  to  have  become  too  powerful  in  defence  of  both 
wages  and  work  rules.  The  wages  of  airline  workers  were  seen  as  one  of  the  last 
bastions  of  corporatist  featherbedding,  a  product  of  rent  seeking  by  powerful  unions, 
who  kept  fares  artificially  high  and  pressured  governments  to  preserve  their  Byzantine 
work  rules,  fostering  an  inefficient  industry.  Management  inertia  seemed  to  bolster 
the  situation  and  allow  unions  free  reign.  This  portrait  of  the  situation  of  airline  labour 
and  management  very  much  informed  the  policy  debate  around  airline  deregulation  in 
the  Europe  up  to  and  including  the  nineties.  (Neven  and  Rbller  1996  933-940.  )  In 
many  ways,  the  situation  within  the  European  airline  industry  in  the  mid  to  late  1990s 
conforms  to  the  labour  inarket  restnicturing  model  of  deregulation  discussed  in 
chapter  1.  The  industry  was  perceived  for  many  years  by  managers,  government  and 
academics  to  be  in  dire  need  of  restructuring  and  labour  and  industrial  relations  were 
often  the  focus  for  criticism.  In  this  chapter  we  will  examine  how  these  assumptions, 
particularly  the  belief  that  European  airline  workers  were  both  over-paid  and  under 
productive,  came  to  influence  management  strategy,  and  the  effect  of  such  strategies 
upon  airline  labour. 
In  order  to  do  this,  the  chapter  addresses  four  key  questions.  Firstly,  to  what  extent  are 
labour  costs  and  productivity  in  Europe,  perceived  as  a  problem  by  airline 
management  in  the  deregulated  environment?  Secondly,  how  are  management 
addressing  this  perceived  problem  and  thirdly,  how  is  organised  labour  within  the 
industry  responding  to  these  challenges?  The  fourth  and  overarching  question  deals 
with  the  extent  to  which  European  airline  res(ructuring  conforms  to  the  models  of 
labour  market  deregulation,  described  in  chapter  1.  The  chapter  also  points  to  a  wider 
convergence  addressed  in  the  final  chapter. 
To  address  the  first  question  we  will  examine  the  evidence  on  airline  pay  and 
productivity  within  Europe  using  a  variety  of  sources.  Thus  we  will  examine  the  study 
conducted  by  Avmark  on  behalf  of  the  European  Union,  which  conducted  a  pay  and 
223 productivity  comparison  between  Europe  and  the  US.  Our  second  main  approach  in 
this  section  is  to  review  evidence  on  the  so-called  airline  premium,  the  additional 
waae  and  conditions  benefit  which  has  been  identified  as  accruin,,  to  airline  workers  C)  C. 
in  Europe.  (European  Union  1994.  )  Again  this  involves  the  use  of  Avmark,  ICAO  and 
UK  earnings  data  in  order  to  provide  a  fuller  picture  of  the  wage  premium.  Having 
identified  the  premium  and  the  massive  competitive  pressures  of  the  airline 
environment,  we  examine  how  carriers  are  seeking  to  reduce  costs  by  targeting 
premium  wage  rates. 
For  the  second  question,  therefore,  we  will  consider  the  strategies  of  airline 
management  in  securing  lower  labour  costs  within  the  deregulated  environment.  The 
strategies  of  franchising,  outsourcing,  the  creation  of  internal  low  cost  subsidiaries 
and  the  threat  from  low  cost  operations  are  all  pivotal  in  airline  strategies. 
Thirdly  we  examine  the  detailed  process  of  restructuring  using  several  case  studies  in 
addition  to  the  BA  example.  The  labour  strategies  of  these  European  carriers 
operating  within  different  labour  market  and  industrial  relations  contexts  will  be 
examined,  along  with  labour's  response.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  extent  and  depth  of 
management  and  labour  response  is  very  much  influenced  by  the  regulatory 
environment  within  both  the  national  and  supranational  context.  In  order  to  begin  our 
discussion  we  need  to  quickly  review  the  effects  of  deregulation  upon  European 
airlines. 
7.1.1  European  Airline  Labour.  Caught  in  the  Slipstream  of  Deregulation? 
Whilst  many  writers  have  voiced  concerns  that  European  airlines  faced  too  many 
obstacles  for  effective  deregulated  competition,  a  new  competitive  product  and  labour 
market  regime  is  being  established.  (Poole/CAA1989),  Doganis  (1994),  Hanlon 
(1996).  In  many  ways,  European  airline  labour  has  had  to  adjust  over  a  much  shorter 
time  period  than  airline  labour  in  the  United  States.  (Marin  1998:  903.  )  The  pressures 
can  be  attributed  to  three  key  factors  related  to  the  extent  of  competition,  as 
liberalisation  takes  hold  bringing  a  range  of  competitive  threats.  Firstly,  the  threat  of 
'early  adapting'  carriers  which  have  managed  costs  and  developed  alliance 
relationships  in  response  to  earlier  deregulation  and  now  threaten  the  core  business  of 
224 weaker  carriers.  These  strong  competitors  can  draw  traffic  away  from  weaker  carriers 
through  their  extensive  hub  and  spoke  networks  and  compete  on  internal  routes  in 
most  countries.  Secondly,  a  range  of  low  cost  entrants  threatens  incumbents  with  their 
abilit  to  compete  on  price  and  cost.  These  carriers  expose  the  high  cost  base  of  such  y0 
carriers  and  pose  a  threat  to  the  more  dynamic  'early  adapting'  carriers  such  as  British 
Airways,  SAS,  KLM  and  Lufthansa.  Thirdly,  flag  carrier  airlines  in  most  countries 
have  traditionally  benefited  from  state  ownership  and  sponsorship,  particularly 
through  subsidy.  These  subsidies  insulated  even  the  most  chronically  inefficient 
carrier  from  the  threat  of  bankruptcy.  Now,  as  states  increasingly  offload  that 
responsibility  and  as  supranational  competition  rules  render  such  policies  illegal, 
these  carriers  must  adapt  or  die.  It  is  the  very  speed  and  extent  of  these  processes 
which  threatens  the  traditional  compact  between  the  state  and  airline  labour.  The 
European  State  has  become  increasingly  concerned  at  the  competitiveness  of  major 
industries  identifying  a  significant  cost  disadvantage  with  US  competitors.  It  seems 
appropriate,  therefore,  to  look  at  these  issues  of  labour  costs  and  productivity  to  set 
events  in  context. 
7.1.2  The  Comparative  Labour  Cost  and  Productivity  Debate 
Europe's  airline  industry  has  long  been  identified  as  a  high  cost  sector.  The  diagnosis 
has  come  primarily  from  economists  but  also  from  management,  and  has  been  driven 
by  a  number  of  key  analyses,  all  of  which  compare  Europe  unfavourably  with  the  US 
(See  chapter  4).  Most  studies,  controlling  for  variables  such  as  route  length  and 
aircraft  type,  have  Europe's  airline  industry  as  one  of  high  labour  cost/low 
productivity.  Earlier  analyses  such  as  Windle  (1991:  31-49)  have  been  supplemented 
by  later  studies  such  as  the  work  of  Neven  and  R61ler  (1996:  933-940),  Vass  (1997: 
8),  Ourn  and  Yu  (1998:  chapter  5).  52 
Some  econometric  studies  have  attempted  to  provide  a  more  grounded  understanding 
of  the  airline  industry.  Encoua,  for  example,  showed  that  though  in  most  cases 
52  Seabright  P  (1997:  509)  'European  Airline  Deregulation;  An  Analysis  of  Productivity  and  Cost 
0  Factors'  European  Economic  Review.  codes  for  'political  interference'  as  though  the  role  of  the  state  0 
were  simply  to  interfere  Whilst  difficult  factors  such  as  the  role  of  the  state  have  to  be  modelled,  the 
sophistication  of  systems  of  the  econometric  specification  is  often  marred  by  quite  crude  assumptions. 
225 deregulation  is  supposed  to  lead  to  short  run  efficiency  gains,  it  often  leads  to  a  short 
run  reduction  in  efficiency  as  carriers  adjust  to  the  new  environment  and  structure 
their  operation  accordingly.  This  is  the  case  even  for  late  adjusting'  carriers  such  as 
Iberia,  Alitalia.  and  Air  France.  (Encoua  1991:  109-24.  )  In  a  later  study,  Marin  found 
that  European  airlines  were  becoming  more  efficient,  identifying  a  closure  of  the  gap 
between  US  and  European  carriers.  (1998:  395-414.  )  Alamdari  also  indicates  that 
product  market  pressures  arising  from  deregulation  have  rendered  European  airlines 
more  efficient.  (1997:  16.  )  Earlier  work  by  Alamdari  and  Morell  showed  that 
European  airlines  were  achieving  significant  productivity  increases,  leading  to 
reduced  unit  labour  costs,  although  these  were  sometimes  offset  by  higher  wages. 
(Alamdari  and  Morell  1997:  53.  )  So  whilst  labour  costs  have  been  seen  as  an 
important  and  even  crucial  aspect  of  the  European  airline  restructuring  debate,  there  is 
evidence  to  show  that  European  labour  costs  may  be  less  intractable  than  many 
authors  have  assumed.  Other  evidence  on  labour  costs  provides  a  more  disaggregated 
picture.  In  order  to  examine  the  issue  further  we  will  now  look  at  some  such  evidence. 
Whilst  such  models  are  useful  in  mapping  out  the  terrain  of  the  debate,  there  is  a  need 
for  case  based  and  long  run  data,  which  provides  an  understanding  of  the  institutional 
richness  and  complexity  of  the  airline  industry.  Since  each  airline  is  governed  and 
regulated  by  its  own  unique  industrial  relations  structures  and  the  nature  of  its  airline 
product  market,  more  often  than  not  real  explanation  lies  within  these  areas.  It  is 
useful  to  look  in  some  depth  at  premium  wages  because  their  existence  informs  much 
of  the  criticism  of  European  airline  labour.  What  is  the  scope  and  nature  of  the 
premium?  Who  receives  it  and  how  much,  what  are  the  ownership  and 
institutional/national  differences?  The  following  section  seeks  to  unpack  some  of  the 
issues  around  the  air  transport  premium  wage. 
7.1.3  The  Avnmrk  Research  Evidence  on  European  Airline  Labour  Costs 
In  1995,  Avmark  the  aviation  consultancy,  undertook  a  thorough  analysis  of  labour 
costs  and  productivity  for  the  European  Union.  Using  1993  data  due  to  lags  in  the 
publication  of  later  data,  they  attempted  to  measure  labour  cost  between  the  US  and 
The  state  can  play  a  variety  of  roles  and  to  assume  its  role  is  only  that  of  'political  interference'  is  to 
226 Europe.  Though  the  evidence  is  time  dependent,  it  provides  a  useful  insight  into 
perceptions  of  the  airline  cost  and  productivity  problem,  and  indeed  still  shapes  much 
of  the  latter  day  policy  response.  The  report  was  prepared  for  the  European  Union 
Comiti  De  Sages,  which  was  then  grappling  with  the  problem  of  European  airline 
restructuring.  Avmark's  remit was  to  compare  the  differences  in  labour  costs  between 
the  US  and  Europe  comparing  labour  costs  and  the  social  cost  of  employment 
between  1988  and  1992.  (Avmark  1993.  )  The  analysis  provides  a  good  comparator  of 
later  changes  in  labour  cost  which  can  be  gleaned  from  IATA  and  ICAO  productivity 
data.  Absolute  levels  of  labour  cost  in  1992  (defined  in  the  report  as  gross  salary  plus 
social  charges)  were  found  to  be  $55,067  per  employee  for  European  carriers  and 
$52,257  per  worker  for  US  carriers,  a  difference  of  5  per  cent.  European  gross  salaries 
were  found  to  be  10  per  cent  higher  than  US  salaries,  but  this  was  offset  by  the  fact 
that  social  charges  were  9.8  per  cent  lower.  (Ibid.  )  As  the  Avmark  researchers 
commented,  "The  finding  that  US  social  charges  are  above  the  European  average 
challenges  a  widely  held  view  in  the  European  aviation  industry".  (Ibid.  )  Key  labour 
cost  and  productivity  comparisons  are  given  below  in  table  7.1 
Table  7.1  Change  In  key  Labour  Cost  and  Productivity  Indicators  USA/Europe 
1988-92  Four  Year  Average) 
Average  Average  Average  Average  growth 
growth  growth  growth 
Employees  Salary  costs  Productivity  Lab  expenses 
European  Average  1.7%  9.29%  5.08%  4.28% 
US  Average  9.07%  12.60%  1.19%  -0.34% 
Source:  Avmark  1995 
The  performance  of  US  carriers  lags  that  of  the  European  carriers,  though  some 
qualifications  should  be  made.  Firstly,  US  carriers  have  already  achieved  significant 
productivity  growth  in  the  1980s  rendering  relative  gains  predictably  smaller. 
Secondly,  both  salary  growth  and  employee  growth  are  higher  because  the  US  is  at  a 
more  advanced  stage  of  deregulation,  where  there  is  more  job  creation.  In  addition, 
the  effect  of  wage  'givebacks'  may  exaggerate  the  US  wage  figures.  Nevertheless, 
adopt  a  particularly  one-dimensional  view. 
227 there  are  signs  of  a  marked  improvement  in  European  productivity,  a  restraint  of 
employment  growth  and  a  reduction  in  labour  expenditure  (See  also  table  7.2).  This 
would  suggest  initially  that  attacks  on  European  salaries  might  exaggerate  the  airline 
premium,  and  that  wages  are  seen  as  a  recurring  cost  factor,  which  has  to  be  driven 
down. 
It  is  also  interesting  to  use  the  data  to  compare  the  performances  of  different  European 
carriers;  in  particular  we  should  consider  both  productivity  and  wage/employment 
growth.  At  Lufthansa,  employment  growth  was  double  that  of  productivity.  Iberia  was 
long  seen  as  one  the  most  inefficient  carriers  in  terms  of  overall  productivity,  yet  it 
managed  to  increase  productivity  by  5  per  cent  Oust  above  average)  whilst  holding 
employment  growth  below  average  at  I  per  cent.  Aer  Lingus,  another  carrier  whose 
record  on  productivity  has  been  criticised,  was  able  to  achieve  a  decrease  in 
employment  of  3-4  per  cent  whilst  productivity  increased  by  8  per  cent.  The  reasons 
for  differing  performance  are  complex  and  effects  such  as  the  margin  for 
improvement  should  be  taken  into  account.  Nevertheless,  the  data  does  show  that 
growth  in  employment  was  being  carefully  restrained  whilst  productivity  was 
increasing.  This  at  a  time  when  European  airlines  were  only  beginning  to  emerge 
from  state  control  and  beginning  to  restructure.  The  comparison  with  US  carriers 
below  throws  some  further  light  on  the  extent  to  which  European  carriers  were 
beginning  the  process  of  labour  market  adjustment.  The  country  data  and  the 
comparison  data  were  computed  using  the  Avmark  data. 
C) 
Table  7.2  Change  In  Key  Labour  Cost  and  Productivity  Indicators  for  Selected 
Fiirnnpan  Carriers.  1989-1992 
Carrier  Average  % 
growth 
Average  % 
growth 
Average  % 
growth 
Average  % 
growth 
Employees  Salaries  Productivity  Labour  expenses 
Aer  Lingus  -3.57  2.3  7.76  -7.69 
Air  France  4.10  10.84  1.52  -5.87 
Alitalia  0.38  13.52  7.64  -5.51 
British  Airways  -0.63  6.97  6.91  -0.15 
Iberia  1.29  10.43  5.18  3.54 
KLM  1.87  2.75  6.41  -7.15 
L.  ufthansa  5.69  11.67  01)  2.92  0.97 
SAS  -2.42  6.86  6.69  -1.57 
SwisLaLir  0.35  6.87  4.89  0.12 
TAP  3.82  15.74  3.11  0.64 
228 Source:  Avmark  1995 
Whilst  change  is  proceeding  in  European  airlines,  it  is  often  argued  that  wages  and 
benefits  are  still  large  in  comparison  to  external  industries.  Faced  by  failing  yields  and 
increased  competition,  management  is  targeting  airline  wages.  Airline  workers  have 
traditionally  been  paid  premium  wages  for  comparable  jobs,  the  so-called  Airline 
Wage  Premium  (AWP).  (See  Dooley  1989:  169-190.  )  is  the  difference  between  the 
the  earnings  of  airline  workers  and  those  in  comparable  non  airline  jobs.  The  AWP  is 
usually  expressed  as  a  ratio  over  national  salaries.  In  1992  the  report  of  the  Comite  De 
Sages  identified  a  significant  premium  within  Europe  in  1992  in  terms  of  average 
national  earnings,  as  table  7.3  indicates. 
Table  7.3  Comparisons  of  the  Airline  Wage  Premium:  Europe  and  USA  1992 
Europe  AWP  USA  AWP 
Portugal  (TAP)  2.8  Delta  1.1 
Italy  (Alitalia)  1.7  US  Air  1.0 
Germany  (Lufthansa)  1.5  United  1.0 
Spain  (Iberia)  1.3  American  1.0 
UK  (British  Airways)  1.2  Southwest  0.9 
Scandinavia  (SAS)  1.1  Continental  0.8 
France  (Air  France)  1.0 
Ireland  (Aer  Lingus)  0.9 
Netherlands  (KLM)  0.9 
Switzerland  (Swissair)  0.9 
UK  (Virgin)  0.9 
Austria  (Lauda  Air)  0.8 
UK  (British  Midland)  0.7 
European  Big  Six  1.1  US  Big  Six  1.0 
Avera2e  Avera2e 
Source:  calculated  from  Avmark  1995 
The  1992  comparison  for  example  identified  a  European  AVVT  effect  of  as  much  as 
I.  I.  In  other  words,  airline  employment  brought  up  to  10  per  cent  higher  relative 
earnings  than  in  outside  industry.  Part  of  the  reason  for  this  differential  is  the  mix  of 
relatively  high  earning  occupations  within  the  industry.  Pilots  and  skilled  technicians, 
whose  earnings  are,  in  any  case,  higher,  are  bound  to  inflate  such  comparisons. 
(Avmark  1993.  ) 
229 However  within  relatively  low  skilled  grades  such  as  cabin  crew  there  is  significant 
variation  between  different  airlines,  often  reflecting  the  varied  national  and 
institutional  contexts. 
Table  7.4  Cabin  Crew  Salaries  Europe  and  USA. 
Cabin  Crew  Salaries  In  Europe  $US  1975-1997 
1975  1980  1985  1995  1997 
Sabena  19,862  20,705  23,868  32,776  *37,372 
Air  France  13,135  25,191  19,257  68,809a  *37,372 
Lufthansa  14,914  29,889  23,318  59,131  *37,372 
Aer  Lingus  5,929  10,721  16,632  32,776  37,372 
Alitalia  14,727  36,261  23,199  32,776  37,372 
KIM  8,607  30,044  23,595  32,776  37,372 
TAP  8,908  15,084  14,763  44,233  41,784 
SAS  15,188  23,913  23,199  60,486  60,224 
Iberia  14,683  25,737  23,199  68,122  61,695 
Swissair  8,607  28,632  24,540  32,776  37,372 
British  Airways  6,407  15,870  14,181  29,550  29,957 
British  Midland  3,035  10,971  10,689  21,221  28,860 
Air  UK  8,607  7,430  23,199  32,776  17,535 
Virgin  ----  ----  9,887  19,283  19,242 
American  12,070  18,236  26,765  29,036  33,995 
US  Air  13,379  18,936  29,657  34,996  36,501 
Continental  8,607  18,372  16,194  27,203  34,292 
Delta  ý  13,315  18,934  28,703  29,985  34,952 
Northwest  8,936  18,881  27,541  30,927  29,975 
TWA  11,287  21,302  34,316  26,751  24,569 
United  10,114  21,251  27,293  43,496  32,257 
Mean  8,607  21,821  23,199  36,053  37,372 
INDEX  1980  39  100  106  165  171 
INDEX  1985  37  94  100  155  161 
Source:  ICAO  Fleet  and  Personnel  Statistics  (selected  years) 
*estimated  from  high  wage  mean 
The  cabin  crew  salary  comparison  provided  above  in  table  7.4  demonstrates  the  wide 
variation  between  different  nations  and  shows  a  definite  ownership  effect.  The  index 
shows  a  slowing  of  earnings  growth  since  1995.  However  it  also  shows  that  even 
within  highly  paid  state  carriers  cabin  crew  earnings  are  coming  under  pressure. 
Carriers  such  as  Iberia,  SAS  and  TAP  who  continue  to  lead  the  field  in  cabin  crew 
salaries  have  suffered  real  reductions.  Iberia  cabin  crew  earnings  have  declined  by  10 
per  cent  in  absolute  terms  between  1995  and  1997.  There  has  also  been  a  fall  in 
earnings  at  the  US  carriers  TWA  and  Northwest,  where  cabin  crew  have  undergone 
230 significant  pay  restructuring.  Only  the  privatised  airlines  have  registered  significant 
increases,  although  they  start  from  a  much  lower  position  than  the  flao,  carriers.  0 
As  the  cabin  crew  comparison  indicates  there  is  a  significant  'Southern  European 
effect.  '  A  1994  analysis  identified  a  significant  premium  within  carriers  such  as 
Alitalia,  Iberia,  and  TAP.  Their  combined  AWP  effect  at  1.9:  1  is  twice  that  of  average 
national  salaries.  The  AWP  seems  to  be  higher  for  state  carriers,  but  only  just,  though 
there  are  outliers  such  as  TAP,  where  airline  workers  on  average  earn  nearly  two  and 
a  half  times  as  much  as  those  in  other  industries.  This  perhaps  explains  the  eagerness 
of  management  at  these  carriers  and  others  such  as  Sabena  and  Iberia  for  drastic  cost 
containment.  In  addition,  there  is  a  large  gap  between  the  AWP  levels  for  private 
(0.9:  1)  and  state-controlled  carriers  (13:  1).  This  differential  suggests  that  for  this 
sample  of  carriers  at  least,  state  ownership  is  a  significant  predictor  of  higher  overall 
compensation  levels  (though  this  level  is  by  no  means  uniform).  Initial  analysis  also 
suggests  that  there  is  an  institutional  effect  related  to  the  nature  of  ownership.  Those 
carriers,  such  as  British  Airways,  KLM  and  SAS,  which  have  been  privatised  have 
average  combined  AWP  of  I  (i.  e.  airline  workers'  salaries  are  about  the  same  as  the 
national  average).  However  in  certain  functions  such  as  ground  handling  and 
unskilled  maintenance  jobs  BA  workers  are  paid  significantly  more. 
The  survey  in  chapter  6  indicated  the  extent  to  which  workers  identified  this  regulated 
wage  and  conditions  premium,  indicating  the  scope,  even  after  13  years  of  private 
ownership,  for  reduction.  From  that  point  of  view,  average  comparisons  can  be 
misleading.  Interestingly,  those  airlines,  which  have  never  been  in  public  ownership, 
had  an  AVYT  around  20  per  cent  lower  than  those  who  had  previously  been  state 
owned.  This  provides  evidence  for  the  concept  of  a  'regulatory  overhang'  in  terms  of 
the  previous  regulation/state  ownership  of  the  industry,  indicating  that  even  after 
privatisation,  wages  continue  to  outstrip  those  of  exclusively  private  competitors. 
Vass  identifies  a  productivity  factor  of  32  per  cent  attributable  to  ownership.  (Vass 
1997:  26.  )  The  importance  to  our  discussion  of  the  AWP  is  that  a  perception  exists 
among  airline  executives  that  costs  can  be  reduced  relatively  easily  because  a  surplus 
exists.  (Neven  and  R61ler  1996:  933-940.  )  Thus,  managers  can  be  expected  to  pursue 
reductions  in  wages  and  benefits,  particularly  in  the  high  cost  carriers.  There  is  a 
counter  perception  among  airline  employees  that  airline  wage  premia  are  an  expected 
231 component  of  the  employment  package  of  large  airlines,  promoting  resistance  to  any 
erosion,  as  we  have  seen  in  chapters  5  and  6  in  the  case  of  British  Airways.  Though 
the  airline  wage  premium  is  given  as  an  aggregate  figure  in  the  research  literature,  it  is 
worthwhile  comparing  airline  earnings  with  national  salaries,  in  order  to  determine  its 
extent.  This  is  the  task  of  the  next  section,  which  will  compare  wages  in  air  transport 
with  other  sectors  in  order  to  provide  a  deeper  look  at  the  premium. 
7.1.4  The  UK  Air  Transport  Wage  Premiltin 
Even  within  more  deregulated  labour  markets  such  as  the  UK,  airline  workers  have 
tended  to  preserve  pay  and  conditions.  The  New  Eamings  Sun,  ey  provides  useful 
comparative  information  on  the  nature  of  this  premium  within  the  UK.  (Dept 
Employment/ONS  1984-96.  )  Air  transport  wages  were  analysed  and  compared  with 
wages  prevailing  in  manufacturing  over  the  tenyear  period  between  1986  and  1996. 
Although  the  data  are  disaggregated  and  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  occupational  data  at 
the  appropriate  time  periods,  it  gives  a  flavour  of  the  overall  trend.  Figure  7.1  below, 
indicates  the  resilience  of  air  transport  wages  generally,  on  the  basis  of  gross  weekly 
earnings,  again  an  imperfect  measure  but  one  which  captures  the  comparison  between 
different  sectors.  Whilst  we  are  unable  to  look  at  the  earnings  of  particular  groups,  the 
data  allow  comparison  between,  for  example,  airline  workers  in  general  employment 
and  outside  comparators  providing  a  broad  picture  of  comparative  trends.  In  1986, 
one  Year  before  the  privatisation  of  BA,  gross  pay  for  male  manual  workers  in  air 
transport  was  around  20  per  cent  higher  than  in  manufacturing,  by  1996  and  almost 
ten  years  of  privatisation,  that  gap  had  actually  widened  by  around  a  third. 
Even  in  nations  where  management  has  been  empowered  and  where  the  external 
industrial  relations  environment  is  favourable,  these  higher  then  average  earnings 
persist  and  more  continue  to  rise.  The  wage  trends  demonstrated  above  are  further 
amplified  when  we  consider  the  distribution  of  wages  in  air  transport  in  comparison 
with  those  in  other  sectors.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  pay  is  higher  on  average  within 
air  transport  than  within  other  industrial  sectors.  In  1996,  the  percentage  of  the  air 
transport  workforce  surveyed  earning  less  than  E220  was  only  66  per  cent  of  that  in 
surface  transport.  Taking  the  upper  level  figure,  we  can  see  that  the  percentage  of  air 
transport  workers,  whose  gross  earnings  fell  below  E400,  was  only  40  per  cent.  It  is 
almost  certain  that  one  explanation  for  this  relatively  high  level  of  air  transport 
232 camings  is  the  distorting  effect  of  outsourcing  around  certain  manual  grades  such  as  C  C-  Cý  -- 
catering,  cleaning  and  other  ancillary  services.  These  areas  howeNer  are  still  counted 
within  the  air  transport  category.  and  the  aggregated  effect  continues  to  be  one  of 
higher  earnings  in  air  transport. 
Figure  7.1  Earnings  Cornparison:  Air'Fransport  and  Other  Sectors 
Sectoral  Wage  Comparison  1986-1997 
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Figure  7.2  Earnings  Distribution  Coniparison:  Air  Transport  and  Other  Sectors 
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Year With  demonstrably  higher  wages  in  air  transport  than  in  the  comparable  service 
sector,  it  is  little  wonder  that  airline  managers  have  embarked  on  a  concerted  policy  of  I-) 
cost  reduction  as  they  face  a  fiercely  competitive  environment. 
7.2  Targeting  Labour:  Management  Strategy  In  the  European  Airline 
Industry 
As  detailed  in  the  previous  section,  the  existence  of  premium  wages  and  conditions 
are  seen  as  a  major  obstacle  to  airline  restructuring.  The  need  for  lower  costs  is  driven 
by  two  principal  factors,  the  existence  of  low  cost  competitors  who  exemplify  the 
need  for  lower  costs,  and  secondly  by  the  emergence  of  a  global  division  of  labour 
within  the  industry,  which  has  seen  many  activities  once  carried  out  as  in-house 
functions,  subject  to  outsourcing  and  other  forms  of  cost  control.  Indeed  innovation 
has  proceeded  to  such  an  extent  that  many  airlines  have  been  accused  by  their  trade 
unions  of  seeking  to  operate  'virtual  operations,  where  the  airline  itself  becomes  a 
marketing  asset,  selling  seats,  and  leaving  other  inputs  to  an  array  of  subcontractors 
and  franchisees.  Whilst  the  industry  is  far  from  that  model,  the  existence  of  low  cost 
innovation,  and  the  threat  of  consolidation  has  forced  a  re-examination  of  the  airline 
industry's  entire  production  strategy,  in  order  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  new 
environment.  This  process  has  already  taken  place  in  industries  such  as  auto 
manufacture  and  semiconductors  but  for  the  airline  industry  with  its  stable, 
operationally  led  culture,  it  is  something  of  a  revolution.  The  push  towards  these  new 
strategies  is  examined  below. 
7.2.1  Lean  Production  In  the  Air  and  Market  Rates 
Airline  employers  have  since  the  early  1990s  focused  on  obtaining  market  rates; 
namely  the  rates  of  pay  offered  by  the  low  cost  providers,  whether  low  cost  airlines 
such  as  Easyjet  and  Ryanair  or  low  cost  'service  providers'  such  as  Midland  Air 
Services  and  Servisair.  Pre-existing  operations  have  also  become  the  model  for  cost 
reduction,  such  as  the  charter  sector  demonstrates.  53  (See  also  chapter  3.  )  Easyjet,  for 
53  The  marginal  operating  costs  of  the  charter  type  service  providers  are  low.  They  tend  to  pay  wages  C' 
below  those  of  the  scheduled  operators,  tend  to  have  greater  flexibility  of  employment,  lower  general 
overheads  and  much  higher  utilisation  of  both  labour  and  capital  (Doganis  1994:  Chap  7).  The  charter 
carriers  subcontract  most  support  services,  as  they  are  necessarily  seasonal  in  nature.  These  cost 
234 example,  has  tended  to  subcontract  aircraft  and  pilots  from  other  carriers.  Its 
marketing  operation  is  based  on  the  successful  telesales  concepts  pioneered  by 
financial  services  firms  such  as  Direct  Line,  with  a  lean  back  office  operation.  Cabin 
crews  are  recruited  from  'non  traditional  sources'  and  wear  casual  uniforms, 
deliberately  breaking  with  the  'stuffy'  dress  code  of  scheduled  airlines.  Check  in  staff 
are  subcontracted  as  are  ground  staff.  (Feldman  1997:  23.  )  Low  cost  carriers  exercise 
just  as  much  of  an  impact  upon  employment  as  they  do  on  fares  as  the  US  experience 
has  shown.  The  recent  entrant  low  cost  carriers  such  as  Easyjet,  Ryanair,  and  Virgin 
Express  provide  ready  labour  cost  comparisons  for  major  airlines,  particularly  on 
short-stage  length  low  yield  routes.  On  these  routes,  labour  intensity  is  highest  and 
labour  costs  are  most  crucial.  (Perreira/ILO  1996  1-29.  )  Low  cost  airlines  are  not  the 
only  threat  to  airline  labour,  there  is  a  simultaneous  impact  from  low  cost  service 
providers;  this  is  discussed  in  the  following  section. 
In  labour  intensive  areas  such  as  ground  services,  labour  costs  typically  account  for 
some  63-78%  of  overall  costs.  (British  Airways  1996.  )  With  relatively  high  'national' 
rates  resulting  from  national  bargaining,  there  is  considerable  scope  for  wage 
reductions.  In  countries  such  as  the  UK,  Netherlands  and  Ireland  liberalisation  of  such 
services  has  already  placed  downward  pressure  on  the  airline  premium.  BA  has 
already  started  to  apply  low  cost  strategies  to  ground  handling.  Two  tier  wage  rates 
have  been  introduced  in  mainline  and  regional  operations  have  been  forced  to  offer 
concessions.  All  the  while,  senior  workers  have  had  their  pay  and  conditions 
protected,  in  the  belief  that  natural  wastage  will  flatten  pay  scales  and  deliver  a  lower 
cost  structure  in  time.  In  1996,  BA  identified  the  need  for  savings  of  E7.5  million  in 
ground  handling  to  achieve  competitiveness.  The  airline  faces  competition  from  rival 
ground  handling  contractors  such  as  Servisair/Midland  Air  Services.  The  projected 
cost  gap,  for  example,  between  BA  at  current  wage  rates,  was  estimated  variously  at 
between  6  and  9  million  pounds.  To  give  an  example  of  this  cost  gap,  at  Glasgow, 
Servisair's  cost  structure  is  nearly  one  third  lower  than  BA.  Other  providers  such  as 
Northwest  Airlines  have  costs  in  terms  of  salaries,  pensions,  and  overtime  rules  that 
are  40  per  cent  lower  than  those  of  BA. 
structures  are  reflected  in  new  entrant  carriers,  who  seek  to  emulate  the  charter  operators  but  because  of 
the  nature  of  their  operations  are  still  relatively  high  cost  by  comparison.  (Feldman  1996:  16.  ) 
C, 
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Lý Whilst  the  UK  has  seen  fierce  competition  in  the  area  of  service  provision,  the 
existence  of  local  ground  handling  monopolies  has  protected  labour  conditions  at 
other  European  airports.  Cost  comparisons  indicate  that  at  airports  where  there  are 
more  than  two  ground  handling  companies,  costs  are  markedly  lower,  as  occurs  in  the 
UK.  (Stockman  1996:  53.  )  In  response  to  ever  increasing  demands  from  airlines  for 
lower  costs,  the  European  Union  has  recently  undertaken  a  major  initiative  to 
deregulate  airport  ground  handling,  where  costs  are  seen  as  an  obstacle  to  market 
entry.  (Parry  1996:  62,  also  chapter  8.  )  Increasing  regulatory  intervention  in  areas 
such  as  ground  handling  is  premised  upon  the  need  for  fair  competition,  but 
undoubtedly  helps  airlines  to  manage  and  control  labour  costs.  (See  Bonassies  1996: 
4-8.  )  The  combined  effects  of  both  low  cost  operations  and  the  threat  of  external 
providers  in  areas  like  ground  handling  are  supplemented  by  another  threat  to  airline 
conditions,  namely  the  proliferation  of  franchising  and  outsourcing.  In  the  next 
section,  we  look  at  these  trends. 
7.2.2  Making  the  Local  Global.  Outsourcing  and  Franchising  Strategies  in  Core 
Service  Provision 
In  order  to  appreciate  the  pressures  on  airlines  and  their  labour  forces,  it  is  worth 
looking  at  some  common  strategic  approaches  used  by  management  to  assess  their 
position  within  the  global  industry  structure.  One  such  approach  is  typified  below  in 
Table  7.5.  This  McKinsey  analysis  points  to  three  emerging  carrier  types:  the 
'network  manager,  the  'capacity  providerand  the  'service  provider  .' 
Table  7.5  Airline  Types  and  Strategies  After  Deregulation 
Network  To  integrate  a  network  of  Access  to  global,  BA,  Air  France, 
Manager  services  based  on  marketin-  network,  with  major  Lufthansa 
whilst  purchasing  both  flying  hub  don-driation  etc. 
and  non  flying  services  from 
other  providers  or  suppliers 
Capacity  To  provide  'non  core'flight  Lower  costs  than  Manx,  Maersk, 
Provider  operations  (e.  g.  low  yield,  network  manager,  Brymon  (BA),  Viva 
secondary  operations).  To  operational  flexibility,,  Air  (Iberia), 
provide  low  cost  services  on  an  spare  capacity  or  Transavia  (KLM), 
ad  hoc  basis.  To  provide  crew  ability  to  procure  it  City  express, 
and  other  resources  Condor  (Lufthansa) 
Service  To  provide  'non  core'services,  Low  cost  base  (often  Dobbs,  Aviation 
Provider  such  as  cleaning,  catering  and  30%  below  airlines)  Catering,  OCS 
maintenance  cleaning,  MAS 
handlins! 
Source:  Adapted  from  McKinsey  Avmark  Report  1995 
236 The  trend  is  towards  hetwork-  managers'  subcontracting  aircraft  and  crews  from 
"capacity  providers.  "  The  anticipated  replacement  subcontracting  of  low  yield  Cý 
services  has  not  been  much  in  evidence  recently.  This  is  probably  because  of  the  lead 
provided  by  'network  manager'  type  carriers  such  as  British  Airways  and  Lufthansa. 
Rather  than  subcontract  low  yield  regional  services,  these  carriers  have  created  low 
cost  subsidiaries  within  their  own  operations  or  have  vertically  integrated  smaller 
operators  into  franchise  type  arrangements.  In  table  7.6  below,  the  employment 
options  implicit  in  the  transition  from  a  regulated  to  deregulated  environment  are 
described.  Most  of  the  options  described  are  already  in  progress  as  carriers  seek  to  C> 
reduce  costs  to  an  absolute  minimum.  54  Engineering,  catering,  cleaning,  ramp  services 
and  ground  handling  have  all  been  subjected  to  outsourcing  in  recent  years.  Airlines 
55 
increasingly  view  such  services  as  peripheral  to  their  core  operations. 
Table  7.6  Labour  Implications  of  Post  Deregulation  Strategy  (Source 
NIcKinsey/Avmark) 
FLAG  PREVIOUS  EMPLOYMENT  !  -EMERGING 
EMPLOYMENT'- 
CARRIERS  -SITUATION  -TREND,  - 
Flight  Operations 
C, 
National  level  basic  contract  for  all  Access  to  low  cost  crew  pool  for 
crew  regardless  of  aircraft  type  smaller  aircraft 
Technical  In  house  maintenance  at  home  base,  by  Inter-carrier  co-operation  allows 
Maintenance  national  carrier,  national  union  contract  specialisation  and  scale  subcontracting  0 
to  third  party  increasing,  use  of  low  cost 
maintenance  bases.  Concentration  of 
large-scale  maintenance  in  regional 
bases  to  take  advantage  of  regional  pay 
differentials  and  labour  pools 
Apron  Services  Monopoly  at  hub,  with  'expensive'  Entry  of  low  cost  providers  with 
(catering  cleaning,  union  contract  for  staff  with  national  European  scale 
servicing)  carrier 
Ground  Handling  As  above  Entry  of  third  party  handlers,  with  low 
wage  costs  (MAS) 
Data  Processing  Performed  in  house  Subject  to  JVs  with  other  airlines  and 
third  parties 
Marketing  In  house,  centralised,  unsophisticated  New  focus  on 
telemarketing/relationship  marketing, 
yield  management  etc.  Performed  at  0  low  cost  centres  (Glasgow,  Newcastle). 
C, 
Increasing  use  of  remote  sourcing  for 
technical  functions  (debugging 
CIC,  "' 
I  I  I  software  etc.  )  (BA,  Bombay) 
_J 
Source:  McKinsey/  Avmark 
'"  See  chapter  7  for  a  detailed  rationale  of  the  need  for  cost  reduction  as  perceived  by  managgement. 
55  Trade  unions  and  others  challenge  much  of  the  view  on  the  peripherality  of  support  functions  but  the  C) 
consultants  seem  to  be  fuelling  a  move  toward  the  outsourcing  of  engineering  and  maintenance.  a  C,  00 
Nevertheless,  BA's  stated  intention  to  outsource  enoineerin-  was  challenged  by  consultant  advice,  0  C, 
237 Even  in  engineering,  many  carriers  have  preferred  to  set  up  arms  length  subsidiaries 
56 
such  as  BA  Engineering,  Lufthansa  Technik  and  Team  Aer  Lingus.  These 
operations  act  as  standalone  businesses,  which  provided  with  'weaning  periods';  to 
either  find  Ihird  party'  work,  or  reduce  costs  drastically  for  the  main  carrier.  Other 
carriers  have  a  much  less  'contractual'  intention,  using  outsourcing  as  a  'cost  discovery 
mechanism'  for  exclusively  In  house'  work.  (Smith  1996.  )  The  prospect  of 
reductions  in  the  order  of  30  per  cent  in  standard  maintenance  contracts  makes  the 
initial  costs  worthwhile.  (Ibid.  )  Whilst  outsourcing  of  the  type  undertaken  in 
engineering  is  widespread,  another  issue  is  the  use  of  benchmarking  in  order  to  reduce 
internal  costs.  This  process  is  described  below  with  its  implications  for  airline  labour. 
Airline  management  have  sought  to  develop  strategies  which  utilise  all  of  these 
capacities,  and  which  separate  functions  into  areas  where  they  can  be  delivered  at 
lowest  cost.  For  some  airlines  this  is  a  means  of  survival  and  amounts  to  the  forging 
of  alliances  with  major  airlines  and  severe  cost  surgery.  An  increasing  number  of 
carriers,  particularly  those  whose  size  makes  them  potential  global  competitors,  have 
embarked  upon  a  wholesale  reappraisal  of  the  business  of  the  airline  itself.  Should  the 
carrier  compete  on  regional  or  domestic  routes?  Should  it  operate  international 
routes?  Should  it  employ  its  own  low  cost  carrier  to  bring  down  costs?  Should  the 
airline  outsource  'non  core'  functions?  Most  airlines  have  faced  these  questions  and 
many  have  already  taken  significant  steps  towards  implementation.  British  Airways, 
Lufthansa  and  SAS,  which  see  a  realistic  chance  of  achieving  a  dominant  alliance  role 
and  a  strong  regional  position,  have  been  foremost  in  pursuing  these  strategies. 
However,  we  need  to  be  aware  also  of  the  institutional  constraints  and  advantages, 
which  apply,  leading  to  differing  levels  of  progress. 
7.2.3  Compulsory  Competitive  Threatening;  Outsourcing  Threats  and  Labour 
Concessions 
In  response  to  the  general  product  market  pressures,  many  carriers  are  using  the  threat  t) 
of  outsourcing  to  secure  major  reductions  in  the  wages  and  conditions  of  service  of 
which  emphasised  the  co-ordinational  and  quality  benefits  of  in  house  provision.  They  might  also  have 
had  one  eye  on  the  industrial  relations  fallout. 
56  Team  Aer  Lingus  was  sold  to  the  Danish  Engineering  group  FLS  in  December  1998. 
238 their  workforces.  This  is  quite  clear  from  the  BA  case  in  chapters  5  and  6,  and  has 
spread  to  other  carriers.  KLM  considered  using  contractors  for  ground  handling  and 
the  engineering  functions.  (Airline  Business  June  1996.  )  Lufthansa  has  also 
established  its  Technik  engineering  subsidiary,  with  unions  agreeing  under  the  threat 
to  move  the  function  abroad.  Operators  are  increasingly  using  global  outsourcing 
strategies  for  back  office'  functions  such  as  telesales  and  specialist  computing. 
Swissair,  for  example,  moved  its  reservations  function  to  Mumbai,  taking  advantage 
of  the  huge  difference  in  labour  costs,  whilst  procuring  a  highly  skilled  and  motivated 
labour  force.  (Hill  1995.  )  British  Airways  has  highly  skilled  Ide-bugging'  technicians 
located  in  Delhi  at  a  fraction  of  UK  costs.  (Oum  and  Yu  1998:  64)  This  migration  of 
airline  jobs,  however,  has  not  been  as  widespread  as  many  observers  first  thought  and 
is  mainly  confined  to  specialist  technical  functions  for  which  recruitment  is  often 
difficult.  (Oum  and  Yu  1998:  64.  )  Although  airline  management  has  been  adept  at 
benchmarking  their  current  cost  structures  against  those  available  in  low  wage  41:  1 
nations,  the  floodgates  do  not  seem  to  have  opened  as  many  unions  feared  and 
anticipated.  When  functions  are  technically  difficult  to  move  abroad,  the  trend,  as 
exemplified  by  BA,  is  for  these  functions  to  be  compared  to  low  cost  domestic 
providers.  Discussing  the  recent  trend  towards  outsourcing  of  information  technology 
services,  the  consultants  DPA  argued: 
'Sometimes  the  real  motivation  behind  outsourcing  is  to  obviate  employment 
protection  and  labour  relation  (sic)  issues,  faced  particularly,  by  European 
carriers.  By  outsourcing  a  particular  function,  the  airline  can  remove  the 
internal  IT  personnel  from  its  payroll,  thereby  reducing  social  charges.  ' 
(Airline  Business  1996 
. 
)57 
In  functions  such  as  IT,  there  are  whole  ranges  of  other  issues  allied  to  the  decision  to 
outsource.  Certain  functions  can  become  profitable  standalone  businesses  on  the  basis 
of  third  party  work.  The  carrier  may  have  limited  investment  to  allocate  to  new  IT 
initiatives,  but  many  motivations  come  down  to  the  desire  to  secure  services  at  market 
cost.  Many  carriers  have  opted  for  the  internalisation  approach.  That  is,  they  have 
turned  such  activities  into  profit  centres.  Air  France,  Swissair  and  SAS  have  all 
undertaken  such  initiatives.  Others  have  adopted  the  stand-alone  subsidiary  approach 
such  as  Speedwing  (British  Airways);  and  the  Lufthansa  System  subsidiary  described 
57  Can  You  Do  IT  Better  Airline  Business  April  1996. 
239 below.  The  current  view  on  airline  outsourcing  points  to  the  provision  of  services  at 
60  per  cent  of  in  house  costs.  (Smith  1995:  3  1.  )  Within  highly  technical  and  skilled 
functions  such  as  IT  where  there  exists  a  considerable  premium  for  skilled  technical 
labour,  the  indications  are  that  the  cost  reductions  are  less  important.  What  seems 
more  salient  is  the  obsession  which  many  have  with  spinning  off  'non-core'  services. 
in  any  case,  there  has  been  a  major  re-evaluation  of  outsourcing  in  maintenance  as  a 
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result  of  the  Valujet  disaster  in  Florida  in  May  1996.  Nevertheless,  for  the  purposes 
of  our  analysis,  we  should  accept  the  airlines'  own  definition  of  'non-core'  as 
summarised  by  Smith  in  his  analysis  of  global  outsourcing.  (Smith:  1995:  56-59.  ) 
AnalYsing  European  carriers,  Smith  identifies  several  carriers  that  have  a  high  degree 
of  outsourcing.  The  extent  of  outsourcing  differs  across  carriers: 
Table  7.7  Outsourcing  Profile  of  Selected  European  Airlines 
Heavy  Light  Engines  Flight  Catering 
Main  Main  training 
%0  W  Air  France 
1 
0%  10% 
CD 
British 
Airways 
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Ryanair 
Ground  IT  Cargo 
Handling 
c0c 
%0  %0  %0  C  i"  %OJ,  []  11  1:  1  41  %  0%  0%  ki  % 
xx 
14 
13 
It" 
XXC 
. 4,  k  . 4ý1  13 
C 
)a 
Source:  Selected  From  Wake  Smith  Airline  Business  August  1995. 
'40  Captive  subsidiary  AOutsourced  to  an  independent  provider  C  Internal  profit  0% 
centre,  11  Internal  department. 
From  table  7.7  above  we  can  see  that  globalisation  strategies  effectively  require 
localised  action  to  restrain  costs.  The  phenomenon  of  thinking  global  and  acting  local 
operates  as  each  carrier  is  then  forced  into  adapting  to  the  decisions  of  other  carriers. 
58  The  crash  was  caused  by  the  loading  of  oxygen  generators  into  the  hold  of  an  aircraft  in  a  clear 
violation  of  procedure.  As  pressurisation  took  effect  these  exploded  killing  all  on  board.  Valujet  had 
carved  a  reputation  as  the  ultimate  lean  airline'  outsourcing  virtually  all  ancillary  and  support 
functions.  A  post-accident  safety  audit  by  the  FAA  found  major  violations  on  maintenance  procedure. 
A  chain  of  II  contractors,  many  of  whom  had  in  turn  subcontracted,  maintained  the  aircraft  involved  in 
the  Everglades  crash.  The  lack  of  central  oversight  and  control  was  severely  criticised  by  the  National 
Transportation  Safety  Board  (NTSB)  investigation  in  July  1996.  This  prompted  a  rethink  among  many 
airlines,  and  probably  increased  dramatically  the  transaction  costs  of  monitoring  maintenance 
contractors.  The  FAA  was  criticised  for  its  reluctance  to  adequately  oversee  low  cost  operators;  its 
principal  officer  forced  to  resign.  The  crash  raises  the  question  of  the  contradiction  of  charging  C, 
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I..  - Given  that  the  majority  are  employed  within  the  airline's  home  country,  any 
restructuring  must  necessarily  take  account  of  the  industrial  relations  and  wider  socio- 
economic  context  within  that  nation.  In  order  to  reduce  costs  it  is  essential  that 
national  impediments  to  such  business  strategies  be  removed.  It  is  often  glibly  implied 
that  all  airlines  need  to  do  is  to  circumvent  national  industrial  relations  structures.  59 
This  is  singularly  the  most  difficult  objective  for  airline  management,  and  attempts  to 
do  so  have  resulted  in  strikes,  disruption  and  problems  of  staff  morale  which  have 
ultimately  affected  the  airline  product.  These  issues  are  addressed  in  the  next  section. 
7.3  Restructuring  and  Conflict  In  the  European  Airline  Industry:  Cases 
and  Issues 
7.3.1  Strikes  and  Dispittes 
Whatever  the  debate  about  productivity  and  employment  growth,  there  is  clearly  a 
good  deal  of  scope  for  restructuring  within  the  European  airline  sector.  Management 
clearly  wishes  to  prepare  airlines  for  the  new  regulatory  environment,  whilst 
employees  defend  wages,  conditions  and  work  practices.  Several  examples  of 
industrial  disputes  during  the  period  give  an  indication  of  restructuring  at  the  national 
and  airline  level.  This  turn  towards  conflict  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  the 
withdrawal  of  state  support  and  the  emergence  of  a  new  regulatory  framework-,  which 
has  empowered  and  emboldened  management.  The  balance  of  bargaining  power  has 
shifted  in  management's  favour,  as  privatisation  and  deregulation  on  a  global  scale 
increasingly  dictate  the  nature  of  restructuring.  (See  Chapter  8.  )  Labour,  though, 
retains  significant  bargaining  power  and  influence  through  national  governments  and 
regulators.  Thus  conflict  becomes  almost  inevitable  as  management's  need  for  cost 
reduction  collides  with  the  need  for  trade  unions  to  defend  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
their  members.  In  this  section,  we  will  look  at  the  incidence  of  strike  action  and  a 
detailed  description  of  disputes  at  a  number  of  carriers.  The  following  data  (table  7.5) 
indicate  the  extent  of  strike  action  within  the  European  airline  industry.  Gall  points  to 
the  increasing  incidence  of  strike  action  to  highlight  labour  resistance.  (Gall  1996: 
econornic  regulators,  with  their  'productivist'  orientation  with  aspects  of  safety  oversight.  (See 
0  Woolfson  and  Beck  1997  for  a  discussion  re  the  UK  offshore  oil  industry.  )  (Jennings  1996  :  74.  ) 
241 255-260.  )  He  argues  that  strike  action  was  much  more  widespread  in  the  European 
airline  industry  than  Warhurst's  1995  analysis  indicates  (1995:  259-274)  and  that 
official  records  understate  the  real  level  of  industrial  action. 
Table  7.8  Strike  Incidence  In  the  European  Airline  Industry  1985-1995 
YEAR  'NUMBER  OF  STRIKES  WORKING  DAYS  LOST 
1985  3  14 
1986  9  15 
1987  19  25 
1988  15  22 
1989  18  25 
1990  5  5 
1991  12  12 
1992  8  9 
1993  3  13 
1994  22  23 
1995  55  61 
Total  169  224 
Source:  Compiled  from  Gall  (1996)  table  1. 
Table  7.8  provides  the  raw  data  on  strike  activity  in  the  European  airline  industry.  An 
upsurge  in  strike  activity  in  1994  and  1995,  the  most  acute  years  of  restructuring,  is 
noticeable  as  can  be  discerned  clearly  from  figure  7.3.  Gall  sees  the  resurgence  of 
strike  action  within  the  airline  industry  from  the  point  of  view  of  effectiveness, 
believing  that  evidence  of  an  increased  incidence  of  strike  action  is  a  manifestation  of 
labour's  continued  power  within  the  industry.  Though  this  assumption  is  questionable, 
it  might  equally  be  evidence  of  the  weakness  and  vulnerability  of  labour;  it  reinforces 
Doganis's  point  about  the  disruptive  power  of  airline  unions,  as  figure  7.3  below 
indicates. 
The  major  upturn  in  strike activity  took  place  in  1995,  which  was  the  high  point  of 
restructuring  conflict  within  the  industry.  However,  the  high  number  of  strike  days  is 
accounted  for  by  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  the  labour  force  (pilots)  and  by  the 
effect  of  continued  disputes  at  both  Iberia  and  Air  France.  To  an  extent  these  levels  of 
strike  activity  were  short-lived,  although  there  is  a  continued  threat  of  strike  action 
from  Air  France  pilots  and  cabin  crew,  as  late  as  1999. 
See  Neven  and  R611er  (1996)  'Rent  Sharing  and  Profitability:  Evidence  From  the  European  Airline 
C, 
Industry'  European  Economic  Review  March  1996  (pp  936-940)  for  an  example  of  this. 
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Aggregated  strike  data  hOWCVCI-  tell  LIS  little  about  the  causes,  processes, 
consequences  or  outcome  of'  strike  episodes.  In  order  to  obtain  detail  on  these  issue,,, 
we  need  to  look  at  a  nUmber  of  case  studies  from  airlines  operating  under  different,  C 
regulatory,  product  market,  and  industrial  relations  environments.  Having  considered 
British  Airways  in  the  previous  chapter.  this  section  allows  us  to  gauge  the  extent  to 
which  strikes  and  unrest  at  other  European  carriers  were  driven  by  similar  concerns. 
in  analysing  individual  cases  of  restructuring,  we  will  use  the  models  of  labour  market  LI 
restructuring  introduced  in  chapter  1. 
7.3.2  Air  France:  Under  New  Management  and  Old  Industrial  Relations 
Perhaps  the  most  notorious  episode  ofairline  restructuring,  and  one  which  attracted  a  Z- 
great  deal  of  international  interest,  was  the  Air  France  dispute  of  1994.  Air  France's 
productivity  rate  over  the  period  1988-92  was  the  poorest  by  far  of  the  European 
carriers  and  its  growth  in  employment  aniong  the  highest  at  the  time  of  the  dispute, 
I  L, 
(see  table  7.2  above).  Much  of'  the  conflict  can  be  ascribed  to  the  compressed  time 
scale  in  which  action  had  to  be  taken  on  costs.  Under  the  direction  of  its  flamboyant 
Chairman,  Bernard  Attali.  the  carrier  embarked  on  a  deep  cost  reduction  plan, 
accompanied  by  massive  organisational  change.  In  fact,  relatively  minor  job  cuts  of 
4,000  (6  per  cent)  were  demanded  from  the  manual  labour  force.  However,  there  were 
a  number  of  proposals  to  reduce  pay  and  conditions  within  powerful  sections  of  the 
airline's  unionised  workforce.  The  strike  be-an  within  ,  round  services,  closing  the 
243 main  domestic  airport,  Orly,  involving  runway  blockades  and  open  sabotage.  The 
strike  was  fairly  instructive  in  terms  of  the  French  industrial  relations  system.  French 
trade  unionism  is  characterised  by  low  union  density,  with  a  corresponding  absence  of 
regional  and  local  union  officials  to  discipline  local  members.  This,  coupled  with  a 
high  degree  of  proactive  decentralised  militancy,  and  anger  at  the  perceived  arrogance 
of  management,  meant  the  strike  could  not  be  channelled  and  controlled  as  in  other 
European  countries  (see  Goetzchy  and  Rosenblatt  1992:  404-445).  The  state 
eventually  stepped  in  to  lend  an  additional  FFr.  20bn.  to  the  carrier.  As  Eaton  argues, 
this  cash  infusion  can  only  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  industrial  relations  difficulties 
that  ensued.  (Eaton  1996:  20-21.  )  The  Air  France  episode  is  also  a  classic  case  of  the 
labour  nzarket  restnicturing  nwdel  of  employment  deregulation  identified  in  chapter 
1.  The  high  costs  and  low  productivity  of  the  carrier  forced  government  to  pursue  a 
drastic  restructuring  package,  by  French  standards,  and  compelled  management  to 
confront  labour  costs  as  the  airline's  biggest  problem. 
The  action  taken  by  management  was,  however,  tactically  naYve,  confronting  every 
occupational  group  simultaneously  and  concentrating  on  wage  cuts  and  work' 
intensification,  rather  than  on  developing  a  long-term  change  programme.  The 
precipitate  nature  of  change,  in  such  a  trade  union  context  and  within  such  a 
strategically  important  industry,  increased  the  likelihood  of  a  militant  response.  When 
workers  blocked  runways  and  paralysed  both  major  Paris  airports,  Bernard  Attali  was 
removed  and  replaced  by  the  public  sector  executive,  Christian  Blanc.  As  in  many  of 
the  other  episodes  of  restructuring,  a  high  profile  manager  was  unceremoniously 
removed  by  government  as  strikes  took  place.  The  nature  of  Attali's  replacement, 
however,  gives  some  indication  that  the  style  of  management  and  its  tactical  outlook 
is  as  important  as  the  overall  strategy.  Importantly,  Blanc  was  recruited  from  a  public 
sector  unionised  environment,  the  Paris  Transport  Authority  (RATP),  and  his 
approach  of  recognising  the  long-term  nature  of  restructuring  has  been  markedly 
different  from  that  of  his  predecessor.  He  proposed  a  new  longer  term  and  more 
tactically  astute  restructuring  initiative,  concentrating  on  two-tier  wage  rates  increased 
productivity  and  controlled  expansion.  This  policy  of  expansion  can  be  contrasted 
with  Attali's  policy  of  retrenchment  and  contraction  and  gave  unions  something  at 
least  to  negotiate  over.  The  Blanc  proposals  were  only  reluctantly  accepted  by  the 
union  side.  (Ibid.  20-25.  )  Industrial  action  continued  at  the  Air  France  group  of 
244 companies  with  a  24  hour  shutdown  in  the  Easter  of  1997,  a  pilot  strike  in  the  month 
of  the  1998  World  Cup  finals  and  a  series  of  24  hour  strikes  in  October  1999  -  the 
latest  episode.  (Chuter  1998:  14,  Airline  Business  (Gill  1998:  11.  )  Strikes  and  disputes 
will  continue  partly  because  of  the  fractious  nature  of  trade  unionism  in  the  sector, 
and  partly  because  management,  although  more  tactical,  has  not  relented  in  the  pace 
of  change.  Arguably,  in  a  global  airline  labour  market,  the  pressure  on  both  sides  will 
continue. 
Similar  divergence  between  employees  and  management  over  the  future  of  the  carrier 
was  to  be  reflected  in  later  disputes  at  Iberia,  Alitalia  and  British  Airways.  The 
dispute  at  Alitalia  is  important  because  it  embodied  many  of  the  threats  to  organised 
airline  labour  now  manifest  in  the  emerging  regulatory  environment  and  is  analysed 
below. 
7.3.3.  Forza  Alitalia!  Rapid  Restnicturing  and  Labour's  Reaction  at  Alitalia 
In  Italy  the  state  faced  similar  problems  in  restructuring  the  national  airline,  Alitalia. 
Long  part  of  a  complex  state  transport  and  utilities  monopoly,  the  airline  suffered 
from  a  lack  of  focus,  political  pressures  to  duplicate  its  route  structure  from  the  North 
and  South,  inefficient  fleet  planning  and  a  variety  of  other  operational  problems.  One 
problem,  which  was  clearly  to  be  tackled,  was  the  issue  of  staff  costs  and 
productivity.  The  state  airline  was  widely  believed  to  be  suffering  from  poor 
management,  when  the  Italian-American  businessman  Robert  Schisano,  was 
appointed  to  arrest  the  decline  in  1996.  Schisano  instituted  a  corporate  plan,  which 
anticipated  large  reductions  in  staffing,  wages  and  the  creation  of  a  separate  low  cost 
carrier  to  operate  more  marginal  services.  With  costs  6  per  cent  higher  than  the 
European  average,  and  labour  costs  particularly  high  in  relation  to  competitors,  the 
carrier  commenced  its  plan  in  the  face  of  union  opposition.  (Hill  1996:  17.  )  This 
focus  on  labour  costs  again  suggests  a  labour  market  restructuring  model.  The 
perceived  strength  of  organised  labour  and  its  ability  to  capture  rents,  and  protect 
restrictive  work  rules,  was  diagnosed  as  the  major  problem.  One  of  the  more 
provocative  actions  was  the  rental  of  replacement  aircraft  and  crews  to  operate 
prestigious  US  flights.  This  'wet  leasing'  enraged  the  pilots'  union,  which  saw 
Schisano's  move  as  a  direct  challenge  to  their  powerful  union,  ANPAC,  which  had 
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b- secured  extra  high  remuneration  for  transatlantic  flight  crew.  The  pilots'  opposition 
led  to  the  resignation  of  the  Chairman  and  Chief  Executive,  indicating  yet  again,  the 
problems  of  European  airline  restructuring  in  the  face  of  union  opposition. 
The  action  of  pilots  over  wet  leasing  and  wage  cuts,  involving  a  campaign  of  co- 
ordinated  sickness  reporting  in  lieu  of  strike  action,  has  already  been  discussed  in 
chapter  4.  At  the  same  time  management  faced  co-ordinated  action  from  ground  and 
cabin  crews,  over  the  establishment  of  a  new  low  cost  carrier.  Management  has  only 
recently  secured  approval  for  new  working  conditions  and  a  low  cost  carrier 
christened  'Team'  which  will  operate  both  European  and  intercontinental  services  on  a 
much  lower  cost  base.  (Jones  1996:  24-32.  )  The  carrier  commenced  operations  in 
1997  and  will  achieve  costs  60  per  cent  lower  than  those  of  the  parent  carrier.  The 
unions,  generally,  have  agreed  to  reduce  costs  by  $340  million  over  four  years,  with 
equity  and  board  representation.  The  ground  and  cabin  crew  union  (FIT)  described 
their  agreement  to  the  deal  as  bom  of  a  desire  "to  be  in  a  position  to  discuss  how  we 
are  privatised  and  have  a  say  in  our  future.  "  This  is  an  important  point.  The  unions 
have  effectively  been  outmanoeuvred,  and  have  succumbed  to  cost  cutting  strategies 
although  they  have,  as  so  often  in  the  industry,  secured  the  ceremonial  scalp  of  the 
incumbent  CEO.  (Ibid.  ) 
Returning  to  the  labour  market  restnictitting  model  three  issues  strengthened 
management  and  forced  the  hand  of  the  unions.  Firstly,  the  progressive  withdrawal  of 
state  subsidy  and  the  impending  privatisation  of  the  carrier  have  weakened  labour's 
position.  Secondly,  the  carrier  is  in  a  parlous  situation  in  regard  to  its  product  market. 
Alitalia  has  an  inefficient  and  badly  planned  fleet,  few  major  routes  and  the 
continuing,  headache  of  servicing  both  Rome  and  Milan  with  direct  international 
flights.  The  use  of  Ansett  pilots  on  'wet  lease'  arrangements  demonstrated  that  these 
routes  could  be  operated  and  further  undermined  the  pilots  and  cabin  crew  bargaining 
power.  An  alliance  between  Alitalia  and  the  US  carrier  Continental  would  have 
minimised  the  threat  to  transatlantic  flights  targeted  by  union  action.  Although 
Continental  is  much  removed  from  the  virulently  anti-union  carrier  it  became  under 
Frank  Lorenzo,  the  code-sharing  situation  would  make  it  difficult  for  ALPA  organised 
pilots  there  to  take  supportive  action.  Thirdly,  Italian  public  sector  workers  are 
involved  in  a  period  of  concession  bargaining  in  order  to  protect  job  security  within 
246 Italy.  Many  of  the  employment  practices  common  in  the  vibrant  small  to  medium 
enterprise  sector  are  being  agreed  in  larger  public  enterprise.  (Hyman  and  Ferrier 
1992:  524-681.  )  These  include  the  extension  of  part-time  working  and  contracts, 
cross  utilisation  and  other  labour  practices,  all  of  which  have  been  accepted  at 
Alitalia.  In  Alitalia,  the  pace  of  change  is  the  major  worry  for  unions.  This  pace  itself 
is  dictated  by  the  market  position  of  the  carrier  concerned.  Few  unions  have  disputed 
outright  the  need  for  some  changes.  However,  in  Europe  the  withdrawal  of  state 
subsidy  and  the  onset  of  globalisation  have  forced  management  into  'panic 
restructuring'.  In  that  situation  the  process  of  restructuring  was  contested  and 
challenged  by  labour  and  only  when  management  took  drastic  or  "climactic"  action  in 
Turnbull's  phrase,  (1991:  25)  did  labour  eventually  succumb.  The  contested  nature  of 
restructuring  in  carriers  such  as  Air  France  and  Alitalia  and  within  other  carriers  such 
as  Iberia,  British  Airways  and  Sabena  has  fuelled  the  perception  that  airline  labour 
markets  can  only  be  reshaped  through  confrontation.  However  in  at  least  one  context 
this  course  of  action  was  avoided.  The  final  case  looks  at  how  restructuring  was 
negotiated  at  Lufthansa,  where  the  institutions  of  German  industrial  relations  were 
used  to  implement  wholesale  restructuring  with  minimal  industrial  unrest,  and  where 
despite  this  negotiated  restructuring  the  carrier  has  managed  to  develop  policies  of 
outsourcing  and  franchising  albeit  at  a  slower  pace  than  its  rivals,  but  where  arguably 
it  has  sought  lower  cost  through  the  alliance  route.  The  example  of  Lufthansa  is 
examined  below. 
7.3.4  Lufthansa:  Negotiated  Restnicturing? 
Lufthansa  commenced  restructuring  in  the  autumn  of  1990.  Wholly  state  owned  at 
that  point,  the  carrier  faced  a  difficult  time  as  the  effects  of  the  Gulf  war  and  increased 
competition  took  their  toll.  The  airline  also  confronted  all  the  'problems'  of  existing 
within  the  so-called  German  model  of  industrial  relations,  such  as  the  co- 
determination  system  and  the  bargaining  power  of  German  industrial  unions.  (Air 
Transport  World  May  1995.  )  Nevertheless,  Lufthansa  has  been  able  to  engineer  a 
comprehensive  restructuring  whilst  avoiding  industrial  unrest.  How  has  this  been 
achieved  and  what  are  the  explanatory  factors  in  such  a  transition?  One  analysis  has 
settled  on  the  unique  nature  of  the  German  industrial  relations  system,  which  locks 
management  and  unions  into  seeking  high  road,  or  diversified  quality  production 
247 systems  of  competition.  Lehrer  argues  that  Lufthansa  has  benefited  from  the 
constraints  of  the  German  industrial  relations  system  to  respond  to  a  new  era  of 
'incremental  change'.  He  contends  that  lifetime  employment  and  consensus  decision 
making  support  respectively  the  accumulation  skills  and  equitable  sacrifice  in 
restructuring.  This,  he  contends,  allows  better  adaptation  to  the  new  airline  product 
and  regulatory  environment.  (Lehrer  1997:  115-140.  ) 
In  this  view  the  carrier  was  forced  to  adopt  a  more  long  term  and  strategic  business 
policy  because  the  unions  on  its  supervisory  board  constrained  it  from  pursuing  more 
aggressive  short-term  policies.  The  analysis  suggests  that  because  it  was  so 
constrained,  the  carrier  developed  more  far-reaching  and  negotiated  solutions  to  its 
internal  cost  problems.  Several  other  factors  have  to  be  taken  into  account  before 
ascribing  Lufthansa's  less  confrontational  experience  of  restructuring  to  the 
uniqueness  of  German  industrial  relations.  Clearly  a  crucial  factor  was  the  carrier's 
position  as  flag  carrier  for  Europe's  major  economy.  Given  this  'global  platform,  60 
Lufthansa  was  clearly  in  a  strong  position.  In  addition  a  combination  of  external  and 
internal  factors  caused  managers  to  re-assess  their  entire  market  position  in  early 
1991.  These  factors,  the  arrival  of  BA  in  the  unified  German  market  through  its 
Deutsche  BA  subsidiary,  re-unification  necessitating  the  painful  absorption  of  the 
61  former  Eastern  flag  carrier  Interflug  ,  and  the  growing  threat  of  mega  carriers  from 
the  US,  concentrated  the  minds  of  both  labour  and  management.  Lufthansa  had  to 
decide  on  whether  to  re-align  its  international  services  towards  the  then  growth 
economies  of  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia.  Management  viewed  their  high  cost 
base  as  problematic.  Given  the  high  non-wage  costs  in  Germany,  there  was  an 
obvious  cost  disadvantage  in  competing  with  the  emerging  breed  of  low  cost  carriers. 
In  addition,  the  carrier's  productivity  performance  up  until  1995  worried  managers, 
especially  at  the  time  of  the  Gulf  War  in  1991.  A  cost  reduction  strategy  enacted  by 
Chairman  Jurgen  Weber  failed  to  lift  that  performance  significantly  and  Lufthansa 
60  A  global  platform  is  a  pre-existing  advantage  possessed  by  firms,  usually  some  form  of  state  support 
or  institutional  factor.  In  the  airline  industry  global  platforms  can  be  obtained  from  route  networks, 
whose  extensiveness  is  related  to  a  nations  political  and  diplomatic  resources.  Other  aspects  might  be 
favourable  labour  market  institutions  allowing  flexibility  of  Iong-term  partnership  type  arrangements. 
(See  Porter.  M:  (1986)  The  Conipetitive  Advantage  of  Nations  Harvard  1986  for  a  full  discussion.  ) 
61  Adjustment  required  not  just  an  integration  of  services,  but  also  a  strategic  re-assessment  of  the 
Lufthansa  hub  network.  Should  it  be  centred  on  Frankfurt  as  was  eventually  decided;  should  Berlin  be 
the  source  of  more  international  flights?  In  addition  the  integration  of  the  Eastern  carrier,  necessitated 
the  usual  wage  equalisation  agreements  witnessed  in  other  industries. 
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Separate  business  units  were  set  up  for  maintenance,  information  tcchnolo,  (YN  'Ind 
cargo.  These  operation,,,  vvere  not  formed  oil  tile  basis  of'  lower  pay  rates  and  inferior 
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labour  costs  as  a  proportion  of  turnover.  The  results  are  entirely  due  to  the  reino\al  of 
subsidiary  companies  from  the  merall  headcount. 
For  example.  Lul'thansa  Svstem  was  estahli.  shed  in  a  joint  venture  with  FDS,  the 
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the  carner  WýIS  L111,11)IC  10  SCIXWý11C  the  SUhsidianes  from  the  I-LIfthansa  pay  and 
24  9 conditions  structure.  A  similar  initiative  was  undertaken  with  Lufthansa  Technik  the 
maintenance  arm.  The  subsidiaries,  however,  were  expected  to  become  profitable 
through  third  party  work  lessening  their  dependence  on  the  airline,  and  to  implement  Z;  ý 
the  cost  reduction  initiatives  introduced  within  the  airline.  There  was  little  concerted 
change  as  the  carrier  prepared  for  privatisation  between  1992  and  1996.  However,  by 
autumn  1996,  the  pace  of  change  set  out  a  plan  to  achieve  cost  cuts  of  $130  million. 
Central  to  this  initiative  was  the  introduction  of  a  wage  freeze  for  fiscal  year  1996- 
1997  and  a  plan  to  increase  the  amount  of  foreign-based  cabin  crew  with  the  benefit 
of  lower  wages  and  conditions.  (Jones  (1)  1996:  18.  )  There  was  also  a  proposal  to 
increase  the  number  of  part  time  and  fixed  term  cabin  crew.  Lufthansa,  facing  fierce 
internal  competition  for  the  BA  satellite  Deutsche  BA,  felt  that  it  needed  similar 
proportions  of  staff  on  atypical  contracts.  Typically,  Deutsche  BA  had  10  per  cent  of 
staff  on  part-time  and  50  per  cent  on  fixed  term  contracts.  Comparable  figures  for 
Lufthansa,  in  Blyton  et  al's  1998  survey,  were  respectively  20  per  cent  and  5  per 
cent.  (Blyton  et  al  1998b.  )  In  1994,  Lufthansa  had  almost  no  staff  on  part-time 
contracts.  (Lufthansa  Annual  report  1994.  )  As  well  as  seeking  increased  temporal 
flexibility,  the  carrier  also  sought  other  avenues  of  labour  restructuring.  The  search  for 
cost  reductions  included  a  measure  of  global  outsourcing,  with  reservations  moved  to 
the  USA,  following  carriers  like  BA  and  Swissair,  with  the  airline's  choice  of  the  US 
perhaps  reflecting  the  relatively  high  cost  of  German  based  workers. 
Like  British  Airways'  Business  Efficiency  programme,  Lufthansa  devised  a  named 
plan  for  cost  reduction  purposes  known  as  'Programme  15'.  The  'Programme  15' 
initiative  aimed  at  securing  a  reduction  in  Available  Seat  Kilometres  (ASKs)  per 
employee  of  around  12  per  cent.  (Ibid.  )  The  target  is  to  be  realised  by  the  year  2000 
and  shows  the  extent  to  which  cost  benchmarking  pervades  the  industry.  Management 
literature  emphasises  the  importance  of  devolving  business  units  in  order  to  reap  the 
benefits  of  market  focus.  Cargo  exemplifies  the  policy.  Spun  out  as  a  'stand  alone' 
business  in  January  1995,  Lufthansa  Cargo  was  able  to  re-define  its  market  position. 
The  change  in  market  focus  involved  the  use  of  Sharjah  in  the  Gulf  States  as  a 
strategic  hub  for  the  Indian  subcontinent. 
The  use  of  Shadah  has  been  predicated  on  its  low  labour  costs.  One  Lufthansa 
manager  commented  that  the  cost  of  building  a  pallet  in  Sharjah  (the  main 
250 productivity  indicator  in  cargo  operations),  is  15  per  cent  of  the  cost  in  Frankfurt. 
(Galla-her  1996:  28-30.  )  The  subsidiary  also  re-modelled  operations  around  certain 
strategic  hubs,  benefiting  from  specialisation,  scale  and  scope.  Thus,  the  operation 
followed  migrating  multinationals  such  as  Siemens  and  Volkswagen  out  of  Germany 
as  they  pursued  lower  labour  costs.  As  freight  yields  fall  more  precipitately  than 
passenger  yields,  typically  by  around  3  per  cent  annually,  the  management  of  costs 
becomes  crucial.  Lufthansa  cargo  benefits  from  lower  relative  labour  costs,  as  cost 
cutting  and  productivity  increases  are  the  only  road  to  profitability  in  such  an 
environment.  Thus  the  carrier  is  placing  more  of  its  workforce  on  separate  union 
contracts  from  Lufthansa.  Indeed,  'cost  transparency'  seems  to  have  been  the  major 
motivation  for  the  spin  off,  initially  paying  a  large  fixed  fee  for  the  possession  of 
Lufthansa  passenger  aircraft  belly  space  agreements.  These  measures  allowed  the  cost 
base  to  be  exposed  as  never  before.  Lufthansa  negotiated  with  trade  unions,  a 
requirement  given  the  German  industrial  relations  system  and  the  high  level 
involvement  of  labour  within  the  supervisory  board  structures.  These  structures 
constrained  the  restructuring  plan  and  brought  labour  into  the  restructuring  process, 
by  necessity,  but  with  the  result  that  Lufthansa  has  begun  major  inroads  into  labour 
costs  without  facing  industrial  action.  This  is despite  the  absorption  of  the  inefficient 
East  German  carrier  Interflug  and  the  general  labour  environment  within  Germany.  A 
major  wage  agreement  signed  in  1990  with  the  unions,  led  to  cost  savings  of  DM  65 
million  (Lufthansa  1990).  Lufthansa's  next  restructuring  commenced  in  1996  under 
Chairman,  Jurgen  Weber.  Commenting  on  the  plans  to  reduce  costs  Weber  argued. 
-you  have  to  have  measures  which  do  not  involve  brutal  job  cutting.  "  (Airline 
Business  November  1996.  )  This  difference  in  approach  can  be  attributed  to  two 
factors.  Firstly,  Lufthansa's  pre-existing  advantages  make  it  less  necessary  for  it  to 
undertake  the  kind  of  labour  cost  fire-fighting  witnessed  at  weaker  carriers  such  as 
Iberia  and  Olympic,  although  it  cannot  afford  to  be  complacent.  Secondly,  the 
institutional  context  of  labour's  involvement  through  supervisory  boards  makes  it 
more  difficult  to  pursue  'low  road'  type  strategies  such  as  job  cutting  and  route 
rationalisation.  This  means  working  with  the  unions  to  develop  a  global  leadership  on 
costs  and  to  make  use  of  the  virtues  of  the  German  industrial  relations  system. 
Management  have  in  effect  obtained  through  outsourcing,  not  cost  savings,  but  a 
renewed  focus  for  both  the  outsourced  areas  and  the  core  airline. 
251 Despite  Lufthansa's  much  cited  existence  within  the  German  industrial  relations 
model,  the  process  of  negotiated  labour  market  restnicturing  still  occurred.  That  it 
occurred  within  a  more  negotiated  labour  market  context,  does  not  detract  from  the 
fact  that  restructuring  was  necessitated  by  the  product  market  and  regulatory  context. 
Thus  whilst  identifying  the  negotiated  aspects  of  the  restructuring,  particularly  the 
role  of  the  trade  unions  in  protecting  labour  during  the  outsourcing  process,  we  can 
still  see  that  management  were  determined  to  push  through  change.  The  powerful 
position  of  Lufthansa  within  the  Star  Alliance,  arguably  afforded  employees  more 
hope  of  a  long  term  assured  future  given  its  dominance  as  a  leading  partner,  within 
that  grouping.  So  whilst  the  difference  is  important,  it  is  in  many  ways  a  difference  in 
emphasis  and  approach,  mediated  through  the  specific  labour  market  context,  than  in 
any  distinctly  diverging  approach. 
Whilst  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  restructuring  within  the  European  airline 
industry  it  is  difficult  to  discern  the  extent  to  which  this  has  had  any  lasting  impact. 
Recent  improvements  in  productivity  can  be  seen  in  table  7.10  below.  Alitalia  for 
example  currently  has  productivity  levels  for  both  pilots  and  cabin  crew,  which  are 
among  the  best  in  Europe.  Its  overall  productivity  levels  are  the  highest,  and  the 
percentage  of  turnover  accounted  for  by  labour  cost  is  the  lowest  and  well  above 
European  and  global  performance. 
252 Whilst  these  figures  are  snapshots,  and  the  low  base  issues  explains  much  of  the 
improvement  in  many  carriers,  they  nonetheless  indicate  a  tentative  upward  direction 
in  productivity  amongst  some  of  Europe's  worst  performing  carriers. 
Table  7.10  Current  (1998-99)  Labour  Productivity  Indicators:  European  Airline 
Industry 
AIRLINE  RPK/PILOT 
000S 
RPK/CABIN 
CREW  000s 
RPK/EMPLOYEE 
000S 
LAB  COST 
T/O  % 
British  Airways  34,741  7,848  2,081  26 
Alitalia  34,559  12,158  2,294  24 
KLM  34,278  10,502  2,098  26 
Sabena  26,130  9,055  1,279  26 
Swissair  25,682  8,314  1,639  26 
Iberia  25,607  9,741  1,356  30 
Air  France  24,883  7,869  1,520  30 
TAP  21,607  6,683  1,101  30 
Lufthansa  20,383  7,035  2,203  26 
Finnair  18,037  6,302  1,900  na 
SAS  11,090  6,498  1,008  30 
European  average  25,581  8,364  1,679  24.9 
Global  average  20,121  9,121  1,600  28 
Source:  IATA/Airl  ine  Business  1999 
Nevertheless  table  7.10  also  indicates  that  in  Air  France,  for  example,  performance  is 
currently  well  below  average,  as  it  is  within  Lufthansa.  The  table  shows  that 
productivity  amongst  pilots  and  cabin  crew  continues  to  be  problematic. 
Conclusion 
The  idea  of  stability  in  airline  industrial  relations,  a  trend  identified  in  previous 
chapters  seems  to  have  disappeared.  The  old  compact  of  high  wages  and  exemplary 
conditions  in  return  for  industrial  relations  peace  has  been  fractured,  as  airlines  search 
for  lower  costs.  Deregulation,  competition,  the  entry  of  low  cost  carriers  and  a  wave 
of  Product  and  pricing  innovation  have  promoted  strategies  of  outsourcing, 
benchmarking,  franchising  and  wage  cutting.  These  policies  have,  at  their  core,  a  re- 
shaping  of  labour  relations.  This  belief  that  labour  relations  are  the  principal  problem 
in  the  European  airline  market  is  a  strong  and  persistent  one.  In  this  chapter  we  have 
used  the  labour  niarket  restritaltring  niodel  to  analyse  the  recent  period  of 
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kh- restructuring  and  labour  unrest  within  Europe.  Reform  of  state  aid  and  the  reluctance 
of  governments  to  subsidise  loss  making  airlines,  in  any  case,  have  forced  a  rapid 
adjustment,  the  threat  of  home  market  penetration  by  strong  global  carriers  and  the  4ý 
challenges  and  opportunities  of  alliances  mean  that  labour  costs  have  to  be  addressed. 
in  most  of  Europe's  state  run  and  previously  state  run  airlines  the  high  costs  and  low 
productivity  identified  by  economists,  politicians  and  management  has  been 
comprehensively  targeted,  often  with  considerable  success.  As  a  result  Europe's 
labour  costs  are  now  much  lower,  and  its  productivity  much  higher  than  previously. 
The  gap  between  Europe  and  the  USA  has  closed  considerably.  The  lagging 
performance  identified  by  earlier  analyses  such  as  the  Avmark  reports  has  in  fact 
improved  considerably.  Nevertheless  the  process  of  change  in  Europe  has  been  slow 
and  often  conflict  ridden. 
Workers  defending  the  prize  of  premium  terms  and  conditions  have  resisted  change 
for  as  along  as  possible  and  in  airlines  such  as  Air  France,  Olympic  and  Iberia 
resistance  continues.  Industrial  relations  are  the  key  issues  in  the  European  airline 
industry  throughout  the  1990s.  Airlines  increasingly  seek  to  retain  on  core  contracts 
only  those  staff  that  are  necessary  for  more  profitable  operations.  Many  other 
activities,  as  we  see,  can  be  outsourced,  benchmarked,  franchised  or  the  risks  shared 
with  another  operator.  This  is  a  major  threat  to  airline  labour.  Already  there  has  been 
a  considerable  reduction  in  the  directly  employed  workforce  as  the  outsourcing  and 
integration  of  key  services  such  as  catering  and  cleaning  takes  place.  Even  in  areas 
such  as  maintenance  the  continued  pressure  on  costs  suggest  that  'in-house'  airline 
maintenance  operations  are  likely  to  be  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule  in  future. 
With  these  two  effects  a  considerable  part  of  the  bottom  and  top  end  of  the  airline 
labour  market  could  be  removed.  Premium  wages  for  workers  such  as  pilots  and  cabin 
crew  continue  to  be  a  problem. 
Yet  the  very  real  constraints  imposed  by  industrial  relations  systems  have  altered  and 
shaped  these  policies  to  specific  institutional  requirements.  Thus  Lufthansa's  unique 
form  of  outsourcing  and  the  failure  of  Sabena  management  to  relocate  short  haul 
pilots'  to  Luxembourg  are  examples  that  the  process  of  cost  containment  will 
continue,  but  with  national  and  institutional  characteristics.  Rather  than  move  to 
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h6- Luxembourg  the  Belgian  pilots'  union  agreed  to  a  lower  scale  for  short-haul  pilots, 
probably  delivering  the  same  cost  reductions,  but  through  a  different  route. 
Within  the  deregulated  environment  at  least  at  this  stage,  the  locomotive  of 
management  strategy  continues  to  be  labour  cost  reduction,  although  there  are  signs 
that  in  a  situation  of  falling  yields,  and  increased  competition,  reduced  labour  costs 
are  not  enough.  Some  analysts  are  now  beginning  to  question  the  fixation  with  labour 
costs,  as  indeed  are  some  airline  executives.  The  CEO  of  Continental  Airlines, 
ironically  given  its  role  at  the  forefront  of  downward  directed  cost  oriented  strategies, 
recently  questioned  the  obsession  with  cost  and  the  corresponding  neglect  of 
revenues.  (Odell  1995.  )  However,  Bethune's  airline  benefits  from  among  the  lowest 
costs  in  the  US  industry.  There  are  variations  on  this  theme  in  Europe,  British 
Airways,  for  example,  which,  having  pursued  cost  reduction  to  the  point  of  damaging 
strikes  and  low  morale,  has  gone  for  a  quality  based  strategy  involving  new 
investment  and  capacity  re-alignment.  For  most  European  airline  workers  the  future 
is  still  one  of  increasing  demands  for  change,  as  management  concentrates  upon  cost 
reduction. 
These  episodes  of  contestation  and  conflict  were  analysed  using  the  labour  market 
restructuring  approach  to  employment.  Within  this  model  labour  costs  and 
productivity  are  identified  as  the  principal  obstacle  to  restructuring.  Policies  are 
therefore  designed  to  challenge  the  accumulated  rents  and  protective  work  rules  of  an 
airline  labour  force  Teatherbedded'  by  regulation  and  public  ownership. 
As  privatisation  and  restructuring  takes  place  there  will  be  more  conflict  on  both  the 
early  adapting  and  late  adapting  carriers.  Yet  the  industry  cost  structure  in  Europe  is 
improving,  as  labour  market  restructuring  takes  place.  However  there  is  a  limit  to 
which  restructuring  can  take  place  on  a  national  basis.  The  influence  of  institutions  is 
only  one  dimension  but  there  is  increasing  evidence  that  supranational  and  structural 
considerations  will  determine  the  nature  of  restructuring  in  future.  Deregulation  and 
liberalisation,  merger  and  acquisition  and  the  growth  of  alliances  have  combined  in  a 
developing  trend  towards  global  product  market  convergence.  This  trend  is 
accompanied  by  a  pronounced  change  in  the  scope  and  structure  of  regulation,  with  a 
turn  towards  're-regulation'  on  the  basis  of  the  interests  of  large  airlines  allowing 
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6- management  the  freedom  of  action  to  target  labour  costs  in  an  era  of  falling  profits. 
These  issues  and  the  wider  global  impact  of  deregulation  and  product  market  change  0 
upon  the  airline  labour  market  are  discussed  in  the  final  chapter. 
256 From  Regulated  Control  to  Global  Product 
Market  Convergence:  The  Emerging 
Regulatory  Framework  and  The  Airline  Labour 
Market 
8.1  Deregulation  Market  Power  and  Labour  Costs  In  the  Airline  Industry 
In  essence,  this  chapter  provides  a  concluding  overview  of  the  long-term 
interconnections  between  changes  in  regulation,  industry  structure  and  the  product 
market,  identifying  their  pronounced  effects  on  employment.  As  the  industry  evolves 
on  the  basis  of  global  collaboration,  large  firms  are  able  to  control  the  market  and  to 
an  extent  the  industry.  By  developing  a  political  economy  of  restructuring  within  the 
airline  industries  of  the  USA,  Europe  and  globally,  we  will  expose  the  permissive 
stance  of  regulators  towards  concentration  and  market  power  as  a  feature  of  both  the 
US  and  Europe.  As  earlier  chapters  demonstrated  during  the  regulated  era,  the  state 
protected  the  terms  and  conditions  of  labour,  reasoning  that  this  would  help  pursue  the 
state's  growth  and  stability.  With  deregulation  however,  the  state's  priorities  have 
changed  markedly.  The  state  continues  to  promote  the  airline  industry,  on  both  a 
domestic  and  supranational  basis,  but,  given  the  importance  of  labour  costs  and  labour 
flexibility  to  the  competitive  success  or  survival  of  carriers,  is  unwilling  to  protect 
labour  from  the  ravages  of  deregulation. 
In  order  to  explore  these  issues  and  to  outline  this  new  industry  framework,  we  will 
firstly  look  at  the  process  of  market  entry,  bankruptcy  and  consolidation  in  the  USA. 
Staying  with  the  US,  we  will  then  examine  the  specific  labour  market  effects  of  the 
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6- mergers  and  rationalisation,  which  followed.  Next,  these  processes  are  located  within 
trends  towards  state  toleration  of  market  power  and  the  enhanced  domination  of  the 
major  carriers.  Again,  the  rationale  for  this  is  the  need  for  continued  growth  and 
stability.  We  will  then  look  at  the  effects  of  the  limited  competition  provided  by  low 
cost  operators,  pointing  to  their  labour  market  implications.  It  is  argued  overall  that 
such  a  structure  of  competition  and  market  entry  allows  capital  the  room  to 
continually  reshape  labour  costs,  which  have  became  increasingly  important. 
In  the  case  of  Europe,  a  more  measured  process  of  deregulation  actually  resulted  in 
more  pronounced  labour  market  effects.  Firstly,  the  state  has  been  forced  to  withdraw 
from  airline  ownership  as  competition  rules  outlaw  direct  subsidy.  A  corollary  of  this 
is  the  fact  that  aid  can  only  be  given  for  restructuring,  which  normally  involves 
attacking  labour  costs.  Secondly,  given  the  allocative  benefits  often  claimed  for 
deregulation,  it  will  be  seen  that,  despite  high  profile  low  cost  entry  in  certain 
markets,  major  carriers  still,  as  in  the  regulated  era,  dominate  the  industry.  The 
reluctance  of  regulators  to  enforce  competition  where  majors  enjoy  a  stranglehold  is 
then  contrasted  with  the  willingness  of  competition  and  sector  authorities  to  promote 
supply  side  measures  that  allow  carriers  to  enjoy  further  labour  cost  reductions. 
Thirdly,  as  carriers  seek  to  exploit  the  deregulated  European  airline  labour  market  and 
'open  skies'.  they  increasingly  pressure  regulators  and  governments  for  greater  labour 
utilisation  under  the  fig  leaf  of  harmonisation.  This  issue  is  illustrated  in  terms  of 
proposals  to  alter  flight  duty  time  limits  for  European  flight  deck  and  cabin  crews. 
The  chapter  then  draws  together  the  experience  of  the  USA  and  Europe  to  investigate 
the  emerging  trend  towards  alliance  and  oligopoly  within  the  industry.,  This  trend 
towards  enhanced  concentration  is described  with  some  observations  about  the  likely 
implications  for  airline  labour.  It  is  argued  overall  that  these  are  pushing  the  industry 
towards  a  model  of  global  product  market  convergence  whereby  overarching  global 
markets  and  large  scale  dominant  firms  have  the  power  to  influence  and  control 
national  and  global  labour  markets  within  particular  sectors.  The  airline  industry 
provides  a  powerful  example  of  this  trend.  Whilst  these,  issues  present  major 
challenges  for  airline  labour,  it  would  be  a  n-dstake  to  see  them  as  unambiguously 
detrimental.  The  dynamics  of  shifting  product  market  structure  have,  as  Blyton  et  al 
(1998b)  argued,  provided  both  threats  and  opportunities  for  organised  labour.  The 
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chapter  therefore  concludes  with  an  evaluation  of  labour's  responses  and  attitudes 
towards  global  restructuring. 
8.1.1  Market  Power  and  Labour  Deregulation 
in  looking  at  the  process  of  US  deregulation  it  is  easy  to  be  seduced  by  short  term 
factors,  such  as  the  fairly  rapid  entry  of  low  cost  carriers  between  1980  and  1986,  into 
believing  that  a  new  competitive  structure  emerged  to  replace  the  dominance  of  the 
'big  six'  carriers  who  profited  from  regulation.  Taking  a  much  longer-term  view 
however,  we  can  see  that  the  post  deregulation  situation  can  be  better  described  as  one 
of  the  competitive  hegenwny  of  the  majors.  In  his  account  of  long  run  regulatory  and 
product  market  trends,  business  historian  Richard  Vietor  (1990)  describes 
deregulation  as  a  process  of  short  run  market  entry,  followed  by  a  period  of  large 
carrier  adaptation  and  response.  This  he  argues  often  resulted  in  the  integration  of  low 
cost  entrants  through  mergers  and  acquisitions.  After  an  initial  threat  from  new 
entrants,  such  as  People  Express  and  New  York  Air,  the  large  carriers  were  able  to 
match  the  fares  of  these  low  cost  carriers  and  out-compete  them  using'economies  of 
scale  and  scope.  62 
As  chapter  I  indicates  deregulation  brings  forward  a  series  of  major  changes  in 
industry  structure  and  product  market  which  can  affect  the  labour  market.  In  chapter  4 
we  looked  at  how  initial  US  domestic  airline  deregulation  can  be  described  as  a 
process  of  coinpetitive  disengagenwnt.  Here  the  state's  withdrawal  from  overt 
economic  regulation  of  the  industry  affects  the  labour  market.  However  as  argued  in 
chapter  I  the  labour  market  effects  of  regulation  and  deregulation  are  dynamicAn  this 
chapter  we  will  gain  an  overview  of  how  the  dynamic  of  deregulation  in  its  various 
phases  impacted  upon  the  labour  market  through  time. 
One  of  the  key  determinants  of  the  effect  of  deregulation  upon  labour  ývas  the  rapid 
change  in  industry  structure,  which  occurred  in  the  wake  of  deregulation.  In  the  initial 
phase  of  deregulation  there  was  a  flood  of  new  entrants,  and  an  expansion  of  services 
62  Economies  of  scope  simply  include  superior  hub  and  spoke  networks,  proprietary  Computer  ý 
Reservation  Systems  (CRS,  )  brand  loyalty  promotions  and  vertical  integration.  These  options  are 
related  to  size  and  scale  (see  footnote  3  below). 
259 by  existing  carriers.  However  as  competition  become  widespread,  profitability  was 
affected  by  the  decline  in  yields  as  carriers  offered  seats  at  wafer  thin  margins,  failing 
to  cover  long  term  and  fixed  costs.  (Dempsey  and  Goetz:  1992:  293.  )  This 
competitive  frenzy,  coupled  with  reckless  speculation  and  debt  leveraging,  resulted  in 
a  cycle  of  bankruptcies  and  cost  cutting  facilitated  by  the  provisions  of  Chapter  II  of 
the  US  bankruptcy  code.  Bankruptcy  allows  not  just  a  re-allocation  of  poorly 
performing  assets  into  better  productive  use  as  the  neo-classical  literature  assumes,  it 
also  affects  the  labour  market,  as  the  next  section  explains. 
8.1.2  Seeking  Protection  from  Laboitr.  ý  US  Deregulation  Bankniptcy  and  The  Contest 
for  Cost  Reductions 
The  US  bankruptcy  statutes  are  designed  to  allow  the  restructuring  of  the  bankrupt 
company  on  a  long-term  basis,  effectively  providing  a  shelter  from  the  pressures  and 
demands  of  other  parties.  As  such,  they  are  biased  in  favour  of  the  debtor,  allowing  it 
to  avoid  obligations  and  to  price  at  marginal  cost.  The  result  is  a  market  distortion 
well  recognised  by  airline  executives  like  the  former  United  Airlines  chief,  Stephen 
Wolf. 
In  a  truly  free  market  the  oversupply  would  be  temporary.  That  is  the  least 
efficient  producers  will  exit  the  market.  US  bankruptcy  laws  however,  in  effect, 
displace  the  realities  of  the  marketplace  and  have  now  become  a  barrier  to  exit. 
Carriers  are  able  to  operate  literally  for  years  without  repaying  their  debt 
obligations;  consequently,  their  capacity  is  artificially  retained  in  the  system,  the 
result  is  economic  havoc  for  all.  '(Wolf  1995:  13.  ) 
Among  the  principal  creditors  are  workers  and  their  trade 
' 
unions,  who  find 
themselves  under  two  main  pressures.  Firstly,  they  have  to  see  the  abrogation  of  fairly 
negotiated  contracts  reducing  their  standard  of  living.  Secondly,  workers  more 
generally  can  suffer  from  the  atmosphere  of  concession  bargaining  which  results. 
Employers  like  Continental  and  TWA  were  in  the  forefront  of  using  bankruptcy  in 
this  way.  63  These  carriers  made  opportunistic  use  of  bankruptcy  to  withdraw  from 
fairly  negotiated  labour  contracts.  Using  the  exit/voice  dichotomy  of  Hirschmann, 
63  Both  Frank  Lorenzo  of  Texas  Air,  the  owner  of  Continental  and  Eastern,  and  Carl  Icahn  of  TWA 
used  bankruptcy  to  escape  from  labour  contracts.  Lorenzo  rehired  all  employees  on  new  non-union 
contracts  at  significantly  below  pre-bankruptcy  terms.  (Demspey  and  Goetz  pp.  69-73  and  133-14  1.  ) 
260 (198  1)  the  use  of  bankruptcy  as  a  bargaining  threat  can  be  regarded  as  the  ultimate 
withdrawal  of  voice  by  the  threat  of  wholesale  exit.  Firstly,  as  bankruptcy  takes  place 
there  is  a  huge  reduction  in  jobs  at  the  bankrupt  carrier.  After  Continental  filed  for 
bankruptcy  in  1983,  their  pilot  work-force  was  reduced  by  75  per  cent.  An  overall 
reduction  in  jobs  of  all  grades  took  place  as  it  reduced  its  route  network  by  40  per  cent 
between  1984  and  1989.  Secondly,  even  viable  carriers  are  'whipsawed'  into 
following  the  labour  cost  cutting  strategy,  regardless  of  whether  their  revenues  are 
actually  falling.  Bankruptcy  has  the  effect  of  allowing  a  retrenchment  of  labour  costs 
and  a  generalised  dampening  of  labour  expectations.  Restructuring  takes  place  on  the 
basis  of  wage  cuts,  furloughs,  two  tier  agreements  and  reductions  in  pensions  and 
medical  benefits.  In  addition,  the  onset  of  bankruptcy  usually  voids  the  collective 
agreement,  leading  to  a  re-negotiation  of  wages  and  work  rules. 
The  experiences  of  Continental,  TWA  and  America  West  are  cases  in  point.  The 
effects  of  bankruptcy  were  not  confined  to  the  workforce  of  the  'stricken'  carrier.  An 
atmosphere  of  anxiety  and  fear  was  transmitted  throughout  the  industry.  Firstly,  in 
concrete  terms,  cost  cutting  was  necessitated  by  the  predatory  pricing  policies  of  the 
bankrupts.  Secondly,  bankruptcy  was  understood  by  workers  as  a  sign  of  industry 
sickness  and  thus  lowered  general  labour  demands  and  expectations.  The  industrial 
relations  climate  is  crucial  in  this  regard.  In  the  USA  of  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  an 
atmosphere  of  concession  bargaining  and  employer  hostility  created  a  mood  of  job 
insecurity  and  anxiety,  even  among  highly  skilled  unionised  workers.  (See  Moody 
1988:  64,  Walsh  1994:  48.  )  The  prolonged  nature  of  bankruptcy  protection  amplifies 
all  of  these  effects.  Bailey  and  Dong  (1995:  473)  question  the  viability  of  bankruptcy 
statutes,  which  allow  extended  and  prolonged  survival  and  ask  why  such  market 
distortions  are  not  tackled.  It  can  be  argued  that  whilst  the  rationale  of  regulators  and 
government  is  the  preservation  of  competition,  the  disciplinary  effect  on  labour  of  the 
policy  is  equally  important.  As  Belzer  argues  in  the  case  of  trucking,  prolonged 
bankruptcy  increases  the  chances  of  a  generalised  effect  on  employment  terins  and 
conditions  throughout  an  industry.  Carriers  are  obviously  disadvantaged  by  the 
ruinous  pricing  strategies  of  bankrupt  carriers  but  the  labour  effects  can  be  seen  to 
benefit  them.  (Belzer  1993:  17.  )  Regulatory  and  governmental  tolerance  of  such 
practices  should  therefore  not  be  viewed  as  irrational  and  counterproductive  for 
bankruptcy  is  the  ultimate  management  bargaining,  'position.  Moreover,  in  most  0 
261 cases  bankruptcy  leads  to  liquidation  (under  Chapter  7)  and  eventual  merger, 
benefiting  the  major  industry  carriers  who  profit  from  reduced  competition  and 
acquire  assets,  including  aircraft  and  routes  at  extremely  low  cost.  Whilst  labour 
lobbied  Congress  to  modify  the  bankruptcy  code,  the  scope  remains  for  companies  to 
scrap  labour  contracts  because  of  the  creditor  bias  of  the  law.  The  next  section  goes 
on  to  describe  how  carriers'  interests  are  upheld  and  labour's  interests  ignored  in  this 
process  of  consolidation  and  merger  that  follows  bankruptcy. 
8.1.3  Merger,  Consolidation,  and  Scale:  The  Effect  on  the  Labour  Market 
As  chapter  3  indicated,  one  consequence  of  the  regulated  era  was  a  protection  for 
workers  from  the  consequences  of  merger  and  acquisition.  The  CAB  and  its 
successors  oversaw  a  relatively  stable  industry  structure,  with  little  entry  on  trunk 
routes  and  with  strictly  controlled  mergers.  One  consequence  of  deregulation 
bankruptcy  and  financial  instability  within  the  US  industry  was  a  trend  towards 
concentration  as  the  routes  and  assets  of  failed  operators  were  acquired  by  their  major 
competitors.  With  carriers  like  Ozark  acquired  by  Northwest,  People  Express  by 
Continental  and  Piedmont  by  US  Air,  competition  within  major  airports  and  routes 
virtually  disappeared.  Consolidation  took  place  in  the  aftermath  of  merger.  Airlines 
such  as  TWA,  United  and  Northwest  became  the  target  for  leveraged  buyouts  (LBOs) 
and  burdened  with  debt  to  pay  for  the  acquisition.  (Dempsey  and  Goetz  1992:  226- 
228.  )  When  the  bankrupt  carrier  is  acquired,  then  economies  of  size  can  be  derived.  64 
64  Many  airline  econoniists  refuse  to  term  these  advantages  economies  of  scale.  Doganis  for  example  C, 
cites  Strazheim's  1969  study  which  identified  a  positive  correlation  between  increased  carrier  size  and 
reduced  direct  operating  costs.  64  (Doganis  1991:  106.  )  As  Doganis  explains  however  since  deregulation 
C, 
researchers  do  not  regard  these  effects  as  attributable  to  scale  but  to  the  innate  differences  between 
large  and  small  carriers  in  terms  of  route  structure,  aircraft  type  etc.  This  is  of  course  true.  Airline  size 
alone  does  not  bring  failing,  costs  over  a  rising  output.  Increasingly  the  advantages  which  airlines  C,  C, 
acquire  through  size  are  ascribed  to  scope  not  scale.  In  Willig's  words:  "with  economies  of  scope,  joint 
production  of  two  goods  by  one  enterprise  is less  costly  than  the  combined  cost  of  production  of  two 
speciality  firms.  "  (Willig  (1979:  346.  ).  However  a  large  airline  would  have  to  be  particularly  inept  in 
its  pursuit  of  strategy  if  it  did  not  choose  to  maximise  activities  such  as  Computer  Reservation  Systems 
(CRS),  Frequent  Flyer  Programmes  (FFP),  and  hub  and  spoke  networks.  These  key  scope  economies 
alongside  integrated  purchasing,  vertical  integration  and  the  like  tend  to  be  related  to  scale.  As  Hanlon 
argues  scope  is  often  related  to  network  size,  which  in  turn  is  related  to  airline  size.  (I  lanlon  1995:  39.  ) 
It  does  seem  a  semantic  distinction  to  arolle  that  such  costs  which  do  fall  with  increasing  output  are  not 
due  to  scale  but  scope.  Scope  econon-des  can  be  viewed  as  similar  to  economies  of  scale  because  scale 
is  necessary  to  benefit  from  scope.  In  any  case  a  review  of  the  literature  on  economies  of  scale  in  the 
industry  argue  that  recent  findings  on  the  multiproduct  nature  of  the  industry,  show  potential  benefits  in 
C,  both  scale  and  scope  for  cost  advantage.  (Hayes  and  Ross  1996  493-509.  )  Taking  account  of  the  C,  C, 
network  basis  of  airline  services  Starr  and  Stinchcombe  (1992:  1-21)  argued  that  hub  and  spoke 
262 In  the  aftermath  of  merger,  although  difficulties  can  arise  in  the  process  of  integrating 
the  two  airline  'cultures'  and  prioritising  goals,  one  goal  which  seems  uppermost  is  4D 
staff  rational  isation.  Bankrupt  airlines  were  bought  over  in  a  huge  wave  of  merger  and 
consolidation  beginning  in  the  mid-eighties.  The  permissive  attitude  of  the  DOT 
under  the  Reagan  administration  to  such  mergers  in  1987  and  1989  exacerbated  this 
effect.  65  The  majors  vertically  absorbed  precisely  120  new  entrants,  in  many  cases 
commuter/regionals.  Prices  plummeted  in  the  short  term  but  once  the  competitive 
frenzy  was  over  fares  began  to  creep  up.  Table  8.1  below  collates  information  on  hub 
domination  using  a  measure  of  dominance  developed  by  the  author,  namely  single 
carrier  market  share.  This  measure  provides  a  reliable  indication  of  the  stability  of 
concentration  over  time.  Whilst  aggregate  measures  of  concentration  such  as  the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  appear  to  have  fallen  slightly  since  197966  ,  the  evidence 
below  in  table  8.1  shows  a  consistent  and  increasing  trend  towards  monopoly  at  major 
airports. 
Table  8.1  Concentration  Over  Time:  Selected  Airports:  1977-1997  Pre- 
Deregulation  until  Present 
AIRPORT  Single  Carrier 
Market  Share 
1977(%) 
Single  Carrier 
Market  Share 
1987(%) 
% 
Difference 
1977-87 
Single  Carrier 
Market  Share 
1997(%) 
% 
Difference 
1987-1997 
% 
Difference 
1977-1997 
Baltimore  24  US  Air  60  USAir  36  55  US  Air  -5  31 
Cincinnati  35  Delta  68  Delta  33  92  Delta  24  57 
Detroit  Met  21  Delta  65  Northwest  44  79  Northwest  14  58 
Houston 
Intcl 
20Continental  71  Continental  51  76  Continental  5  56 
Memphis  40  Delta  87  Northwest  47  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Minneapolis  50  Northwest  82  Northwest  32  81  Northwest  -1  31 
Pittsburgh  44  US  Air  2  83  US  Air  39  85  US  Air  3  1 
St  Louis  -  t 
3-9-  TWA  82  TWA  43  74  TWA  -8 
*  Merged  with  Delta  in  1986 
Sources:  Dempsey  and  Goetz  (1992)  and  Airline  Business  Jan  1997. 
networks  confer  economies  of  scale  as  each  additional  city  included  in  the  network  increases  traffic 
density  to  all  other  cities.  They  argue  that  on  the  basis  of  such  an  analysis,  the  industry  can  be  viewed 
as  natural  monopoly.  It  could  be  argued  that  adhesion  to  the  notion  of  the  absence  of  economies  of 
scale  and  the  refusal  to  relate  economies  of  scope  to  size  helps  deflect  regulatory  criticism  of  mergers. 
Empirical  evidence,  which  points  to  a  reality  of  increasing  concentration  and  natural  monopoly 
characteristics,  might  promote  a  less  indulgent  regulatory  response.  0 
65  Dempsey,  S  Goetz,  A  Airline  Deregulation  and  Laissez  Faire  Mythology  (p  227). 
66  The  11111  which  squares  the  market  share  of  the  largest  firms  in  terms  of  sales  revenue.  An  11111  of  0 
indicates  a  high  number  of  competing  similar  size  firms.  An  IIIII  of  10,000  indicates  pure  monopoly. 
The  IIIII  depends  very  much  on  the  type  of  concentration  situation  measured.  The  US  airline  industry 
11111  according  to  Belobaba  and  Van  Acker  (1994),  was  4920  in  1979,3360  11985  and  4020  by  199  1. 
Given  the  importance  of  the  HHI  measure  in  the  evaluation  of  mergers  by  the  US  Dept  of  Justice  and 
other  anti-trust  authorities,  it  is  surprising  that  few  other  studies  have  been  undertaken. 
263 It  can  be  seen  from  table  8.1  that  there  has  been  a  significant  increase  in  the  market 
share  of  the  major  carriers  over  the  period  of  nominal  deregulation.  The  trend  of 
concealed  consolidation  pertains  even  in  an  era  of  increasing  low  cost  entry.  The  data 
are  based  on  weekly  seat  capacity.  These  levels  of  market  power  cement  the  already 
strong  position  of  the  major  operators. 
Whilst  most  airline  economists  have  argued  that  such  levels  of  concentration  are 
unproblematic,  detailed  evidence  points  otherwise.  In  a  major  study  of  concentration 
in  the  US  industry,  Kim  and  Singal  (1993),  compared  consumer  fares  (product  prices) 
in  both  pre-merger  (announcement)  and  post-merger  (completion)  periods.  They 
identified  two  distinct  types  of  mergers,  that  of  distressed  carriers  and  normal  carriers. 
The  financially  distressed  carriers  tried  to  stem  passenger  losses  in  the  pre-merger 
period  by  offering  fare  discounts.  However,  post  merger,  Kim  and  Singal  found  a 
positive  correlation  between  higher  price  levels  and  higher  concentration  levels.  Their 
data  dispute  the  notion  that  efficiency  gains  were  the  dominant  outcome.  They  argued 
that  most  mergers  resulted  in  increased  market  power  usually  exploited  in  the  form  of 
fare  increases.  The  US  General  Accounting  Office  found  that  during  1988-90,  fares 
were  27  per  cent  higher  at  concentrated  than  'non-concentrated'  airports.  (ITF  1994.  ) 
The  level  of  hub  concentration  shown  above  certainly  points  to  the  possibility  of  such 
effects.  One  certainty  of  merger  policy  is  that  it  allowed  firms  to  consolidate 
operations  and  reap  economies  of  size.  In  a  detailed  study  of  airport  dominance, 
Wilson  (1993)  recommended  that  regulators  should  prioritise  access  to  stimulate 
competition.  (Wilson  1993:  17.  )  Yet,  aside  from  its  desire  to  deflect  foreign  control, 
for  example,  by  restricting  foreign  carriers  to  below  25  per  cent  of  U.  S.  carrier  voting 
stock,  regulators  have  been  largely  tolerant.  As  a  result,  the  pattern  of  competition  has 
settled  into  one  of  competition  between  rival  hubs  but  with  such  high  levels  of  hub 
domination,  there  is  little  effective  choice  for  consumers.  The  level  of  collusion 
between  major  carriers  is  in  fact  increasing  with  code  share  arrangements  underway 
between  American  and  US  Airways  and  United  and  Delta.  (Flint  1998:  39.  ) 
Mergers  have  affected  labour  primarily  through  the  absorption  of  bankrupt  carriers 
and  in  many  cases,  the  effects  have  been  positive,  as  merged  workforces  benefit  from 
higher  major  carrier  pay  scales.  Nevertheless,  there  have  also  been  negative 
264 consequences  in  the  shape  of  rationalisation  of  ground  and  maintenance  crews,  often 
with  considerable  levels  of  redundancy  (Sleigh  1995),  and  loss  of  seniority  for  some 
grades,  most  notably  pilots  and  flight  deck  staff.  Despite  the  high  levels  of 
concentration,  however,  there  is  a  level  of  competition  provided  by  low-cost  carriers, 
who  in  Penrose's  (1959)  terminology  operate  at  the  "interstices  of  the  market.  "  As  the 
next  section  explains,  the  labour  market  effect  of  these  carriers  is  considerable. 
8.1.4  Contesting  Labour  Costs:  The  Real  Impact  of  Low  Cost  Carriers 
Whilst  there  has  been  little  effective  competition  between  the  major  carriers,  the 
existence  of  low  fares  in  many  market  segments  owes  much  to  the  continued  impact 
of  low  cost  carriers.  Many  of  the  most  vaunted  new  entrants  such  as  People  Express, 
New  York  Air  and  Air  Cal  suffered  from  an  Icarits  effect  as  they  expanded  too  early 
and  became  complacent  in  the  face  of  major  competition.  These  carriers  were  then 
digested  into  the  route  networks  of  the  major  carriers  against  whom  they  competed. 
Later  low  cost  entrants,  such  as  Valqjet,  Kiwi,  Reno  Air  and  Pacific  Western,  which 
are  often  invoked  to  prove  the  contestability  of  US  airline  markets,  have  in  fact  also 
succumbed  to  bankruptcy  and  merger.  In  the  case  of  Valujet,  the  negative  publicity 
around  the  horrific  Everglades  crash  of  1996,  forced  a  name  change  but  the  carrier  has 
not  recovered.  In  fact  the  crash  almost  acted  as  a  negative  advertisement  for  all  low 
cost  carriers,  and  probably  had  an  effect  on  the  revenues  of  others.  However  whilst 
these  later  entrants  have  failed  or  are  failing,  a  more  resilient  band  of  low  cost  carriers 
continues  to  operate,  driving  down  fares  and  provoking  the  major  carriers. 
Possessing  network  economies  such  as  CRS,  FFPs  and  proprietary  hubs  is,  of  course, 
preferable  to  the  undifferentiated  approach  of  the  low  cost  carriers.  However,  whilst 
the  low  cost  airlines  provide  ultra  low  fares,  disciplining  major  operators  from 
exploiting  their  monopoly  position,  their  impact  is  geographically  confined  and  the 
most  successful  of  them  have  similar  advantages  to  their  major  competitors.  The 
more  resilient  low  cost  carriers,  such  as  Southwest,  Continental  and  America  West, 
play  a  crucial  role  in  the  deregulated  environment.  They  offer  ultra  low  fares, 
affording  a  large  measure  of  public  approbation  to  the  process  of  deregulation.  From  a 
labour  market  point  of  view,  these  low  cost  carriers  provide  convenient  'cost 
comparators'  for  the  major  carriers.  Their  seat  mile  costs  tend  to  be  much  lower  than 
265 the  majors  and  their  eschewal  of  the  expensive  full  fare  service  options  and  use  Of 
standardised  fleets  make  thein  extremely  important  in  competing  at  the  margins.  They 
force  larue  carriers  to  examine  their  own  cost  structures,  pailICLII,  11-IN'  in  WIIIIS  Of  Cý  - 
labour  Litillsation.  (Wells  1999:  474.  )  Southwest,  for  example,  has  endured  because  it 
was  Inaugurated  as  an  intrastate  can'ier  after  the  CAB  relaxed  the  rules  for  such 
operators  in  the  early  1970,  -,.  Its  near  monopoly  of  Dallas's  second  airport  allowed  it  a 
huge  advantage  in  a  high  growth  sector  of  the  US  econom  . 
Despite  regulatory  Z_  I-  y 
limitations  on  its  scope  to  enter  new  markets,  Southwest  has  challenged  the  so-called 
inega  carriers'  with  low  fares.  no  frills  service.  Yet,  as  figure  8.1  shows,  even  the  Z, 
MOSt  Successful  low  cost  carriers  account  for  a  small  proportion  of'  the  overall  sales. 
In  fact  beCaLISC  of  their  marginalised  position  many  low  cost  carriers,  despite  offerino  I  -- 
low  fares  and  having  low  operalino  costs,  have  gone  bankrupt.  Western  Pacific,  which  C-  Z- 
ceased  trading  in  1997,  is  a  case  in  point.  Figure  8.1  below  demonstrates  the  limited 
overall  effect  ofthe  low  cost  carriers  compared  to  the  major  operalors. 
Figure  8.1  Market  Share  Comparison  Major  and  Low  Cost  Carriers 
Sales  US  majors  and  Competitors.  Low  cost=  Valujet  (Airtran)and  Reno 
Air  (1998)  Source:  Air  Transport  World 
Lowcost 
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The  latest  new  entrants  have  limited  impact  and  often  use  older  noisier  equipment, 
which  effectively  excludes  thein  fi-om  operations  in  many  of  the  11101-C  lucrative 
markets  where  restrictions  apply.  Valujet,  a  much  trumpeted  low  cost  niche  operator 
which  commenced  operations  in  October  1993,  accounted  for  only  4  per  cent  of 
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weekly  seats  offered  at  its  main  base,  Atlanta,  in  1995  .  Its  share  had  doubled  by 
January  of  1996  and  another  low  cost  operator,  KIWI  International,  offered  3  per  cent 
of  seats.  However,  although  Atlanta  was  one  of  the  most  contested  markets,  the 
combined  market  share  of  the  two  low  cost  operators  is  dwarfed  by  the  75  per  cent 
controlled  by  Delta,  which  uses  Atlanta  as  a  proprietary  hub.  The  latest  data  for  the 
top  US  airports  point  to  a  marginal  impact  from  low  cost  carriers.  The  majors,  like 
United,  American  and  Delta,  have  crushing  superiority  at  many  of  the  major  hubs. 
Often,  however,  the  impact  of  low  cost  carriers,  though  marginal  in  terms  of  overall 
traffic  share,  dynamises  the  product  market  exposing  in  particular  the  need  for 
management  to  control  labour  costs.  The  low  cost  threat  though  marginal  in  terms  of 
overall  market  share  is  a  very  potent  one,  because  hit  and  run  competition  from  these 
operators  drives  down  yields.  There  is  also  an  element  of  management  using  the  threat 
to  extract  labour  concessions.  Nevertheless  it  is  the  effect  of  these  operators  at  the 
margins  of  the  product  market  which  is  important. 
Essentially  the  existence  of  low  cost  competition  encourages  carriers  like  United, 
Continental  and  Delta  to  initiate  their  own  low  cost  niche  operations.  Virtually  every 
ma  .  or  operator  has  had  to  respond  to  the  low  cost  threat  either  by  initiating  their  own  j 
low  cost  operation  or  by  reducing  terms  and  conditions  for  workers  employed  on 
commuter  and  low  yield  routes.  (Jones  1998a:  28.  )  Continental  Lite,  sponsored  by 
Continental  Airlines  to  compete  within  the  Eastern  United  States,  and  Shuttle  by 
68 
United,  aimed  at  competing  with  Southwest  Airlines,  typify  these  strategies.  The 
creation  of  low  cost  operations,  as  in  Europe,  is  usually  based  on  the  protection  of 
'insider'  terms  and  conditions,  with  new  entrants  tending  to  staff  the  new  lower  cost 
operation.  In  this  way  airlines  can  develop  low  cost  counter  strategies  whilst  avoiding 
labour  unrest,  though  not  in  all  cases.  69 
In  the  US,  therefore,  the  process  of  deregulation  has  been  accompanied  by  the  failure 
67  The  carrier  is  now  known  as  Airtran  in  a  clear  attempt  to  deflect  public  attention  from  its  role  in  the 
Everglades  disaster  of  1996  (see  Chapter  7). 
68  Altered  lmages:  Airline  Business  February  1995  (the  airline  subsequently  abandoned  the  strategy 
succumbing  to  a  fare  war  with  United  and  US  Air. 
60  9  These  option  have  been  somewhat  frustrated  by  the  power  of  the  pilots  union  ALPA  and  the  Allied 
Pilots  Association  (APA)  which  represents  flight  crew  at  American  Airlines.  Both,  particularly  the 
latter,  have  opposed  the  introduction  of  separate  pay  scales  for  pilots  operating  small  capacity  jet 
aircraft,  thus  stifling  the  creation  of  low  cost  commuter  operations.  C, 
267 of  new  entrants  and  the  bankruptcy  of  established  carriers.  These  market  changes 
either  had  a  pronounced  effect  upon  the  labour  market,  as  carriers  sought  to  replicate 
the  settlements  at  bankrupt  carriers,  or  were  forced  to  by  industry  recession.  As  a 
wave  of  consolidation  took  place,  regulators  stood  back  and  allowed  carriers  to  grow, 
thus  allowing  them  to  reap  economies  of  size,  particularly  of  scope,  enabling  them  to 
further  reduce  costs.  This  process  of  market  selection  was  assisted  by  the  permissive 
stance  of  regulators,  who  failed  to  tackle  the  problem  of  bankruptcy,  thus  allowing 
stricken  carriers  to  attack  labour  costs,  whilst  other  carriers  took  advantage  of  the 
general  bargaining  climate.  After  the  resultant  mergers,  which  resulted  in  short  term 
job  loss  and  wage  reduction,  regulators  tolerated  massive  concentration  and  effective 
monopoly  of  hub  airports.  When  the  industry  settled  down  into  a  pattern  of  major 
dominance,  as  Vietor  (1990)  describes,  large  firms  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the 
entry  of  low  cost  carriers  to  further  rationalise  and  reduce  the  cost  of  their  operations. 
In  so  doing,  they  particularly  focused  on  labour  costs.  None  of  these  market  effects 
can  be  seen  in  isolation,  but  their  combined  effect  indicates  that  by  allowing  a  certain 
type  of  market  structure  to  develop,  regulators  can  influence  the  nature  of  labour  costs 
within  the  industry.  This  aspect  of  the  changing  regulatory  environment  is  even  more 
apparent  in  Europe  as  the  next  section  demonstrates. 
8.2  European  Competition  Policy:  Servicing  the  Majors? 
8.2.1.  From  Cosy  Cartels  to  Competitive  Consolidation? 
Deregulation  within  Europe  has  developed  in  a  series  of  phased  liberalisation 
packages  and  has  been  more  gradualist  than  the  cathartic  deregulation  seen  in  the 
USA.  (Button  et  al  1998.  )  In  chapters  I  and  4  we  described  how  the  labour  market 
effects  of  European  deregulation  could  be  described  as  a  process  of  controlled 
competitive  disengagement.  Under  these  conditions  the  state's  more  gradualist  policy 
allowed  carriers  more  time  for  adjustment,  but  eroded  the  long-standing  pay  and 
conditions  premia,  which  had  accrued  to  airline  workers. 
To  that  extent,  whilst  the  implementation  of  policy  was  different,  the  outcomes  have 
been  broadly  similar.  A  similar  pattern  of  consolidation  and  monopoly  has  occurred 
268 within  Europe.  In  Europe  national  regulatory  policies  have  created  some  scope  for  a 
downward  movement  on  fares,  as  has  the  existence  of  the  low  cost  charter  sector.  In  a 
sense  this  is  comparable  to  the  US,  although  the  process  has  been  slower.  The  process 
of  consolidation  in  Europe  has  not  been  brought  about  through  bankruptcy,  as  in  the 
USA  government  support  has  prevented  this,  but  by  the  championing  policies  of 
national  governments.  British  Airways'  acquisition  of  both  British  Caledonian  (1988) 
and  Air  Europe/Dan  Air  (1993)  can  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  UK  government's 
desire  to  see  BA  as  a  global  carrier,  possessed  of  a  wide  route  structure  and  able  to 
compete  with  US  and  Asian  carriers.  Similarly  the  Air  France  take-over  of  the 
domestic  carrier  Air  Inter  and  the  long  distance  operator  UTA,  all  were  aimed  at 
allowing  the  'national  champion'  to  attain  the  size  and  route  network  necessary  to 
challenge  the  so  called  'mega  carriers'.  Part  of  that  process  of  building  'champion 
carriers'  has  been  the  establishment  of  or  acquisition  of  major  shareholdings  in 
airlines  operating  within  other  nations.  Thus  BA  acquired  a  major  stake  in  TAT  in 
order  to  secure  slots  at  Orly  airport.  Similarly  it  acquired  Air  Liberte,  in  order  to  build 
a  presence  in  Southern  France,  at  the  same  time  it  created  Deutsche  BA  to  challenge 
Lufthansa's  dominance  in  the  German  market.  KLM  has  been  active  in  acquiring 
stakes  in  other  countries,  most  notably  through  its  acquisition  of  Air  UK,  which  now 
operates  as  KLM  UK.  British  Midland  is  now  in  effect  a  partially  owned  subsidiary  of 
SAS.  The  nature  and  extent  of  the  competitive  challenge  in  the  more  liberalised  parts 
of  Europe  is  therefore  as  sharp  as  that  which  occurred  in  the  US  market. 
Competition  therefore  occurred  between  newly  enlarged  flag  carriers  who  could  offer 
integrated  route  networks,  thus  luring  passengers  into  their  hub  system,  and  from 
carriers  acquired  or established  within  second  countries.  When  competition  policy  is 
examined,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  EU,  despite  its  stated  preference  for  a  policy  of 
liberalisation  and  its  imposition  of  conditions  on  mergers,  has  consistently  taken  the 
view  that  airlines  should  become  'international  champions.  '  (Kassim.  1995.  )  This 
policy  has  to  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  growth  of  US  carriers  on  the  basis  of  an 
equally  tolerant  merger  policy.  To  compete  with  these  mega  carriers,  Europe  wants 
mega  carriers  of  its  own.  These  areas  of  competition  were  largely  between  rival  flag 
carriers,  but  another  level  of  competition  also  existed.  As  in  the  US low  cost  carriers 
made  their  mark,  and  their  existence  has  led  to  a  considerable  re-alignment  in  major 
carrier  operations.  This  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
269 8.2.2  European  Low  Cost  Operators:  Cheap  Fares  and  Cheap  Labour? 
Europe's  experience  with  low  cost  carriers  has  been  similar  to  that  of  the  USA.  The 
existence  of  the  charter  sector  and  independent  operators  such  as  British  Midland  and 
Air  Liberte  (now  owned  by  BA)  meant  there  had  always  been  some  challenge  to  the 
cartel  pricing  which  characterised  European  air  transport  before  deregulation.  Periodic 
attempts  were  made  to  challenge  the  transatlantic  cartel,  with  the  most  celebrated 
example  being  Laker  Airways  of  the  1970s.  However  from  about  the  mid  1990s  a 
new  breed  of  low  cost  entrants  began  to  operate  in  the  more  liberalised  aviation 
environments  of  the  UK,  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands.  Their  avowed  intention  was  to 
'grow  the  market'  for  air  travel  in  countries  like  the  UK  and  Ireland  with  spare 
terminal  capacity,  albeit  at  regional  and  secondary  airports,  compete  with  'bloated' 
majors,  and  effect  a  demographic  shift  in  air  travel  preferences.  The  most  successful 
such  as  Ryanair  and  EasyJet  were  fashioned  on  the  US low  cost  operator  Southwest 
and  like  their  US  counterparts  they  operated  linear,  point  to  point  route  structures, 
with  low  initial  frequency  and  ultra  low  fares,  attracting  the  less  time-sensitive  leisure 
traveller.  Given  the  low  yield,  these  carriers  operated  much  tighter  cabin 
configurations  and  as  in  the  US  dispensed  with  on  board  food  and  otherfrills'.  There 
were  very  few  frills  in  their  operating  structures,  with  aircraft  and  crews  being  leased, 
cabin  crew  recruited  from  non-traditional  areas,  and  functions  such  as  handling  and 
maintenance  outsourced  from  the  start.  (See  chapter  7.  ) 
There  was  nothing  revolutionary  about  this  operating  structure  in  Europe,  as  many 
charter  operators  had  long  operated  in  such  a  way  however,  the  real  impact  of  the  low 
cost  operators  was  on  the  labour  cost  of  the  major  operators.  Whilst  carriers  like  BA 
and  the  then  Air  UK  dismissed  the  threat  of  Ryanair,  they  restructured  operations  so 
that  regional  operations  became  in  effect,  lower  cost  operations.  This  included  a 
restructuring  of  regional  operations  within  many  carriers  and  signalled  the  seriousness 
with  which  the  low  cost  threat  was  taken.  Given  the  high  margin  on  European 
business  class  fares,  there  has  also  been  market  entry  from  premium  low  cost 
270 operators  such  as  Debonair  of  the  UK  and  Azzura  of  Italy.  70  The  acquisition  by 
Richard  Branson  of  the  Belgian  low  cost  operator  TEA,  and  its  re-branding  into 
Virgin  Express  in  1996,  was  designed  to  secure  lucrative  business  traffic  from 
Northern  Europe,  operating  under  the  new  European  liberalisation  'freedoms'.  As  a 
result  flag  carriers  in  Italy,  Spain  and  Germany  have  established  or  are  negotiating  the 
introduction  of  internal  low  cost  operations  in  order  to  compete  with  home  based  and 
'inward'  low  cost  competition.  The  establishment  of  these  operations  has  led  to 
significant  reductions  in  pay  for  all  grades  of  staff.  (See  chapter7.  ) 
Yet  despite  the  effect  of  low  cost  carriers  on  the  European  airline  industry,  their 
impact  is  still  constrained  by  infrastructure.  Furthermore,  it  has  yet  to  be  tested  by  a 
lengthy  recession,  which  would  probably  impact  upon  the  low  cost  carriers'  mainstay, 
the  leisure  market.  For  this  reason  low  cost  operators  are  trying  to  diversify  their 
market  by  attracting  price  sensitive  business  travellers  as  did  Southwest  in  the  USA. 
However,  the  size  of  the  market  and  the  demographic  and  geographical  features  of  the 
European  market,  with  heavy  concentrations  of  such  markets  around  major  cities, 
make  this  a  difficult  strategy.  In  order  to  reach  these  markets  and  a  considerable 
segment  of  the  leisure  market,  these  carriers  need  access  to  slots  at  the  major  business 
hubs  such  as  Heathrow,  Frankfurt  and  Charles  de  Gaulle.  At  the  moment  they  have  to 
make  do  with  connections  between  regional  airports,  which  are  unattractive  to  time 
sensitive  travellers,  and  their  lower  frequencies  make  delays  less  acceptable  to  this 
demanding  market.  It  seems  clear  that  the  low  cost  carriers  prefer  to  avoid  the  hub 
airports  with  their  high  costs  and  that  they  prefer  not  to  compete  head  to  head  with  the 
major  carriers.  Nevertheless  though  they  do  not  compete  in  the  same  markets,  they 
have  drained  passengers  away  from  the  full  fare  major  carriers  in  every  country. 
These  carriers  find  it  difficult  to  compete  with  the  cost  structures  of  low  cost  carriers. 
Both  the  effect  of  low  cost  carriers  and  the  low  cost  operations  of  strong  and  efficient 
flag  carriers  has  forced  European  governments  to  re-evaluate  the  state  aid,  which  has 
traditionally  been  used  to  maintain  state  carriers.  Thus,  there  has  been  high  level 
institutional  support  and  encouragement  to  privatisation,  both  in  response  to  EU 
statutes  and  aspirations,  but  also  as  a  method  of  disciplining  and  reforming  the 
70  Debonair  Italian  owned  and  UK  based  went  bankrupt  in  the  Autumn  of  1999.  The  reason  offered  by 
analysts  was  its  failure  to  identify  a  definite  market  segment.  The  airline  tried  to  target  high  yield 
passengers  but  failed  in  this  strategy  (see  Pearse  (Airline  Business)  October  1999).  0 
271 European  airline  labour  market.  The  state  has  used  its  competition  policy  in  effect  to 
sponsor  privatisation  within  the  industry.  These  issues  are  discussed  in  the  next 
section. 
8.2.3  State  Aid  Policy:  Market  Investor  Principle  or  Labour  Market  Restructuring 
on  Principle? 
The  EU  policy  on  state  aid  is  specified  within  the  Treaty  of  Rome  within  the  general 
competition  rules.  (Articles  92  and  93.  )  However,  the  specific  rules  on  state  aid  for 
the  airline  industry  are  prescribed  within  the  'second  memorandum'  of  1978.  The 
memorandum  policy  is  in  flux,  yet  a  consistent  thread  runs  through  it.  In  essence  it 
treats  aid  on  the  basis  of  two  distinct  guidelines.  First,  it  allows  state  aid  on  the  basis 
of  the  market  investor  principle.  This  means  a  government  could  only  provide  support 
if  an  individual  or  institution,  seeking  a  commercial  rate  of  return,  would  do  the  same. 
In  such  cases,  the  Commission  then  retrospectively  evaluates  the  aid  measure  to 
71  ascertain  whether  the  market  investor  would  have  placed  equity  in  this  way.  If  not, 
then,  the  second  criterion  comes  into  play.  The  Commission  can  disallow  the  aid  or  it 
can  permit  aid  within  the  specific  criteria  that  the  aid  is  designed  to  'facilitate  the 
development  of  certain  economic  activities'. 
The  first  criterion  is  problematic  and  as  such  is  often  strongly  contested  by  member 
states.  Firstly,  it  almost  immediately  rules  out  aid  to  a  carrier  that  does  not  have  an 
extensive  route  network  and  global  potential  attractive  to  the  private  sector  leading  to 
a  potential  'catch  22'  situation.  In  essence  if  the  state  is  prohibited  from  investing,  it 
will  be  unable  to  attract  private  sector  investors.  Secondly,  governments  faced  with 
the  imminent  collapse  of  state  airlines  have  provided  aid  regardless  of  the  evidence  of 
actual  investor  sentiment  on  the  airline.  Alitalia,  Iberia,  Air  France,  Olympic  and  TAP 
have  all  attempted  to  secure  state  aid  on  that  basis.  However,  from  the  end  of  1993, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Air  France  case,  the  Commission  has  tended  to  allow  aid 
only  on  the  second  criteria:  that  of  facilitating  the  development  of  certain  economic 
activities.  Within  these  criteria  goes  the  'one  last  time'policy  of  restructuring  aid.  This 
policy  has  been  endorsed  by  the  most  recent  enquiry  into  the  European  airline 
71  Ibid. 
272 industry,  the  report  of  the  ComW  De  Sages.  (European  Union  1994 
.  )72  The  so-called 
'wise  men'report  stipulates  that  state  aid  should  be  used  only  for  restructuring. 
Restructuring  however  often  implies  job  loss,  wage  reductions  and  the  intensification 
of  work.  Pointing  to  Europe's  low  productivity  in  comparison  with  the  USA,  the 
report  attributes  these  differentials  to  the  continuing  existence  of  state  aid. 
Nationalised  airlines,  they  argue,  are  susceptible  to  overstaffing,  bureaucracy  and 
inflexibility,  echoing  the  rent  sharing,  X-inefficiency  analysis  discussed  in  chapter  1. 
This  gives  an  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  the  perceived  need  for  labour  market 
rationalisation  informs  policy.  With  this  belief,  privatisation  becomes  an  irreversible 
trend,  given  the  wage  premium  in  nationalised  airlines  and  their  generally  lower 
productivity  and  wider  macroeconomic  problems  of  servicing  budget  deficits.  The 
continuation  of  a  large  public  sector,  financed  largely  by  government  debt,  directly 
threatens  the  Maastricht  criteria.  (Button  et  al  1991.  )  Though  the  state  aid  criteria  are 
nebulous  enough  for  governments  to  channel  finance  into  failing  national  carriers,  the 
trend  is  towards  privatisation.  The  central  driver  towards  privatisation  in  the  European 
airline  industry  is  the  restructuring  of  the  labour  market.  Without  the  state  as  lender  of 
last  resort  and  with  the  management  empowerment  which  is  supposed  to  result, 
airlines  can  fundamentally  re-order  the  employment  relationship  - 
72  Expanding  Horizons:  Report  of  The  Comite  De  Sages  Into  The  Future  of  European  Civil  Air  0  Transport  (Brussels  1994.  ) 
273 The  following  graph  (figure  8.2)  gives  an  indication  of  the  staffinc,  reductions  Zý  I-  Zý  --  Zý 
undertaken  by  major  European  airlines  in  the  period  1980-1996,  when  Inuch 
restructuring  took  place. 
Figure  8.2  Employment  at  Major  European  Airlines  1980-1996 
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It  can  be  seen  from  the  chart  that  there  is  a  steady  trend  of  employment  reduction 
from  the  crisis  point  of  1991,  when  the  impact  of  the  Gulf  war  induced  losses 
equivalent  to  the  historical  profits  ofthe  industry.  A  revival  in  employment  within  the 
major  airlines  is  apparent  within  some  rnaýjor  carriers  by  1995.  In  the  post  Gulf  war 
period,  and  subsequent  world  air  transport  boom,  airlines  such  as  BA,  Lufthansa  and 
KLM  were  able  to  effect  nizkjor  cost  surgery.  BA  obtained  a  commitment  to  close  the 
scissors  between  costs  and  revenue,  securing  savings  of  nearly  fl.  5  billion.  KLM  was 
able  to  implement  a  'Competitive  Cost  Levels  Program'  to  secure  a  labour 
productivity  increase  of  57  per  cent,  unit  cost  reductions  of  20  per  cent  and  an 
increase  in  fleet  utilisation  of  II  per  cent.  (Airline  Business  November  1995.  )  Most  of 
these  savings  have  been  achieved  by  increasing  the  intensity  of  operations.  Even  with 
the  post  Gulf  war  recovery,  the  industry  continues  to  make  cost  reductions.  Some  of 
these  cost  reduction  strategies  superficially  inflate  the  overall  level  of  employment. 
For  example,  in  the  case  of  British  Airways,  the  acquisition  of  Dan  Air  conceals  the 
10  per  cent  reduction  in  core  BA  staffundertaken  since  the  GUlfwar. 
274 In  the  wake  of  the  ComW  De  Sages  report  and  various  other  ad  hoc  enquiries  and 
investigations  into  the  competitiveness  of  the  industry,  it  becomes  clear  that  although 
European  carriers  have  been  reducing  their  workforces  and  increasing  their 
productivity,  this  process  is  hampered  by  perceived  rigidities  in  the  input  costs  which 
they  face  for  certain  key  services.  In  a  recent  interview,  the  EU  transport 
Commissioner,  Neil  Kinnock  argued: 
'Efforts  to  exert  downward  pressure  on  the  external  costs  of  airlines  must 
continue  and  particular  attention  needs  to  be  given  to  ground  handling, 
liberalisation  of  which  is  under  way,  and  to  airport  charges.  '(Hill  1998:  52.  ) 
Yet  this  willingness  to  attack  the  supply  side  of  service  provision  to  the  airlines  can  be 
contrasted  with  the  glacial  progress  made  on  issues  of  competition  and  market  access. 
The  reasons  and  consequences  of  this  seeming  policy  paradox  are  examined  below. 
8.2.4  Slot  Allocation  and  Ground  Handling  Monopolies:  Regulatory  Schizophrenia  in 
Practice 
The  current  EU  policy  on  Slot  Allocation  compels  the  larger  carriers  to  use  or  lose 
their  slots,  allocating  such  under  used  slots  to  a  pool  for  distribution  to  new  entrants. 
In  effect  this  amounts  to  a  policy  of  ad  hoc  unbundling,  with  slots  used  as  a 
bargaining  chip  in  negotiations  over  mergers  and  alliances.  Given  the  difficulties  of 
market  entry  and  access  to  the  most  lucrative  hubs,  this  is  hardly  likely  to  have  a 
significant  impact  on  the  structure  of  competition.  73  The  major  airlines  still  enjoy  the 
privilege  of  block  exemption  in  this  regard.  Arguably,  the  proliferation  of  alliances 
and  code  sharing  makes  it  more  difficult  for  regulators  to  identify  abuses  than  under 
the  previous  regime.  During  the  regulated  period  major  flag  carriers  pooled  revenues 
in  price  cartels,  their  chosen  policy  nowadays  is  to  sign  route-by-route  code  shares 
with  regulatory  approval.  (Feldman  1998:  49.  )  The  fact  that  these  arrangements  have 
block  exemption  status  means  that  regulators  have  decided  to  tolerate  them  in  any 
case. 
73  A  recent  UK  Civil  Aviation  Authority  (CAA)  paper  entitled  Slot  Allocation:  A  Proposalfor 
European  Airports  (CAA  Cheltenham  Gloucs.  Feb  1995)  pointed  to  a  lack  of  consumer  benefits  with  a 
large  proportion  of  routes  being,  operated  by  two  carriers  who  the  report  alleges  were  'more  used  to  co-  C,  t, 
operating  than  competing'  (Air  Competition  Warning,  Financial  Times  11.02.95).  C, 
275 This  permissiveness  in  the  face  of  industry  consolidation  can  be  contrasted  with  the 
relative  zeal  with  which  the  European  authorities  have  attacked  situations  of  minor 
importance  in  the  overall  competitive  picture  namely  the  deregulation  of  ground 
service  monopolies  (GSMs).  These  ground  handling  monopolies  have  lost  block 
exemption  status  with  the  Third  Package  of  deregulation  measures  implemented  in 
1993  (Van  Moutte  1993:  283). 
GSMs,  which  control  the  provision  of  airside  services,  such  as  baggage  handling, 
cleaning  and  catering,  are  viewed  by  many  as  a  supply  constraint,  locking  carriers  into 
inflexible  contracts,  usually  with  rival  national  carriers.  There  is  evidence  of 
overcharging,  but  EU  regulatory  oversight  has  already  been  brought  to  bear.  The 
break  up  of  GSMs  could  lead  to  a  downward  bidding  of  wages  and  conditions  as  the 
International  Transport  Workers  Federation  (ITF)  argues.  There  is  already  evidence  of 
this  development  within  the  UK,  where  ground  handling  has  been  substantially 
deregulated.  A  new  wave  of  deregulation  based  on  lowest  cost  tender  has  had  major 
effects  on  airport  ground  staff.  The  imposition  of  two  tier  wage  rates,  non-union,  low 
cost  competition  and  a  large  expansion  of  part  time  work  have  all  been  features  of  the 
UK  experience.  (Darlington  1995.  )  British  Airway's  latest  attempt  to  secure  so  called 
'market  rates'  for  regional  ground  handling  activities,  clearly  indicates  the  impact  of 
low  cost  downward  directed  competition  in  the  UK.  Labour  costs  are  hugely 
important  within  ground  handling  functions,  (see  chapter  7).  If  airlines  such  as  Iberia 
and  Air  France  are  forced  to  surrender  their  GSM,  then  the  business  will  be  parcelled 
out  on  the  basis  of  some  form  of  competitive  tendering.  Given  the  low  capital 
intensity  of  functions  such  as  check  in,  information  baggage  handling  and  other  areas, 
and  the  imposition  of  regulatory  price  caps,  airlines  will  be  able  to  negotiate  low 
handling  prices  only  at  the  expense  of  wages  and  conditions  for  already  low  paid 
workers.  This  will  only  benefit  the  major  dominant  carriers,  rather  than  new  entrants, 
who  tend  to  use  secondary  airports  where  GSMs  are  less  common.  (Reed  1998:  55.  ) 
The  policy  paradox  between  slot  allocation  and  ground  handling  demonstrates  the 
willingness  of  the  European  authorities,  under  intensive  lobbying  from  carrier 
interests,  to  tackle  cost  issues  on  behalf  of  the  airlines  whilst  ignoring  their  own 
market  dominance.  In  the  European  single  aviation  market,  efficient  labour  utilisation 
276 has  become  the  essential  com  onent  of  carrier  strategy.  Any  national  or  regulatory  p  Cý 
rules,  which  constrain  efficient  utilisation,  are  subject  to  challenge  and  lobbying.  With 
national  regulatory  guidelines  and  trade  union  agreements,  there  is  a  wide  disparity 
between  nations.  Thus,  many  airlines  have  argued,  somewhat  disingenuously,  that 
harmonisation  is  necessary  between  different  jurisdictions  in  order  to  conform  to  EU 
objectives.  The  apparent  willingness  of  the  regulatory  authorities  to  promote 
measures,  which  facilitate  labour  market  change,  is  seen  in  the  extension  of  flight 
crew  utilisation  proposed  by  the  Commission  under  the  so-called  Joint  Aviation 
Authority  Regulations  (JAA).  The  next  section  examines  how  this  policy,  which  is 
actually  based  on  a  need  for  increased  utilisation  of  flight  and  cabin  crew,  has  been 
promoted  as  an  issue  of  competition  and  market  convergence. 
8.2.5  Joint  Authority  Regulation:  Extending  the  Power  of  the  Majors? 
Since  most  operators  are  subject  to  industrial  agreements,  which  determine  the  level 
of  effective  utilisation  of  flight  and  cabin  crews,  harmonisation  could,  in  principle, 
mean  convergence  on  the  practices  of  more  heavily  regulated  nations  such  as  France 
and  Germany.  However,  airline  operators  have  made  it  clear  that  they  wish  to  see 
convergence  on  the  practices  of  the  more  liberal'jurisdictions  such  as  Romania,  the 
CIS  and  Turkey.  This  policy  allows  the  operators  to  dilute  national  regulatory 
safeguards  under  the  veil  of  'harmonisation.  The  policy  effectively  allows  airlines  to 
challenge  national  terms  and  conditions  without  confronting  their  own  national 
unions.  The  regulations  designed  to  allow  carriers  to  benefit  from  third  package 
'freedoms'.  have  been  presented  as  a  harmonisation  measure.  Yet  as  the  UK  airline 
pilots'  union,  BALPA  points  out  only  12  out  of  23  countries  party  to  the  JAA 
proposals  are  EU  members.  74  The  proposals  would  allow  carriers  to  roster  crews  for 
continuous  duty  on  those  routes  that  involved  multiple  stops.  Non-productive  periods 
would  be  subtracted  from  the  total  flying  hours,  allowing  a  two  pilot  crew  to  fly 
London-Glasgow-New  York-Boston  on  a  duty  time  of  12  hours  50  with  flying  time  of 
9  hours  50  minutes.  (Ibid 
. 
)75  Research  by  the  UK  flight  deck  union  BALPA  points  to 
a  large  disparity  between  the  JAROPS  proposals  and  the  national  regulations 
sponsored  by  the  UK  regulator  the  Civil  Aviation  Authority  (CAA). 
74  The  Lo-  October/November  1995 
0 
277 The  agreement  considerably  exceeds  the  limitations  imposed  within  the  British 
Airway's  Industrial  Agreement,  which  is in  turn  more  restrictive  than  the  CAA's  own 
guidelines  CAP  371.  (Ibid.  )  The  EU  already  allows  considerable  freedom  to  carriers 
to  'wet  lease'  aircraft  and  crews,  in  effect  subcontracting  aircraft  and  crews.  These 
crews  are  often,  though  qualified,  trained  under  a  more  lax  regulatory  regime  such  as 
that  of  the  CIS  or  Turkey.  An  incentive  for  hiring  these  crews  is  their  ability  to 
disregard  the  hours  limitations  of  the  country  concerned.  By  'flagging  out'  in  this  way, 
some  carriers  effectively  circumvent  the  more  restrictive  regulations  imposed  by  the 
national  aviation  authorities.  JAROPS  would  harmonise  the  regulations  at  the  level  of 
some  of  the  most  lax  countries.  Whilst  there  has  been  some  backtracking  in  the  face 
of  labour  campaigning,  the  prospect  of  a  set  of  common  scheduling  and  duty  time 
limitations  is  a  real  threat. 
The  more  explicit  labour  market  effects  of  issues  such  as  ground  handling 
deregulation  and  adjustments  to  flight  duty  limitations  are  at  least  readily  identifiable 
as  labour  issues.  This  allows  a  more  co-ordinated  response  from  airline  labour. 
However,  other  issues,  which  carry  an  implicit  threat  to  labour,  are  less  readily 
identifiable  as  specific  labour  issues,  yet  arguably  these  have  even  far  more  reaching 
implications.  Thus  the  trend  towards  increasing  interfirm,  collaboration,  ranging  from 
joint  marketing  and  shared  capacity  agreements  right  through  to  the  creation  of  global 
alliances,  is  a  major  industrial  relations  issue  although  its  labour  market  consequences 
are  often  elusive  and  difficult  to  analyse.  The  next  section  examines  how  global 
alliances  affect  airline  labour. 
8.3  Airline  Alliances:  Towards  Global  Product  Market  Convergence? 
Whilst  internationalisation  and  globalisation  are  often  confused  in  analyses  of 
international  restructuring  (see  Ruigrok  and  Van  Tulder  1995),  the  airline  industry  is 
clearly  undergoing  a  global  transformation.  Ourn  et  al  point  to  the  emergence  of  a 
group  of  international  trading  blocs  around  the  Americas,  Europe  and  Asia  whose 
airlines  will  compete  globally.  (Oum  et  al  1993:  17.  )  From  a  European  point  of  view, 
75  Ibid. 
278 such  blocs  will  be  dominated  by  those  airlines  enjoying  significant  global  reach,  such 
as  British  Airways,  Lufthansa  and  Air  France.  These  airlines  dominate  alliances, 
locking  smaller  national  airlines  into  feeding  their  proprietary  hubs.  (Hanlon  1996 
201-202.  )  The  major  airlines  in  turn  will  build  alliances  with  US  carriers  in  order  to 
secure  access  to  the  huge  US  market  and  with  Pacific  Rim  carriers  to  ensure  access  to 
the  expanding  Asian  market.  According  to  Oum  et  al,  due  to  national  sensitivities 
over  ownership  and  the  possibility  of  anti-trust  suits,  such  alliances  will  be  based  on 
joint  operations  (code  sharing)  bolstered  by  significant  shareholding.  76  Airlines  in  a 
junior  position  will  have  no  choice  but  to  become  feeders  for  those  carriers.  (lbid.  ) 
The  issue  of  alliances  is  therefore  a  crucial  'regulating  mechanism'  within  the  industry 
and  it  is  increasingly  being  left  to  the  most  dominant  firms  to  oversee  this  process. 
This  has  major  implications  for  airline  labour,  which  are  explored  in  the  next  section. 
According  to  the  German  political  economist  and  industrial  relations  theorist 
Wolfgang  Streeck: 
'Globalisation,  by  increasing  the  mobility  of  capital  and  labour  across 
national  borders,  extricates  the  labour  supply  from  national  control  and 
enables  the  financial  sector  to  refuse  doing  service  as  a  national  utility. 
By  internationalising  and  thereby  disorganising  capital  and  labour 
markets,  globalisation  dissolves  whatever  negotiated  co-ordination 
may  have  been  nationally  accomplished  between  them  and  replaces  it 
with  a  global  hierarchical  dominance  of  the  former  over  the  latter.  ' 
(Streeck  1997:  49.  ) 
Streeck's  view  is  essentially  a  macro-political  one,  however,  the  similarity  of  the 
environment  of  globalisation  within  the  airline  industry  is  apparent.  Airlines  have 
traditionally  been  national  entities  supported,  subsidised  and  shepherded  by  the  state 
as  instruments  of  national  prestige  and  policy  (see  Hanlon  1996  chapter  1).  However, 
the  pressure  of  deregulation,  competition  and  economic  restructuring  are  undermining 
this  national  focus  and  replacing  it  with  an  increasingly  global  focus.  Whilst 
collaboration  on  routes,  fares  and  services  has  been  a  feature  of  the  industry  since  the 
early  years,  the  industry  had  little  global  focus.  In  the  advanced  stage  of  deregulation, 
this  multinational  focus  has  been  superseded  by  a  drive  towards  globalisation,  as 
major  operators  seek  to  expand  into  markets  outside  their  own  domestic  and 
76  The  authors  were  mistaken  in  believing  that  shareholding  would  be  important.  Actual  equity  stakes  00 
are  largely  irrelevant,  and  in  fact  regulatory  tolerance  of  alliances  is  based  on  the  understanding  that  C,  0 
they  do  not  involve  significant  equity  and  therefore  remain  'virtual'rather  than  Yeal'mergers. 
C, 
279 transnational  sphere.  In  order  to  do  so,  they  need  to  overcome  the  barriers,  which 
remain  to  acquisition  and  ownership  of  state  airlines,  both  from  a  regulatory  and 
political  viewpoint.  The  favoured  policy  has  been  that  of  global  alliances.  Alliances 
here  relate  to  any  form  of  cross  carrier  business  collaboration,  and  not  just  the  large- 
scale  global  alliances  which  tend  to  dominate  policy  consideration.  Thus  issues  such 
as  franchising,  code  sharing,  joint  ventures  in  service  provision  are  all  considered 
under  the  term  alliances. 
Alliance  activity  has  recently  reached  a  new  level  of  intensity.  According  to  the  latest 
annual  survey,  204  airlines  are  involved  totalling  501  alliance  agreements.  Only  a 
small  proportion  (10  per  cent),  involve  equity  stakes.  (Airline  Business  Alliance 
Survey  June  1999.  )  Yet  this  lack  of  direct  financial  involvement  conceals  a  very  deep 
level  of  operational  involvement.  Most  alliances  involve  highly  specified  contracts, 
and  those  with  anti-trust  approval  such  as  the  Star  Alliance,  have  complete  revenue 
pooling  authority.  Even  those  without  regulatory  approval,  because  of  their  dominant 
position  on  key  routes,  such  as  the  BA  American  'Oneworld'  network,  are  able  to 
collaborate  to  a  high  degree.  The  principal  alliances  are  given  below  in  Table  8.2.  It 
can  readily  be  seen  that  they  account  for  a  substantial  proportion  of  world  passenger 
traffic,  the  greater  proportion  of  revenues  and  over  half  the  directly  employed  airline 
workforce.  When  those  in  service  companies  are  taken  into  account  the  proportion  is 
around  70  per  cent. 
280 Table  8.2The  Major  Global  Airline  Alliances  in  1999 
Alliance  Star  Alliance  I  Oneworld  Nortim,  cst/K1,  N]  I  Atlantic 
I  BA,  AA.  Cmiidimi  Noriliwest  KIAL  FxccIIcnce/Quafin)er 
United  lmfthansýi,  Infl.  ("ItImy  Aliudi'l.  Alrstriý111.  swissall. 
Air  Camidii,  SAS,  Pacificý  Qarltas'  Continental  Sýihewi. 
Thai  Ind-  vzlrig.  Fimmir.  Iberia,  Lan  Delta.  Air  Furope, 
Ansett.  Air  NZ.  Chile  AMI.  Crossiir.  Lauda 
ANA  Singapore  I  TAP.  Turkish 
Passenger  540b  467.1  287.0  0  ).  0 
RM  (Im) 
NN  orld  20.6(/(  17.  M'(  1  3.5 
tr  affic  share 
Passengers  261.0  185.5  1,33  ).  3  47.4 
carried  oun) 
ReNenue  5S.  6  36.2  44.0  14.6 
($I)n) 
Emplosees  302.660  31  ý.  198  149.669  114.380 
Sourcc:  C  omplIcd  from  Air  hiie  BLISMess  Allimice  SUIAey  1999 
8.3.1  Airlme  Alliaiice.  ý  atidAirlitie  Employment 
EarlY  studies  of  airline  alliances,  such  as  those  of  BA/US  Air.  KLM/Northwest  and 
United/Luffhansa  have  emphasised  the  marketing  and  sales  benefits.  Undouhtedly 
these  have  been  considerable.  Alliance,,  are  undoubtedly  profitable.  KLM/Northwest, 
for  example  managed  to  increase  their  combined  market  share  on  Atlantic  I-OLItes  from 
7.5  per  cent  to  11.5  per  cent.  British  Airways  identified  $55  millions  in  savings  fi-oin 
its  Lilliniately  failed  alliance  with  US  Air,  which  were  non-at  t  Hhu  table  to  re\enue.  In 
other  words  they  resulted  from  operating  economics.  (Airline  Business  JLIIIC  1995.  ) 
Although  there  are  considerable  scope  economics  in  terms  of'  marketing  and 
purchasing,  alliances  also  have  a  considerable  employment  dimension.  The  likely 
employment  Implications  are  outlined  in  table  8.3  below. 
'181 Table  8.3  Principal  Fornis  of'  Inter-firm  Collaboration  in  the  Clobal  Airline 
IncluNtry 
Type  ol'Collaborafive  Description  Likel)  outconic 
Venture 
Code  Share/blocked  space  111%ohe"joint  designafion  and  %%ill  imohe  long-term  rafionalisation 
agreement  sometimes  operafion  ol'ser%ices  bý  of'  major  services  N60i  subsequent 
t%%o  or  more  airlines.  The  I'light  is  stat'ling  reductions.  Emunple: 
a(hertised  N60i  ajoin(  d"i"nation.  N\\  /KIAl 
TarilTs  are  set  independentlý. 
Equi(y  Alliance  I'suall)  in  (lie  form  of'cross  equit)  Tends  to  result  in  cost  pressin-c  Crom 
stakes  whereb)  airlines  agree  to  the  larger  to  the  smaller  carrier. 
adol)t  cquitý  holdings.  This 
?I 
Examples:  S%sissair/Sabena, 
imohes  either  cross  equity  BA/TAT'  Detit"ClIe/BA 
holdings  or  a  unilateral  stake. 
Franchising  Based  on  a  subcontracting  (ýpe  The  major  procures  low  cost 
relationship  N%hereb)  airlines  adNantagcs  of  the  1'ranchisce  selected 
Nerticall)  integrate  I'ccder  trallic  because  of'lower  cost  base.  The 
into  their  networks.  The  franchise  Nvorkforce  of  the  maJor  are  then 
carrier  ustialh  carriers,  the  lkcrý  compared  %ýith  the  franchisee,  and 
and  branding  ol'the  ma  r.  cost  reduction  negotiated.  Examples: 
BA/Mam,  possiblý  BA/RNanair. 
SOUrcc:  Author. 
Within  these  alliances,  cach  airline  manages  its  own  kIbOLII-  fOl-CC  bUt  Stl'MC-ICýIIIV  Cý  C,  - 
share  capacity.  In  the  current  phase  ol'alliance  development,  the  strategy  ofairlines  is 
to  avoid  labour  conflict  through  the  allianccs  ,  ivcii  flic  thrcat  of  cross  alliancc  trade 
union  co-operation.  (See  section  8.3.3  heloý\.  )  Nonetheless  the  existence  of'  a  partner 
airline  can  be  used  as  a  bar-ainim-,  threat.  This  has  been  the  case  at  Northwest,  where 
the  Use  of  KLM  to  operate  key  European  roules  has  been  used  to  ,  aln  vvork  Rile 
changes  in  Northwests  core  operations,  in  addition  to  the  S886  million  cost  savings  I  I- 
negotiatccl  since  1983.  when  (lie  airline  faced  bank-ruptcy.  (Airline  Business, 
November  1995.  )  Code  sharim,  and  alliance  strategies  also  reduce  the  potential 
bargaining  powcr  of  airline  labour  unless  thcrc  is  co-ordinatcd  action  berween  labour 
I  -- 
groups  in  both  carriers.  In  the  case  ol'a  strike,  its  allililiCe  partner  on  duplicated  I-OUICS 
Could  replace  the  affectcd  Carrier,  and  the  non-striking  partner's  spare  capacity  could 
hC  Utilised.  Alliances  pose  a  greatcr  threat  to  some  categories  of  stal't'  than  others'. 
Ground  cre",  and  check-in  staff  ill  particular,  as  the  most  readik!  replaceable  of'  tile 
labour  force  with  holli  iow  mohility  and  low,  training  le\els  are  liahle  to  replacement  I 
with  partner  airline  crews.  Cabin  crew  X.  0111st  less  replaccabic  thall  (Tround  and  check--  I- 
in  s'laff  would  he  potentially  more  \  ulnerable  in  operational  strategies  such  as  cre-w 
sharing  which  WOUld  ýIIVC  crews,  I'Minharity  Willi  each  other",  aircraft  and 
-)S-) routes.  Even  highly  skilled  maintenance  staff  are  vulnerable  to  replacement  in  a 
dispute  situation  as  there  is  ample  excess  Ihird  party'  capacity  and  the  likelihood  of 
duplication  across  alliances. 
Current  thinking  on  maintenance  policy  estimates  that  the  minimum efficient  scale  (to 
justify  in-house  maintenance)  is  50  engine  overhauls  per  engine  model  per  year. 
Pressure  exists  therefore  for  the  maintenance  function,  or  the  most  expensive  aspects 
of  it,  to  be  'spun  ouffrom  the  core  business.  Airlines  involved  in  joint  ventures  can  be 
expected  to  rationalise  maintenance  work  in  labour  intensive  operations  such  as 
engine  overhaul,  interiors  and  external  painting  where  they  fail  to  meet  tightly 
specified  cost  criteria.  Such  business  strategies  have  a  number  of  implications  for 
airline  labour.  Lucrative,  labour  intensive  work  on  larger  aircraft  can  be  transferred  to 
a  partner's  larger  maintenance  facilities  to  reap  economies  of  scale.  This  is  already  the 
case  with  KLM,  where  older  labour-intensive  DC10s  are  being  maintained  at 
Northwest  facilities  in  Minneapolis.  (ATW  Oct  1995.  )  The  scale  in  this  case  is 
important  as  the  aircraft  types  are  being  phased  out.  Since  Northwest  operates  a 
greater  number  of  these  aircraft,  it  makes  sense  to  Place  maintenance  within  their 
facilities.  The  economies  of  scale  are  incidental  in  this  case,  but  are  important  when  it 
comes  to  the  establishment  of  joint  facilities,  often  in  a  third  low  labour  cost  country. 
The  buyer  power  which  combined  airlines  can  command  is  leading  to  the  export  of 
large  scale  maintenance  to  overseas  facilities  such  as  the  Hong  Kong  Aircraft 
Engineering  Company  (HAECO)  in  Guangdong  province,  China,  where  wage  rates 
are  typically  a  tenth  of  those  payable  in  the  USA.  Other  operators  have  built  similar 
facilities  in  Mexico,  Brazil  and  Poland.  Again,  regulatory  approval  of  measures  that 
facilitate  cost  reduction  is  evident. 
For  these  strategies  to  be  possible,  the  regulatory  regime  has  to  play  a  part.  In  the  case 
of  maintenance,  the  main  domestic  and  international  regulators  have  to  permit  the 
cross  border  certification  of  aircraft  maintenance.  The  US  authorities  lead  the  world 
on  this  because  of  their  size  and  role  in  aircraft  manufacture,  and  have  undertaken  a 
leading  role  on  cross  border  approval.  In  1988,  the  US  Federal  Aviation  Authority 
(FAA),  the  industry  technical  regulator,  approved  a  regulation  (FAR  Part  145) 
allowing  US  operators  to  perform  scheduled  maintenance  work  overseas.  Previous 
283 regulations  permitted  this  only  for  emergency  repairs  at  foreign  locations  or  where 
there  was  insufficient  maintenance  capacity  at  home,  a  point  made  by  the  major  US 
maintenance  union.  (Peterpaul  1993:  21.  )  This  regulatory  adjustment  was  made 
despite  misgivings  about  certification  and  inspection  standards  within  the  USA  itself, 
anxieties  likely  to  be  magnified  when  countries  with  less  restrictive  safety  and 
certification  rules  are  involved.  The  International  Association  of  Machinists  (IAM), 
the  main  aircraft  maintenance  union  in  the  US,  points  out  that  there  are  311  FAA 
certified  foreign  repair  stations,  with  only  16  FAA  licensed  inspectors  to  police  them. 
(Ibid.  )  Once  again,  the  desire  of  regulators  to  sponsor  the  development  and  growth  of 
the  industry  has  conflicted  with  labour  conditions  and  ultimately  safety.  Deregulation 
advocates  and  airline  management  may  well  dismiss  these  concerns  as  protectionist, 
but  given  the  level  of  protection  being  afforded  to  large  scale  carriers  in  terms  of 
restrictions  on  foreign  holdings,  lax  anti-trust  laws,  tolerance  of  concentration,  it 
seems  once  again  that  labour  is  bearing  the  cost  burden.  Regulations  seem  to  be 
considered  from  the  viewpoint  of  facilitating  cost  reduction. 
8.3.2  Global  Product  Market  Convergence  in  the  Airline  Industry 
These  developments  point  to  a  discernible  process  of  global  product  market 
convergence  within  the  airline  labour  market.  This  form  of  convergence  is  not  to  be 
confused  with  the  convergence  of  national  employee  relations  practices  based  on  an 
HRM  model  as  asserted  by  Warhust  (1995:  259-74).  Nor  does  it  assume  a 
convergence  at  the  institutional  level  (see  Lane  1991:  515-539,  and  Baldry  1994:  96- 
107,  for  respectively  empirical  and  theoretical  critiques  of  the  convergence  issue).  As 
Baldry  argues,  the  issue  of  convergence/divergence,  when  used  within  an  industrial 
relations  context,  is  a  socio-structural  concept  and  its  misapplication  creates 
theoretical  and  empirical  confusion.  The  form  of  convergence,  which  is  taking  place 
within  the  global  airline  industry,  is  not  a  progressive  fusion  of  product  and  labour 
market;  rather  it  is  a  convergence  on  product  market  constraints.  Each  carrier  faces 
the  same  parameters  of  competition  and  market  access,  and  as  a  result  each  is 
constrained  in  how  they  operate  within  that  setting.  However  the  strategy  which 
carriers  pursue  in  meeting  those  objectives  is  mediated  by  their  own  industrial 
relations,  and  national  product  market  context.  Therefore  convergence  within  the 
product  market  limits  and  constrains  the  choices  and  strategies  of  both  management 
284 and  unions  whilst  national  and  industrial  relations  systems  allow  them  some  latitude 
to  pursue  diverging  paths.  However  this  has  no  overall  impact  on  the  outcome  of  the 
convergence  process,  which  in  the  airline  industry  is  towards  the  fragmentation  of 
labour  markets,  the  growth  of  scale  within  services  and  support  functions,  and  an 
agglomeration  of  core  airline  services  within  alliance  networks.  In  short  the  national 
labour  market  policies  pursued  are  simply  different  paths  on  the  road  to  convergence. 
With  this  trend  towards  global  product  market  convergence  labour  conditions  come 
under  increasing  pressure.  Changes  in  the  regulatory  structure  and  product  market  and 
the  advent  of  genuine  transnational  strategies  begin  to  re-order  the  labour  market. 
This  is  due  to  four  principal  reasons:  the  salience  of  labour  costs  in  the  deregulated 
environment;  the  global  division  of  labour  within  the  industry;  the  asymmetries  of 
power  between  major  and  minor  carriers  in  terms  of  their  route  and  operating 
structures;  and  lastly,  the  feasibility  of  interfirm  co-ordination  on  wages  and 
conditions.  These  issues  are  discussed  in  turn  below. 
Firstly,  in  the  globalised  airline  environment  the  relative  stability  and  intractability  of 
other  costs,  such  as  fuel  and  equipment,  means  that  labour  costs  become  ever  more 
important.  This  aspect  of  restructuring  relates  directly  to  the  second  point. 
Secondly,  within  the  spatial  dimension  of  production  it  is  feasible  for  management  to 
develop  a  globalised  division  of  labour.  The  international  comparison  on  the 
proportion  of  labour  costs  in  the  structure  of  overall  costs  makes  this  clear.  Ubour 
costs  range  from  20  -25  per  cent  of  overall  costs  in  the  Asia-Pacif  ic  region  to  around 
30-35  per  cent  within  Europe.  (Merz  1995.  )  These  cost  differentials  make  the 
relocation  of  labour  an  attractive  proposition,  especially  in  high-cost  areas  such  as 
engineering;  they  also  provide  management  with  an  incentive  to  constantly  re-order 
and  restructure  operations  to  obtain  labour  cost  advantages.  All  of  these  aspects  of  the 
globally  converging  product  inarket  are  developing  realities  within  the  industry.  As 
discussed  earlier,  joint  ventures  in  maintenance  have  taken  advantage  of  such  low 
labour  costs,  particularly  within  China,  South  America  and  Eastern  Europe.  However, 
there  is  also  a  re-allocation  of  employment  to  low  cost  areas  of  Europe,  particularly 
the  Irish  republic  and  the  UK,  where  wage  and  non-wage  costs  are  lower.  (See  Airline 
Business  June  1999.  )  The  growth  of  the  Internet  and  advanced  communications 
285 technologies  make  the  relocation  of  many  administrative  and  technical  functions 
relatively  simple  and  cost-effective.  The  much  lower  labour  costs  of  skilled  technical 
and  professional  labour  make  the  policy  attractive  to  airline  executives.  This  is 
evident  from  global  outsourcing  strategies  undertaken  by  Swissair,  British  Airways 
and  Lufthansa  (see  chapter  7).  A  related  issue  is  the  rationalisation  of  service 
provision,  notably  catering  and  ground  handling  as  large  service  providers  capture  the 
majority  of  the  operations  on  the  basis  of  superior  scale.  As  airlines  outsource  the 
catering  function,  service  providers  such  as  LSG  Skychefs,  (owned  by  Lufthansa)  and 
Gate  Gourmet  (owned  by  Swissair),  now  operate  a  duopoly  within  the  airline  catering 
market.  (See  chapter  7.  ) 
Thirdly,  the  asymmetric  nature  of  market  power,  operating  and  route  resources  within 
alliances  means  that  large  alliance  partners  could  increasingly  dominate  the  smaller 
airlines.  Recognising  the  high  relative  costs  of  many  subordinate  partner  airlines,  the 
principal  players  may  well  develop  strategies  which  curtail  the  activities  and  scope  of 
these  smaller  airlines.  Thus,  a  carrier  like  Iberia  could  find  itself  playing  the  role  of 
feeding  traffic  from  Southern  Europe  into  the  BA/American  Hub  at  Heathrow  and 
would  probably  maintain  some  routes  where  it  enjoys  a  level  of  cultural  as  well  as 
commercial  fit,  notably  to  South  America.  However,  it  would  almost  certainly  lose 
routes  across  the  Atlantic  and  to  the  Far  East,  which  it  operates  expensively,  and 
without  a  great  deal  of  hub  traffic.  The  principal  hub  partners  would  operate  these 
routes,  whilst  subordinate  alliance  carriers  would  operate  the  low  yield  routes.  This 
process  of  route  rationalisation  would  also  affect  the  major  carriers  and  their 
employees.  British  Airways  for  example  might  lose  Southern  European  short-haul 
routes,  and  possibly  those  to  South  and  Central  American  gateways.  This  may  lead  to 
an  overall  net  reduction  in  employment.  In  effect  the  long  haul  traffic  of  junior 
alliance  'partners'is  already  being  fed  into  the  route  networks  of  major  players  via  the 
hub  system.  A  deeper  'division  of  operations'  is  a  possibility,  with  the  primary 
obstacle  a  differential  in  labour  costs  being  eroded  by  restructuring. 
Lastly,  as  alliances  and  interfirm  collaboration  deepen  and  extend  the  possibility  of 
common  wage  structures,  bargaining  and  employment  policies  become  possible  and 
even  desirable.  There  is  evidence  that  labour  is beginning  to  organise  across  carriers. 
The  best  example  so  far  is  the  ITF  co-ordinated  steering  groups  for  the  major 
286 BA/American  alliance  'One  World'  and  the  rival  United/Lufthansa  Star  alliance.  BA 
and  American  pilots  have  concluded  a  solidarity  agreement,  which  guarantees  no  4-P 
cross  cover  in  strikes,  joint  negotiation  on  common  training  initiatives,  regular 
meetings  and  campaigns.  (Gill  1998:  46.  )  Other  workers  are  set  to  follow  suit,  thus 
thwarting  some  of  the  potential  impact  of  alliances  on  industrial  action,  labour 
organisation,  and  ultimately  jobs  and  conditions.  (Ibid.  )  Unions  are  also  looking  at  the 
possibility  of  developing  cross  alliance  bargaining  and  common  conditions.  This  has 
raised  the  issue  of  'global  bargaining',  although  a  more  likely  scenario  is  global  co- 
ordination  on  wages,  conditions  and  common  campaigns. 
Though  there  would  be  too  many  differences  in  costs  and  operating  structure  for 
'system  wide'  co-ordination,  it  is  possible  that  there  may  be  'convergence  of  the 
fittest'.  i.  e.  the  lead  alliance  operators  would  have  co-ordinated  wages  and  conditions 
with  subordinate  operators  within  the  hierarchy  excluded.  The  dynamics  of  alliance 
trade  union  co-ordination  already  suggest  that  trade  union  co-operation  is  hierarchical 
and  instrumental.  (Observations  ITF  Star  alliance  forum  Dec  1998.  ) 
8.3.3  Delaying  the  Inevitable?  Trade  Union  Strategies  In  the  Global  Airline  Industry 
The  possibility  of  global  bargaining  and  the  current  fact  of  cross  alliance  trade  union 
co-operation  suggest  that  whilst  there  are  obstacles  for  trade  unions  and  organised 
labour  they  are  not  insurmountable.  Despite  the  emergence  of  a  converging  regulatory 
and  competitive  framework,  with  pronounced  labour  market  effects,  labour  has  not 
acquiesced.  Not  only  has  labour  resisted  restructuring  and  employment  change  within 
a  variety  of  contexts,  it  has  also  adapted  its  response  towards  the  new  airline 
environment.  In  order  to  gauge  the  extent  to  which  labour  has  been  able  to  respond  it 
is  necessary  to  finally  to  examine  the  nature  of  labour's  response.  As  we  shall  see  the 
response  has  been  varied  and  diverse  separating  along  occupational  and  national  lines. 
Though  there  has  been  no  uniform  response,  there  have  been  a  number  of  strategies 
ranging  from  militant  opposition  to  collaborative  partnership  as  befits  trade  unionism 
within  a  dynamic  and  constantly  changing  environment. 
287 In  the  popular  BBC  Doctor  Who  science  fiction  series,  an  army  of  highly  efficient 
cold  and  determinedly  heartless  robots  called  the  Daleks  rolled  over  any  form  of 
opposition,  emitting  their  refrain,  "Resistance  is  useless.  "  International  airline 
restructuring  on  management  terms  is  often  presented  as  inevitable  and  even 
ineluctable;  labour  resistance  is  viewed  as  pointless,  many  commentators  question  the 
value  of  industrial  action  when  strikes  ultimately  harm  the  carrier.  Yet,  even  when 
labour  has  ultimately  had  to  concede  on  restructuring,  resistance  has  been  fruitful. 
Strike  action  in  the  face  of  autocratic,  insensitive  and  quite  often  inept  management 
has  led  to  the  removal  of  a  clutch  of  airline  chairmen.  At  some  airlines,  organised 
labour  has  maintained  a  great  deal  of  power,  even  after  agreeing  to  major  change. 
Resistance  and  contestation  are  still  an  important  part  of  the  industrial  relations 
landscape.  Increasingly,  however,  resistance  is being  redefined.  Labour  has  inanaged 
often,  in  the  face  of  strident  opposition  and  Dalek  -  like  imperviousness,  to  establish 
its  right  to  a  voice  as  a  major  stakeholder  within  the  industry  and  advance  its  own 
solutions  on  restructuring.  Increasingly,  these  solutions  require  labour  groups  to 
become  involved  in  restructuring,  and  the  opportunity  to  influence  and  shape  the 
process  of  change.  Often  at  its  most  basic  level,  trade  union  action  has  been  about 
curtailing  the  worst  excesses  of  cost  cutting  management.  This  has  often  involved 
promoting  'high  road'  strategies  of  restructuring,  whereby  a  quality/customer  service 
focus  is  advanced  and  business  strategies  prioritising  high  yield  routes  and  services 
favoured.  Streeck  indicates  the  extent  of  such  diversified  quality  production  strategies 
within  the  world  car  industry,  but  the  concept  is  equally  applicable  to  airlines. 
(Streeck  1987:  437-62.  )  Unions  have  also  become  more  involved  in  the  political 
arena,  lobbying  agencies  such  as  the  EU  and  the  national  governments  against 
practices  such  as  wet  leasing,  and  cross  border  employment,  where  this  is  used  simply 
to  cut  labour  costs.  Other  campaigns  have  been  co-ordinated  at  international  level  to 
protect  airline  jobs  from  the  ravages  of  restructuring.  For  example,  the  International 
Transport  Workers'  Federation  (ITF),  is  pursuing  a  policy  of  seeking  full  licensed 
status  for  ground  handling  staff  in  much  the  same  way  as  licensing  covers  engineers, 
pilots  and  cabin  crew.  The  organisation  is  using  misgivings  about  safety  and  security 
to  argue  that  only  employees  with  secure  permanent  jobs  should  be  employed  on 
ground  handling  functions.  (ITF  1997.  )  The  organisation  has  also  been  lobbying  the 
international  regulator  ICAO,  to  have  employee  considerations  taken  into  account 
within  the  policy-making  arena  and  is  trying  to  conduct  similar  work  with  the  national 
288 I-Cý,  'UhtOrS  111d  Clllpl()ý'Cr  Orgalli  sat  i  ons.  Thi's  represents  a  co-ordillated  anculpt  hý 
lahour  groups  u)  irilluence  the  emerging  regulatory  structure,  Inleresivingly.  it  nuinins 
tj',  j(IitioMll  UlliOll  11-ý-ILIIIICrits  ahoUt  sjj'CtN'  ýJlld  joh  SCCLII'itý'  to  the  11CW  and 
market  frýjjjje"rork. 
Union,,,,  are  al.  so  indepcndcntlý'  I)Lll'sLlilll-'  a  IILIII)hC[-  01'  diffffent  Stl-,  I(CýIJCS,  I)I-illial'y 
aniong,  st  these  arc  co-operation  forums  across  tile  various  alliances  discussed  earlier. 
This  is  clear  from  the  auloCs  involvement  in  a  recent  research  proýject,  which  looked 
at  the  is,,  Lic,,,,  of'  ghkalivation  and  Irade  union  response  ý,  vithin  the  industry.  (131\  ton  et 
a!  1998bj  The  proýjec(  imolved  a  survey  or  52  airline  LlWons  on  a  wkle  range  of 
labOL11-  market  and  rcgulation  issucs.  (Blyton  ct  al  1998h  Table  4.2.  )  Tahlc  8.4  helow 
pi-mides  evidence  on  union  strategies. 
Table  8.4  Union  Ranking  of  Effectiveness  of  Strategics  Cl7c) 
The  key  fill(fill"  IS  that  IIIdLIStI-II1  ýWtl()n  Was  Still  Viewed  aS  the  1110st  effectiVe 
strategy,  with  ,.  ',  ti-on(y  SLII)POI*t  for  education  campaigns  and  trade  union  co-operation. 
The  report  discusses  tile  ISSLIC  Of  'assertive  C()-()Pcl.  lltloll,.  vOicreby  unions  arc  ahle  to 
co-operate  with  management  in  resti-LICRII-ing  after  having  asserted  their  position 
throuizi-I  adversarial  industrial  action.  (Cohn  1993.  )  These  strategies  are  il,,.,,  o  heiffi-I 
supplemented  by  policies  which  seek  to  increase  participation.  These  Include 
providing  statutorý  worker  i-cprescillat  loll  oil  all-1111C  boards.  it  feature  of  spaill.  11-cland 
and  Gcrniany. 
2  89 
Source:  Cardiff  Business  School/ITF  Survey  1997  (Blyton  et  al  1998b) Another  aspect  is  the  granting,  01'  equllý  shares  to  airline  employees  as  'millessed  III 
Italy  and  France. 
Table  8.5  Trade  Union  Attitudes  Towards  Product  Market  and  Regulatory 
Policies  In  The  Labour  Market  (  (7c  ) 
Support  Neither/No  Oppose 
-- 
OlAnion 
Uphold  L1111011  reCO"IlItIO11  111d  COlleCtIVe  98 
bargaining 
Harmonise  imminum  tcriwý  and  conditions  94  4  2 
SLIPPOrt  11,11-1110111SC(I  111111t',  011  I'll'-flIt  (lLlt\  90  1 
tinic" 
Enforce  existing  social  protection  (e..  g.  88  1 
Social  Chapter  and  11,0) 
Pro\  ide  forstatffl0rý  worka  i-cpresciitation  07  24  9 
oil  boards 
Allow  \,  vorkcrs  and  managciiient  to  57 
-15 
is 
negotiate  tlicir  mýn  solutions____ 
Support  workers  right  to  obtain  a  stake  in  41  37  31 
their  affline 
Source:  Cardiff  BLISHIeSS  Schoolfffl`  Survey  1997  (Bl  yton  et  al  19981)) 
Table  8.5  (abo\e)  pi-mides,  evidence  on  the  views,  01'  ti-ade  LIIIiOIIS  vvithin  the  Industry 
tomvards  statc  and  regulatory  policies  as  they  affect  the  labour  market.  In  all  of  thesc 
cases.  trade  Unions  are  assertin-  their  ridl  to  he  imolved  in  I-eStRiCtUrim-,  and  to  he  a 
key  participant  on  behalf  of  airline  employees  in  cons  iderat  i  on,,  of  reoulation,  policy  I- 
and  Ultimately  bLl,,  ines,,  strategy.  Unsurpris'ingly,  LIIIIOIIS'  SLII)I)01't  the  continuation  of' 
recognition  and  the  upholdino  of  collectl\e  bargaining.  They  also  favour  the 
harnionisation  of  terms  and  conditions,  although  they  differ  from  management  in  I- 
terms  of  the  directioti  of  that  process.  However.  OthCI-  aSI)CCtS  Of  IIIC  SLIIACV  fOLIIId 
that  the  bargaining  level'  had  in  many  cases  changed,  with  IIILICII  11101-e  L1111011  SLII)I)01*t 
for  company  lcvcI  bargaining 
There  Was  also  Wide  SLIPPOI-t  fOl'  the  policy  of  placing-  ýwrkcr  I-cpi-c"ClItative's  Oil 
airline  boards  and  less  SLII)I)01-1  fol-  the  ESOPs  ISSLIe  (final  (ILIeStI011  'Fable  8.5). 
Althouoh  ESOPs  are  nonunaliv  indiVIdLIal  relationships.  the  US  experience  shows 
that  workers  can  gain  power  1111-OL11.111  the  1)001111-  OfV0611,11  I)OWel-  III  union  blocs.  Thus 
there  was  higher  support  for  the  policy  of  w,  orkCF  I-Cl)I-CSCIItat1011.11iVC11  the  COlleC(i\'C 
290 (WIC11MOOll  of'  tile  trade  unions  especially  general  unions,  , \ho  \icýý  [ý,  Sol,,  s  ýýitii 
I,  sp  '011.  (Tahle  8.5.  )  Cj'\cii  the  cITect  on  orgamsed  lahour  of  chan-es,  in  tile  wider  LIS  CI  I  C, 
product  market  and  regulator\  ',  Cttill(".  tile  SLIIA'Cý'  I-C\CýIICCI  tIMt  1.1111011,  s  fl\OLll-Cd  tile 
preser\ation  ofnational  ownershipand  tile  regulation  oflow  cost  carriers,  as  the  most 
important  issues.  Table  8.6  below  1)1.0\  Ides  C\  ldClICC  Oil  lillion  \  lc\ý  "  of'  the  product 
market  and  regulatory  situation: 
Table  8.6  Trade  Union  Attitudes  ToNvards  Product  Market  and  Regulatory 
Issues  (14 
Uphold  national  sovercignty 
Re, 
-,  ulate  low  cost  carriers  to  pre\ent  cost 
CLIttIll'! 
Preserve  state  aid  to  promote  service  to 
remote  communities 
Restrict 
-lobIll 
scalc  alliances 
Promote  genume  *open  skies'  policies 
Provide  state  aWort  vdicii  requircd 
Accept  that  state  aid  is  necessary  to  protect 
-Jobs  Government  support  should  only  be 
provided  to  facilitate  I-eSti-LICRII-1110 
Allow  onlv  iiiarkct-ba,  ýcd  criteria  for  state 
financial  support 
Take  action  against  anti-com  etitive  P 
practices 
Accept  that  state  aid  is  uncompetitive  and 
should  cease 
Accept  that  state  I'mancial  support  25  24 
promote  incfflclciicý  and  high  fares 
Source:  Cardiff  Business  Scliool/ITF  Survey  1997  (Blyton  et  al  1998h) 
Agree  Neither/No  Disagree 
Opinion 
711S, 
71  19 
63  27 
58  28  14 
50  33  17 
49  27  24 
45  33 
36  28  36 
28  35  37 
27  58  15 
25  55 
25  24  51 
. 
Much  of  the  rhetoric  around  airline  restructuring  assunics  that  politicians  and  airline  I 
executives  are  hufleted  by  union  pressure.  (Doganis  1995.  )  However,  manaoers  and 
politicians  are  not  Just  WSPOIRIIII(I  to  union  plVSSUI-e,  as  Do-anis  asserts,  because 
C,  - 
unions  are  in  control,  very  often  thev  are  not.  but  rather  because  ill-though(  and 
pi-ccipitous  clianoe  prooraninic.,  have  increased  tile  likelihood  of'  a  militant  response  I-  I- 
from  labour.  There  is  arowina  evidence,  however,  that  1,1110111-  is  becomim,  invoked  in 
the  process  of  change  and  that  unions  are  brokering  chanoe  to  then-  members.  even  in 
countries  Such  as  Italy,  Germany,  Ireland  and  Spain  , vhere  there  is  a  nominally  higher 
-)()  I level  of  labour  market  regulation.  The  buzzword  of  partnership  has  recently  invaded 
the  airline  management  vocabulary  and  whilst  the  term  is  contested,  there  is  one 
common  and  unifying  meaning:  it  is  the  notion  that  labour  should  be  involved  in  the 
restructuring  of  the  industry.  This  might  mean  simply  co-opting  union  leaderships  into 
the  change  programme  as  occurred  within  Sabena  under  its  Swiss  CEO  Paul 
Reuthlinger.  As  Gallagher  demonstrates,  the  partnership  policy  is  based  on  little  more 
than  a  requirement  for  cost  reductions: 
The  push  for  partnership  has  been  closely  complemented  by  the  pursuit  of 
necessary  hard  cost  savings.  Major  union  concessions  on  job  numbers  and 
salaries  have  been  made  and  there  is  a  clear  understanding  that  they  must 
continue.  Since  the  agreement  with  unions  in  October  1996  the  airline  has 
seen  a2  per  cent  decrease  in  payroll  costs,  and  a  new  pre-downturn  plan 
appropriately  named  'fit  for  the  cycle'aims  at  a  reduction  in  unit  seat  cost  of 
15  per  cent,  by  the  end  of  2000.  '  (Gallagher  1998a:  22.  ) 
Reutlinger  continues  to  pursue  the  relocation  of  short  haul  Sabena  pilots  away  from 
the  higher  non-wage  costs  of  Belgium,  despite  his  more  emollient  stance  with  the 
unions.  This  type  of  'co-optational  partnership'  can  be  contrasted  with  the  more 
corporatist  policies  at  both  Aer  Lingus  and  Iberia  where  the  policy  is  based  on 
genuine  worker  involvement  and  where  unions  accept  as  much  as  management,  the 
need  for  adaptation  to  a  hostile  competitive  environment.  (See  Blyton  et  al  1999.  )  At 
both  carriers,  management  has  developed  a  quality-based  partnership  (predicated  on 
full  privatisation),  which  seeks  to  retain  most  services  in  house  against  the  general 
industry  trend.  This  may  seem  to  contradict  the  earlier  argument  about  the  pattern  of 
the  globalising  industry,  however  unlike  Sabena,  neither  carrier  has  been  integrated 
into  a  major  alliance.  Aer  Lingus  has  yet  to  join  an  alliance  and  Iberia  has  only 
recently  become  part  of  the  Oneworld  network.  The  crucial  issue  is  that  both  carriers 
are,  to  use  Encoua's  (1998)  terminology,  late  adapting  carriers  whose  need  to 
restructure  is  encouraged  by  their  need  to  become  integrated  into  one  of  the  major 
alliances.  As  the  discussion  of  Iberia  above  indicates,  once  integrated,  these  carriers 
could  be  forced  to  play  their  role  within  a  prescribed  alliance  hierarchy.  In  that  event, 
national  industrial  relations  polices  would  be  less  relevant. 
As  we  have  discussed,  a  key  variable  in  the  development  of  the  global  airline 
employment  pattern  is  the  influence  of  national  systems  of  regulation.  Clearly 
292 countries  such  as  Spain,  Ireland,  Germany,  France,  Belgium,  the  US  and  Japan  vary 
enormously  in  their  forms  of  labour  regulation.  These  divergent  forms  of  labour 
regulation  are  important  limiting  factors  in  the  response  to  a  globalised  product 
market  and  can  provide  both  threats  and  opportunities  for  organised  labour.  For 
example,  as  Blyton  et  al  (1999)  demonstrate,  the  fact  Lufthansa  is  restrained  by  the 
German  system  of  industrial  relations  from  pursuing  short-term  cost  reduction,  so 
favoured  by  BA,  means  that  it  has  been  forced  to  'adapt'  by  developing  the  Star 
alliance  and  seeking  to  obtain  cost  savings  globally.  However,  national  industrial 
relations  particularities  are  not  impermeable.  The  restructuring  of  Alitalia  described  in 
chapters  4  and  6  was  based  on  an  accommodation  to  the  global  convergence  pressures 
of  the  airline  industry  rather  than  the  Italian  institutional  environment.  Similar 
pressures  are  taking  place  within  both  Japan  Airlines  and  Cathay  Pacific. 
Unions  have,  as  the  evidence  on  wage  premia  indicates,  managed  to  retain  a  great  deal 
of  control  over  wages  and  conditions.  However,  the  diversity  within  unions  needs  to 
be  understood.  Strong  labour  groups,  particularly  pilots,  benefit  from  labour  market 
characteristics  which  have  allowed  them  to  resist  or  deflect  change  and  even  when 
accepting  that  change  to  continue  to  influence  its  implementation.  These  workers  have 
also  proved  adept  in  influencing  the  regulatory  regime,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  the 
JAA  proposals  and  in  pursuing  their  safety  and  technical  agenda.  In  doing  so,  these 
workers  have  been  able  to  influence  the  new  regulatory  regime;  however,  they  are 
also  building  more  effective  cross  border  co-operation  to  preserve  global  bargaining 
threat.  For  less  skilled  workers,  there  is  less  opportunity  to  influence  the  regulatory 
process  or  even  to  negotiate  over  restructuring.  The  erosion  of  wages  and  conditions 
in  ground  handling  and  the  removal  of  favourable  work  rules  for  cabin  crew,  for 
example,  has  commenced  and  will  deepen,  especially  as  the  industry  enters  a 
downward  cycle.  These  workers  have  as  yet  been  unable,  despite  the  actions  of  their 
co-ordinating  international  union  bodies,  to  influence  matters  at  the  regulatory  level. 
Their  ability  to  resist rests  on  a  capacity  to  take  strike  action,  given  the  costs  to 
management  of  a  successful  strike,  these  workers  still  retain  considerable  power. 
However,  the  costs  of  conflict  have  been  increased  as  the  section  on  strikes  and  their 
aftermath  in  chapter  7  has  demonstrated. 
293 Conclusion 
The  refusal  of  regulators  to  address  the  consolidation  of  the  industry  into  a  tight 
oligopoly  has  had  consequences  for  the  airline  labour  market.  In  the  USA,  Chapter  II 
bankruptcy  protection  pushed  the  burden  of  deregulation  onto  the  labour  force. 
Permissiveness  on  the  anti-trust  front  allowed  an  unprecedented  level  of  hub 
concentration.  In  both  the  USA  and  Europe  there  has  been  a  reluctance  to  implement 
measures  which  increase  the  scope  of  competition  and  which  deter  consolidation.  At 
the  same  time,  measures  which  improve  the  supply  side  of  labour  have  been 
prioritised. 
This  is  not  to  argue  that  greater  competition  is  the  Holy  Grail  for  airline  labour.  On 
the  contrary,  non-union  market  entry  at  depressed  wage  rates  would  be  disastrous  for 
the  welfare  of  airline  workers.  On  a  worldwide  scale,  authorities  have  been  reluctant 
to  assess  the  impact  of  industry  collaboration  such  as  code  shares  and  joint  ventures. 
This  is  particularly  the  case  with  vertical  integration  through  the  franchising  of  feeder 
operators.  Given  the  reduced  transaction  costs  associated  with  such  strategies  they 
have  become  the  preferred  method  of  expansion  for  large  carriers.  It  is  argued  that 
mergers,  the  traditional  concern  of  regulators,  are  being  superseded  by  these  co- 
operative  ventures,  whose  often-nebulous  form  makes  them  difficult  to  gauge. 
However,  this  is  no  accident  or  oversight.  In  a  globalised  and  deregulated  industry, 
with  stable  costs  for  most  inputs  and  finite  infrastructure,  airlines  increasingly  rely  on 
the  control  of  staff  costs  as  their  preferred  strategy.  Even  when  airlines  increase 
demand  by  lowering  prices,  they  fall  into  the  trap  of  falling  yields,  which  renders  the 
control  of  labour  costs  even  more  important.  Such  a  background  explains  the  thirst  of 
industry  analysts  for  further  labour  cost  reductions.  Even  those  carriers  such  as  British 
Airways  and  Lufthansa,  which  have  made  most  progress  on  costs,  are  set  to  secure 
further  cost  reductions.  77  The  onset  of  alliances  is,  it  is  argued,  very  much  about 
procuring  these  cost  reductions  on  a  global  scale. 
77  In  November  1999  BA  was  negotiating  with  pilots  to  devolve  low  yield  routes  from  London  Gatwick 
0  C, 
to  the  low  wage  Cityflyer  Express,  a  BA  franchise.  Negotiations  were  also  taking  place  with  cabin  C,  0 
crew.  The  driver  for  these  renewed  attempts  at  cost  reduction  was  BA's  profits  slump.  (See  Airline 
Business  November  1999.  ) 
294 Within  the  old  regime,  the  form  of  regulation  favoured  all  producers  and  particularly 
labour  in  a  form  of  producer  corporatism.  Now  the  emerging  regulatory  patchwork 
has  shifted  the  risk  towards  the  airline  labour  force.  This  new  form  of  regulation  has 
allowed  consolidation,  merger,  vertical  integration  and  the  achievement  of  cost 
economies  across  a  range  of  functions.  Simultaneously,  measures  which  protect 
labour  conditions,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  have  been  jettisoned  or  are  under 
increasing  challenge.  These  policies  range  from  the  abolition  of  state  aid  for  weaker 
carriers,  the  deregulation  of  airport  handling,  the  proposed  lifting  of  constraints  on 
working  hours  and  a  more  liberal'  operating  environment.  This  process  has 
undermined  the  power  and  position  of  airline  workers  on  a  global  basis.  This  process 
of  global  product  inarket  convergence  will  increasingly  shape  and  influence  policy 
although  it  will  continue  to  be  mitigated  by  systems  of  industrial  relations  and  labour 
market  regulation  within  particular  nations.  However,  as  carriers  seek  to  undermine 
labour  regulation  through  supranational  channels,  these  systems  will  often  be 
superseded. 
As  described  in  chapter  5,  it  is  not  enough  for  carriers  to  pursue  their  own  labour 
strategies  within  the  industry,  facing  the  resistance  of  organised  labour.  They 
increasingly  seek  to  escape  national  constraints,  confronting  labour  at  a  global  level. 
This  new  era  of  global  product  market  convergence  effectively  provides  a  re- 
regulation  of  the  product  market  on  the  basis  of  the  interests  of  the  dominant  firms 
whilst  deregulating  the  labour  market  and  allowing  these  firms  to  manage  and  control 
labour  costs  as  never  before.  Airline  workers  are  experiencing  trends  evident  in  other 
deregulated  industries  as  described  in  chapter  1.  Labour,  as  the  final  section 
indicated,  has  resisted  and  continues  to  resist.  In  particular,  through  industrial  action 
where  it  has  asserted  its  right  to  be  involved  in  the  restructuring  process.  However, 
labour  is  employing  more  long-term  strategies.  In  particular,  addressing  its  concerns 
through  international  trade  union  bodies  such  as  the  ITF  and  through  international 
trade  union  co-operation,  particularly  within  alliances.  Its  success  and  failure  is  very 
much  dependent  upon  its  strength  and  resources  which  vary  across  occupational 
groups.  Though  many  airline  workers  have  benefited  from  their  own  scarcity  and 
power,  the  new  environment  is  much  more  difficult  for  labour.  As  in  other  industries  a 
deepening  globalisation  presents  new  threats  and  challenges  for  organised  workers. 
295 Labour's  response  and  adaptation  to  this  emerging  regulatory  environment  will 
determine  the  landscape  of  the  airline  industry  beyond  the  millennium. 
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Conclusion 
In  the  opening  chapter  we  introduced  the  issue  of  deregulation,  with  the  argument  that 
whilst  the  policy  is  almost  always  publicly  justified  on  the  basis  of  allocative 
efficiency,  the  labour  market  often  assumes  great  importance.  Labour  market 
deregulation  occurs  because  the  state  not  only  withdraws  its  control  over  prices  and 
market  structure,  but  also  because  it  permits  a  regulatory  framework  conducive  to 
labour  market  reform.  That  is  one,  which  allows  the  re-regillation  of  the  product 
market  whilst  affording  management  the  scope  to  restructure  the  labour  market.  This 
is  often  though  indirectly,  a  consequence  of  decisions  made  in  the  regulatory  arena.  It 
was  demonstrated  that  in  the  case  of  UK  bus  deregulation,  the  state  fostered  a  market 
structure  which  favoured  the  largest  operators  and  allowed  them  to  acquire  their 
competitors.  Following  the  massive  wave  of  consolidation  and  merger,  labour  lost  out 
in  terms  of  wages,  and  conditions  and  witnessed  the  decline  of  collective  bargaining 
and  unionisation.  It  was  demonstrated  that  the  real  impact  of  regulatory  reform  in  the 
bus  industry  case  was  to  reduce  the  rents,  purported  to  accrue  to  labour.  Further 
evidence  for  this  was  provided  by  a  number  of  studies  including  US  trucking,  and  UK 
ports  and  utilities.  With  labour  weakened  and  with  its  bargaining  power  neutralised,  a 
general  attack  on  unionisation  and  collective  bargaining  took  place. 
Permissiveness  and  tolerance  of  concentration,  merger  and  market  dominance,  have 
effects  on  the  labour  market  as  was  argued  in  the  case  of  price  reform  within  US  rail 
freight.  Eventually  the  confluence  of  deregulation,  product  market  change  and 
regulatory  intervention/nonintervention,  change  the  labour  market  and  employment 
relationship.  In  the  US  it  was  not  just  the  deregulation  of  trucking,  but  state 
permissiveness  on  mergers  and  consolidation  which  broke  the  power  of  the 
Teamsters'  union  by  allowing  the  largest  firms  to  confront  organised  labour. 
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been  subjected  to  regulation,  and  then  deregulation  in  various  stages,  and  to  examine 
and  explain  the  developments  in  regulatory,  product  and  labour  market  change.  Such 
an  understanding  of  regulation  had  to  be  comparative  across  contrasting  economic 
and  political  systems,  and  it  was  therefore  decided  to  undertake  a  study  of  the  airline 
industry  in  both  the  US  and  Europe.  This  approach  provided  an  emerging  comparison 
of  the  interplay  between  the  forces  described. 
It  was  necessary  therefore  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  linkages  between 
regulatory,  product  and  labour  market  change.  How  did  the  state  enact  regulatory 
structures,  which  offered  capital  protected  markets,  free  from  excessive  competition, 
thus  protecting  prices?  How  were  labour's  interests  addressed  within  this  framework 
and  wider  legislation?  Thirdly,  did  labour  and  capital  pursue  their  interests  within 
recognised  constraints,  delimited  by  the  state's  own  desire  for  stability  and  growth?  In 
short  we  argued  that  under  regulation  capital  could  make  profits  whilst  labour  could 
bargain  freely  for  a  share  of  those  profits.  Thus  chapter  2  developed  an  analysis  of 
this  regulatory  cornpact  which  had  arisen  in  the  US  and  UK  airline  industries.  The 
chapter  demonstrated  how  the  state  encouraged  the  parties  at  various  stages  to  move 
from  positions  of  contestation,  towards  one  of  limited  contractual  co-operation, 
enforced  through  collective  bargaining  and  product  market  regulation.  So  whilst  in  the 
US  the  state  strengthened  the  hand  of  labour  through  the  legislation  of  the  New  Deal 
period  and  the  thorough  'technical'  regulations  such  as  Decision  83,  curtailing  the 
power  of  employers  in  the  process,  this  was  conditional.  It  did  not  hesitate  to  curb 
labour's  bargaining  power,  by  permitting  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact  of  1957,  when  it  judged 
labour's  action  detrimental  to  the  future  stability  of  the  industry. 
In  the  UK  the  state  was  seen  to  intervene  against  the  autocratic  management  of 
Imperial  Airways  by  providing  limited  bargaining  freedoms  to  labour,  whilst 
eventually  constraining  the  most  powerful  labour  groups  within  the  structures  of 
bargained  corporatism.  In  the  USA  firm  level  bargaining  took  place,  with  multiple 
unions  and  multiple  representation  for  occupational  groups.  This  benefited  workers 
with  industry  specific  skills  such  as  pilots  and  maintenance  personnel,  with  their 
potent  and  largely  un-fragmented  craft  bargaining  power.  In  Europe,  exemplified  by 
the  UK,  state  ownership  meant  national  level  bargaining,  often  with  a  single 
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procedurally-based  industrial  relations  institutions,  typiried  by  the  UK's  NJC  CAT. 
Within  that  framework  pilots  as  the  key  occupational  group  were  constrained  and 
limited,  although  the  structure  of  the  UK  industry  meant  that  when  they  decided  to 
exercise  their  power  the  disruption  would  be  much  more  immediate  and  widespread 
than  in  the  US.  The  state's  intervention  however  was  not  static.  The  state  reserved  its 
right  to  're-balance'  the  regulated  employment  relationship  when  it  saw  the  need  as 
occurred  with  the  Mutual  Aid  Pact  and  limited  market  entry  in  the  early  1970s,  and 
the  UK  government's  intervention  of  the  1970s. 
Having  analysed  the  nature  of  industrial  relations  and  collective  bargaining  within  the 
regulated  era,  a  more  grounded  understanding  of  what  transpired  in  the  de-regulated 
era  became  possible.  Having  seen  in  a  sense  what  went  before,  it  became  easier  to  put 
into  context  what  followed.  This  allows  the  focus  on  regulatory  change  to  be  located, 
not  as  a  novel  and  distinct  'event',  but  as  a  continuing  and  evolving  process. 
Chaptcr  4  therefore  examined  how  deregulation  affected  pilots  as  the  strongest  and 
most  organised  occupational  group.  Evidence  from  both  the  US  and  Europe  described 
the  experience  of  pilots  as  varied  and  complex.  Whilst  data  on  earnings  from  the  US 
show  that  pilots  suffered  falls  in  line  with  general  earnings,  this  data  can  be  compared 
with  other  evidence  which  charts  the  change  between  regulated  and  deregulated 
regimes  indicating  that  pilots  lost  out  significantly  in  the  short-term. 
The  earnings  and  employment  picture  and  thus  pilot  fortunes  on  the  bargaining  front 
were  examined.  Given  their  ability  to  maintain  protective  rules  on  scheduling  and 
their  long  run  ability  to  protect  wages,  pilots  made  tempting  targets  in  a  downturn. 
The  state's  refusal  to  implement  the  protective  clauses  in  the  Airline  Deregulation  Act 
of  1978  meant  that  it  was  almost  impossible  for  US  airline  labour  to  establish  a  link 
between  deregulation  and  specific  job  losses,  and  avoid  these  totally  as  first  hoped. 
It  is  easy  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  pilots  suffered  when  we  look  at  the  longer-term 
aggregated  earnings  data.  But  lose  ground  they  did,  largely  through  wage  freezes  and 
wage  cuts,  curtailment  of  pension  rights,  loss  of  health  benefits  and  a  raft  of  other 
concessions.  But  since  pilots  tended  to  recoup  their  losses  in  periods  of  expansion, 
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studies  such  as  that  by  Johnson  (1995).  Even  deep  cuts  in  wages  could  always  be  4-:  1 
recouped.  The  periodic  tightness  of  the  pilot  labour  market  made  it  difficult  for 
carriers  to  discipline  wage  expectations  with  two-tier  wages  in  any  case.  These  gains 
were  liable  to  swing  back  to  labour  in  better  times,  and  sometimes  as  in  the  case  of 
Northwest's  1998  contract  could  be  taken  back  with  interest.  Perhaps  more  important 
was  the  fact  that  pilots  managed  to  preserve  for  the  most  part  their  restrictive  work 
rules  on  crewing  and  scheduling.  This  rendered  negotiations  an  ever-receding  horizon 
for  airline  management,  and  encouraged  a  new  approach  towards  restructuring 
characterised  by  ESOPs.  Arguably  the  quantum  shift  came  with  the  United  Airline's 
deal,  whereby  labour,  particularly  pilots,  agreed  to  increased  productivity  and  lower 
earnings  in  exchange  for  participation  in  the  management  of  the  carrier.  Whilst  they 
continued  to  try  and  influence  regulatory  policy  it  seems  that  in  the  US  at  least  pilots 
were  seeking  to  develop  their  influence  within  the  firm. 
In  Europe  we  noted  that  regulation  and  a  'negotiated'  deregulatory  environment  was 
blamed  for  the  fact  that  pilots  delivered  lower  relative  productivity  and  enjoyed  higher 
relative  wages  than  their  US  counterparts.  The  productive  hours  and  utilisation  of 
European  pilots  were  lower  due  in  part  to  differences  in  route  structure,  and  stage 
length.  Nevertheless,  many  ascribed  this  to  the  persistence  of  state  ownership  and 
attendant  rent  sharing.  In  a  sense  this  aspect  revisited  the  discussion  initiated  in 
chapter  1,  where  the  usual  rent  seeking  explanation  that  labour  profits  under 
regulation,  and  then  loses  under  deregulation,  was  seen  as  inadequate.  It  was  stressed 
that  we  had  to  look  both  at  countries  and  sectors,  and  at  differences  both  between  and 
within  occupational  groups.  Thus  there  was  evidence  from  both  the  US  and  Europe  of 
pressure  on  pilot  pay  and  benefits  from  the  entrance  of  low  cost  carriers,  the  creation 
of  regional  operations  and  the  extension  of  franchising. 
The  pattern  was  very  much  set  by  US  experience.  Non-union  entry  provided  a  cost 
comparison  against  which  management  could  benchmark  costs  within  the  majors.  The 
major  carriers  introduced  limited  two  tier  wage  levels  and  modified  work  rules  to 
counteract  the  low  cost  threat.  By  allowing  bankrupt  carriers  only  to  service  their 
debts,  and  to  break  their  contractual  obligations  on  wages  and  conditions,  the  state 
strengthened  the  hand  of  employers. 
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recouped  losses  suffered  in  the  earlier  period.  However,  the  state  left  the  machinery  of 
the  Railway  Labour  Act  intact;  its  refusal  to  deal  with  the  consequences  of  the 
regulatory  environment  allowing  employers  the  upper  hand.  In  that  sense  the  state 
recognised  the  need  for  carriers  to  restructure  their  labour  costs  in  the  light  of 
deregulation  and  provided  a  regulatory  framework  tolerance  of  bankruptcy  and 
permissiveness  on  concentration,  which  allowed  carriers  to  focus  on  labour  costs.  In 
Europe,  whilst  deregulation  has  not  been  as  precipitate  as  the  US,  arguably 
management's  response  has  been  more  pronounced.  As  carriers  respond  to 
deregulation  and  the  entry  of  new  carriers  they  develop  cost  reduction  strategies.  Low 
yield  services  are  spun  out  and  expansion  in  these  markets  is  procured  by  policies  of 
external  growth,  namely  franchising.  The  effect  of  such  low  cost  policies  was  shown 
when  UK  pilot  salaries  were  related  to  the  salaries  of  both  low  cost  subsidiaries  and 
franchise  carriers.  As  in  the  USA  European  pilots,  particularly  those  at  the  state 
owned  carriers,  have  faced  demands  for  wage  cuts,  and  work  rule  changes.  This  is  due 
to  the  withdrawal  of  state  aid  and  the  threat  of  new  entrants  especially  after  the 
liberalisation  of  intra-European  services  in  1996.  However  given  the  considerable 
bargaining  power,  which  pilots  even  in  weakened  state  carriers  continue  to  hold, 
many  of  these  strikes  have  ended  in  stalemate.  Often  restructuring  occurs  with  equity 
based  concession  as  witnessed  at  Air  France,  Alitalia  and  a  number  of  other  European 
carriers.  At  the  same  time  pilots  in  Europe  have  rather  adeptly  moved  towards 
bargaining  with  supranational  authorities,  sensing  that  it  is  here  and  not  within 
individual  airlines,  major  decisions  affecting  their  livelihoods  are  made.  Thus  the 
lobbying  of  the  European  pilot  unions  over  the  introduction  of  more  relaxed 
regulatory  rules  on  cockpit  hours,  a  measure  which  would  have  cut  across  national 
jurisdictions,  indicates  this  desire  to  continue  to  seek  influence  where  it  can  best  be 
used.  Looking  at  both  the  USA  and  Europe  therefore  the  picture  is  mixed.  Pilots 
continue  to  enjoy  the  strength  of  their  unique  disruptive  capability,  though  are  unable 
to  resist  all  of  the  changes  being  introduced,  but  they  retain  significant  bargaining 
power,  though  the  costs  of  their  taking  action  are  higher  than  under  a  regulated/state 
controlled  environment.  We  analysed  these  changes  in  terms  of  the  competitive 
disengagement  nwdel  of  restructuring.  In  essence  the  withdrawal  of  the  state  in  both 
nations  had  fairly  major  consequences  for  pilots,  but  long-run  sustained  demand  for 
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been  some  tailing  off  in  wage  levels  it  is  not  clear  that  this  describes  a  long-term 
trend.  The  experience  of  the  US  industry  suggests  that  pilots  will  sustain  their 
earnings  and  protect  many  of  their  work  rules.  The  environment  in  which  they  are 
attempting  to  do  this  is  however  a  more  hostile  one  and  concessions  have  come 
because  pilots  have  been  convinced  of  their  necessity  in  the  face  of  a  transformed 
industry  environment. 
Pilots,  as  we  have  noted,  are  specialised  labour  and  the  analysis  of  them  in  both  the 
regulated  and  deregulated  periods  is  intended  to  indicate  what  happens  to  the  most 
powerful  labour  group  within  the  industry.  To  understand  what  happened  to  workers 
generally  it  is  necessary  to  look  at  the  outcome  for  less  powerful  occupational  groups. 
Those  workers  who  did  not  have  the  skill  premium  or  bargaining  power  of  pilots  were 
interesting  for  a  number  of  reasons.  These  workers  continue  to  enjoy  a  significant 
earnings  premium  above  comparable  workers  in  outside  industry.  Workers develop 
the  expectation  favoured  by  long  run  state  involvement  and  the  prestige,  which  often 
attaches  to  airline  jobs  that  these  premium  wages  are  part  of  the  package  of  working 
in  civil  air  transport.  This  perception  is heightened  when  those  workers  are  employed 
within  large  and  profitable  airlines.  One  of  the  reasons  why  workers  have  resisted  the 
demands  for  lower  wage  levels  greater  productivity  and  more  flexible  working 
practices  is  that  they  cling  to  the  employment  contract  of  the  regulated  period.  Thus 
expectations  of  the  labour  contract  under  deregulation  are  informed  by  past 
experience,  this  phenomenon  is  identified  by  the  author  as  the  regulatory  overhang. 
This  is  especially  relevant  when  the  carrier  has  been  state  owned,  where  premium 
terms  and  conditions  apply  for  all  industries.  In  order  to  investigate  this  it  was  decided 
focus  on  a  case  study  of  a  large  successful  carrier,  which  had  demonstrated  long  run 
profitability,  on  the  basis  of  post  deregulation  expansion,  from  a  history  of  state 
ownership.  British  Airways  fulfilled  that  criteria  and  chapters  5  and  6  formed  the 
core  of  this  case  study  into  the  concept  of  the  regulatory  overhang.  This  involved  a 
large-scale  questionnaire  survey  of  general  occupations  within  the  industry  in  order  to 
determine  the  extent  of  the  overhang. 
In  chapter  5  the  case  study  was  contextualised  with  a  brief  description  of  the  post 
privatisation  history  of  British  Airways.  It  was  argued  that  the  carrier  was  privatised 
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network  and  domination  of  the  world's  principal  international  hub  allowed  expansion. 
Management  strategy  at  that  time  eniphasised  customer  service  and  quality.  Within 
such  a  framework  trade  unionism  and  collective  bargaining  were  tolerated,  though  the 
culture  change  programme  attempted  to  niarginalise  these  perceived  hangovers  of 
national  i  sat  ion.  This  had  no  lasting  effect  on  trade  union  organisation  per  se  as  strong 
union  representation  existed  at  other  levels  of  the  organisation.  Wages  increased  and 
terms  and  conditions  were  preserved  largely  intact.  The  carrier  profited  from  its 
ability  to  undertake  growth  in  key  expanding  markets,  and  to  acquire  the  routes  and 
equipment  of  UK  competitors.  In  this  period  product  market  deregulation  was 
confined  to  mutually  negotiated  bilateral  pacts,  and  the  carrier's  major  hub  was 
protected  from  further  encroachment.  Competition  consisted  mainly  of  weakened  US 
carriers  with  poor  service  reputations  although  all  of  this  changed  as  chapter  5 
indicated.  The  replacement  of  weakened  US  carriers  by  vibrant  and  profitable  ones, 
and  the  presence  of  Virgin  Atlantic,  was  accompanied  by  the  entry  of  low  cost 
domestic  airlines.  To  adjust  to  this  new  product  environment  the  carrier  began  to  re- 
evaluate  its  operations,  involving  several  pronounced  changes  in  labour  conditions. 
Firstly,  the  understanding  on  national  wages  and  conditions  and  the  unified  firm  focus 
was  broken  by  the  creation  of  regional  business  units  and  franchising.  By  about  1994 
competition  from  a  new  breed  of  low  cost,  non-union  carrier,  typified  by  the  Luton 
based  Easyjet,  began  to  demonstrate  the  possibility  of  a  lower  cost  base.  The  working 
practices  of  these  carriers  were  characterised  by  a  high  incidence  of  seasonal  and 
atypical  contracts,  short  training  periods  and  wages  reflecting  external  'market  rates.  ' 
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Secondly,  the  presence  of  low  cost  carriers  forced  management  to  look  at  the  way  in 
which  labour  was  utilised  within  the  airline,  and  to  radically  re-evaluate  the  cost  base, 
in  particular  the  wage  premia  accruing  to  most  BA  workers.  Labour  however  was  still 
wedded  to  the  unified  firin  focus,  full  time  work,  premium  earnings  and  a 
commitment  to  company  wide  collective  bargaining.  What  then  would  be  its  view  of 
such  changes?  The  survey  was  designed  to  look  at  all  of  these  issues  and  to  ascertain 
employee  attitudes.  Having  been  conducted  amongst  unionised  workers  in  thd 
Autumn  of  1996  when  attitudes  on  new  employment  polices  and  management 
strategies  apparent  since  the  early  1990s  had  had  time  to  permeate,  the  survey 
provided  a  timely  insight  into  change  within  BA. 
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cases  unionised  workers  in  the  survey  sample  opposed  BA's  policies  to  procure  low 
cost  services  across  regional  and  European  services.  The  results  were  similar  for 
workers  based  in  the  regions  and  those  based  at  the  main  bases.  Another  set  of 
questions  sought  the  view  of  unionised  workers  on  the  extension  of  part-time  work. 
BA  is  seeking  temporal  flexibility  in  order  to  service  peaks  and  troughs  in  demand 
efficiently.  The  responses  here  were  equally  negative  indicating  that  such  workers  see 
the  extension  of  such  working  practices  as  a  threat  to  the  premium  terms  and 
conditions  enjoyed  by  BA  workers,  who  lead  the  UK  industry  in  terms  of 
remuneration  and  working  conditions.  The  issue  of  outsourcing  and  other  contentious 
issues  of  the  period  were  also  addressed  in  the  survey.  The  issue  was  viewed  in  terms 
of  how  workers  would  see  being  separated  from  the  unified  firm,  as  exploratory 
interviews  had  shown  general  and  predictable  hostility  to  outsourcing.  Outsourcing 
often  took  place  during  the  survey  period  and  since,  under  the  threat  of  the  airline 
withdrawing  completely  from  many  activities.  The  unionised  workforce  rejected  this 
'core/periphery  airline'  concept.  When  asked  what  aspects  of  working  for  BA  would 
be  missed  in  the  event  of  outsourcing,  they  provided  some  interesting  responses. 
Most  important  in  terms  of  worker  ranking  was  the  job  security  of  working  for  a  large 
airline,  followed  by  the  protection  of  national  terms  and  conditions  and  the  protection 
of  trade  union  agreements.  Interestingly  the  more  unitarist  statement  1he  common 
purpose  of  working  exclusively  for  BA'  was  ranked  highest  by  only  half  of 
respondents.  This  indicates  that  the  terms,  conditions,  and  job  security,  all  of  which 
can  be  traced  back  to  the  regulated  era,  are  uppermost  in  workers'  minds,  providing 
more  evidence  of  the  regulatory  overhang. 
However  the  regulatory  overhang  is  not  a  permanent  effect,  it  can  be  and  is  modified 
by  the  competitive  environment.  At  the  time  of  the  survey,  BA  was  adjusting  to  a  new 
globalised  environment.  Over  a  third  of  respondents  supported  the  statement  that  cost 
reduction  should  be  seen  as  the  overriding  priority,  and  three  quarters  supported  the 
strategy  of  'increasing  productivity  as  much  as  possible.  '  High  levels  of  support  were 
indicated  for  ending  state  aid  to  BA  competitors,  taking  over  and  acquiring  other 
airlines  and  building  alliances  with  other  carriers.  There  was  little  support  for  the 
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globalisation  policies  were  operationalised  into  specific  statements  about 
employment,  a  different  picture  emerged. 
A  significant  proportion  believed  that  globalisation  would  lead  to  reduced  job 
security,  specifically  moving  jobs  to  low  labour  cost  nations.  These  misgivings  were 
then  translated  into  direct  effects  on  the  jobs  of  the  respondents.  Thus  the  majority  felt 
that  such  polices  would  lead  to  reduced  wages  and  benefits.  In  addition,  a  lower 
number  believed  that  it  would  lead  to  reduced  allowances  and  shift  payments.  This 
was  similar  across  the  two  principal  trade  unions  covered:  the  TGWU  and  the  AEEU. 
Given  the  importance  of  collective  bargaining  and  national  level  negotiation  in 
preserving  aspects  of  the  regulatory  overhang  a  final  set  of  questions  looked  at 
employee  perceptions  of  the  proposed  abolition  of  national  collective  bargaining.  The 
majority  of  respondents  felt  that  unions  would  be  marginalised,  that  workers  would  be 
under  the  constant  threat  of  outsourcing  and  franchising,  that  management  would 
bypass  trade  unions,  and  that  pay  and  conditions  would  be  negatively  affected.  Most 
were  sceptical  that  there  would  be  any  positive  outcome.  The  existence  of  national 
level,  or  in  BA's  case  company  wide,  collective  bargaining  is  in  a  sense  the 
institutional  lynchpin  of  the  regulated  compact,  something  which  BA  explicitly 
recognised  when  they  tried  to  abolish  it  in  1996.  The  process  of  national  bargaining 
was  seen  to  guarantee  all  the  benefits  that  accrued  since  regulation,  and  which 
workers  wish  to  retain.  Thus,  the  perceptions  of  general  employees  are  revealed  in  the 
survey  to  be  influenced  by  the  past  regulatory  compact  and  the  bargaining 
environment  that  accompanied  it. 
Having  established  the  regulatory  overhang  and  management  attempts  to  undermine 
it  within  the  British  airline  industry  it  then  became  necessary  to  investigate  trends 
within  Europe.  Thus,  chapter  7  looked  at  how  European  airline  management  has 
responded  to  the  deregulated  environment  in  its  own  attempts  to  force  change. 
European  airline  workers  had  enjoyed  wages  high  above  external  industry,  and 
nationalised  and  Southern  European  carriers  in  particular  enjoyed  this  protection 
above  others.  The  resilience  of  the  Airline  Wage  Premium  (AWP)  was  indicated  in 
the  case  of  the  UK  where  despite  ten  years  of  privatisation  and  deregulation  the 
premium  for  workers  in  air  transport  has  remained  high  and  stable,  outstripping 
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vulnerability  of  these  premium  terms  and  conditions  was  demonstrated  in  our  analysis 
of  management  strategy  within  Europe.  We  saw  that  airlines  were  seeking  wage  cuts 
and  work  rule  changes  as  in  the  US,  but  in  many  cases  going  much  further.  A  new 
pattern  of  industry  organisation  based  on  the  procurement  of  low  cost  in  service 
provision  and  competitiveness  in  core  airline  services  threatened  airline  labour  in 
Europe.  Certain  occupational  groups  such  as  ground  and  support  staff  were  more 
vulnerable  to  these  strategies  than  others  such  as  engineers  and  pilots.  In  order  to 
examine  the  process  of  restructuring  within  Europe  we  utilised  the  labour  nuirket 
restnictitring  model.  This  indicated  that  particularly  in  the  case  of  Southern  European 
carriers  such  as  Alitalia  and  Iberia,  restructuring  was  premised  on  a  need  to  confront 
the  power  of  organised  labour.  Detailed  case  studies  of  Air  France,  Alitalia,  and 
Lufthansa  indicated  the  product  and  labour  market  constraints  faced  by  these  carriers, 
and  the  different  approaches  towards  restructuring.  It  was  argued  that  quite  often  the 
tactical  deficiencies  of  senior  management  exacerbated  conflict  and  provoked  an 
inevitable  reaction.  Nevertheless,  European  airline  workers  faced  a  major  challenge  as 
the  industry  began  to  restructure  based  on  a  global  product  market  and  regulatory 
regime.  The  search  for  market  rates  as  labour  cost  become  central  saw  a  concerted 
attempt  to  erode  the  airline  premium,  as  chapter  7  indicated. 
Chapter  7  demonstrated  the  tortuous  nature  of  deregulation  and  labour  market 
change  in  Europe,  and  the  difficulties  carriers  face  in  confronting  organised  labour 
within  individual  nations  and  airlines.  Chapter  8  demonstrates  how  labour's  capacity 
to  resist  is  being  undermined  by  a  process  of  global  product  market  convergence. 
Firstly,  the  emerging  industry  pattern  of  consolidation  and  merger  allows  carriers  to 
attain  economies  of  scale  and  scope,  allowing  ongoing  labour  cost  reduction. 
Secondly,  the  entry  of  low  cost  carriers  allowed  cost  comparisons  with  unionised  and 
state  carriers,  and  thus  a  downward  pressure  on  labour  costs.  Thirdly,  a  process  of 
industry  restructuring  around  core  strategies  of  network  management  and  service 
provision  has  allowed  ancillary  services  to  be  divorced  form  core  airline  operations. 
Fourthly,  a  related  pattern  of  alliances  and  collaboration  is  allowing  carriers  the  scope 
to  procure  cost  options  over  a  wide  range  of  carriers  and  affords  the  possibility  for 
cost  containment  on  the  basis  of  yield.  All  of  these  aspects  of  global  product  market 
convergence  negatively  impact  upon  the  terms  and  conditions  of  airline  labour. 
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regulators  to  pursue  supply  side  reforms  in  the  labour  market,  whilst  remaining 
largely  tolerant  of  industry  consolidation.  The  state,  with  a  new  goal  of  fostering 
national  and  supranational  champions,  is  increasingly  supporting  carrier  pressure  for 
labour  market  reform.  The  development  of  alliances  presents  regulators  with  the 
conundrum  of  how  to  regulate  without  inhibiting  the  growth  of  strong  regional 
alliance  partners.  The  aim  of  most  regulators  is  to  nurture  their  own  horne  based 
carriers  into  alliance  networks  and  to  aid  them  in  assuming  dominance.  Increasingly 
domestic  competition  and  market  access  have  come  second  to  the  projection  of  that 
global  strength.  In  Europe  the  regulatory  permissiveness  of  large  scale  alliances  and 
policies  on  state  aid  and  restructuring  have  allowed  airline  management  to  restructure 
the  labour  market.  These  measures,  which  allow  deep  restructuring  of  costs  and  large 
improvements  in  productivity,  are  designed  quite  literally  to  fatten  'moribund'  state 
airlines  for  the  alliance  market.  Once  integrated  into  the  alliance  networks  their  role  is 
unclear,  although  their  routes  and  functions  are  likely  to  be  rationalised. 
Since  many  of  the  protections  labour  enjoys  are  nested  within  specific  local  labour 
market  arrangements,  and  labour  tends  to  be  strong  and  combative,  a  new  approach 
has  been  adopted  towards  confronting  labour  within  alliances.  Thus  the  push  towards 
harmonisation  and  a  level  playing  field  is  designed  in  effect  to  level  specific  national 
labour  market  conditions,  which  protect  airline  labour.  The  deregulation  of  ground 
handling  arrangements  and  the  creeping  harmonisation  of  flight  crew  duty  hours  and 
licensing  requirements  is  fundamentally,  and  at  root,  an  attempt  to  circumvent  the 
effect  of  national  labour  market  regulation.  This  is  not  to  say  that  labour  has  been 
quiescent  or  complacent  in  that  process. 
We  noted  how  labour  was  able  to  influence  that  process  through  industrial  action. 
Despite  platitudinous  statements  that  nobody  wins  in  a  strike  situation,  clearly  airline 
workers  have  gained  from  deploying  that  tactic.  This  is  the  case  whether  unions 
operate  within  first  mover  or  late  adapting  carriers,  because  the  issues  under  dispute 
though  similar  are  often  simply  at  different  stages.  It  is  perhaps  surprising,  that  pilots 
who  have  the  most  industry  specific  skills  and  the  most  human  capital  invested  in  the 
airline  industry  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  disputes  and  threatened  disputes,  but  they 
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just  through  strike  action.  Unions  are  increasingly  taking  to  the  road  of  cross  union 
collaboration,  building  alliances  within  and  between  occupational  groups  to  push 
forward  the  labour  agenda.  International  federations  have  long  existed  but  new  times 
in  the  industry  have  re-vitalised  them.  Labour  is  also  to  a  large  degree  at  least 
tactically  and  strategically  co-operating  with  airline  management,  as  both  face  a 
hostile  environment.  Often  this  works  best  when  it  occurs  against  a  background  of 
traditional  industrial  relations,  and  when  some  form  of  participation  is  involved  be  it 
employee  equity,  board  representation  or  forms  of  ownership  and  governance.  At 
United  airlines  and  a  range  of  other  North  American  operators,  ESOPS  have  been 
used  to  motivate  employees  into  concessions.  Whilst  legal,  political  and  institutional 
obstacles  prevent  widespread  ESOP  type  solutions  in  Europe,  other  forms  of 
management/employee  co-determination  exist  there.  Lufthansa  with  its  supervisory 
board  and  labour  direct  strategic  and  corporate  involvement  has  to  an  extent  managed 
to  square  the  restructuring  circle.  Aer  Lingus,  long  written  off  as  a  'basket  case" 
airline  hobbled  by  excessive  labour  market  regulation  and  government  interference, 
has  made  a  steady  if  not  entirely  pain  free  advance  from  state  controlled  chaos  to  state 
shepherded  transformation.  Labour  has  been  fully  involved  and  included  in  that 
profoundly  corporatist  partnership  process. 
At  the  root  of  restructuring  and  transformation  within  the  industry  is  a  simple  but  key 
issue.  Labour  needs  some  say  in  theTuture  shape  and  structure  of  the  airline  industry; 
alliances  cannot  and  should  not  be  made  above  the  heads  of  workers  in  the  industry. 
Undoubtedly,  the  persistence  of  the  'regulatory  overhang'  in  the  expectations  of  airline 
workers  means  that  in  most  airlines,  workers  will  initially  resist  restructuring.  But  the 
evidence  indicates  that  workers  accept  the  need  for  change,  recognising  the  changed 
environment  and  the  fact  that  national  protections  and  previous  competitive 
advantages  cannot  be  retained.  If  firms  can  collaborate  and  influence  regulator 
policy,  then  workers  and  their  trade  unions  should  be  allowed  to  do  the  same.  Key 
labour  groups  have  demonstrated  that  they  have  enormous  power  to  disrupt  even 
within  the  new  regulatory  framework.  As  the  industry  emerges  towards  a  global 
structure  of  inter-firm  collaboration  tempting  management  into  rationalisation  on  the 
basis  of  labour  costs,  unions  will  seek  influence.  Without  a  seat  at  the  regulatory 
table,  labour  is  developing  its  own  methods  of  cross  national  influence  and  solidarity. 
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across  the  industry  (Gill  (2)  1998:  16).  Only  a  framework  of  regulation,  which 
involves  all  parties,  can  and  will  avoid  this. 
With  the  vesting  of  enormous  power  in  the  hands  of  the  major  airlines,  there  is  need 
for  a  system  of  regulation  and  restructuring,  which  respects  the  commercial  freedom 
of  carriers,  but  involves  labour  as  a  stakeholder.  The  consequences  of  labour's 
estrangement  are  seen  in  the  various  strikes  and  disputes  at  Air  France  and  British 
Airways.  Both  episodes  show  that  even  where  management  has  the  institutional 
freedom  to  pursue  its  interests  to  the  end,  it  is  always  constrained.  BA  could  use  the 
UK's  employment  laws  to  dismiss  striking  cabin  crew  but  did  not.  The  implications 
for  morale,  commitment  and  thus  service  quality  were  probably  the  most  important 
constraint  on  this  action.  In  Air  France,  though  the  unions  have  the  law  on  their  side 
they  have  not  completely  defeated  the  company's  restructuring  plan.  Partly  this  is 
because  the  weakness  of  Air  France's  position  in  the  airline  market.  The  unions  are 
aware  that  with  the  removal  of  state  subsidy  and  the  protection  of  'cosy'  bilateral 
agreements  future  job  security  is  under  threat. 
In  the  US  which  was  'first  mover'  in  the  deregulation  process  the  fortunes  of  labour 
have  settled  down.  Pilots  at  Northwest,  as  we  discussed,  have  effectively  eliminated 
two  tier  wage  scales  and  secured  a  12  per  cent  increase  over  the  four-year  contract. 
An  important  aspect  of  the  strike  was  the  internationally  co-ordinated  support  from 
KLM  pilots  who  refused  to  operate  Northwest  flights  and  the  support  of  other  pilot 
groups.  This  is  yet  another  indication  that  labour  deserves  and  demands  to  be  listened 
to,  and  increasingly  labour  is  asserting  that  right  in  various  ways.  When  pilots  at  Delta 
vetoed  a  code  share  with  United  Airlines,  believing  this  would  lead  the  carrier  into  a 
subordinate  role,  they  were  expressing  their  misgivings  about  a  regulatory  system, 
which  allows  carriers  great  freedom  of  action,  and  potentially  threatens  jobs  and 
conditions.  (Gill  1998  :  11.  )  Labour  therefore  needs  to  be  involved  in  the  regulatory 
process,  not  in  a  partial  or  technical  role,  but  as  a  key  stakeholder  within  the  industry. 
This  approach  is  a  long  way  off,  but  not  impossible.  Without  labour's  involvement  on 
issues  such  as  cabin  crew  licensing  and  flight  duty  limitations  only  airline  employers' 
voices  will  be  heard.  The  regulatory  process  has  already  provided  the  framework  for 
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of  labour  right  to  participate  would  begin  to  bring  labour  into  that  process  also. 
Suggestions  for  Future  Research 
One  of  the  principal  findings  of  the  thesis  was  the  persistence  of  a  regulatory 
overhang  in  terms  of  the  expectations  of  airline  workers.  It  was  clear  from  the  BA 
survey  that  this  would  continue  to  frustrate  attempts  to  restructure  the  airline  industry. 
Future  research  should  try  to  measure  this  more  definitively  and  analyse  it  over  time. 
The  importance  of  the  case  study  approach  was  shown  in  the  analysis  of  British 
Airways.  The  author  would  suggest  six  principal  directions  for  future  research  in 
airline  employment.  Firstly,  more  case  studies  and  qualitative  investigations  are 
needed.  This  will  allow  the  full  depth  and  extent  of  employment  relations  to  be 
understood,  allowing  research  to  get  beyond  the  aggregates  and  headlines,  which  tend 
to  characterise  the  field.  78  Secondly,  there  is  a  need  for  data  to  be  collected  on  the 
goals  and  aspirations  of  airline  unions.  An  international  survey  on  restructuring  and 
labour  issues  was  conducted  for  the  International  Transport  Workers'  Federation  as 
part  of  the  same  project.  Thirdly,  whilst  there  has  been  a  great  deal  of  concern  within 
airline  industry  circles  about  the  impact  of  alliances  upon  competition  and  market 
structure,  it  would  be  timely  to  conduct  a  study  of  the  employment  impact.  The 
incidence  of  crew  sharing  and  facilities  pooling  has  had  limited  effect  but 
employment  impacts  can  be  expected  in  the  future.  Fourthly,  work  needs  to  be  done 
on  the  micro-level  interactions  between  firms  and  labour  markets  in  the  airline 
industry,  particularly  in  respect  of  the  spread  of  outsourcing  and  franchising.  What 
sorts  of  contracting  and  employment  relationships  are  airlines  hoping  to  develop? 
How  sustainable  are  these  from  the  point  of  view  of  employee  commitment  and 
motivation?  Is  the  'virtual  airline'  no  more  than  a  concept,  a  consultant's  dream,  or 
are  management  actively  seeking  to  pursue  such  strategies?  Will  the  policy  witnessed 
in  both  the  USA  and  Europe  of  'de-structuring'  areas  such  as  cabin  crew  and  ground 
handling  by  the  introduction  of  temporary  contract  and  tiered  wage  structures,  lead  to 
adverse  effects  on  quality? 
78  The  author  is  jointly  involved  in  a  four  case  comparison  funded  by  the  Leverhulme  Foundation  and 
based  at  Cardiff  Business  School,  to  investigate  developments  in  employment  and  restructuring  in  four 
major  European  carriers. 
310 In  this  regard,  research  needs  to  be  carried  out  on  the  low  cost  sector  and  the  premium 
sector  given  the  latter's  tendency  to  subcontract  most  functions.  How  do  such  carriers 
manage  without  unions  and  collective  bargaining?  To  what  extent  are  major  airlines 
following  suit?  In  addition  there  is  a  need  for  research  on  the  increasing  use  of 
financial  participation  in  the  global  airline  industry.  Are  workers  being  given  shares  in 
a  depreciating  asset,  in  the  hope  that  they  will  trade  wages  and  work  rules;  are 
structures  genuinely  participatory  or  merely  using  labour  for  concessions?  Do  such 
policies  offer  an  optimum  restructuring  strategy  in  weak  state  airlines?  Finally  the 
thesis  has  shown  that  the  airline  industry  is  developing  an  increasingly  global  focus,  it 
would  therefore  be  worthwhile  for  researchers  to  address  the  implications  of  these 
trends  for  bargaining  and  industrial  relations.  Will  global  collective  bargaining 
develop  across  alliances?  Will  there  be  global  benchmarking  of  wages  and  conditions 
within  alliance  groups?  How  and  in  what  ways  can  labour  influence  these 
developments?  These  questions  and  issues  suggest  a  research  and  policy  agenda  for 
airline  labour  relations,  which  is  distinct  from  costs  and  productivity.  Though 
neglected  in  the  European  literature  to  date,  the  airline  industry  is  a  complex  and 
fascinating  sector,  two  adjectives,  which  describe  why  industrial  relations  scholars 
should  be  addressing  it  in  greater  numbers.  The  author  hopes  to  have  provided  some 
encouragement  to  that  endeavour,  by  developing  an  analysis  of  the  industrial  relations 
and  regulatory  environment  of  the  industry. 
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